It is argued that two aspects of the progress of mature science characterize, at least in combination, no other fields; hence, that these aspects can usefully serve as a demarcation criterion. Scientific progress is: (1) cumulative, regardless of crisis or revolution, from the viewpoint of concrete applications; (2) capable of unrestricted growth towards universal coerciveness of argument and evidence. Before these aspects of progress are discussed, some clarifications are made and corrections offered to Kuhn's view of the nature of scientific (...) progress across revolutions; afterwards, the suggested criterion is used to distinguish, concretely, various fields from science. Finally, it is shown that the "style" of scientific progress is not a useful demarcation criterion. (shrink)

The purported failures of ergodic theory are shown to arise from misconception of the functions served by scientific explanation. In fact, the predictive failures of ergodic theory are precisely its points of greatest physical utility, where genuinely new knowledge about actual physical systems can be obtained, once the links between explanation and reconstructive estimation are recognized.

Attention is drawn to two closely related functions served by scientific theory which are of fundamental importance in physical science but as yet little discussed in philosophy. As indicated by their names, they constitute the theoretical basis of physical measurements. After analysing some historically important examples and sketching the historical development of these ideas, this paper examines the similarities and differences between the estimate functions of theory and such well-known functions as prediction and explanation. The pervasiveness of the estimative functions (...) even when theory is but poorly developed is noted; and some of the problems raised by the physical equivalence of the measuring instrument to the object measured are discussed. The relations of estimation to ‘reductive logic’ are also considered. We then apply this understanding of estimative functioning to distinguishing experimental errors from those genuine anomalies which result in discovery. It is also shown that there can be no facts established nor any verification of predictions except on the basis of valid estimates derived, in turn, from antecedently accepted theories. (shrink)