A number of empirical studies have examined business ethics across cultures, focusing primarily on differences in ethical profiles between cultures and groups. When managers consider whether or not to develop a business relationship with those from a different culture, their decision may be affected by actual differences in ethical profiles, but potentially even more so by their perceptions of ethicality in the counterpart culture. The latter issue has been largely ignored in extant empirical research regarding cross-cultural ethical profiles. In this (...) study, we employ a design that allows for a more complete analysis of cross-cultural perspectives, examining both the manner in which selected cultures view themselves and the manner in which those same cultures perceive the ethical profiles of others. To this end, we surveyed master’s students in business fields at several universities in the United States and China—two countries/cultures that engage in a significant amount of business transactions—and examined differences in personal ethical profiles across cultures, differences in one group’s ethical profile and the way it is perceived by the other group, and differences in perceived ethical profiles across cultures; that is, differences in how groups view each other. Findings suggest meaningful discrepancies in the ethical perceptions formed toward the counterpart culture. Results support a role for ethical perceptions in future research, and further examination and inquiry into the development and adaptation of ethical perceptions in cross-cultural business dealings. (shrink)

Living man and ventriloquist's doll -- The ugly joker with the gift for happiness -- Socrates and the climax of Athenian optimism -- Socrates the philosophical genius -- Socrates and justice -- The demoralisation of Athens and the death of Socrates -- Socrates and philosophy personified.

A leading cognitive scientist argues that a deep sense of good and evil is bred in the bone. From John Locke to Sigmund Freud, philosophers and psychologists have long believed that we begin life as blank moral slates. Many of us take for granted that babies are born selfish and that it is the role of society—and especially parents—to transform them from little sociopaths into civilized beings. In Just Babies, Paul Bloom argues that humans are in fact hardwired with (...) a sense of morality. Drawing on groundbreaking research at Yale, Bloom demonstrates that, even before they can speak or walk, babies judge the goodness and badness of others’ actions; feel empathy and compassion; act to soothe those in distress; and have a rudimentary sense of justice. -/- Still, this innate morality is limited, sometimes tragically. We are naturally hostile to strangers, prone to parochialism and bigotry. Bringing together insights from psychology, behavioral economics, evolutionary biology, and philosophy, Bloom explores how we have come to surpass these limitations. Along the way, he examines the morality of chimpanzees, violent psychopaths, religious extremists, and Ivy League professors, and explores our often puzzling moral feelings about sex, politics, religion, and race. In his analysis of the morality of children and adults, Bloom rejects the fashionable view that our moral decisions are driven mainly by gut feelings and unconscious biases. Just as reason has driven our great scientific discoveries, he argues, it is reason and deliberation that makes possible our moral discoveries, such as the wrongness of slavery. Ultimately, it is through our imagination, our compassion, and our uniquely human capacity for rational thought that we can transcend the primitive sense of morality we were born with, becoming more than just babies. -/- Paul Bloom has a gift for bringing abstract ideas to life, moving seamlessly from Darwin, Herodotus, and Adam Smith to The Princess Bride, Hannibal Lecter, and Louis C.K. Vivid, witty, and intellectually probing, Just Babies offers a radical new perspective on our moral lives. (shrink)

Its critics to the contrary, the “gift of life” metaphor is not to be blamed for the indebtedness and guilt that organ recipients often experience. It is certainly misused, however, both by post‐transplant caregivers, who exploit it to manipulate recipients' behavior, and by the organ procurement system, which has failed to understand that the decision to give the gift of life must be approached communally.

Aim To ascertain the quantity and nature of gifts and items provided by the pharmaceutical industry in Australia to medical specialists and to consider whether these are appropriate in terms of justifiable ethical standards, empirical research and views expressed in the literature.

This book explores the role of divine severity in the character and wisdom of God, and the flux and difficulties of human life in relation to divine salvation. Much has been written on problems of evil, but the matter of divine severity has received relatively little attention. Paul K. Moser discusses the function of philosophy, evidence and miracles in approaching God. He argues that if God's aim is to extend without coercion His lasting life to humans, then commitment to (...) that goal could manifest itself in making human life severe, for the sake of encouraging humans to enter into that cooperative good life. In this scenario, divine agapē is conferred as free gift, but the human reception of it includes stress and struggle in the face of conflicting powers and priorities. Moser's work will be of great interest to students of the philosophy of religion, and theology. (shrink)

