In 1830, members of the Belgian National Congress asserted that they would not attempt to create an ideal constitution. Rather, they wanted to frame a constitution which would take the existing order into account, which would be adapted to Belgian manners and customs. Their ‘pragmatic conservatism’, as it can be described in distinction to Burke's juridical conservatism, was to an important degree inspired by the writings of Montesquieu. Both the discussion on the monarchy and the debate on the senate were (...) influenced by the Esprit des lois. Indirectly, the debates in the National Congress give evidence of the enormous influence of the Esprit des lois on political thought in the Restoration period. (shrink)

To appear in Jean-Yves Béziau (ed.) Proc. First World Congress on the Square of Opposition.

This is the second of two voumes designed to document a trend in Norwegian philosophy away from the empirical semantics represented by Arne Naess towards a more pragmatic and transcendental perspective. A number of the contributed essays examine the controversy between Wittgenstein and the philosophies of Habermas and Apel.

Taking user’s role and features as milestones for an approach on scientific representation has become a growing trend. We shall investigate the implications that pragmatics bring in the relevant debate. Proponents of pragmatic approaches support that questions such as ‘how an object represents another’ or ‘which features of a certain object represent the target of the representation and in what way’ can be answered only within the given context of representation’s use. Thus, attention is drawn to the intentionality of (...) the representation, in contrast to the semantic tradition, according to which the representational function is based on morphic relations between the representation and the represented object. Given that scientific representations surrogate objects and phenomena in our studies, they should reproduce aspects, relations and interactions of them, possessing the appropriate features. Therefore, we support that user’s intention is not enough to build the representational relation on it. We claim that a) a sustainable and successful theory of scientific representations cannot be grounded on pragmatics b) pragmatic approaches undermine the objectivity of the knowledge inferred by representations c) the important role of the cognizing subject in a theory of scientific representation can be rescued without the burden coming with pragmatic approaches. (shrink)

Religious pluralism (the view that all the great world religions are equally true) is largely motivated by the fear that religious exclusivism ( the view that there is just one correct religion) leads to intolerance and oppression of those holding differing religious views. I claim that this suggests a false dichotomy: either be a tolerant pluralist or an intolerant exclusivist. I argue, first, that the seventeenth-century doctrine of toleration supports the claim that exclusivists of differing sects can peacefully coexist and, (...) second, that religious pluralism has harmful consequences. Exclusivism (tempered by toleration) is the best solution to the challenge of religious diversity. (shrink)

The Indian philosophers lay emphasis on mind-control. Mind-control is not only negative practice. For, we are not only required to check and curb our evil tendencies but also employ them for a better purpose. The lower constituents of human beings can not be annihilated but can only be tamed and reformed. Cessation of bad tendencies is coupled with cultivation of good tendencies and is followed by good actions. According to Jainism & Buddhism, the path of liberation from sufferings starts with (...) mind-control. The Jainas emphasize on right faith, right knowledge and right conduct which are regarded as Triratnas, three Jewels. Right conduct consists in abstinence from injury, falsehood, stealing, self-indulgence and attachment. According to Buddhism, way to Nirvan (cessation from suffering) consists in eight-fold path which is nothing but self-control. It starts from right views, right determination and right speech and proceeds through right conduct to right livelihood to right effort and to right mindfulness. This process of self-control finally culminates in right concentration. The Upanishadic thinkers and the systems based on Upanishadic traditions have also recognised the importance of self-control. In view of the importance of mind-control in familial, social, moral and spiritual lives we should consistently and constantly make endeavour to practice mind-control and should fight despondency with enthusiasm in the event of some initial failures. (shrink)

This paper proposes a re-evaluation of the theism vs. atheism controversy from a Kantian transcendental perspective, connected with Jamesian pragmatism. Insofar as there is a morally vital human need to postulate the reality of God, and insofar as this theistic postulation can be regarded as rational or legitimate from the perspective of “practical reason”, metaphysical and ethical aspects of the theism issue turn out to be deeply entangled with each other. A Kantian-cum-pragmatist philosophy of religion will inevitably approach the question (...) of God’s existence from a standpoint that thoroughly synthesizes ethics and metaphysics – just as Kant’s defense of theism as a postulate of practical reason did. (shrink)

