_Anthropic Bias_ explores how to reason when you suspect that your evidence is biased by "observation selection effects"--that is, evidence that has been filtered by the precondition that there be some suitably positioned observer to "have" the evidence. This conundrum--sometimes alluded to as "the anthropic principle," "self-locating belief," or "indexical information"--turns out to be a surprisingly perplexing and intellectually stimulating challenge, one abounding with important implications for many areas in science and philosophy. There are the philosophical thought experiments (...) and paradoxes: the Doomsday Argument; Sleeping Beauty; the Presumptuous Philosopher; Adam & Eve; the Absent-Minded Driver; the Shooting Room. And there are the applications in contemporary science: cosmology ; evolutionary theory ; the problem of time's arrow ; quantum physics ; game-theory problems with imperfect recall ; even traffic analysis. _Anthropic Bias_ argues that the same principles are at work across all these domains. And it offers a synthesis: a mathematically explicit theory of observation selection effects that attempts to meet scientific needs while steering clear of philosophical paradox. (shrink)

_Anthropic Bias_ explores how to reason when you suspect that your evidence is biased by "observation selection effects"--that is, evidence that has been filtered by the precondition that there be some suitably positioned observer to "have" the evidence. This conundrum--sometimes alluded to as "the anthropic principle," "self-locating belief," or "indexical information"--turns out to be a surprisingly perplexing and intellectually stimulating challenge, one abounding with important implications for many areas in science and philosophy. There are the philosophical thought experiments (...) and paradoxes: the Doomsday Argument; Sleeping Beauty; the Presumptuous Philosopher; Adam & Eve; the Absent-Minded Driver; the Shooting Room. And there are the applications in contemporary science: cosmology ; evolutionary theory ; the problem of time's arrow ; quantum physics ; game-theory problems with imperfect recall ; even traffic analysis. _Anthropic Bias_ argues that the same principles are at work across all these domains. And it offers a synthesis: a mathematically explicit theory of observation selection effects that attempts to meet scientific needs while steering clear of philosophical paradox. (shrink)

The seminal work by one of the most important thinkers of the twentieth century, Physics and Philosophy is Werner Heisenberg's concise and accessible narrative of the revolution in modern physics, in which he played a towering role. The outgrowth of a celebrated lecture series, this book remains as relevant, provocative, and fascinating as when it was first published in 1958. A brilliant scientist whose ideas altered our perception of the universe, Heisenberg is considered the father of quantum physics; he (...) is most famous for the Uncertainty Principle, which states that quantum particles do not occupy a fixed, measurable position. His contributions remain a cornerstone of contemporary physics theory and application. Book jacket. (shrink)

In the search for elementary particles, such principles are used as Gell?mann's that ?anything which is possible is compulsory?. This is an example of a teleological principle according to which the scientist tries to realize in science the kind of world that he desires on prior emotional grounds. Mendeleev's classical discovery of the Periodic Law and Table of Elements was thus guided by his mystical values. A mechanistic anti?teleologist such as Jacques Loeb was indeed a crypto?teleologist who wished (...) science to fulfil his radical, socialistic aims. Hoyle's ?perfect cosmological principle? projected conservative values, while such conceptions as Oppenheimer's ?catastrophic collapse?, and Mach's Principle likewise had their teleological bases. Anti?mystical and individualistic values inspired Bridgman's operationism. A ?perfect operational principle? would stipulate that every imaginable state of affairs would be operationally differentiable from others. Teleological principles are essential to the functioning of sciences; in the Theory of Theories, the principle of plenitude may hold: that for every mode of theory, there is some segment of reality for which it provides the best explanation. Naturalistic accounts of basic teleological principles seem inadequate. (shrink)

Explores some steps toward non-assimilative encounters in the "global village.".

Illustrates various basic principles and unifying concepts in the philosophy of science as the author has discovered them in his career.