The eternal recurrence of the same. Simmel's critique ; Awareness ; Evidence ; Significance ; Coherence -- Demon or god? Deathbed revelation ; Daimonic prophecy ; Dionysian doctrine ; Diagnostic test -- The dwarf and the gateway. The gateway to Hades ; The dwarf's interpretation ; Zarathustra's cross-examination ; The inescapable cycle ; Crossing the gateway ; No time until rebirth ; The ancient memory ; Midnight swan song -- The great noon. Two conclusions ; Tragic end and analeptic satyr (...) play ; Zarathustra's hour ; Noon crucifixion ; Seventh-day convalescence ; Last temptation ; Third-day resurrection -- The laughing lions. Revaluation of values ; Dawn reunion ; Morning consecration ; Call to arms ; Final farewell and last will ; Zarathustra's great destiny -- The shepherd and the serpent. The eternally recurring human ; The future human ; Zarathustra the dragon-slayer ; The decapitation ; The heavy hammer ; No longer shepherd -- Circulus vitiosus deus. Impotence and revenge ; Backward-willing ; Self-redemption ; The third transformation ; The child spirit ; No longer human ; Zarathustra's dying gift -- Post-Zarathustra. Nietzsche and Zarathustra ; Reversing the bad conscience ; Atheism and the death of God ; Countering the ascetic ideal. (shrink)

Augustine developed one of the most profound and influential accounts of love ever offered. Led this way and that by the desires of his famously restless heart, Augustine came to view the experience of desiring as indicating a profound excess to the self. His theory of love has enduring philosophical relevance, not least because it disrupts our prevalent notion of freedom as self-determination. In contrast to our own dominant ethics of autonomy, Augustine argues that true freedom depends upon what exceeds (...) self- willing: we only become free when we are able to acknowledge our finitude, and thereby learn to love others rightly. This dissertation traces the development in Augustine’s thinking concerning the relationship between love and freedom across two pivotal texts: the De libero arbitrio and the Confessiones. I argue that what emerges in Augustine’s thought is the startling realization that genuine freedom is constituted by submission to a good beyond our anticipation, i.e., a good encountered in the experience of love. As Augustine came to see, the human person is ecstatically self-surpassing, drawn dynamically to the good through affect and rationality. Given this philosophical anthropology, the primary concern of the ethical life has less to do with autonomous willing, and more to do with properly nurturing and attuning our desire through a purifying attention. In other words, as Augustine shows us, the aim of the moral life is to allow our self-exceeding loves— viii and the good at which they aim—to form and reform the self. The following project aims to rehabilitate an Augustinian account of freedom by arguing for a renewed appreciation of the goodness of being, and for a recovery of the notion of loving-desire that constitutes our fundamental way of relating to this good. Given the fundamentally ecstatic nature of the human person revealed in love, freedom cannot be conceived purely as self-determination; as Augustine argues, we are made free by a transcendent source of our being. There is, ultimately, a deeper source of freedom than autonomous choosing: we are given our freedom in the gift of our being, and we discover this freedom by learning to love rightly. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Gifts and Obligations: The Living Donor as StorytellerPaul Root WolpeThe Illness NarrativeEach of us lives with an inner biographical narrative, the story we tell ourselves about ourselves, the story that becomes our account of who we are. It is the story we have constructed about our life and its meaning, built from memories of our past—our childhood, our parents, our friends, our experiences. We construct that story through our (...) subjective experience and memories of our past, bringing together the disparate parts of our lives and weaving them into a coherent whole by which we make sense of ourselves.Under the pressures of the advent of sudden illness, or in the face of chronic illness that becomes a dominant status, “individuals often feel a pressing need to re-examine and re–fashion their personal narratives in an attempt to maintain a sense of identity” (Bury, 2001, p.264). Illness forces us to re–imagine our life in the face of often sudden new circumstances. Illness narratives about chronic or lifelong illness are not necessarily about suddenly needing to recast one’s life due to new circumstances, but about the need to understand the way chronic illness positions and defines us in the web of social and institutional relationships.The narratives in this collection might be thought of as a peculiar type of illness narrative. The people who populate these stories are not themselves sick (or at least were not when their stories began); yet they are bound up in the medical world, have had their bodies cut open and pieces removed, have had, at times, problematic recoveries and lasting physical and mental challenges. For that reason, the stories of living donors are particularly interesting in the illness narrative literature, and they raise a unique set of questions. Living donors have not discovered a sudden illness that requires re–imagining their lives, nor are they coping with a long illness that has become a thematic frame for how they conceptualize their world. The key aspect that differentiates the living donors’ narratives from the usual illness narratives is volition; the donors have chosen to enter the world of the infirm, have chosen to subject themselves to surgery and medical management, and have chosen to join their stories to someone else’s—and in so doing to become allied to, and yet never fully a part of, the illness narratives of the recipients.Gifting and OwnershipIf it is true that we tell our stories informed by the other stories of our culture, that we must fit our own stories into the narrative resources available in our particular society, then the living donors need to find a cultural frame to make sense of this strange position they find themselves in: joining the world of the sick and infirm not because of intrinsic illness but, to the contrary, because of their relative health. Almost thirty years ago, Renée Fox and Judith Swazey began their ground-breaking work The Courage to Fail (1974) with a clear [End Page 39] statement of the way in which the donor’s role is understood:The donor who offers a part of his body for transplantation is making an inestimably precious gift. The acutely ill patient who receives the organ accepts a priceless gift. The giving and receiving of a gift of enormous value, we believe, is the most significant meaning of human organ transplantation. The extraordinary gift exchange, moreover, is not a private transaction between the donor and the recipient. Rather, it takes place within the complex network of personal relationships that extends to the families, the physicians, and all the members of the medical team who are involved in the operation. Within the network of these relations, a complex exchange occurs through which considerably more than the organ itself is transferred(p. 5).It is the sociological and psychological power of the idea of the gift that makes transplantation an especially evocative case. Eighteen years later, in their second book about organ transplantation, Spare Parts (1992), Fox and Swazey cite their own quote above and comment about it that “Despite all the biomedical and social changes that have ensued within and around the... (shrink)