It is a commonplace that, in everyday life, we compare different people’s preferences with respect to content and strength. We typically make such comparisons with relatively little difficulty. Furthermore, we often do not find inter-personal comparisons of preferences more difficult than intra-personal comparisons, that is,comparisons involving our own preferences. This contrasts with the difficulties that comparing preferences across individuals pose at the theoretical level. Since preferences are typically represented numerically through a utility function, the problem is known as the problem (...) of interpersonal utility comparisons (IUCs for short). In this paper, I examine the most common solution to the problem of IUCs. According to it, we can assume that preferences are interpersonally comparable on pragmatic grounds (i.e. explanatory power, parsimony and simplicity) I argue that, contrary to our intuitions, the assumption of interpersonal comparability is not pragmatically advantageous. I conclude that this strategy to solve the problem of IUCs fails. (shrink)

Tarski’s assessment that natural language is inconsistent on account of the Liar Paradox is shown to be incorrect: what Tarski’s theorem in fact shows is that Truth is not a property of sentences but of propositions. By using propositions rather than sentences as the bearers of Truth, semantic closure within the same language is easily obtained. Tarski’s contrary assessment was partly based on confusions about propositions and their grammatical expression. But more centrally it arose through blindness to pragmatic factors in (...) language — a blindness that was common in his time, and it has continued to the present day, in discussions of ‘Open Pairs’, and Yablo-type paradoxes, for instance. For completeness, it is also shown that the Fixed Point Theorem does not apply to propositions, because of categorical differences between sentences and propositions — also predicates and properties. (shrink)

Academic studies of Chinese Buddhist views of language generally focus on issues such as paradox, contradiction, and the limits of expression and thought. However, such studies seldom seem to focus on the fact that many Buddhist texts deliberately use an ambiguous mode of linguistic expression, one that actually constitutes their compositional patterns and is designed to enhance and promote the Mahāyāna Buddhist soteriological goal—namely, liberation from suffering via detachment from falseness. In fact, many of the Chinese masters’ treatises and exegetical (...) commentaries develop a textual pragmatics rooted in the ambiguous and paradoxical rhetoric of early Madhyamaka scriptures translated by Kumārajīva. This paper discusses the philosophical and soteriological significance of such a linguistic pragmatics as we find it in the early Chinese Madhyamaka scriptures. The Buddhist doctrines such as “the two truths of the conventional and ultimate,” “emptiness,” “non-duality,” “differentiation,” as well as “the middle way” are the focus of the present paper. (shrink)

Religious pluralism (the view that all the great world religions are equally true) is largely motivated by the fear that religious exclusivism ( the view that there is just one correct religion) leads to intolerance and oppression of those holding differing religious views. I claim that this suggests a false dichotomy: either be a tolerant pluralist or an intolerant exclusivist. I argue, first, that the seventeenth-century doctrine of toleration supports the claim that exclusivists of differing sects can peacefully coexist and, (...) second, that religious pluralism has harmful consequences. Exclusivism (tempered by toleration) is the best solution to the challenge of religious diversity. (shrink)

Research on the human embryo is one of the most obstinately controversial issues of international bioethical debate. There has not been enough of a consensus on this issue to allow for more than a formal compromise within Europe. I argue in this paper for a pragmatic approach to the problem which accords priority to "want-regarding" considerations but does not fail, as most utilitarian approaches do, to give due weight to the "morality-dependent harms" caused by the practice of embryo research to (...) those rejecting it from other than want-regarding principles. I suggest that in deeply controversial bioethical issues a consistent want-regarding perspective should be prepared, under certain narrow conditions, to make pragmatic tradeoffs between the inherent merits of the practice in question and the averse emotions of the public. These conditions are that the averse emotions are widespread, felt to be of existential importance, and stable under additional information, and that the costs in terms of reduced freedom and foregone humane progress do not seem excessive. (shrink)

Logic and linguistics have engaged in a many-faceted dialogue since the very beginnings of both disciplines in Antiquity. While participants may have had diverse views over the ages, arguably, the dialogue has always revolved around the relationship between human thought and natural language. While there are those who see these two domains as one and the same, or as a case of one-directional influence , we beg to differ. To us, the long historical tradition of authors such as Arnauld, Boole, (...) Turing, or Jespersen demonstrates the much richer perspectives on language and reasoning that are needed, including connections with intelligence and computability.Another major historical theme in the above dialogue are similarities or convergences between natural and artificial languages. It is clear that natural languages are not only semantically broader, but also much closer to human communication than artificial languages, and so linguistic grammars have long dealt with a larger set of problems than logical formalism. This specal issue of JoLLI consists six selected papers presented in the "Logic and Linguisics" Workshop in UNI-LOG 2013 in Rio de Janeiro, plus two papers by invited authors: Johan van Benthem, and Marcus Kracht and Uno Klein. It contains a number of samples of what is intriguing and promising work at the interfaces of logic and language. (shrink)

