Proponents of evolutionary psychology take the existence of humanuniversals to constitute decisive evidence in favor of their view. Ifthe same social norms are found in culture after culture, we have goodreason to believe that they are innate, they argue. In this paper Ipropose an alternative explanation for the existence of humanuniversals, which does not depend on them being the product of inbuiltpsychological adaptations. Following the work of Brian Skyrms, I suggestthat if a particular convention possesses even a very small (...) advantageover competitors, whatever the reason for that advantage, we shouldexpect it to become the norm almost everywhere. Tiny advantages aretranslated into very large basins of attraction, in the language of gametheory. If this is so, universal norms are not evidence for innatepsychological adaptations at all. Having shown that the existence ofuniversals is consistent with the so-called Standard Social ScienceModel, I turn to a consideration of the evidence, to show that thisstyle of explanation is preferable to the evolutionary explanation, atleast with regard to patterns of gender inequality. (shrink)

Whether one's interests lie in psychological practice, counseling, research, or the classroom, psychologists today must deal with a broad range of ethical issues--from charging fees to maintaining a client's confidentiality, and from conducting research to respecting clients, colleagues, and students. Now in a new edition, Ethics in Psychology, the most widely read and cited ethics textbook in psychology, considers many of the ethical questions and dilemmas that psychologists encounter in their everyday practice, research, and teaching. The book has (...) been completely updated in response to evolving trends in psychological research and practice, as well as extensive changes in the American Psychological Association's ethics code. Taking a practical, common sense approach to ethics in modern-day psychological practice, this useful book offers constructive means for both preventing problems and resolving ethical predicaments. This new edition retains the key features which have contributed to its popularity, including extensive case studies that provide illustrative guidance on a wide variety of topics, such as fee setting, advertising for clients, research ethics, sexual attraction, classroom ethics, managed care issues, confidentiality, and much more. Highly readable, the book unites an accessible style with humorous anecdotes that highlight the human side of ethics and make the book a pleasure to read. Ethics in Psychology will be an indispensable guide to ethical decision-making for all psychologists and students in psychology. (shrink)

There is a growing body of global research demonstrating the significance of mental health to individuals’ overall happiness and productivity. The research evidence has encouraged governmental agencies in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to divert more attention toward the provision and development of mental health services. As the sector grows, one of the first issues of concern is the adherence to a unified set of ethics of practice. The purpose of this paper is to present and discuss the existing ethical (...) codes of conduct relevant to the mental health profession in the unique context of the UAE. Specifically, this discussion will focus on the interaction of cultural factors with the ethical standards of confidentiality, informed consent, and multiple relationships. This paper provides an initial reference for researchers and practitioners to explore regional issues of ethical standards in mental health services. (shrink)

Psychologists today must deal with a broad range of ethical issues--from charging fees to maintaining a client's confidentiality, and from conducting research to respecting clients, colleagues, and students. As the field of psychology has grown in size and scope, the role of ethics has become more important and complex whether the psychologist is involved in teaching, counseling, research, or practice. Now this most widely read and cited ethics text in psychology has been revised to reflect the ethics questions (...) and dilemmas that psychologists encounter in their everyday work. Ethics in Psychology has been completely updated in response to evolving trends in psychological research and practice, as well as extensive changes in the American Psychological Association's ethics code. Gerald P. Koocher and Patricia Keith-Spiegel take a practical, commonsense approach to ethics in modern-day psychological practice, and offer constructive suggestions for both preventing problems and resolving ethical predicaments. In this book, their main intent is to present the full range of contemporary ethical issues in psychology as not only relevant and intriguing, but also as integral and unavoidable aspects of the profession. The authors make extensive use of actual case studies in order to illustrate how the APA guidelines apply to specific situations, such as fee setting, advertising for clients, research ethics, sexual attraction, classroom ethics, managed care issues, confidentiality, and much more. The most recent ethics code of the American Psychological Association (1992) is used here only as a starting point. The authors go well beyond the APA code and incorporate the input of many experts. In addition to the analysis of a wide variety of general situations, new problematic areas are identified and explored. The book includes two appendixes - Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct, adopted by American Psychological Association, Rules and Procedures of the Ethics Committee of the American Psychological Association - both in an easy-to-use format. In addition, each chapter lists summary guidelines along with current and valuable references. Highly readable, the book unites a straightforward, lively writing style with humorous anecdotes that highlight the human side of ethics and make the book a pleasure to read. Ethics in Psychology will be an indispensable guide to ethical decision-making for all psychologists and students in psychology. (shrink)

The paper focuses on exploring sources and aims of evolutionary psychology, on how its representatives devlope their own approaches in opposition to the Standard social science model. Evolutionary psychology is in favor of functionally specia_lized and/or domain-specific mechanisms in the architecture of the human mind as it evolved in the course of evolution. Such evolution is the point emphasized by evolutionary psychology. Attention is also given to the implications the domain-specific architecture might have for culture. In the (...) final section the author outlines his own standpoint concerning evolutionary psychology, attempting to temper the antagonism between it and the Standard social science model. (shrink)