This chapter presents a movie Doctor Strange, which is about a gifted physician. Throughout the course of the movie, Doctor Stephen Strange experience a magnificent existential conversion. Early in the film, Strange holds a philosophical perspective that has three primary features: it is empirical, practical, and scientific. Strange starts to realize that there might be meaning and value to existence, but that these things can only be found outside of scientific nihilism. After facing off with Kaecilius, Strange finds himself in (...) a dilemma once he achieves prowess as a powerful sorcerer and uses his abilities to help defend the New York Sanctum. Although Strange started with a perspective that was mostly nihilistic about the meaning of life, by the end of the film, he has discovered his freedom to make authentic choices and decisions which are ultimately more powerful and effective than his old ones. (shrink)

Seeing Nature is a series of true stories or parables that offer tools for understanding relationships in the natural world. Many of the stories take the reader to wild landscapes, including canyons, tundra, and mountain ridges, while others contemplate the human-made world: water-diversion trenches and supermarket check-out lines. At one point, Krafel discovers a world in a one-inch-square patch of ordinary ground. Inspiring for parents and teachers seeking to encourage excitement about the positive role of people in nature, Krafel's work (...) harkens to St. Exupery's The Little Prince, Annie Dillard's Pilgrim at Tinker Creek, and Jean Giono's The Man Who Planted Trees. As Barbara Damrosch has noted: [This book] is a gift.... With curiosity, wit, and a spare and graceful style, Krafel notes why birds in flocks land as they do, how islands can move upstream in a river, how kelp forests, swaying gently, break the force of the sea's power, how tundra plants create whole ecosystems on bare rock from mere specks of life. Yet there are no long-winded sermons about the woods, or cute anthropomorphizations of animals. The book's economical, unsentimental style is part of its originality. Paul Krafel's years as a park ranger afforded him time to walk and think--his job was to observe the world around him. He is now a teacher, creating a curriculum for young people that is built on a startlingly simple truth: The world around us is an extended conversation between "upward spirals"--nature in regenerative, procreative modes--and downward spirals toward entropy and disintegration. As nature refreshes and rebuilds, the downward spirals are overcome. Nature's process becomes the process of replenishing hope. (shrink)

