This paper responds to the issues raised by D. Chalmers by offering a research direction which is quite radical because of the way in which methodological principles are linked to scientific studies of consciousness. Neuro-phenomenology is the name I use here to designate a quest to marry modern cognitive science and a disciplined approach to human experience, thereby placing myself in the lineage of the continental tradition of Phenomenology. My claim is that the so-called hard problem that animates these Special (...) Issues can only be addressed productively by gathering a research community armed with new pragmatic tools for the development of a science of consciousness. I will claim that no piecemeal empirical correlates, nor purely theoretical principles, will really help us at this stage. We need to turn to a systematic exploration of the only link between mind and consciousness that seems both obvious and natural: the structure of human experience itself. In what follows I motivate my choice by briefly examining the current debate about consciousness at the light of Chalmer’s hard problem. Next, I outline the phenomenological strategy. Finally I conclude by discussing some of the main difficulties and consequences of this strategy. (shrink)

Pytanie o początki człowieka, stawiane na gruncie nauk biologicznych, jest pytaniem o linię filogenetyczną, wiodącą do pojawienia się gatunku Homo sapiens. Dysponując jakąś hipotezą, dotyczącą przebiegu tej linii, biolog może starać się ustalić, kiedy i gdzie zaszła zmiana na tyle decydująca, że należy ją uznać za równoznaczną powstaniu naszego – prawdziwie nowego – gatunku. Problem polega jednak na tym, że kryteria, pozwalające jednoznacznie odróżnić jeden gatunek od drugiego, wydają się być trudne, a być może nawet niemożliwe do sformułowania. Oznacza to, (...) że samo pojęcie „prawdziwie nowego” gatunku jest w pewnym sensie puste. W artykule zostały ukazane kluczowe problemy metodologiczne, występujące na gruncie antropologii przyrodniczej, mające znaczenie dla jej ustaleń. -------------- Zgłoszono: 12/08/2020. Zrecenzowano: 10/09/2020. Zaakceptowano do publikacji: 12/10/2020. (shrink)

W artykule jest suponowana opozycja między statyką i dynamiką nauki. Przez naukę rozumiemy głównie nauki empiryczne, zwłaszcza przyrodnicze, lub nauki ścisłe (sciences), inaczej: matematyczne przyrodoznawstwo. Przy doborze kategorii jako przedmiotu podjętych analiz kierowano się racjami badawczymi oraz odwołującymi się do praktyki naukowej i metanaukowej. Kontekstowe objaśnienia tych obiektów relatywizowano do sytuacji poznawczej potencjalnych odbiorców. Uwzględniano zarówno adeptów, jak i profesjonalnie zainteresowanych refleksją nad czynnościowo i wytworowo ujmowaną nauką. Podjęte zagadnienia są rozpatrywane poprzez stopniowe dyskusje aspektywnie wyselekcjonowanych problemów. W rozpatrywanej perspektywie (...) należą do nich: ramowe stanowiska; terminy-klucze; statyka/dynamika nauki; rewolucje w filozofii nauki; dwa konteksty; nowa filozofia nauki; nurt normatywny i deskryptywny; kategoria rewolucji naukowych; super-, supra- i maksiteorie jako jednostki ponadteoretyczne; problematyka aksjologiczna; pluralizm filozofii nauki; problem / teoria problemu; wartość — kategoria z zakresu aksjologii epistemicznej; dalsze zagadnienia filozofii nauki; charakterystyka opracowania. (shrink)

The main thesis of this book - written by a well known epistemologist and philosopher of sciences is rather sceptical. Both parties of the conflict defend a complex set of beliefs, both a priori accept many narrow, but controversial assumptions, both often ignore the primary arguments of the opponent.