Comparative political theory is at best an embryonic and marginalized endeavor. As practiced in most Western universities, the study of political theory generally involves a rehearsal of the canon of Western political thought from Plato to Marx. Only rarely are practitioners of political thought willing (and professionally encouraged) to transgress the canon and thereby the cultural boundaries of North America and Europe in the direction of genuine comparative investigation. Border Crossings presents an effort to remedy this situation, fully launching a (...) new era in political theory. Thirteen scholars from around the world examine the various political traditions of West, South, and East Asia and engage in a reflective cross-cultural discussion that belies the assumptions of an Asian "essence" and of an unbridgeable gulf between West and non-West. The denial of essential differences does not, however, amount to an endorsement of essential sameness. As viewed and as practiced by contributors to this ground-breaking volume, comparative political theorizing must steer a course between uniformity and radical separation--this is the path of "border crossings.". (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:388 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Beyond the Edge of Certainty: Essays in Contemporary Science and Philosophy. Edited with an Introduction by Robert G. Colodny. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965.) This is the second volume of lectures on various current topics in the philosophy of the physical, biological, and social sciences which has been published under the auspices of the Center for Philosophy of (...) Science at the University of Pittsburg. Volume I, Frontiers o] Science and Philosophy, also edited by Professor Colodny, appeared in 1962. Five of the seven lectures contained in this volume treat topics which fall within the philosophy of physics. The persistent student who is without a technical background in either logic or physics will find these for the most part quite readable. Considering this, it is worthy of note that, while the lectures are not of uniform quality in this respect, several problems are treated with sufficient freshness of insight to justify the interest of the philosopher of science as such. Since I cannot discuss all of the lectures, I will restrict my comments, for the most part, to those the significance of which I think I understand best and which deal significantly with some aspect of the history of philosophy. In "Newton's First Law: A Philosopher's Door into Natural Philosophy," Norwood Russell Hanson exhibits what has become a widely accepted analysis of Newton's First Law as a model to be applied to theories in science which must be regarded as, in some sense, true, but which, in principle, are not empirically demonstrable. Briant Ellis, in "The Origin and Nature of Newton's Laws of Motion," deals in a somewhat parallel way with all three of Newton's laws of motion. It is argued that these laws are primarily conceptual in origin. Evidence is marshalled that they were derived from Cartesian physics. That no amount of empirical work could establish or provide support for a principle of natural motion is held by Ellis to be due to the fact that "force" is conceived as something that exists only in order to explain effects. "Since we are at liberty to choose to regard whatever changes or states we please as natural (i.e., as not being effects) it follows that the forces which we should say are operative in nature depend upon the choices we actually make" (65). It would, I think be difficult to show that any one of the points Ellis makes, with the exception of his interesting historical note on the probable origin of Newton's laws of motion, has not previously been made. All, or nearly all, of these points were set forth, at least in outline, for example, by William Werkmeister in A Philosophy o] Science. The approach Ellis makes to his development of the concept of "force," however, is both fresh and incisive and worthy of careful study. In "A Philosopher looks at Quantum Mechanics," Hillary Putnam exhibits the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics of Bohr and Heisenberg, viewed in historical perspective, as the most adequate of several unsatisfactory theories. He finds the locus of the problem to lie in a suitable definition of "measurement." Noting that Heisenberg's definition (improperly) appeals to the macrocosm conceived in terms of classical mechanics, he seeks to clarify some of the issues that must follow the attempt to define measurement within the context of quantum mechanics. Putnam holds the relative sharpness of macroobservables for Bohr and Heisenberg to be an underived assumption of their theory. Since the quantities of which macro-observables are supposed to be averages are not (in quantum mechanics) required always to exist, this assumption cannot be derived from a plausible definition of macro-observables together with a suitable formulation of the laws of quantum mechanics. Moving from Bohr and Heisenberg's conclusion that measurement requires interaction of a system (or part of a system) measured with respect to an outside system, and that macroobservables do not exist unless measured, measurement for quantum mechanics is defined as "an interaction in which a system A (the 'measured' system), which was previously isolated, interacts with a system B (the 'measuring' system) in such a way as to cause a... (shrink)