“Give to everyone who begs from you,” Jesus advised his followers. Most of us do not and rush on by, concerned for our safety, for what the beggar will buy with our gift of alms, for who will benefit from our gift. Fewer stop and give something: if not cash, then a snack or beverage, and their precious time. A century since Marcel Mauss published his famous essay, we all feel quite well informed about “the gift.” In (...) this richly detailed study, Caner's achievement is to show how different gift-giving was in the late antique Roman Empire, “the first truly affluent, complex Christian society.” Philanthropy was no longer the ancient “love of humanity,” the imperative to be generous to people, when you thought, or even knew, that they did not deserve it. Yet philanthropy was moreover not, or not only, a series of precisely calibrated acts of reciprocal giving.Caner's focus is on the religious gift. He identifies five distinct categories of religious gift-giving, which others have too easily conflated. The newest of these was the blessing (eulogia), which emerged only in the sixth century, in the thousands of sermons, saintly lives, and letters that Caner consulted. It has been identified similarly in other ascetic cultures, for example in Hinduism and Jainism, as the pure or free gift whose existence Mauss denied. The blessing is a gift of divine benevolence, grace delivered through a human mediator. It is not synonymous with the gift of alms (eleēmosynē), a very human act of mercy from one individual to another. These are in turn distinct from charity (agapē), “self-sacrificial gifts derived from essential resources”; two forms of offering—liturgical offerings (prosphorai), such as the communion bread, on the one hand, and fruit-bearing offerings (karpophoriai), along with agricultural and other gifts to support religious professionals. “Each category,” which has an equivalent in contemporary Syriac and Coptic writings, “was associated with a distinct set of goals, responsibilities, relationships, and material resources.”The late antique city was as busy with organized gangs of professional beggars as any modern downtown, but early Christians could not simply turn away. They were hectored into caring by golden-mouthed preachers like John, bishop of New Rome. Chrysostom insisted that almsgiving should be direct and personal, a source of discomfort for those who offered comfort. The rich might also, as ever, engage in ostentatious acts of giving, the exchange of worldly goods to redeem them from their sins, including the pride associated with ostentatious giving. Transactional gift-giving could end up with everyone insulted: generosity could be refused, donors repudiated, gifts returned. That much seems familiar at a time when museums and universities have felt compelled to remove the names of disgraced donors from their buildings and galleries. Caner's rich analysis, because it is so firmly rooted in early Byzantium, offers reasons, and some new tools, to think again and hard about the complexities of philanthropy. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Dialogue and Liberation:What I Have Learned from My Friends—Buddhist and ChristianPaul KnitterMy co-coordinator for this conference, Kyeongil Jung, has given me a rather daunting assignment for this lecture: within no more than forty minutes, I am supposed to (1) draw some insightful conclusions for our conference, (2) bid farewell to Union Theological Seminary as I sail off into retirement, and (3) reminisce on the past fifty years of my (...) life. The easiest and most enjoyable of these assignments will, I suspect, be the most effective in covering them all: I’m going to focus on reminiscing.It all started for me more than fifty years ago as I stood in the Piazza San Pietro on October 11, 1962, having just arrived in Rome two weeks earlier to begin my theological studies at the Gregorian University. There, awestruck and euphoric, I watched Pope John XXIII lead some two thousand bishops into the Basilica of St. Peter to begin the Second Vatican Council. That council, especially in its revolutionary “Declaration on the Church’s Attitude toward Non-Christian Religions” (Nostra Aetate), is where for me things took off—where I first felt the challenge of religious diversity and the inspiration to take up the challenge. Vatican II opened the door and beckoned Christians to enter into a life-giving dialogue with other religious communities—and to work out a theology that would support and animate such a dialogue. That, essentially, has been the business I have been about over these past fifty years: laying the foundations for, and then trying to engage in, an interreligious dialogue that will be truly life-giving and world-healing.But on the occasion of this conference and of this lecture, surrounded by so many old and new friends, I’ve come to realize, with a stunning clarity that I did not have before, that what has inspired and guided me in my efforts to respond to religious diversity over these past five decades has been friends much more than books. Yes, over the years, I have tried to put in my required academic hours of study: I have developed a sizeable amount of what Germans call Sitzfleisch. But tonight, as I look upon the faces of so many old friends with whom I have walked, and of so many new, younger friends with whom I try to keep pace, it is clear to me that most of the theological convictions and spiritual discoveries that have sustained my professional and personal life have become true for me—really true and trustworthy—because I have [End Page 173] seen them embodied in the lives of my friends and fellow searchers. Other people, in the kind of lives they live, have inspired me, challenged me, convinced me, more than any coherent, creative theological, philosophical, or political argument. That’s the kind of realization that becomes clear especially after one tips seventy. On some matters, you just have to get old before you can get wise.So let me spend this time with you this evening reminiscing on some of the Christian and Buddhists friends who have guided me and formed me over these past fifty years. They have also contributed to the gifts I have tried to bring to, and hope to leave behind for, Union Theological Seminary. Clearly, too, these friends embody and confirm what I suspect are some of the principal points of consensus for our conference on Enlightenment and Liberation. With only forty minutes to speak, and with seventy-four years full of friends, I’ll have to be painfully selective.karl rahner, john hick, stanley samartha: the theological challenge of religious diversityThree of my oldest friends, all of them now of blessed memory, were clear-cut and beautiful examples for me of both the honesty and the courage that are required in taking other religious traditions seriously. All three of them, in differing ways and degrees, recognized that if Christians are going to be able to engage in the kind of dialogue that Vatican II and eventually the World Council of Churches were calling for, then Christians and especially Christian theologians are going to have to do some heavy... (shrink)