The relation between bioethics and ethical methodology is the subject of this article. The author is of the opinion that bioethical considerations demand both medical and biological knowledge as well as some general ethical theory. As we know there is not one ethical theory. but many. The author asks whether we have any moral rational foundations for choosing one of the competing ethical systems, and, if this is not possible, whether normative ethics is at all necessary for the solution of (...) practical conflicts. In other words, the author poses the question whether the cultivation of normative ethics. while one is aware of the pluralism of values and variety of ethical theories, has any scientific and practical sense. Still, according to the author methodological relativism need not necessarily imply the acceptance of an axiologically relativistic stand and need not necessarily lead to moral indifference. Beauchamp and Childress work shows a fine approach to bioethical problems. (shrink)

Cet artide présente ľhistoire des institute de ľancienne littérature polonaise et caractérise la spécifité de la méthodologie de recherches sur celte période de la littérature polonaise et caracterise la specifite de la methodologie de recherches sur cette perióde de la littérature polonaise. De plus, ľauteur de cet article donne la revue des manuels de ľhistoire de litterature, consacrés aux siècles passés et montre la place des études sur ľancienne littérature nationale pármi les autres matières universitaires de la filologie polonaise et (...) aussi des sciences suplementaires de ľhistorien de la littérature polonaise. Cet article est achevé par un appel á ľélargissement des connaissances des étudiants dans le domaine de filologie classique. (shrink)

The first part of the article contains a logical reconstruction and a methodological analysis of some aspects of the famous Władysław Witiwcki’s work “Faith of Enlightened”. In particular, the classifications of believers and the principles of these classifications are analyzed; methodological errors committed by Witwicki are indicated. In the second part of the text, Witwicki's distinctions are illustrated by attitudes towards God and faith represented by four representatives of the Lvov-Warsaw School: Kazimierz Twardowski, Jan Łukasiewicz, Tadeusz Kotarbiński, and Józef Maria (...) Bocheński. (shrink)

Autor przeprowadza rozwalanie zmierzające do uchwycenia pewnych metodologicznych i logicznych osobliwości procesu predykcji (procesu naukowego przewidywania). Dla zrealizowania swego zamiaru dyskutuje szczegółowo obiektywne i subiektywne przesłanki procesu predykcji i w oparciu o tę analizę charakteryzuje główne rodzaje przewidywania i ich wewnętrzną strukturę. Dodatkowo, przedyskutowane zostały organicznie związane z przewidywaniem procesy takie, jak np. prognozowanie oraz naukowe wyjaśnianie. Końcowy fragment artykułu, najbardziej moim zdaniem wartościowy, przynosi rozważania dotyczące tzw. modelowego przewidywania.

Author: Werner Maria TITLE: EPISTEMOLOGICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL GROUNDS OF HIPPOLYTE TAINE’S THEORY OF ART (Teoriopoznawcze i metodologiczne podstawy filozofii sztuki Hipolita Taine’a) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2006, vol:.6, number: 2006/1, pages: 223-237 Keywords: TAINE, THEORY OF ART, METHODOLOGY, POSITIVIST PHILOSOPHERS Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail:Taine postulates that the status of the humanities should be equal with that of the sciences. The claim is based on a conviction, shared by other positivist (...) philosophers, that both kinds of knowledge should share the same methodology. Thus, all knowledge turns out to be a collection of facts and relations among them. The facts are subordinate to some major facts being their “causes” or “principal features”. The task of a work of art is to extract such facts. The emergence of the characteristic feature of a phenomenon allows us to describe a work as a perfect one. The value of the work depends on the kind of a characteristic feature, being more or less universal. (shrink)