Ethical training in graduate programs is an important part of the professional development process. Such training has taken a position of prominence in both counseling and clinical psychology but seems to be lagging behind in the field of sport psychology. A debate exists about whether such training is necessary and, if so, how it should be provided. An important step in better understanding these issues is to identify how such training is currently taking place. This study surveyed the (...) program directors of sport psychology programs listed in the Directory of Graduate Programs in Applied Sport Psychology about the ethical training that takes place in their programs and their perceptions of the preparedness of the students in their programs. Of those contacted, 54% responded to the e-mail based survey. The results from these respondents indicated that 64.4% of programs require training in ethics and that the training was most commonly integrated into other nonethics courses. Overall, respondents did not feel as if students were completely prepared for either the ethical or legal issues that they will face in their professional careers. The importance of ethical training and suggestions for improving ethical training are discussed. (shrink)

Consider a specific type of fission where psychological continuity takes a branching form, and one of the offshoots comes into being later than the other offshoot. Let us say that the earlier offshoot comes into being in the left branch at t, and the later offshoot comes into being in the right branch at t+1. With regard to the question how many persons are involved in this case, three answers are worth considering: (i) The original subject persists up to t; (...) a distinct person comes into being immediately after t and continues to exist in the left branch; and the third person comes into being in the right branch at t+1. (ii) The original subject persists up to the moment immediately before t+1; a distinct person comes into being at t+1 and continues to exist in the left branch; and the third person comes into being in the right branch at t+1. (iii) The original subject continues to exist in the left branch; a distinct person comes into being in the right branch at t+1. For those who hold that personal identity consists in psychological continuity of some sort, the aforementioned three options exhaust the sensible ways of understanding how one persists in delayed fission. However, I argue that complications arise for each answer. Hence, delayed fission poses a challenge for the psychological approach to personal identity. (shrink)

In Part 1 of this article, the legal and scientific origins of the concept of psychological safety are examined as background to, and support for, the new Canadian National Standard on Psychological Health and Safety in the Workplace (CSA Z1003/bnq 9700). It is shown that five factors influencing psychological safety can be identified as being common to both legal and scientific perspectives: job demands and requirements of effort, job control or influence, reward, fairness, and support. This convergence of evidence from (...) legal and scientific perspectives creates a powerful case for the development of a national standard built around these five factors. In Part 2, it is proposed that the introduction of a national standard can be expected in the long run to have positive social benefits since the health or harm that is generated in the workplace does not remain there but migrates into families, communities, and society at large in the form of either social capital or social exhaust. Consequently, psychological safety is a concept that connects the dynamics of the workplace to the health, resilience, and well-being of society at large. (shrink)

Since 1985, the US Animal Welfare Act and Public Health Service policy have required that researchers using nonhuman primates in biomedical and behavioral research develop a plan “for a physical environment adequate to promote the psychological well-being of primates.” In pursuing this charge, housing attributes such as social companionship, opportunities to express species-typical behavior, suitable space for expanded locomotor activity, and nonstressful relationships with laboratory personnel are dimensions that have dominated the discussion. Regulators were careful not to direct a specific (...) set of prescriptions (i.e., engineering standards) for the attainment of these goals, but to leave the design of the programs substantially up to “professional judgment” at the local level. Recently, however, the Institute of Medicine, in its path-finding 2011 report on the necessity of chimpanzee use in research, bypassed this flexible and contingent concept, and instead, required as a central precondition that chimpanzees be housed in “ethologically appropriate” environments. In so doing, obligations of ethical treatment of one great ape species were elevated above the needs of some research. The evolution and significance of this change are discussed. (shrink)

Educational gatekeeping functions in psychology serve to assess, remediate, and/or dismiss students and trainees with problematic professional competencies (STPPC). Recently, professional psychology graduate programs have increasingly focused on problems with professional competency, and they have begun to implement formal procedures to intervene with STPPC (Rubin et al., 2007). However, there has been considerably less literature addressing the ethics and ethical considerations of instituting these gatekeeping functions, especially in different stages of education and training in psychology. The American (...) Psychological Association (APA; 2002) Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct (Ethics Code) offers faculty and supervisors ethical principles and obligatory standards that provide guidance about how to implement highly ethical gatekeeping practices. The purpose of this article is to highlight the major ethical issues and dilemmas that faculty and supervisors may face when intervening with STPPC and provide recommendations for ethical gatekeeping practices that are inspired by the APA Ethics Code. (shrink)

Normality Does Not Equal Mental Health: The Need to Look Elsewhere for Standards of Good Mental Health is the first book to question the equation of psychological normality and mental health. It is also the first book to take contemporary psychiatry and clinical psychology to task for deeply flawed thinking when they accept the diagnostic system propounded by the DSM, which reifies syndromes into alleged “mental disorders.” Where Thomas Szasz argued that “mental disorders” are myths, Bartlett makes the (...) much more damaging charge that reifying mental disorders involves a provable form of fallacious thinking, producing a variety of epistemological nonsense. /// -/- -/- The author weighs the evidence, and with strict logic, compelling evidence, and careful analysis, challenges the current paradigm of mental health theorists and practitioners. Never has the case against the standard of psychological normality and against the non-scientific creation of “mental disorders” been made with such boldness, multidisciplinary knowledge, solid scholarship, and clarity of language. /// -/- -/- Normality Does Not Equal Mental HealthAlthough the need to question psychological normality as a satisfactory standard of good mental health has been staring us in the face for a long time, no one, clinical professional or scholar, has had the courage or the intellectual willingness to face with unflinching honesty the shortcomings and disappointments of psychological normality and to propose that we should look elsewhere for standards of good psychological health. /// -/- -/- Contemporary psychiatry and clinical psychology, on the contrary, base their conception of mental health on the standard of psychological normality. This supposition has come to be accepted uncritically and without question, and yet it has become fundamental to current clinical theory and practice, and forms the core of the psychiatric classification system of the DSM, which has become today’s diagnostic authority. /// -/- -/- While touting today’s scientific gold standard of “evidence-based” research, DSM’s authoritative classification of “mental disorders” is itself hardly “evidence-based,” for it is recognized, but seldom emphasized, that the majority of DSM’s “mental disorders” have no known empirical, organic basis. /// -/- -/- Normality Does Not Equal Mental Health takes DSM to task not only for its failure to adhere to today’s evidence-based standard, but for its failure to rein in its highly speculative diagnostic labeling, in accordance with the modern paradigm of rigorous science, which repudiates metaphorical reifications whose alleged validity rests only on the voting preferences of a professional membership. /// -/- -/- The book is a carefully argued critique of the dominant assumption in current psychiatry and clinical psychology that psychological normality is fundamental to mental health and therefore good. In place of this unsatisfactory presumption, Normality Does Not Equal Mental Health proposes a positive and constructive revision in our understanding of mental health and of our conception of mental disorders. (shrink)