At the seventh international congress of Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, held at Salzburg in 1983, I was talking with John Searle when I glanced at my watch and exclaimed, I must run. I'm due to solve the problem of induction at 2.15. ‘Yes,’ he replied, I must go too; I'm due to solve the mind-body problem. I don't know how seriously he meant his remark, but I did actually believe that I had cracked this old problem in the (...) Epilogue of my Science and Scepticism,1 the manuscript of which was then with the publisher. In that book I drew a sharp distinction between the problem which faces a theoretical scientist trying to select, out of several competing theories, the one that best fulfils the aim of science, and the pragmatic problem which faces an applied scientist or practical decision-maker trying to select, out of several competing hypotheses, the one that offers the best guidance. I had what I still regard as a viable solution to the theoreticians problem. It aid that theoreticians should prefer that theory, if there is one, that is the best corroborated; for on a certain non-trivial but uncontroversial assumption about what kinds of test have been made, the best corroborated theory will best satisfy what I claimed to be the optimum aim for science: it will be deeper and wider than its rivals and, moreover, possibly true, given all the reported outcomes of tests in its field. For present purposes we can forget the explications I offered for ‘deeper’ and ‘wider’. As to ‘possibly true’: this reflects the abandonment of hopes that science can arrive at theories that are certainly true, or at least have a high probability of being true, or at the very least have had their probability raised by the experimental evidence. (shrink)

Randomized controlled trials test new drugs using various debiasing devices to prevent participants from manipulating the trials. But participants often dislike controls, arguing that they impose a paternalist constraint on their legitimate preferences. The 21st Century Cures Act, passed by US Congress in 2016, encourages the Food and Drug Administration to use alternative testing methods, incorporating participants’ preferences, for regulatory purposes. We discuss, from a historical perspective, the trade-off between trial impartiality and participants’ freedom. We argue that the only way (...) out is considering which methods improve upon the performance of conventional trials in keeping dangerous or inefficacious compounds out of pharmaceutical markets. (shrink)

A volume of studies in natural language semantics which brings together work by philosophers, logicians and linguists. The main topics treated are: quantification and reference in natural language; the relations between formal logic, programming languages and natural language; pragmatics and discourse meaning; surface syntax and logical meaning. The volume derives from a colloquium organised in 1973 by the Kings College Research Centre, Cambridge and the papers have been edited for publication by Professor Keenan. It is hoped that the collection (...) will make available some of the best work in this fast-moving field and will stimulate further progress by juxtaposing the different approaches and interests represented here. (shrink)

This volume contains selected contributions to the interdisciplinary symposium on 'Models of Meaning' held in Varna, September 25-28, 1988, under the auspices of the Institute of the Bulgarian Language of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences. The aim of the meeting was to broaden the horizons of meaning research and the modeling of linguistic semantics, with contributions centering on the appropriate modeling of lexical, syntactic, and textual-semantic representations. The papers challenge some basic notions of semantics and reveal two main avenues of (...) development in contemporary investigations. One is toward broadening the scope of investigativeness, the second is toward a greater domain-specificity as expressed in a greater sensitivity to pragmatics and meta-pragmatic concerns. (shrink)

In 1927, Walter Lippmann published The Phantom Public, denouncing the ‘mystical fallacy of democracy.’ Decrying romantic democratic models that privilege self-governance, he writes: “I have not happened to meet anybody, from a President of the United States to a professor of political science, who came anywhere near to embodying the accepted ideal of the sovereign and omnicompetent citizen.” Almost 90 years later, Lippmann’s pragmatism is as relevant as ever, and should be applied in new contexts where similar self-governance concerns persist. (...) This paper does just that, repurposing Lippmann’s argument in the context of the ongoing debate over the role of the digital citizen in Big Data management. It is argued that proposals by the Federal Trade Commission, the White House and the US Congress, championing failed notice and choice privacy policy, perpetuate a self-governance fallacy comparable to Lippmann’s, referred to here as the fallacy of data privacy self-management. Even if the digital citizen had the faculties and the system for data privacy self-management, the digital citizen has little time for data governance. We desire the freedom to pursue the ends of digital production, without being inhibited by the means. We want privacy, and safety, but cannot complete all that is required for its protection. If it is true that the fallacy of democracy is similar to the fallacy of data privacy self-management, then perhaps the pragmatic solution is representative data management: a combination of non/for-profit digital dossier management via infomediaries that can ensure the protection of personal data, while freeing individuals from what Lippmann referred to as an ‘unattainable ideal.’. (shrink)