This paper explores the claim made by Thomas Aquinas in Summa Theologiae, I, q. 1, a. 3 that ‘sacred doctrine’ is ‘scientific.’ After reviewing some of the key historical commentators on the question, I propose an examination of Thomas' treatment of the gift of prophecy as providing an important clue into discerning more clearly his evolution from an Aristotelian understanding of knowledge or ‘science’ to a fuller sense of the term scientia as used by Thomas. Chief among these is (...) a clue into how Thomas resolves the difficulty between necessity and history. His treatment of prophecy in the Summa Theologiae gives one a glimpse into how Thomas is a historical thinker, despite weighty authorities such as Etienne Gilson arguing otherwise. Closer attention to prophecy permits one to rethink Thomas' account of sacred doctrine in Question One and appreciate how pivotal the fact of divine revelation having been made to prophets in history is for its ‘scientific’ character. (shrink)

Often-cited papal pronouncements regarding organ donation emphasize the importance of gift giving and the consent of the donor. However, a critical reading reveals an ill-defined separation of living organ donation and donation after death. Given that a corpse cannot engage in gift giving, nor can it give consent, the family, acting as good stewards, is the proper decision maker for organ donation after death. A historical examination of relics and human anatomical dissection reveals that the Catholic Church has (...) primarily favored the decisional authority of the family over the first-person consent of the dead. Given this history, family-based consent (as opposed to opt-in or opt-out criteria) is the best model to ensure the dignity of the dead. (shrink)

Rationalism and faith.--The Socratic revolution.--Platonic idealism.--The Platonic teleology.--Illusions of reason.--The evolution of Hebraism.--The telos of Christianity.--The gift of hope.

This article examines the kind of power available to a God worthy of worship, in connection with the prospect for a full theodicy for the world's suffering and evil. It portrays how such a God would seek to relate to people with uncoerced reconciliation to God as a gift having definite expectations of them. To that end, God would be elusive and hidden at times, including regarding ultimate purposes, to minimize the alienation of humans from God. We have no (...) good reason to suppose that God would reveal divine purposes to humans in a way that gives them a full theodicy. Similarly, we have no good reason to acknowledge a certain kind of limitation in divine power over evil, but, given divine goodness, we would expect to have such a clear reason if God had such a limitation. The absence of the latter clear reason counts against a proposed full theodicy. (shrink)

Philosophy as well as theology have always been keen to know which natural capacities of the conditio humana a religiously inspired life is connected with. What is it that makes man susceptible and sensitive to religion? In which natural source of power does religion find its fertile soil? Today this classic question is still of importance. To think about religion from this perspective may help prevent it becoming even more isolated from the totality of forms of life which may support (...) and give an orientation to human existence. The formulation of the question presupposes, on the one hand, that religion is a continuation of interests and practices that may indeed actually be present in forms of existence that are not religiously coloured, and on the other hand that religion provides an enlargement as well as an orientation that these interests and practices, on which it builds, cannot themselves provide.Philosophy and natural theology have forwarded several candidates to serve the function of a natural link. According to some, reason is the most suitable candidate. Religion enlarges upon man's scientific curiosity and appeals to his love for truth. Religious belief is then interpreted as a version of believing that. To believe, in a religious sense, entails that the believer takes a minimum number of propositions concerning what is ultimately the case to be true, and he does so on the basis of rational arguments, which, no matter how much they are religiously coloured, are not fundamentally different from arguments that are equally valid in scientific discourse. Others, in line with biblical-exegetical elucidations of believing , prefer to link religious belief back to the basic attitude of trust of men in each other. To believe is then interpreted in terms of to believe and trust someone. The relation between belief as trust in God, and the events that may confirm as well as contradict this trust, that may support it as well as cause it to falter, must then be understood by analogy with what it means to trust one another in normal life.Wittgenstein and cultural anthropologists like Lévi-Strauss, Mauss and Malinowski connect religious practice to man's capacity to understand symbols and to set ritual actions that are sensitive to symbols. Finally, more existentially inclined approaches link religious belief to a basic feeling of dependency or to universally recognizable experiences involving notions such as receptivity, gratitude for gifts given for nothing, etc. Religion is thereby linked to, and at the same time enlarges the meaning of these experiences by relating notions such as gratitude, dependency and indebtedness to a receding horizon that soars above inner-worldly, merely human limits and is yet addressed personally as God. (shrink)