The psychological literature frequently elaborates ethical principles and standards and highlights the complexity of many ethical issues. The American Psychological Association code of ethics (American Psychological Association, 1992) directs psychologists to become familiar with the code and its implications for their work. A computerized search strategy is described for identifying and organizing published articles dealing with ethical issues. Specifically, we report the development of a search strategy for use with the journal literature database contained on PsycLIT(CD-ROM). The search terms (...) identify ethics articles and categorize them according to Ethical Standards 2 through 8 of the 1992 code. (shrink)

Ethical training in graduate programs is an important part of the professional development process. Such training has taken a position of prominence in both counseling and clinical psychology but seems to be lagging behind in the field of sport psychology. A debate exists about whether such training is necessary and, if so, how it should be provided. An important step in better understanding these issues is to identify how such training is currently taking place. This study surveyed the (...) program directors of sport psychology programs listed in the Directory of Graduate Programs in Applied Sport Psychology (Burke, Sachs, & Schrader, 2002) about the ethical training that takes place in their programs and their perceptions of the preparedness of the students in their programs. Of those contacted, 54% (n = 47) responded to the e-mail based survey. The results from these respondents indicated that 64.4% of programs require training in ethics and that the training was most commonly integrated into other nonethics courses. Overall, respondents did not feel as if students were completely prepared for either the ethical or legal issues that they will face in their professional careers. The importance of ethical training and suggestions for improving ethical training are discussed. (shrink)

Ethical training in graduate programs is an important part of the professional development process. Such training has taken a position of prominence in both counseling and clinical psychology but seems to be lagging behind in the field of sport psychology. A debate exists about whether such training is necessary and, if so, how it should be provided. An important step in better understanding these issues is to identify how such training is currently taking place. This study surveyed the (...) program directors of sport psychology programs listed in the Directory of Graduate Programs in Applied Sport Psychology (Burke, Sachs, & Schrader, 2002) about the ethical training that takes place in their programs and their perceptions of the preparedness of the students in their programs. Of those contacted, 54% (n = 47) responded to the e-mail based survey. The results from these respondents indicated that 64.4% of programs require training in ethics and that the training was most commonly integrated into other nonethics courses. Overall, respondents did not feel as if students were completely prepared for either the ethical or legal issues that they will face in their professional careers. The importance of ethical training and suggestions for improving ethical training are discussed. (shrink)

This article aims to summarize the current ethical issues in the field of clinical and counseling psychology and the process of developing professional ethical standards in China. First, through a review of the history of counseling and psychotherapy in China, general background information is provided. Important ethical issues are then discussed based on the results from several empirical studies. Finally, the process of developing the new edition of the Chinese Psychological Society Code of Ethics for Clinical and Counseling (...) Psychology, the main contents as well as the considerations taken into account in the development of this code are presented. (shrink)

Contemporary caution against anachronism in intellectual history, and the currently momentous theoretical emphasis on subjectivity in the philosophy of mind, are two prevailing conditions that set puzzling constraints for studies in the history of philosophical psychology. The former urges against assuming ideas, motives, and concepts that are alien to the historical intellectual setting under study, and combined with the latter suggests caution in relying on our intuitions regarding subjectivity due to the historically contingent characterizations it has attained in contemporary (...) philosophy of mind. In the face of these conditions, our paper raises a question of what we call non-textual (as opposed to contextual) standards of interpretation of historical texts, and proceeds to explore subjectivity as such a standard. Non-textual standards are defined as (heuristic) postulations of features of the world or our experience of it that we must suppose to be immune to historical variation in order to understand a historical text. Although the postulation of such standards is often so obvious that the fact of our doing so is not noticed at all, we argue that the problems in certain special cases, such as that of subjectivity, force us to pay attention to the methodological questions involved. Taking into account both recent methodological discussion and the problems inherent in two de facto denials of the relevance of subjectivity for historical theories, we argue that there are good grounds for the adoption of subjectivity as a non-textual standard for historical work in philosophical psychology. (shrink)