It is expected that industrial heritage actually tells the story of the emerging capitalism highlighting the dynamic social relationship between the “workers” and the owners of the “production means”. In current times of economic crisis, it may even involve a painful past with lost social, civil, gender and/or class struggles, a depressing present with abandoned, fragmented, degraded landscapes and ravaged factories, and a hopeless future for the former workers of the local (not only) society; or just a conquerable ground for (...) controversial investments. This is certainly an emotionally charged subject matter, with multiple readings and interpretations. However, this view is only partial when facing landscape during its historical evolution process. A diachronic study, thus, embraces all resources that probably gave rise to a variety of human activities; all of them embody heritage values -“subjectively” or “objectively” perceived- their evaluation, though, is a matter of an on-going process of the civil society. Greece's landscape accommodates a diversity of diachronic productive practices that may overlap historical periods, technological evolutions and social transformations. Pre-, early and industrial exploitation of resources does not remain firm but vary according to time and the needs of each society. The comparative scale of certain resource exploitation is highlighted as the key for the assessment methodology in close relation to the specific frame of a local landscape and a historical period. Even though archaeological evidence may possibly reveal and document continuity in a range of sustainable productive processes without conflicts, great controversies emerge when new investments are “offered” as an antidote to economic crisis -not harmonized to the local scale, traumatizing thus the “spirit” of the landscape. Suggestions for incompatible productive use and investment planning imply irreversible and irreparable effects on the environment, society and economy of a region and are only faced through social awareness. Case studies of passive and/or active involvement of local communities, in synthesizing and enhance landscape’s “spirit”, its diachronic industrial heritage and the embedded tangible and intangible values, will support a pragmatic -not a suspended- step towards a sustainable future. Quoting Neil Cossons (TICCIH Congress 2012) “Industrial imperialism ensures its position and protects its future not by the conquest of distant lands as by the securing of its sources of raw materials ... The modern world is as much under the control of the major industrial powers as it ever was during the colonial era”; if such a case can the industrial heritage sector remain apolitical? (shrink)

Conference paper presented at the 10th International Congress of Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, Florence, Italy (19-25 August 1995). Extrapolation here refers to the act of inferring more widely from a limited range of known facts. This notion of extrapolation, especially when applied to past events, has recently been used to formulate a pragmatic definition of truth. This paper shows that this definition has serious problems. The pragmatic definition of truth has been formulated in discussions on internal realism. In (...) this paper, the basic internal realist starting point, as expounded in the works of H. Putnam and N. Jardine, will be taken to be the claim that the distinction between judgements that are true from judgements that are false is explainable from within our judgement-forming faculty — no recourse to the external world is necessary. The paper first shows how the pragmatic definition of truth involves a counterfactual statement. It then describes how the counterfactual definition is apparently justified by an inductive argument. In the final step, this justification is shown to be unsuccessful. (shrink)

This essay combines information on the recent ISUD Sixth World Congress Humanity at the Turning Point: Rethinking Nature, Culture, and Freedom and some reflections inspired by presentations and discussions at the congress. It is focused on the presentation of one of the keynote speakers, Karl-Otto Apel, entitled “Discourse Ethics, Democracy, and International Law: Toward a Globalization of Practical Reason”. Apel argued that the transcendental-pragmatic foundation of morality serves as the ultimate basis for the universal conception of law, e.g., of human (...) rights. It establishes the transcendental basis of the idea of democracy, and at the same time establishes a regulative principle for a possible critique of the democratic states. Apel discussed the question of a political order of law able to represent the idea of human rights. In his approach to it, he referred to Kant’s idea of “a federation of free states” (as opposite to a “world state”) in the solution of the problem of a cosmopolitan system He noticed the tension between two orientations of international law: one towards “human rights” and hence a cosmopolitan law of single citizens and the other towards the sovereignty of single states. He asserted that the universal conception of law cannot be reduced to the legislative autonomy of any state. Consequently, the universal conception of human rights cannot be adequately realized either by particular democratic states or by a world state as a despotic superpower. Apel concluded that an adequate institution for the current debate regarding the issues of global peace and security can only be a federation of nations like the UN, the meta-institution of global discourse and the political representation of international law. At the heart of the essay is Kant’s cosmopolitan ideal and its relevance for today’s discussions about peace and security. Attention is paid to the attempts to rethink Kant by Karl-Otto Apel, Jürgen Habermas, Jaques Derrida, Martha Nussbaum, and David Held, among others. Some of the authors indicate the tension between the sovereignty ofstates and the universality of human rights. Other authors criticize cosmopolitanism as overly unifying in contrast to the socio-cultural diversity of societies. The essay draws a contrast between two tendencies concerning international relations. One is the current neoconservative course toward American domination throughout the world. An alternative to this is the philosophers’ call for “the cosmopolitan model of democracy” and strengthening the network of transnational grass-roots movements and international institutions, including the UN. (shrink)