Stanisław Kamiński (1919-1986) was a philosopher, philosopher of science and historian of science. He defended in 1949 at the Catholic University in Lublin (KUL) his PhD thesis on Frege's axiomatic system of the sentence logic in the light of the contemporary methodology of deductive science. Since 1957 he was the head of the Chair of Methodology (the first one in Poland, founded in 1952 by J. Iwanicki) at the KUL, since 1965 the associate and since 1970 the full professor of (...) KUL. He was for many years the dean of the Faculty of Philosophy KUL where he developed the methodological foundations of the »Lublin-school of philosophy«. The main interests of S. Kamiński (1919-1986) was history of science and logic, general and special methodology, methodology of philosophy and (medieval) semiotics. Himself he saw his main achievements in the domain of the theory of science and the methodology of classical philosophy, especially in the studies of the method and language of metaphysics; he gave a methodological description of general metaphysics, philosophical anthropology, ethics, philosophy of religion, philosophy of history and studies on religion (religiology); he investigated the beginnings of the mathematical induction in the Middle Ages and in modern times, modern history of the theory of definition (Th. Hobbes, B. Pascal, J. Locke, E. B. de Condillac, J. D. Gergonne), the theory of argumentation (reasoning), the structure and the evolution of scientific theory, the deductive method (B. Pascal, G. W. Leibniz, G. Frege), the achievements of logic and philosophy in Poland. A characteristic feature of S. Kamiński's philosophical and methodological approach was a specific historicism, consisting of referring to the heritage of the past and at the same time to the latest achievements in logic and philosophy of science. He looked to history for inspiration, for how to solve his own problems and for a partial confirmation of legitimacy of his answers. He also used history to better understand the context of the discussed problems. His methodological interests are characterized by a philosophical and historical approach. He had a broad concept of knowledge and was maximalist both in raising questions and in giving answers. He cultivated the ideal of rational knowledge. In accordance with classical philosophy he saw the substance of person as ens rationale, a being realizing himself in a disinterested search for a theoretical truth, whose highest expression is philosophy. He stressed the epistemological and methodological plurality of knowledge and distinguished (with Kant) a material and formal part of knowledge, assuming that the formal element manifests itself as the logical form in the formal procedures of the (scientific) cognitive processes, that is in the (scientific) method and the (scientific) language. Making many attempts at a methodological characterization of different types of cognition and knowledge he distinguished – besides commonsense knowledge that lies at the bottom of any other type of knowledge – the scientific, philosophical and theological knowledge. None of them can be reduced to other type of knowledge, because each of them has its own problems, goals and methods. At the top there is a kind of sapiential knowledge which is much more than a simple generalization of all particular kinds of knowledge. S. Kamiński indebted his understanding of science to contemporary philosophy and to the classical philosophy. The nature of science was determined by him from the point view of its subject matter, aims, methods, logical structure and genesis. The question of what science is concerned with, i.e. what is its subject matter, is a philosophical question, it presupposes an appropriate understanding of the nature of the world. S. Kamiński opted for a pluralistic approach to the world: the principal object of science is the objective world but so are subjective states of man and products of his mind and his language. The best diagnostic test of the scientific character of science is the scientific method. Also here – rejecting the scientism (i.e. the view, that the scientific method and knowledge is the pattern and the measure of each knowledge) – S. Kamiński takes a pluralistic attitude. Accepting that the scientific method is not simple, that there is not one uncomplicated ideal way of doing science, and that because of the multiplicity of questions and scientific aims it would be difficult to construct one universal scientific method as a uniform set of rules for every kind of science, S. Kamiński assumes that different subject matter and different goals of scientific cognition require different research strategies and types of cognitive procedures. One manifestation of S. Kamiński's methodological pluralism is his antinaturalistic position in the theory of the humanities where he supported the thesis of their methodological autonomy with regard to natural sciences. Closer to the philosophical cognition and knowledge, the humanities do not meet and can not meet the conditions imposed upon the natural sciences, as they differ from them in subject matter (the world of culture) and hence in method (understanding, interpretation) used. The publications of S. Kamiński include over 350 positions. During his life he published three books: Georgonne'a teoria definicji [Georgonne's Theory of Definition], Lublin 1958; Pojęcie nauki i klasyfikacja nauk [Concept of Science and Classification of Sciences], Lublin 1961, 19813; and [together with M. A. Krąpiec] Z teorii i metodologii metafizyki [On the Theory and Methodology of Metaphysics], Lublin 1962. After his death five volumes of Collected Papers have been published: vol. I: Jak filozofować? [How to Philosophize? Studies in Methodology of Classical Philosophy], edited by Tadeusz Szubka, Lublin 1989; vol. II: Filozofia i metoda. Studia z dziejów metod filozofowania [Philosophy and Method. Studies from the History of the Method of Philosophizing], edited by Józef Herbut, Lublin 1993; vol. III: Metoda i język. Studia z semiotyki i metodologii nauk [Method and Language. Studies in Semiotics and Philosophy of Science], edited by Urszula Żegleń, Lublin 1994; vol. IV: Nauka i metoda. Pojęcie nauki i klasyfikacja nauk [Science and Method. Concept of Science and Classification of Sciences], edited by Andrzej Bronk, Lublin 1992); vol. V: Światopogląd - Religia - Teologia [Worldview - Religion - Theology], edited by Monika Walczak and Andrzej Bronk, Lublin 1998. (shrink)

The main thesis of this book - written by a well known epistemologist and philosopher of sciences is rather sceptical. Both parties of the conflict defend a complex set of beliefs, both a priori accept many narrow, but controversial assumptions, both often ignore the primary arguments of the opponent.