Contemporary caution of anachronism in intellectual history on the one hand, and currently momentous theoretical emphasis on subjectivity on the other, are two prevailing circumstances that set puzzling constraints for studies in the history of philosophical psychology. Together these circumstances call for heightened awareness of our own interpretive presuppositions as historians: the former urges against assuming ideas, motives, and concepts that may be alien in the historical intellectual setting under study and the latter suggests caution in relying on our (...) intuitions regarding subjectivity due to the specific and historicallycontingent characterisations subjectivity has attained in the contemporary philosophy of mind. In face of these enticements our paper explores subjectivity as a non-textual standard of interpretation. Taking into account recent methodological discussion and examples of denials of the relevance of subjectivity for historical theories, we argue that historical work should be conceived as a reflective investigation into what is and what is not genuinely historical. In particular, we show how subjectivity can function as a pre-conceptualized feature of the world that has an effect on our concept formation. (shrink)

Contemporary caution of anachronism in intellectual history on the one hand, and currently momentous theoretical emphasis on subjectivity on the other, are two prevailing circumstances that set puzzling constraints for studies in the history of philosophical psychology. Together these circumstances call for heightened awareness of our own interpretive presuppositions as historians: the former urges against assuming ideas, motives, and concepts that may be alien in the historical intellectual setting under study and the latter suggests caution in relying on our (...) intuitions regarding subjectivity due to the specific and historicallycontingent characterisations subjectivity has attained in the contemporary philosophy of mind. In face of these enticements our paper explores subjectivity as a non-textual standard of interpretation. Taking into account recent methodological discussion and examples of denials of the relevance of subjectivity for historical theories, we argue that historical work should be conceived as a reflective investigation into what is and what is not genuinely historical. In particular, we show how subjectivity can function as a pre-conceptualized feature of the world that has an effect on our concept formation. (shrink)

In the last three decades, considerable theoretical and empirical research has been undertaken on the topic of moral distress among health professionals. Understood as a psychological and emotional response to the experience of moral wrongdoing, there is evidence to suggest that—if unaddressed—it contributes to staff demoralization, desensitization and burnout and, ultimately, to lower standards of patient safety and quality of care. However, more recently, the concept of moral distress has been subjected to important criticisms. Specifically, some authors argue that (...) the standard account of moral distress elucidated by Jameton :542–551, 1984) does not refer to a discrete phenomenon and/or that it is not sufficiently broad and that this makes measuring its prevalence among health professionals, and other groups of workers, difficult if not impossible. In this paper, we defend the standard account of moral distress. We understand it as a concept that draws attention to the social, political and contextual determinants of moral agency and brings the emotional landscape of the moral realm to the fore. Given the increasing pressure on health professionals worldwide to meet efficiency, financial and corporate targets and reported adverse effects of these for the quality and safety of patient care, we believe that further empirical research that deploys the standard account moral distress is timely and important. (shrink)

Human beings, like other organisms, are the products of evolution. Like other organisms, we exhibit traits that are the product of natural selection. Our psychological capacities are evolved traits as much as are our gait and posture. This much few would dispute. Evolutionary psychology goes further than this, claiming that our psychological traits -- including a wide variety of traits, from mate preference and jealousy to language and reason -- can be understood as specific adaptations to ancestral Pleistocene conditions. (...) In Evolutionary Psychology as Maladapted Psychology, Robert Richardson takes a critical look at evolutionary psychology by subjecting its ambitious and controversial claims to the same sorts of methodological and evidential constraints that are broadly accepted within evolutionary biology. The claims of evolutionary psychology may pass muster as psychology; but what are their evolutionary credentials? Richardson considers three ways adaptive hypotheses can be evaluated, using examples from the biological literature to illustrate what sorts of evidence and methodology would be necessary to establish specific evolutionary and adaptive explanations of human psychological traits. He shows that existing explanations within evolutionary psychology fall woefully short of accepted biological standards. The theories offered by evolutionary psychologists may identify traits that are, or were, beneficial to humans. But gauged by biological standards, there is inadequate evidence: evolutionary psychologists are largely silent on the evolutionary evidence relevant to assessing their claims, including such matters as variation in ancestral populations, heritability, and the advantage offered to our ancestors. As evolutionary claims they are unsubstantiated. Evolutionary psychology, Richardson concludes, may offer a program of research, but it lacks the kind of evidence that is generally expected within evolutionary biology. It is speculation rather than sound science -- and we should treat its claims with skepticism. (shrink)

Starting from the observation that data sharing in general and sharing of reusable behavioral data in particular is still scarce in psychology, we set out to develop a curation standard for behavioral psychological research data rendering data reuse more effective and efficient. Specifically, we propose a standard that is oriented toward the requirements of the psychological research process, thus considering the needs of researchers in their role as data providers and data users. To this end, we suggest that researchers (...) should describe their data on three documentation levels reflecting researchers’ central decisions during the research process. In particular, these levels describe researchers’ decisions on the concrete research design that is most suitable to address the corresponding research question, its operationalization as well as a precise description of the subsequent data collection and analysis process. Accordingly, the first documentation level represents, for instance, researchers’ decision on the concrete hypotheses, inclusion/exclusion criteria and the number of measurement points as well as a conceptual presentation of all substantial variables included in the design. On the second level these substantial variables are presented within an extended codebook allowing for the linkage between the conceptual research design and the actually operationalized variables as presented within the data. Finally, the third level includes all materials, data preparation and analyses scripts as well as a detailed procedure graphic that allows the data user to link the information from all three documentation levels at a single glance. After a comprehensive presentation of the standard, we will offer some arguments for its integration into the psychological research process. (shrink)