Pragmatic philosophy and discourse ethics are offered as an alternative way to respond to and understand the concerns of philosophical animal ethics and animal welfare science, especially as they relate to ethical decision-making and democratic participation in today's technical animal agriculture. The two major challenges facing philosophical animal ethics and animal welfare are: the acceptability of alienating individual animals from their genetic and social identities through practices that seek to alter their genome or which fail to provide for their respective (...) natures, and the extent to which the former concern will contribute to further deterioration of already fractured human-farm-animal and consumer-producer relationships. This paper considers how we might ethically and strategically rise to the challenge of reshaping conventional animal farming practices in liberal democracies, especially as it applies to making improvements in animal welfare standards and promoting public trust and confidence in science, the production sector and government. I suggest some ways to empower consumers and farmers to realize this end. (shrink)

This paper discusses the pragmatic world view and philosophy of education. It argues that it is possible to integrate certain elements of pragmatic education which are actually Islam’s pragmatism into Muslim education as a tool for the development of the Muslim community. The Islamic world view would not object topragmatic aims of education for understanding and helping the child to think, for preparation for life in society, and education as a scientific and experimental enterprise. It argues that these pragmatic aims (...) which are urgently needed in Muslim education today, are coherent with the Islamic world view but has beenneglected. Hence, they should be revived and integrated to complement the traditional aims of Islamic education and to enhance the development of the Muslims for the present century. (shrink)

In what way to understand of the idea of freedom is one of the major factors determining world outlook of a society. There are too many concepts of freedom. That kind of differences appears in individual, group and national level. But the major differences appear in perspectives of civilization understanding, in eastern and western world outlook. In eastern approach the idea of freedom is mostly individualistic, idealistic, spiritual one. In comparison with the eastern understanding, in the western thinking realistic and (...) pragmatic concept of freedom has always been prevailed. It stands on difference of philosophical understanding of the world. In the eastern philosophical thought the idea of freedom mostly connected with mental perfection, higher moral-spiritual values, and the understanding of Truth. However, in the western philosophy freedom has been searched in human researches; in realization of his individual ability in scientific, cultural, political, social, economical spheres of life. Seeking freedom both in internal and external world are two extremes of one phenomenon – human freedom. Each of these extremes has some shortages. In a time of dialogue of civilizations it would be very beneficial for ideas to research in a lightof essence of a life of the human being. Mutual understanding of those who carry different ideas and approaches would be essential step for peace and harmony in the world. (shrink)

In what way to understand of the idea of freedom is one of the major factors determining world outlook of a society. There are too many concepts of freedom. That kind of differences appears in individual, group and national level. But the major differences appear in perspectives of civilization understanding, in eastern and western world outlook. In eastern approach the idea of freedom is mostly individualistic, idealistic, spiritual one. In comparison with the eastern understanding, in the western thinking realistic and (...) pragmatic concept of freedom has always been prevailed. It stands on difference of philosophical understanding of the world. In the eastern philosophical thought the idea of freedom mostly connected with mental perfection, higher moral-spiritual values, and the understanding of Truth. However, in the western philosophy freedom has been searched in human researches; in realization of his individual ability in scientific, cultural, political, social, economical spheres of life. Seeking freedom both in internal and external world are two extremes of one phenomenon – human freedom. Each of these extremes has some shortages. In a time of dialogue of civilizations it would be very beneficial for ideas to research in a lightof essence of a life of the human being. Mutual understanding of those who carry different ideas and approaches would be essential step for peace and harmony in the world. (shrink)

When are the meanings of two utterances the same? And how, if at all, could we determine this sameness? In this paper I take a look at the contextualist answer of Hilary Putnam and Charles Travis. One characteristic trait of Hilary Putnam's conception of meaning is what he calls 'semantic externalism' and what I shall label 'public semantics' to avoid confusion with the topological or what I call 'locational' connotation of externalism in other contexts:1 the meaning of a word and (...) the full meaning/sense of a sentence or utterance are not determined by some private mental state(s) of the speaker but are determined by the use of words on an occasion or in a saying. According to Hilary Putnam and Charles Travis (both elaborating on Wittgenstein's discussions in his Philosophical Investigations), the varieties of such situational uses or occasions, the varieties of public semantics, can themselves not be described or determined once and for all. It is therefore not possible to reduce or absorb each and every pragmatic aspect into semantics. That means that semantics is essentially open and questions as to the sameness of meaning or sense of utterances cannot be answered independently of a pragmatic approach. Travis extends this diagnosis in his most recent book {Unshadowed Thought) to thought, beliefs and attitudes: no one thought, attitude or belief can be individuated independently of relevant situational aspects, these including, among others, acts in accord with, say, an attitude on some occasion or other. The approach pursued here claims that pragmatics is in either of these areas unavoidable and genuine. It cannot be explained away or be re-absorbed into semantics or epistemology.2 This has important consequences for what it means to do philosophy, as can be seen in Putnam's arguments as to the unintelligibility of various philosophical positions. (shrink)