Kant’s philosophy of science takes on sharp contour in terms of his interaction with the practicing life scientists of his day, particularly Johann Blumenbach and the latter’s student, Christoph Girtanner, who in 1796 attempted to synthesize the ideas of Kant and Blumenbach. Indeed, Kant’s engagement with the life sciences played a far more substantial role in his transcendental philosophy than has been recognized hitherto. The theory of epigenesis, especially in light of Kant’s famous analogy in the first (...) Critique, posed crucial questions regarding the ‘looseness of fit’ between the constitutive and the regulative in Kant’s theory of empirical law. A detailed examination of Kant’s struggle with epigenesis between 1784 and 1790 demonstrates his grave reservations about its hylozoist implications, leading to his even stronger insistence on the discrimination of constitutive from regulative uses of reason. The continuing relevance of these issues for Kant’s philosophy of science is clear from the work of Buchdahl and its contemporary reception. (shrink)

Understanding Institutions proposes a new unified theory of social institutions that combines the best insights of philosophers and social scientists who have written on this topic. Francesco Guala presents a theory that combines the features of three influential views of institutions: as equilibria of strategic games, as regulative rules, and as constitutive rules. -/- Guala explains key institutions like money, private property, and marriage, and develops a much-needed unification of equilibrium- and rules-based approaches. Although he uses game theory concepts, the (...) theory is presented in a simple, clear style that is accessible to a wide audience of scholars working in different fields. Outlining and discussing various implications of the unified theory, Guala addresses venerable issues such as reflexivity, realism, Verstehen, and fallibilism in the social sciences. He also critically analyses the theory of “looping effects” and “interactive kinds” defended by Ian Hacking, and asks whether it is possible to draw a demarcation between social and natural science using the criteria of causal and ontological dependence. Focusing on current debates about the definition of marriage, Guala shows how these abstract philosophical issues have important practical and political consequences. -/- Moving beyond specific cases to general models and principles, Understanding Institutions offers new perspectives on what institutions are, how they work, and what they can do for us. (shrink)

Universalism in science, when conceived in methodological terms, leads to the problem of the limits of science. On the one hand, there is “methodological imperialism” which in principle involves a form of universalism. On the other hand, there is the multivariate complexity – structural and dynamic, as well as epistemological and ontological – which represents a huge problem for methodological universalism, as may be seen with the obstacles for scientific prediction. Within the context of the limits of (...) class='Hi'>science, there is a better understanding of the issues of expansionism and imperialism. 1. Varieties of Methodological Universalism 1.1. Levels of Methodological Analysis 1.2. The Historical Dimension 2. The Limits for Methodological Universalism: The Problem of Complexity 2.1. Obstacles to Methodological Universalism Due to Complexity 2.2. Methodological Universalism and the Obstacles to Predictors from the Angle of Complexity 3. Coda: Limits of Science, Expansionism and Imperialism. (shrink)

I argue that Émilie Du Châtelet breaks with Christian Wolff regarding the scope and epistemological content of the principle of sufficient reason, despite his influence on her basic ontology and their agreement that the principle of sufficient reason has foundational importance. These differences have decisive consequences for the ways in which Du Châtelet and Wolff conceive of science.