Moral functioning is a defining feature of human personhood and human social life. Moral Psychology provides an integrative and evaluative overview of the theoretical and empirical traditions that have attempted to make sense of moral cognition, prosocial behavior, and the development of virtuous character.This is the first book to integrate a comprehensive review of the psychological literatures with allied traditions in ethics. Moral rationality and decisionmaking; the development of the sense of fairness and justice, and of prosocial dispositions; as (...) well as the notion of moral self and moral identity and their relation to issues of character and virtue are fully discussed in the rich contexts provided by psychological and philosophical paradigms. Lapsley emphasizes parenting and educational strategies for influencing moral behavior, reasoning, and character development, and charts a line of research for the “post-Kohlbergian era” in moral psychology.This book will be an invaluable text for advanced courses in moral psychology, as taught in departments of psychology, education, and philosophy. It will also prove to be a standard reference work for researchers and ethicists alike. (shrink)

Evolutionary psychology and the selectionist theories of neural development are usually regarded as two unrelated theories addressing two logically distinct questions. The focus of evolutionary psychology is the phylogeny of the human mind, whereas the selectionist theories of neural development analyse the ontogeny of the mind. This paper will endeavour to combine these two approaches in the explanation of the human mind. Doing so might help in overcoming some of the criticisms of both theories. The first part of (...) the paper mentions three standard objections to evolutionary psychology and then outlines three philosophical problems evolutionary psychology has to offer a solution to. The second part will try to show that an approach combining evolutionary psychology and the selectionist theory of neural development might overcome some of these objections. (shrink)

This target article argues that the Turing test implicitly rests on a "naive psychology," a naturally evolved psychological faculty which is used to predict and understand the behaviour of others in complex societies. This natural faculty is an important and implicit bias in the observer's tendency to ascribe mentality to the system in the test. The paper analyses the effects of this naive psychology on the Turing test, both from the side of the system and the side of (...) the observer, and then proposes and justifies an inverted version of the test which allows the processes of ascription to be analysed more directly than in the standard version. (shrink)

This paper challenges the conventional wisdom dominating the social sciences and philosophy regarding temporal discounting, the practice of discounting the value of future utility when making decisions. Although there are sharp disagreements about temporal discounting, a kind of standard model has arisen, one that begins with a normative standard about how we should make intertemporal comparisons of utility. This standard demands that in so far as one is rational one discounts utilities at future times with an exponential discount function. Tracing (...) the justification for this standard through economics, philosophy and psychology, I’ll make what I believe is the best case one can for it, showing how a non-arbitrariness assumption and a dominance argument together imply that discounting ought to be exponential. Ultimately, however, I don’t find the case compelling. Non-exponential temporal discounting is often rational. If this is correct, Instead of trying to ‘fix’ non-exponential discounting because it is irrational and associated with negative life outcomes, we might instead focus attention on why the conditions obtain that make such discounting rational. (shrink)

Human beings, like other organisms, are the products of evolution. Like other organisms, we exhibit traits that are the product of natural selection. Our psychological capacities are evolved traits as much as are our gait and posture. This much few would dispute. Evolutionary psychology goes further than this, claiming that our psychological traits -- including a wide variety of traits, from mate preference and jealousy to language and reason -- can be understood as specific adaptations to ancestral Pleistocene conditions. (...) In Evolutionary Psychology as Maladapted Psychology, Robert Richardson takes a critical look at evolutionary psychology by subjecting its ambitious and controversial claims to the same sorts of methodological and evidential constraints that are broadly accepted within evolutionary biology. The claims of evolutionary psychology may pass muster as psychology; but what are their evolutionary credentials? Richardson considers three ways adaptive hypotheses can be evaluated, using examples from the biological literature to illustrate what sorts of evidence and methodology would be necessary to establish specific evolutionary and adaptive explanations of human psychological traits. He shows that existing explanations within evolutionary psychology fall woefully short of accepted biological standards. The theories offered by evolutionary psychologists may identify traits that are, or were, beneficial to humans. But gauged by biological standards, there is inadequate evidence: evolutionary psychologists are largely silent on the evolutionary evidence relevant to assessing their claims, including such matters as variation in ancestral populations, heritability, and the advantage offered to our ancestors. As evolutionary claims they are unsubstantiated. Evolutionary psychology, Richardson concludes, may offer a program of research, but it lacks the kind of evidence that is generally expected within evolutionary biology. It is speculation rather than sound science -- and we should treat its claims with skepticism. (shrink)

Book synopsis: The causal theory of action is widely recognized in the literature of the philosophy of action as the "standard story" of human action and agency—the nearest approximation in the field to a theoretical orthodoxy. This volume brings together leading figures working in action theory today to discuss issues relating to the CTA and its applications, which range from experimental philosophy to moral psychology. Some of the contributors defend the theory while others criticize it; some draw from historical (...) sources while others focus on recent developments; some rely on the tools of analytic philosophy while others cite the latest empirical research on human action. All agree, however, on the centrality of the CTA in the philosophy of action. The contributors first consider metaphysical issues, then reasons-explanations of action, and, finally, new directions for thinking about the CTA. They discuss such topics as the tenability of some alternatives to the CTA; basic causal deviance; the etiology of action ; teleologism and anticausalism; and the compatibility of the CTA with theories of embodied cognition. Two contributors engage in an exchange of views on intentional omissions that stretches over four essays, directly responding to each other in their follow-up essays. As the action -oriented perspective becomes more influential in philosophy of mind and philosophy of cognitive science, this volume offers a long-needed debate over foundational issues. (shrink)