When are the meanings of two utterances the same? And how, if at all, could we determine this sameness? In this paper I take a look at the contextualist answer of Hilary Putnam and Charles Travis. One characteristic trait of Hilary Putnam's conception of meaning is what he calls 'semantic externalism' and what I shall label 'public semantics' to avoid confusion with the topological or what I call 'locational' connotation of externalism in other contexts:1 the meaning of a word and (...) the full meaning/sense of a sentence or utterance are not determined by some private mental state(s) of the speaker but are determined by the use of words on an occasion or in a saying. According to Hilary Putnam and Charles Travis (both elaborating on Wittgenstein's discussions in his Philosophical Investigations), the varieties of such situational uses or occasions, the varieties of public semantics, can themselves not be described or determined once and for all. It is therefore not possible to reduce or absorb each and every pragmatic aspect into semantics. That means that semantics is essentially open and questions as to the sameness of meaning or sense of utterances cannot be answered independently of a pragmatic approach. Travis extends this diagnosis in his most recent book {Unshadowed Thought) to thought, beliefs and attitudes: no one thought, attitude or belief can be individuated independently of relevant situational aspects, these including, among others, acts in accord with, say, an attitude on some occasion or other. The approach pursued here claims that pragmatics is in either of these areas unavoidable and genuine. It cannot be explained away or be re-absorbed into semantics or epistemology.2 This has important consequences for what it means to do philosophy, as can be seen in Putnam's arguments as to the unintelligibility of various philosophical positions. (shrink)

The criteria of “forced, live, and momentous options,” as William James utilized them in his pragmatic defense of religious belief, cannot, I argue, both support religious pluralism and acknowledge lessons about failure of epistemic responsibility in Heaven’s Gate-followers. But I attempt to re-vitalize the pragmatic argument, showing it capable of walking this narrow line. I proceed (1) by developing the distinction and relationship between a commitment to a particular religious system or community, and a commitment to the generic “religious hypothesis” (...) itself; and (2) by explicating and expanding upon the “experimental” status—and associated pragmatic criteria for success or failure—that James already recognized for commitments to particular religious communities. I thus show how the “pragmatic argument” takes on heightened significance—and renewed promise—in light of problems associated with New Age and so-called “cult” religiosity. (shrink)

Ordinary consciousness is viewed as a variety of practically spiritual attitude to life, as an element of socially-transformational activity in its various manifestations as characteristics of life itself as syncretic phenomenon, performing a function of integral reality mastering on a level of everyday life. Direct contact with life, a pragmatic mood and practical orientation of ordinary consciousness clear up its ontological status and make it possible to speak about its eternal role in the social and private life of man; about (...) relative independence concerning specialized forms and levels of social consciousness, which came out of the ordinaryconsciousness and later separated from it. In the XX century the stake of society on pragmatism of ordinary consciousness while increasing the supremacy of utilitarian relations above human relations (a man becomes one of the material things) against a background of globalization and postmodernism led culture to the spiritual crisis, into the oblivion of spiritual values by contemporary man. Of course, globalization brings a number of advantages creating a sense of identity all over the world. It lowers trade barriers, shipping costs, telecommunication and computing costs, improves communication among peoples. However, there is debate about whether the power of international capital and the supposed homogenization of taste worldwide are good things or not. Globalization imposes a common standard of living on states and peoples, which belittles their cultural and national originality. Such a standard of living (mainly founded on principles of practicism) hinders mankind’s and man’s development. For the collective life is dialectical unity of diversity. The world must be smile and multipolar simultaneously. Unstable equilibrium between the whole and its parts leads to spiritual crisis. The social production of «useful» man closed up practically the possibility of bringing up man as the personality. That is why it so important today to recognize the necessity and possibility of moral and spiritually–religioustransformation of ordinary consciousness. The Eastern Wonder of the XX century (the South Korea, China and Japan) in the sphere of economics is based on the synthesis of national and human laws of being. (shrink)