In the first part of the paper, three objections to the precautionary principle are outlined: the principle requires some account of how to balance risks of significant harms; the principle focuses on action and ignores the costs of inaction; and the principle threatens epistemic anarchy. I argue that these objections may overlook two distinctive features of precautionary thought: a suspicion of the value of “full scientific certainty”; and a desire to distinguish environmental doings from allowings. In Section 2, I argue (...) that any simple distinction between environmental doings and allowings is untenable. However, I argue that the appeal of such a distinction can be captured within a relational account of environmental equity. In Section 3 I show how the proposed account of environmental justice can generate a justification for distinctively “precautionary” policy-making. (shrink)

QUINE'S DOCTRINE of the indeterminacy of translation is made possible by the principle of substitution characteristic of extensional logic. The same characteristic makes it impossible, in philosophy of science, to choose among theoretical models no one of which is obviously best suited to explain the facts. Hilary Putnam achieved a sort of closure to the problem of reference in philosophy of science, when he pointed out the implications of the Skolem-Löwenheim theorem. He said that besides the (...) facts a theory is designed to explain, there are any number of unintended interpretations of the same theory that assign the correct truth values to all sentences of the theory. There can be no sound basis for deciding upon the sole interpretation for a theory. Following Putnam, some philosophers have abandoned the problem of reference in the context of axiomatic systems. Ian Hacking, for instance, prefers a notion of reference "that is not tied by any specific, binding theory about what is referred to." He has turned to the study of approximations and practical models, spurred on by the difficulty of reconciling axiomatic systems to scientific practice. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Jahrbuch für Wissenschaft und Ethik Jahrgang: 20 Heft: 1 Seiten: 293-302.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:388 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Beyond the Edge of Certainty: Essays in Contemporary Science and Philosophy. Edited with an Introduction by Robert G. Colodny. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965.) This is the second volume of lectures on various current topics in the philosophy of the physical, biological, and social sciences which has been published under the auspices of the Center for Philosophy of (...) Science at the University of Pittsburg. Volume I, Frontiers o] Science and Philosophy, also edited by Professor Colodny, appeared in 1962. Five of the seven lectures contained in this volume treat topics which fall within the philosophy of physics. The persistent student who is without a technical background in either logic or physics will find these for the most part quite readable. Considering this, it is worthy of note that, while the lectures are not of uniform quality in this respect, several problems are treated with sufficient freshness of insight to justify the interest of the philosopher of science as such. Since I cannot discuss all of the lectures, I will restrict my comments, for the most part, to those the significance of which I think I understand best and which deal significantly with some aspect of the history of philosophy. In "Newton's First Law: A Philosopher's Door into Natural Philosophy," Norwood Russell Hanson exhibits what has become a widely accepted analysis of Newton's First Law as a model to be applied to theories in science which must be regarded as, in some sense, true, but which, in principle, are not empirically demonstrable. Briant Ellis, in "The Origin and Nature of Newton's Laws of Motion," deals in a somewhat parallel way with all three of Newton's laws of motion. It is argued that these laws are primarily conceptual in origin. Evidence is marshalled that they were derived from Cartesian physics. That no amount of empirical work could establish or provide support for a principle of natural motion is held by Ellis to be due to the fact that "force" is conceived as something that exists only in order to explain effects. "Since we are at liberty to choose to regard whatever changes or states we please as natural (i.e., as not being effects) it follows that the forces which we should say are operative in nature depend upon the choices we actually make" (65). It would, I think be difficult to show that any one of the points Ellis makes, with the exception of his interesting historical note on the probable origin of Newton's laws of motion, has not previously been made. All, or nearly all, of these points were set forth, at least in outline, for example, by William Werkmeister in A Philosophy o] Science. The approach Ellis makes to his development of the concept of "force," however, is both fresh and incisive and worthy of careful study. In "A Philosopher looks at Quantum Mechanics," Hillary Putnam exhibits the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics of Bohr and Heisenberg, viewed in historical perspective, as the most adequate of several unsatisfactory theories. He finds the locus of the problem to lie in a suitable definition of "measurement." Noting that Heisenberg's definition (improperly) appeals to the macrocosm conceived in terms of classical mechanics, he seeks to clarify some of the issues that must follow the attempt to define measurement within the context of quantum mechanics. Putnam holds the relative sharpness of macroobservables for Bohr and Heisenberg to be an underived assumption of their theory. Since the quantities of which macro-observables are supposed to be averages are not (in quantum mechanics) required always to exist, this assumption cannot be derived from a plausible definition of macro-observables together with a suitable formulation of the laws of quantum mechanics. Moving from Bohr and Heisenberg's conclusion that measurement requires interaction of a system (or part of a system) measured with respect to an outside system, and that macroobservables do not exist unless measured, measurement for quantum mechanics is defined as "an interaction in which a system A (the 'measured' system), which was previously isolated, interacts with a system B (the 'measuring' system) in such a way as to cause a... (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Jahrbuch für Wissenschaft und Ethik Jahrgang: 20 Heft: 1 Seiten: 237-240.

