The debate between Einstein and Bergson is a salient episode in the history of modern physics and a telling example of the interaction between science and philosophy. This paper initially discusses five reasons why Bergson criticised Einstein for giving up absolute time. The most important one was Bergson’s commitment to an intuitionist, anti-Kantian metaphysics informed by common sense. Apart from that, he knew that the theory of special relativity permits “duration” in the form of the passage of proper time, to (...) which Bergson referred as “real time”. Neither static eternalism nor dynamic eternalism are acceptable from Bergson’s philosophical perspective, which acknowledges the role of temporal experience and everyday thinking in addition to science and metaphysics. He understood temporal passage as creation of new existence, anticipating what later became known as the growing block theory of time. The pointy relativistic variant of this theory, which divides the universe into blocks of growing past light cones, does justice to large parts of his philosophy, including the distinction between the actual and the virtual. Supporters of Bergson’s account of duration should adopt this theory of time. (shrink)

The gift of life argument, the claim that suicide is immoral because our lives are not ours to dispose of as we are their guardians or stewards, is a persistent theme in debates about the morality of suicide, assisted-suicide, and euthanasia. I argue that this argument suffers from a fatal internal incoherence. The gift can either be interpreted literally or analogically. If it is interpreted literally there are serious problems in understanding who receives the gift. If it is understood analogically (...) the question arises whether the gift is understood to be a finite or everlasting existence. If it is finite then it is hard to see how one can be punished for bringing that existence to an end for one will not be around to be punished. If the existence is infinite it is impossible to see how one can be punished for ending one’s life because one cannot end it. However, there is still ethical mileage to be gained from the description of life as a gift and in the concluding section I indicate one way in which this is so. (shrink)

Subjectivism states that meaning in life is determined by what subjects regard as meaningful. Objectivism denies this. The main argument against subjectivism is that it allows for seemingly worthless, or even immoral, sources of meaning. Objectivism, on the other hand, does not do justice to the role of subjective perspectives in the quest for meaning. This paper addresses the shortcomings of both positions by referring to the objective value of ‘meaning autonomy’, defined here as the freedom to determine for oneself (...) what is meaningful in life. While the notion of meaning autonomy is compatible with realist objectivism, objectivity is understood in a non-realist sense in this paper, as being based on cultural standards of meaningfulness. Subjective meaning may be attached to ‘worthless’ activities, but it cannot contradict the moral norms of the society that grants its members meaning autonomy. (shrink)

Some theories of personal identity allow persons to lose their identities in processes of qualitative change, i.e., to become a numerically different person by getting new physical and/or psychological properties. I shall call these theories strong. Weak theories, in contrast, do not allow for such a loss of identity. In general, weak theories put less restrictions on personal identity than strong ones. I will argue that each type of theory faces a serious problem.

In his book The Darkness of God, Denys Turner claims that medieval mysticism was not based on mystical experiences. This view is called ‘anti-mysticism’; its opposite is ‘experientialism’. After giving a brief account of the theology of Dionysius the Areopagite, I argue that an experientialist interpretation of this theology is more plausible than an anti-mystical interpretation. Robert Forman’s classification of apophatic mystical states helps to understand the experiences behind the texts.

The Reduction of the Possible to the Real. Modern philosophy cannot avoid dealing with possible worlds - neither in the field of intensional logic nor in other fields not directly connected with logical investigations. This paper attempts to develop a method to substitute possible worlds by the real world, referring to the works of Stig Kanger and Nino B. Cocchiarella. This is done by investigating the metaphorical and dynamical functions of natural languages. It is proved that this new technique is (...) adequate for use in the semantics of intensional languages. As an example a language is constructed, which is based on the aristotelian view of universal concepts. (shrink)

Gilles Deleuze's notion of sense, as developed in Difference and Repetition and The Logic of Sense, is meant to be a fourth dimension of the proposition besides denotation, manifestation and signification. While Deleuze explains signification in inferentialist terms, he ascribes to sense some very unusual properties, making it hard to understand what sense is. The aim of this paper is to improve this situation by confronting Deleuzian sense with a more or less contemporary, but otherwise rather distant philosophical conception: Gilbert (...) Ryle's theory of categories and category mistakes. The leading idea is that to understand the sense of a proposition regarding X is to know the category of the concept X, which requires that one knows which questions may appropriately be asked with regard to X. Thus, sense, category and questions are intimately related to each other. Finally, it seems to be consistent with Deleuze's views to assume that abstract signification is contextually generated by concrete sense. (shrink)

Arguments by W. T. Stace and C. J. Insole show that metaphorical descriptions of God presuppose literal descriptions of God. This poses a problem for the metaphor of darkness which has often been used, for instance by Pseudo-Dionysius, in the context of negative theology and apophatic mysticism. Three strategies of dealing with the problem are discussed in this article. The negative, apophatic approach can be seen either as subverting itself, or as being restricted to certain properties, or as resting on (...) a self-excluding principle. Whereas the first two strategies have their difficulties, self-exclusion is linguistically founded and adequate to the purposes of negative theology. (shrink)

In contrast to historically orientedapproaches, this paper tackles the concept ofNirvna from the perspective ofcontemporary philosophy of language. It focuseson four propositions: Nirvna exists;Nirvna does not exist; Nirvna existsand does not exist; Nirvna neither exists nordoes not exist. The Buddha's rejectionof these propositions is interpreted by meansof explicit and conditionaldefinitions of existence. Stalnaker's notion ofpragmatic presupposition providesan explanation why the propositions are withoutmeaning. After comparing theword ``Nirvna'' with indexicals, propernames and theoretical terms, it is finallyasked what linguistic function the word (...) has. (shrink)