Since cognitive neuroscience aims at giving an integrated account of mind and brain, its ontology should include both neural and cognitive entities and specify their relations. According to what we call the standard ontological framework of cognitive neuroscience, the aim of cognitive neuroscience should be to establish one-to-one mappings between neural and cognitive entities. Where such entities do not yet closely align, this can be achieved by reforming the cognitive ontology, the neural ontology, or both. In order to assess the (...) limits and the possibilities of the SOFCN, we will examine a paradigmatic case study: the concept of Broca’s area, which indicates an alleged mapping between the left inferofrontal gyrus and the production of language. We review evidence showing that such a mapping does not hold, thus calling into question either the status of Broca’s area or the validity of the SOFCN. We then propose some strategies for addressing the issue and suggest that it may be solved within the SOFCN by adopting both of the following strategies: first, more accurately defining the relevant neural structures and second, switching the focus of neural ontology from structures to events, individuated by a where conjoint with a how. (shrink)

The practice of research is full of ethical challenges, many of which might be addressed through the teaching of responsible conduct of research . Although such training is increasingly required, there is no clear consensus about either the goals or content of an RCR curriculum. The present study was designed to assess community standards in three domains of research practice: authorship, collaboration, and data management. A survey, developed through advice from content matter experts, focus groups, and interviews, was distributed (...) in November 2010 to U.S. faculty from 50 graduate programs for each of four different disciplines: microbiology, neuroscience, nursing, and psychology. The survey addressed practices and perceived standards, as well as perceptions about teaching and learning. Over 1,300 responses yielded statistically significant differences in responses to nearly all questions. However the magnitude of these differences was typically small, leaving little reason to argue for community consensus on standards. For nearly all questions asked, the clear finding was that there was nothing approaching consensus. These results may be useful not so much to teach what the standards are, but to increase student awareness of the diversity of those standards in reported practice. (shrink)

Given the recent explosion of interest in applications of evolutionary biology to understanding human psychology, we think it timely to assure better understanding of modern evolutionary theory among the psychologists who might be using it. We find it necessary to do so because of the very reducd version of evolutionary theorizing that has been incorporated into much of evolutionary psychology so far. Our aim here is to clarify why the use of a reduced version of evolutionary genetics will (...) lead to faulty science and to indicate where other resources of evolutionary biology can be found that might elevate the standard of the evolutionary component of evolutionary psychology. (shrink)

A standard formalization of a scientific theory is a system of axioms for that theory in a first-order language (possibly many-sorted; possibly with the membership primitive $$\in$$ ). Suppes (in: Carvallo M (ed) Nature, cognition and system II. Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1992) expressed skepticism about whether there is a “simple or elegant method” for presenting mathematicized scientific theories in such a standard formalization, because they “assume a great deal of mathematics as part of their substructure”. The major difficulties amount to these. (...) First, as the theories of interest are mathematicized, one must specify the underlying applied mathematics base theory, which the physical axioms live on top of. Second, such theories are typically geometric, concerning quantities or trajectories in space/time: so, one must specify the underlying physical geometry. Third, the differential equations involved generally refer to coordinate representations of these physical quantities with respect to some implicit coordinate chart, not to the original quantities. These issues may be resolved. Once this is done, constructing standard formalizations is not so difficult—at least for the theories where the mathematics has been worked out rigorously. Here we give what may be claimed to be a simple and elegant means of doing that. This is for mathematicized scientific theories comprising differential equations for $$\mathbb{R}$$ -valued quantities Q (that is, scalar fields), defined on n (“spatial” or “temporal”) dimensions, taken to be isomorphic to the usual Euclidean space $$\mathbb{R}^n$$. For illustration, I give standard (in a sense, “text-book”) formalizations: for the simple harmonic oscillator equation in one-dimension and for the Laplace equation in two dimensions. (shrink)