First published in 1931 and originally delivered as the Deems Lectures at New York University in 1929, this book examines what scientific discoveries in many different branches of science reveal, and the implications of such discoveries for philosophy. Esteemed philosopher F. S. C. Northrop surveys a variety of advances, including relativity and quantum mechanics, and how they correlate to his epistemological theory of concepts. This book will be of value to anyone with an interest in the history of (...) science and the connection between science and philosophy. (shrink)

I first quickly outline what I think grasping is, and suggest that it is both among our basic aims of inquiry and not essentially tied to belief, justification, or knowledge. Then, I briefly look at some places in the metaphysics of science in which it looks like our aim of grasping and our aim in knowing—or perhaps more specifically in knowing the explanations for things—might seem to conflict. I will use this conflict to support a broader view: sometimes, we (...) might develop philosophical views or theories—and even endorse them—in order to better grasp them, regardless of whether we genuinely believe them, or are justified in so doing. At other times, we may be aiming at propositional knowledge. These aims can come apart, and perhaps even systematically come apart. A pluralism about the value of those aims doesn’t entail an “anything goes” attitude with respect to how we think about what philosophical views to put forward, defend, or endorse, however—far from it. Instead, it suggests that what counts as a virtue of a philosophical theory depends on our aims in espousing it. If philosophers have distinct aims at the meta-level, it will be hard for them to engage in joint theory evaluation at the first-order level. At least all three of theoretical virtues, evaluative judgments of philosophical views, and what attitudes we ought to have towards the views we ourselves espouse will vary according to our guiding metaphilosophical aims. (shrink)

QUINE'S DOCTRINE of the indeterminacy of translation is made possible by the principle of substitution characteristic of extensional logic. The same characteristic makes it impossible, in philosophy of science, to choose among theoretical models no one of which is obviously best suited to explain the facts. Hilary Putnam achieved a sort of closure to the problem of reference in philosophy of science, when he pointed out the implications of the Skolem-Löwenheim theorem. He said that besides the (...) facts a theory is designed to explain, there are any number of unintended interpretations of the same theory that assign the correct truth values to all sentences of the theory. There can be no sound basis for deciding upon the sole interpretation for a theory. Following Putnam, some philosophers have abandoned the problem of reference in the context of axiomatic systems. Ian Hacking, for instance, prefers a notion of reference "that is not tied by any specific, binding theory about what is referred to." He has turned to the study of approximations and practical models, spurred on by the difficulty of reconciling axiomatic systems to scientific practice. (shrink)

Thomas Hobbes based his natural philosophy on definitions and general principles of matter in motion, which he refrained from calling “laws of nature.” Across the channel, René Descartes had presented his own account of matter in motion in such a way that laws of nature play a central causal-explanatory role. Despite some notable differences in the two systems of natural philosophy, the content of the three Cartesian laws of nature is shared by Hobbesian principles of motion. (...) Why is it the case that Hobbes never ‘transferred’ the concept of law of nature from the sphere of civil society to the realm of nature? What is the status of the Hobbesian principles of motion if they are not laws? Answering these questions is the main aim of this article. It is shown that Hobbes made available an importantly different and genuinely original way to do natural philosophy, which renders it free of metaphysics and eschews the need to ground it in anything other than ‘natural reason’. Briefly put, Hobbes took the category of ‘laws of nature’ to involve commitments that cannot be met in the natural world, unless natural philosophy loses its autonomy from theology and metaphysics. (shrink)