Ever since Kant, mainstream moral philosophy has been more or less animated by the mission of discovering inescapable law-like rules that would provide a binding justification for morality. Recently, however, more and more authors have started to question a) whether this is possible, and b) what could this project, after all, achieve? An alternative vision of the task of moral philosophy starts from the pragmatic idea that philosophizing begins and ends in the actual human experience. It leads into a view (...) where morality is seen as a ‘social technology’ that aims to make living together possible, and strengthen people’s capability to live a good life within a society. Moral rules, then, are tools that we use to influence our behavior for the better. The role of moral philosophy is, accordingly, to develop further our moral tools, to propose solutions that enhance people’s capabilities to live good lives. In other words, moral philosophers become ethical engineers that use their expertise in ethical topics to criticize existing ‘moral technology’ and construct new concepts and theories that better answer the current challenges for living a good life. (shrink)

In this essay, I argue that the deflationary view of truth is inconsistent with Davidson's theory of meaning. I take deflationism to consist of two basic theses: the linguistic thesis that truth talk is always expressive and never explanatory, and the metaphysical thesis that truth is not a property. Since Davidson construes meaning in terms of truth-conditions, it appears that Davidson regards truth talk as explanatory, and truth as a property. Michael Williams argues otherwise, suggesting that Davidson's theory of meaning (...) can be understood in terms of his theory of radical interpretation, and that radical interpretation does not require a notion of truth richer than the deflationist allows. I argue that at the level of the T-sentences Davidson's theory of meaning entails (T-sentences yielded through the practice of radical interpretation), a non-deflationary notion of truth is indeed required. This is because, first, for Davidson, to grasp the meaning of a sentence is to grasp the T-sentence associated with it, and the T-sentence predicates the property truth of that sentencesecond, because it does so, in T-sentences "true" is explanatory, not merely expressive. I then consider the objection that T-sentences can be understood in terms of a norm of assertion, rather in terms of "true" as predicating a property of sentences, and I respond that the objection confuses pragmatic issues with semantic issues. (shrink)

The flurry of debate that trailed the existence of African philosophy in the 1960s and 70s and the consequent demise of the controversies in the late 1990s have occasioned a periodiszation shift from traditional African philosophy to contemporary African philosophy. While the scope and nature of predominant issues inthese periods differ considerably, what ought to constitute the basis and shape the direction of discourse in contemporary African philosophy remain controversial. In this regard, this paper argues that rethinking African philosophy should (...) be high on the agenda. It harps that more fundamental to contemporary African philosophy, is the critical need for self-assessment and re-evaluation, which would involve rethinking the nature, direction, scope, method and place of African philosophy. Rethinking African philosophy is a cognitive process of charting a new course of pragmatic reflection on metaphysical, epistemological, ethical, aesthetical, social and political themes in contemporary African philosophy, in order to make relevant philosophical abstraction to practical human problems inthe continent. The case is justifiably made that those African philosophers should make the influence of their speculations spill beyond the confine of academic citadel to the outside world such that will influence the lives of contemporary Africans. (shrink)

At The promotion of international exchange of ideas can immensely contribute to the enhancement of global peace and mutual understanding because it provides one community an opportunity to know and thereby respect to the thoughts and ideas, values and belief systems of others, as well pragmatically apply those ideas and values in different social and cultural locations. This is particularly important to the intellectuals of the non-western space because on the one hand, postcolonial theoretical orientation has taught us to resist (...) the strategic mindsets embedded in western systems of thought; on the other hand, we have a need to know and learn them not only to properly resist them but also to pay reverence to the humanistic contents and beauty of western humanities and toabsorb them in order to create and enrich our own humanities. (shrink)

Dewey's understanding of growth is inseparably intertwined with his distinctively pragmatic understanding of the self-community relation and of knowledge as experimental. Within this framework, growth emerges as a process by which individual communities achieves fuller, richer, more inclusive, and more complex interactions with their environment by incorporating the perspective of "the other". Growth involves reintegration of problematic situations in ways which lead to expansion of self, of community, and of the relation between the two. In this way growth and workability (...) go hand in hand, for growth involves the resolution of conflict through reconstructive expansion of contexts which work in bringing about the desired resolution. And in this way growth and workability properly understood in their concrete fullness are inherently moral, and the ethical dimension of business decisions involves consideration of both. In this sense, pragmatism can hold that the ultimate goal in the nurturing of moral maturity, whether for individuals, communities, or corporations, is the development of the ability for ongoing self-directed growth. (shrink)