In February 1993, Judge Charles R. Richey of the United States District Court issued a summary judgment in the case of Animal Legal Defense Fund, et al. v. The Secretary of Agriculture, et al. The decision, which was in favor of the Animal Legal Defense Fund, requires the U.S. Department of Agriculture to withdraw its current regulations governing exercise for dogs and the psychological well-being of nonhuman primates used for biomedical research and to issue new regulations containing only minimum, measurable (...) standards. Both plaintiffs and defendants contended that they were seeking the best interests of the laboratory animals. The issue at stake is whether animals are better protected if the government establishes limited minimal standards or is allowed to require institutions to provide additional standards, which will be judged on the basis of their effectiveness in maintaining healthy animals. The Court avoided this dispute, however, by placing primary emphasis on applying the Administrative Procedures Act and stating that it was merely interpreting the "plain meaning" of the Animal Welfare Act, as amended. In this article, arguments are presented for interpreting the law in a far more flexible way than Judge Richey did. The conclusion is also reached that there were no winners in the Animal Legal Defense Fund case and that the real losers are the laboratory animals. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Standards of Music Education and the Easily Administered Child/Citizen: The Alchemy of Pedagogy and Social Inclusion/Exclusion Thomas S. Popkewitz and Ruth Gustafson University of Wisconsin-Madison Educational standards are forsome a corrective device to promote the twin goals of excellence and equity by making explicit the performance outcomes ofschooling. For others, performance standards do not do what they say and install the wrong goals for teaching. But (...) various sides in the debate assume that school subjects teach the subjects and what is needed are more effective and efficient classroom practices. Our approach is different. We consider the standards of school subjects as related to the conditions of state governing. School subjects inscribe principles that administer the conduct ofthe child who is to grow into the "reasonable citizen." The Standards Movement is more than what is publicly discussed. Pedagogy embodies particular ways ofthinking or a system ofreason in which pedagogy orders who we are, who we should become, and who are not qualifiedto become that "we." If we think of modern schooling as an inscription device in the fonning of the citizen through the development ofthe child, the crux of the debate is not whether to have standards. It is how particular standards are inscribed through pedagogicalpractices. Ifwe treat school subjects as analogous to a uniform system of taxes, the developmentofuniformmeasurements, andurban planning in the modem state, our concern is with the boundaries created about the rules and standards of reason and the reasonable person. Pedagogygoverns inadoublesense: schoolmusic embodies representations that constitute the objects that children act on as real, and it generates principles to orderand patrol the borders that qualify and disqualify individuals for participation. The standards that govern music education can be thought about as an alchemy.1 The field of music is transported and translated into school subjects andpedagogical content. As the sorcerer ofthe middle ages sought to turn lead into gold, a specializedpedagogyplaces children in a new set ofrelations that is no longerthe academic field of music. Why is the alchemy important? First, the alchemy ofschool subjects is a particular system of reason that fabricates the kinds of people administered in schooling. Second, the alchemy reconfigures the sensitivities and awarenesses of the field of music to make the child's "soul" the site of administration. That soul in music and other school subjects is talked about today as personaldevelopment, self-reflection,personality, and character. Third, school subjects are sites in which the relations between the state, society, community, and individuality are worked and reworked to produce the borders ofinclusion and exclusion. The first section of this paper considers school subjects as a practice of governing that administersprinciples (orstandards ifwecanplay with that word) about who we are and should be. The second section considers psychology as the translation device that transports academic disciplines into school subjects. It may seem odd at firstglancebutthesamepsychologicaltransportation systems exist across school subjects. The historical intervention of the transportation system, we argue in the third section, has little to do with understanding music or science, but with governing the soul. In that section we examine the different cultural practices that overlap to©Philosophy ofMusic Education Review 10, no. 2 (Fall, 2002): 80-91. Thomas S. Popkewitz/Ruth Gustafson 81 generate principles that orderthe nature ofmusic, the child/childhood, teaching, and reflection and subjectivity in music education. The discussion is not about the internal structure or the goodness ofmusic education but the particular frames of reference that form the evidence and possibilities of reform in school subjects. We take up the task ofinquiry into the alchemy of music as part of a broader project to show the contingency ofthe arrangement that we live by showing how thought has played a part in holding those arrangements together and to contestthe strategiesthatgovernthehumanpossibilities. The Art ofGoverning: Standards as Mapping Who We are/to Become Themodern state governs through developing a precise system of classifications and the correct sorting devices to chart a course ofaction that will change society for the better and which will prevent any futurejoining ofthe ranks ofthe poorly performing. To govern is to develop systems ofclassification that calculate and make legiblepeople fortheadministrationofthe society and the citizen. Mass schooling is a central institution in... (shrink)

School Psychology Ethics in the Workplace introduces a pragmatic and user-friendly model that helps readers become proficient ethical decision-makers using the 2020 NASP ethical code and to critically engage the ethical standards and work through ethical dilemmas that often occur in school and clinical settings. This book provides an overview of the National Association of School Psychologists' (NASP) latest Principles for Professional Ethics. It introduces readers to various ethical codes related to psychology, the importance of having ethical (...) codes, the limitations of ethical codes, and an ethical decision-making model that accounts for multicultural and social justice issues. Over 100 ethical case studies are presented in the text that specifically relate to NASP's Principles for Professional Ethics. Readers are provided step-by-step directions on how to use the ethical decision-making model when problem solving each case scenario. School psychology graduate students and their instructors will find this guide invaluable for learning NASP's new ethical code and for being prepared for situations school psychologists are likely to experience in practice. (shrink)

Friedrich Nietzsche is one of the most elusive thinkers in the philosophical tradition. His highly unusual style and insistence on what remains hidden or unsaid in his writing make pinning him to a particular position tricky. Nonetheless, certain readings of his work have become standard and influential. In this major new interpretation of Nietzsche’s work, Robert B. Pippin challenges various traditional views of Nietzsche, taking him at his word when he says that his writing can best be understood as a (...) kind of psychology. Pippin traces this idea of Nietzsche as a psychologist to his admiration for the French moralists: La Rochefoucauld, Pascal, Stendhal, and especially Montaigne. In distinction from philosophers, Pippin shows, these writers avoided grand metaphysical theories in favor of reflections on life as lived and experienced. Aligning himself with this project, Nietzsche sought to make psychology “the queen of the sciences” and the “path to the fundamental problems.” Pippin contends that Nietzsche’s singular prose was an essential part of this goal, and so he organizes the book around four of Nietzsche’s most important images and metaphors: that truth could be a woman, that a science could be gay, that God could have died, and that an agent is as much one with his act as lightning is with its flash. Expanded from a series of lectures Pippin delivered at the Collège de France, _Nietzsche, Psychology, and First Philosophy_ offers a brilliant, novel, and accessible reading of this seminal thinker. (shrink)

An overview of Zhu Xi's moral psychology, with a special focus on the metaphysical underpinnings and the relations between heartmind (xin), emotions (qing), and nature (xing). The authors explain how Zhu uses his account to balance the demand for independent standards of assessment with his commitment to ethical norms that virtuous agents can embrace wholeheartedly.