James VI and I united the crowns of England and Scotland. His books are fundamental sources of the principles which underlay the union. In particular, his Basilikon Doron was a best-seller in England and circulated widely on the Continent. Among the most important and influential British writings of their period, the king's works shed light on the political climate of Shakespeare's England and the intellectual background to the civil wars which afflicted Britain in the mid-seventeenth century. James' political (...) class='Hi'>philosophy was a moderated absolutism, with an emphasis on the monarch's duty to rule according to law and the public good. Locke quoted his speech to parliament of 1610 approvingly, and Hobbes likewise praised 'our most wise king'. This edition is the first to draw on all the early texts of James' books, with an introduction setting them in their historical context. (shrink)

A theorem due to Bob Geroch and Pong Soo Jang ["Motion of a Body in General Relativity." Journal of Mathematical Physics 16, ] provides a sense in which the geodesic principle has the status of a theorem in General Relativity. I have recently shown that a similar theorem holds in the context of geometrized Newtonian gravitation [Weatherall, J. O. "The Motion of a Body in Newtonian Theories." Journal of Mathematical Physics 52, ]. Here I compare the interpretations of these two (...) theorems. I argue that despite some apparent differences between the theorems, the status of the geodesic principle in geometrized Newtonian gravitation is, mutatis mutandis, strikingly similar to the relativistic case. (shrink)

In the article, the organic principle of the Euroasian philosophy is studied. The organic principle acts as a basis of special style of thinking and a certain methodology of scientific knowledge here. The Euroasian methodology of studying of development of society allows establishing of the nature of communications between social processes and the phenomena of wildlife. In the article, the most important components of the Euroasian organic principle of thinking are shown: special terminology and possibilities of its application for (...) the description and forecasting of the social phenomena. Prerequisites of change of the style of thinking dominating in modern science are also noted. The author considers advantages of the organic principle of the Euroasian methodology in solution of national political, social-economic and cultural problems and in possible prospects of its use for formation of scientific methodology. The organic principle of thinking creates complex idea of reality, which can appear before us new, party unknown earlier. Lack of division of sensual experience and ‘pure reason‘, irrational and rational in organic thinking is unconditional advantage of organic approach. Organic principle presented by the Euroasian philosophical organization of the beginning of the twentieth century and continued by Lev Gumilev in the theory of ethnogenesis acts as alternative developed in the west of one-dimensional, mechanistic methodology. It can be told with confidence that owning all of variety of intellectual traditions is necessary for the modern humankind to become capable to realize global ecological threats and negative consequences of influence of culture in which ethics of individualism prevails. (shrink)

I distinguish three ways in which early modern rationalists seek to apply the principle of sufficient reason to empirical science, and critically assess some of their attempts to do so. I focus especially on how these thinkers assume substantive theories of explanation and intelligibility--which are indebted to the mechanist and experimentalist traditions--in many of their deployments of this rationalist principle. A recurring problem is that these philosophers deploy their standards of intelligibility inconsistently: some of their own favored explanations do (...) not always live up to their standards. I argue that the problem is especially acute for Leibniz and Euler, given their enthusiasm for final-causal explanations. (shrink)

The article deals with the problem of how production of scientific knowledge transforms nowadays. It is shown that current situation puts forward problem of integration different types of knowledge (not only scientific) – both for producing general meanings, and scientific knowledge. This problem is reflected in several conceptions in the philosophy of science: postacademic science, technoscience, transdisciplinarity. The author pays attention to an idea to be found in these conceptions and some current basic and applied studies; she (...) calls it “the principle of participation”. A few embodiments of this principle are brought out, its conceptual core is revealed, epistemological questions this principle generates in respect to scientific knowledge are defined and some of them are considered in the article: what is a mechanism for aggregating dispersed knowledge? what is the difference between dispersed knowledge and dispersed information? who is the agent of such forms of production of knowledge as Delphi, scientific crowdsourcing, civic science and foresight? Several strategies of knowledge production in modern science (both academic and postacademic) are revealed, two versions of the principle of participation are proposed. (shrink)