Dewey's understanding of growth is inseparably intertwined with his distinctively pragmatic understanding of the self-community relation and of knowledge as experimental. Within this framework, growth emerges as a process by which individual communities achieves fuller, richer, more inclusive, and more complex interactions with their environment by incorporating the perspective of "the other". Growth involves reintegration of problematic situations in ways which lead to expansion of self, of community, and of the relation between the two. In this way growth and workability (...) go hand in hand, for growth involves the resolution of conflict through reconstructive expansion of contexts which work in bringing about the desired resolution. And in this way growth and workability properly understood in their concrete fullness are inherently moral, and the ethical dimension of business decisions involves consideration of both. In this sense, pragmatism can hold that the ultimate goal in the nurturing of moral maturity, whether for individuals, communities, or corporations, is the development of the ability for ongoing self-directed growth. (shrink)

The paper examines the current debates regarding human rights and international law. Two contrasting approaches are analyzed: One is represented by the neoconservative and neoliberal concepts, which justify forcibly “spreading democracy” through the unilateral intervention of a superpower, thus challenging the global rule of law. The other approach consists of strengthening international human rights law and cosmopolitan order. It is represented by the theorists of “discourse ethics” and “cosmopolitan democracy.” The paper analyses the internal relations and difference between the legislation (...) of a particular democratic state and the universality of international law. It examines the tension between the plurality of democratic states and the universal principles of internationallaw, e.g. human rights, which direct us toward a cosmopolitan legal order. It further asserts that universally valid international law is above any positive law of any state, including a democratic state, and provides a regulative principle for external normative critique with regard to human rights. The paper examines important insights provided by discourse ethics theory. The transcendental-pragmatic principle of discourse ethics gives a moral foundation for human rights and thus for the law of a liberaldemocratic state as well as for international law. As Karl-Otto Apel notes, the idea of democracy is not identical to that of universally valid law, and the universal concept of law cannot be reduced to the legislative autonomy of any state. Jürgen Habermas argues for an “egalitarian universalism” and emphasizes the paramount role of international law as a medium for the advancement of human rights. The analysis shows that the universal concept of human rights cannot be adequately realized either by individual democratic states or by a “world republic” as a hegemonic superpower. Rather, its realization requires strengthened international law and institutions such as a properly reformed UN. The contemporary period is viewed as a transitional phase from an international to a cosmopolitan order. (shrink)

The central question: "What is the Human?" is since Platon till today not answered. Kant distinguishes a physiological and a pragmatic anthropology: The Human knows the nature by senses, but himself by "pure apperception... from physical determinations independently personality (homo noumenon)..., different to... (homo phenomenon)". Kant's idea of the anthropology according to R. Brandt is a holistic totality with three spheres: phenomenal, pragmatic and moral-teleological. The philosophical (Gelen, Scheler), pedagogical (Roth, etc.), medical (V. von Weizsäcker, etc.), also the new anthropology (...) of Gadamer/Vogler considers the human multidimensional, but not enough holistic [Lit.: Michailov, Neu: Soc. Resp. Philos. In: Proc. 21st World Congr. Philos. Istanbul. Press FISP279‐280, 2003; J. Psychosom. Res. 58/6, 85‐86, 2005]. CONCEPTION: Philosophy as "the unique science, which considers a systematic interdependence and gives all other sciences a systematic unity" (Kant) in co-operation with the anthropological sciences could create an integral anthropology, i.e. a general - philosophical (normative), pedagogical (educative), medical (prophylactic/curative), based on a special anthropology (from biological to theological). The last oneshall consider the human [with his "spheres" somatic, psychical, mental/logical, philosophical (epistemology, ethics, aesthetics), spiritual/theological-metaphysical: individual] as well as his interaction with environment and society (natural, social anthropology) on the last level of knowledge, also under consideration of the big cultures – Brahmanism, Buddhism, Christianism, Confucianism, Mohammedanism. CONCLUSION: An integral anthropology could give the way for a transformation of the "false programmed" (Steinbuch) "homo actualis" (Binswanger) by society, i.e. "zoon politicon" (Aristoteles), into a homo sanus, humanus et spiritualis (in context of illumination and perfection/Kant). Scientific and political support of anthropological research is conditio sine qua non for realization of UNO-Agenda 21, which aims are better health, education, ecology, economy in all countries. (shrink)

Defining "terrorism" as the intentional targeting of non-combatant civilians, the paper argues that, other things being equal, it is not possible to effectively distinguish morally between "terrorism" and use of military power against combatant targets which might reasonably be expected to produce some guesstimable quantity of "collateral" or non-combatant civilian casualties; that it is upon the expected likely consequences of actions rather than upon the intentions underlying them, that actors should be morally judged. Furthermore I argue that other attempts to (...) rationalize the use of conventional military force, as retaliatory for prior "terrorist" actions, or as preemptive, also often largely fail either on historical grounds or pragmatic grounds. (shrink)