Teaching of responsible conduct of research is largely predicated on the assumption that there are accepted standards of conduct that can be taught. However there is little evidence of consensus in the scientific community about such standards, at least for the practices of authorship, collaboration, and data management. To assess whether such differences in standards are based on disciplinary differences, a survey, described previously, addressing standards, practices, and perceptions about teaching and learning was distributed in November (...) 2010 to US faculty from 50 graduate programs for the biomedical disciplines of microbiology, neuroscience, nursing, and psychology. Despite evidence of statistically significant differences across the four disciplines, actual differences were quite small. Stricter measures of effect size indicated practically significant disciplinary differences for fewer than 10 % of the questions. This suggests that the variation in individual standards of practice within each discipline is at least as great as variation due to differences among disciplines. Therefore, the need for discipline-specific training may not be as important as sometimes thought. (shrink)

Rosenberg argues that intentional generalizations in the human sciences cannot be law-like because they are not amenable to significant empirical refinement. This irrefinability is said to result from the principle that supposedly controls in intentional explanation also serving as the standard for successful interpretation. The only credible evidence bearing on such a principle would then need conform to it. I argue that psychological generalizations are refinable and can be nomic. I show how empirical refinement of psychological generalizations is possible by (...) considering concrete cases. A sufficiently detailed view of the role of psychological generalizations in interpretation allows us to find in psychological investigations instances of bootstrap testing. (shrink)

Do sensory measurements deserve the label of “measurement”? We argue that they do. They fit with an epistemological view of measurement held in current philosophy of science, and they face the same kinds of epistemological challenges as physical measurements do: the problem of coordination and the problem of standardization. These problems are addressed through the process of “epistemic iteration,” for all measurements. We also argue for distinguishing the problem of standardization from the problem of coordination. To exemplify our claims, we (...) draw on olfactory performance tests, especially studies linking olfactory decline to neurodegenerative disorders. (shrink)

The existential approach described by Mark Nesti offers a radical alternative to the cognitive-behavioral model which informs most contemporary applied sports psychology. Whereas standard psychological models of athlete behavior would advocate appropriate "mental skills" training such as visualizing the perfect race to help an athlete overcome performance problems, the existential approach will refer to an athletes unique emotional world to find deeper causes of their limitation. These causes may be only very indirectly linked to the athletes sporting life. Existential (...) sports psychology has gone out of phenomenological theory and existential philosophy. Mark Nesti's text is the first book to present an overview of this exciting approach. It contains case studies and a framework for psychologists to apply this approach to their work. (shrink)

This article blends psychological and social factors in the explanation of science, and defends the compatibility of a psychosocial picture with an epistemic picture. It examines three variants of the 'political' approach to interpersonal persuasion advocated by Latour and others. In each case an 'epistemic' or mixed account is more promising and empirically better supported. Psychological research on motivated reasoning shows the epistemic limits of interest-driven belief. Against social constructivism, the paper defends the viability of a truth-based standard, and reports (...) how truth-possession can be promoted even when scientific work is motivated by political/professional considerations. (shrink)

Depending on how one looks at it, we have been enjoying or suffering a significant empirical turn in moral psychology during this first decade of the 21st century. While philosophers have, from time to time, considered empirical matters with respect to morality, those who took an interest in actual (rather than ideal) moral agents were primarily concerned with whether particular moral theories were ‘too demanding’ for creatures like us (Flanagan, 1991; Williams, 1976; Wolf, 1982). Faithful adherence to Utilitarianism or (...) Kantianism would appear to be inconsistent with other things we value, like personal integrity and flourishing, which depend upon pursuing individually determined projects and ways of life in rather single-minded ways. Maximizing the good is a full-time job, and the impartiality recommended by Kantian theory can get in the way of showing special care for those we know and love. All this is standard philosophical fare. However, more recently, philosophers and psychologists have begun to treat moral psychology as a legitimate branch of cognitive science. They inquire into the evolution of morality (e.g., Joyce, 2007; Nichols 2004), debate the human uniqueness of moral capacities (e.g., deWaal, 2006; Hauser, 2006), investigate the causal etiology of moral judgments (e.g., Haidt & Greene, 2002; Hauser et al., 2006; Prinz, 2006), attempt to map the neuroanatomy of moral reasoning (e.g., Greene et al., 2001; Greene et al., 2004; Moll, et al., 2005), and consider what other affective and cognitive capacities are required by a creature who sees the world in moral terms. (See also Sinnott-Armstrong, 2007, 2008a, 2008b). 1 In this essay, I discuss two issues whose interdependence and central importance for empirically informed moral psychology have not been fully grasped, or so I believe. First is what I call the Explananda Challenge. Let us assume that the primary question for moral psychology is this: How is it possible for human beings to be moral creatures? Deceptively simple, this question obscures a number of rather more difficult ones.. (shrink)

Exponential discounted utility theory provides the normative standard for future discounting as it is employed throughout the social sciences. Tracing the justification for this standard through economics, philosophy and psychology, I’ll make what I believe is the best case one can for it, showing how a non-arbitrariness assumption and a dominance argument together imply that discounting ought to be exponential. Ultimately, however, I don’t find the case compelling, as I believe it is deeply flawed. Non-exponential temporal discounting is often (...) rational–indeed, the paragon of rationality. If this is correct, it’s an important point when considering policy interventions. Instead of trying to “fix” non-exponetial discounting because it is irrational and associated with negative life outcomes, we might instead focus attention on why the conditions obtain that make such discounting rational. (shrink)