The era in which Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī emerged as a canonical scientist significantly contributed to his education and shaped his scientific worldview. The formation of al-Farabi’s spiritual worldview and his ideas is directly associated with embracing the ancient philosophical tradition, more precisely, Aristotle’s philosophy and logic. The focus of the article is alFarabi’s analysis of Aristotle’s principles in the study of logic and their further development. Al-Farabi’s worldwide reputation as the Second Teacher after Aristotle, the First Teacher, in (...) the East is directly rooted in his mastery and advancement of the science of logic. In simple terms, the philosopher states that logic leads a person to a straight path to being capable of radically discerning between good and bad, truth and lies, and honesty and deceit. This, in turn, steers humanity away from succumbing to mistakes or getting into trouble. Al-Farabi constructs a comprehensive scientific analysis of the socio-cultural foundations of Aristotle’s doctrine of logic and the ability to adapt it in his unique way to society. The study of the theoretical basis of al-Farabi’s teachings on logic and its significance involves employing hermeneutic, comparative, and stylistic methods in the research of the texts. (shrink)

The concept of emergence has seen a significant resurgence in philosophy and the sciences, yet debates regarding emergentist and reductionist visions of the natural world continue to be hampered by imprecision or ambiguity. Emergent phenomena are said to arise out of and be sustained by more basic phenomena, while at the same time exerting a "top-down" control upon those very sustaining processes. To some critics, this has the air of magic, as it seems to suggest a kind of circular (...) causality. Other critics deem the concept of emergence to be objectionably anti-naturalistic. Objections such as these have led many thinkers to construe emergent phenomena instead as coarse-grained patterns in the world that, while calling for distinctive concepts, do not "disrupt" the ordinary dynamics of the finer-grained (more fundamental) levels. Yet, reconciling emergence with a (presumed) pervasive causal continuity at the fundamental level can seem to deflate emergence of its initially profound significance. This basic problematic is mirrored by similar controversy over how best to characterize the opposite systematizing impulse, most commonly given an equally evocative but vague term, "reductionism." The original essays in this volume help to clarify the alternatives: inadequacies in some older formulations and arguments are exposed and new lines of argument on behalf the two visions are advanced. (shrink)

The first three chapters are personal history, highly picturesque and amusing, illumined by flashes of his lively humor....From here the chapters go on into Philosophy, Education, and Science. covering a span of thrity years though these writings do, they are surprizingly unified. Atlantic.

In this article author considers the problem of epistemology of historical knowledge. Author doesn't accept the neo-kantianism theory. He makes an attempt to differ the two forms of unitarization of scientific knowledge — theoretization and the principle of holism and, hence, the two forms of the theoretical consideration of history. The author insists that the Marxists approach seems to be the most relevant from this point of view. Thus, he defends the thesis that the idealistic concepts are much vulnerable comparing (...) with the materialistic approaches. (shrink)

The subject of this study is the problem of the failure of attempts by the scientific community to come to a common understanding of what exactly information can be as something encoded into material structures and moved along with them. At the same time, the following aspects of this problem are considered in detail: what is the immediate cause of the information problem; what are the objective and subjective prerequisites for its appearance; why the unresolved nature of this problem does (...) not interfere with the creation and development of communication systems, control and other "smart" devices; is there any general guideline for finding solutions to such problems, and what is it; what role did the philosophy of information play in turning the problem of information from a private scientific problem into a problem of the ideological level. The main results of the conducted research are as follows: the immediate cause of the information problem has been identified and a comprehensively substantiated solution to this problem has been given; it has been revealed that the incompleteness of the materialistic theory of cognition has become a fertile ground for the appearance of this problem; the circumstances that prevented its completion have been identified; the natural mechanism of control and cognition has been revealed, as a result of which the materialistic theory of cognition has been further developed the source of the ideal in the material world is revealed; it is shown that the mechanistic idea of information coding made the concept of information incompatible with the presence of any objective content; it is revealed what is actually hidden behind the words about information coding and its measurement; the nature of signals and signs is revealed; a kind of bias of the philosophy of information and a general error is revealed all known concepts of information. (shrink)

The term ‘Empiricism’ has had at least two different, though not unconnected, applications in modern thought, one to scientific method and the other to philosophical theory. My intention in this lecture is to try to show that, while these two applications of the term have a common source, their actual referents are widely divergent and in large measure even mutually incompatible.

The first task of the philosophy of nature -- The problem of elementarity -- The philosophical myth of creation : the Platonic philosophy of nature -- Aristotle's Physics -- Aristotle's method of cosmological speculation -- Descartes' mechanism -- Isaac Newton and the mathematical principles of natural philosophy -- The world of Leibniz : the best of all possible worlds -- Immanuel Kant : the a priori conditions of the sciences -- The romantic philosophy of nature (...) -- The cosmology of Whitehead: the universe as process -- Popper's open universe -- Science as philosophy -- Problems and methods of the philosophy of nature. (shrink)

It has been maintained, by both philosophers and modern scientists, that the two domains of discourse of science and of philosophy are disjoint Though admitting that many physicists subscribed to metaphysical principles, it was claimed - by Duhem and Reichenbach among others - that the scientist's philosophical convictions play, or should play, no role in his scientific work. The present paper attempts to refute this separatist view by showing that Einstein's metaphysical realism - coupled with his Platonistic (...) panmathematicism - played a crucial role in his construction of the Relativity Programme and in his criticism of Quantum Mechanics. The article also shows that although Einstein was neither a strict Humean nor a strict Machian, his phenomenalist interpretation of the empirical basis proved to be an antidote against both conventionalist scepticism and Neurath's coherence theory of truth. /// Tanto filósofos como cientistas têm defendido a ideia de que os domínios discursivos da Ciência e da Filosofia seguem caminhos separados. Mesmo admitindo que muitos cientistas subscreveram princípios metafísicos, a ideia tem sido defendida - por Duhem e Reichenbach, entre outros - de que as convicções filosóficas do cientista não desempenham, ou deveriam não desempenhar, qualquer papel no seu trabalho científico. O objectivo do presente artigo é refutar esta visão separatista das coisas mostrando de que modo o realismo metafísico de Einstein - associado ao seu panmatematicismo platónico - desempenhou um papel crucial na sua construção do Programa da Relatividade e nas suas críticas à Mecânica Quântica. O artigo mostra igualmente que embora Einstein não fosse nem um Humeano estrito nem um estrito Macheano, a sua interpretação fenomenalista da base empírica demonstrou ser um antídoto quer contra o cepticismo convencionalista quer contra a teoria da coerência da verdade de Neurath. (shrink)

Grand debates over reduction and emergence are playing out across the sciences, but these debates have reached a stalemate, with both sides declaring victory on empirical grounds. In this book, Carl Gillett provides new theoretical frameworks with which to understand these debates, illuminating both the novel positions of scientific reductionists and emergentists and the recent empirical advances that drive these new views. Gillett also highlights the flaws in existing philosophical frameworks and reorients the discussion to reflect the new scientific advances (...) and issues, including the nature of 'parts' and 'wholes', the character of aggregation, and thus the continuity of nature itself. Most importantly, Gillett shows how disputes about concrete scientific cases are empirically resolvable and hence how we can break the scientific stalemate. Including a detailed glossary of key terms, this volume will be valuable for researchers and advanced students of the philosophy of science and metaphysics, and scientific researchers working in the area. (shrink)