In this paper, however, I will argue that Kant’s restriction of interest to natural rather than artistic beauty should not be taken as a basic aspect of his aesthetic theory, and thus need not affect our assessment of that theory’s more basic claims. First, I will suggest that Kant’s theory of intellectual interest is not really necessary to explain what we ordinarily mean by an interest in beautiful objects—a desire to preserve them for repeated experience, a motivation for our efforts (...) to see them and our willingness to pay for them, and the like—and that the exclusion of art from a special moral interest thus does not leave our general interest in its objects unexplained. But, I will also argue, Kant’s own theory of art and our response to it actually allows beauties of art to have just as much claim to this intellectual interest as do objects of natural beauty. Kant’s differentiation of natural and artistic beauty with regard to moral interest turns on an ambiguity in the concept of nature itself, as well as on Kant’s assumptions that art, unlike nature, is a product of an intention to produce pleasure through determinately conceived objects, and that our response to art, again unlike that to nature, must be connected to a recognition of its intentionality. But Kant’s own theory of artistic creation—his theory of genius—undermines the force of the first of these assumptions, for it teaches us that art, while indeed the product of intentional activity, also calls upon the use of a natural talent that deserves our admiration as much as any other gift of nature. In other words, Kant’s own view of the complexity of artistic intentions forbids the simple differentiation of art and nature that he employs in §42, and while Kant’s theory of aesthetic response does not clearly preclude the view that our response to art must take into account the intentions with which art is produced, it also hardly entails this view. This may have been obscured from Kant by the indeterminacy of his own key concept of the freedom of the imagination, but, I will suggest, this freedom might actually have to be extended to the case of art if it is to work even in Kant’s paradigmatic case of natural beauty. Thus, on Kant’s own account the beauties of nature and of art are far more intimately connected, both in their own ontological status and in our response to them, than his theory of intellectual interest concedes. (shrink)

The Stoic rejection of the passion of grief strikes many ethicists writing on dying as inhuman, selfish, or lacking appreciation for the world. This essay argues that Stoics rejected grief and the fear of death because these passions alienated one from the present through sorrow or anxiety for the future, disrupting one's ability to fulfill obligations of care for others and to feel gratitude for the gift of loved ones. Early Christian writers on death, such as Ambrose, maintained much (...) of the substance of Stoic doctrine but transformed it through their belief in the resurrection and their corresponding revaluation of the future. While these writers rejected grief as an affective response to death, they affirmed longing for lost loved ones. These authors provide an example of how contemporary religious ethicists can use Stoic insights for recovering the tradition of the art of dying. (shrink)

My title is “Arguing for Freedom of Religion,” not for “Toleration,” because I follow the eighteenth-century writer Christoph Martin Wieland in taking “toleration" to connote a gift or indulgence from a majority to a minority, whereas true freedom of religion would put everybody on the same plane to believe and practice religion as they see fit, or not at all. I consider three historically distinct ways of arguing for freedom of religion: from a premise held by one religion that (...) requires freedom from others (the strategy of Locke, Madison, and Mendelssohn); from a premise about the uncertainty of all religious beliefs which calls for equal freedom (Bayle and Wieland); or from a fundamental requirement of equal freedom for all, with no premise about religion although it entails freedom in religious matters as in other things (Hutcheson, Meier, Kant). The latter approach may be most appealing from a purely philosophical point of view, but the former styles of argument have obviously had much to recommend them in historical contexts, and may still be useful. (shrink)

Para lá da dívida que Claude Bruaire reconhece em relação a Blondel, o presente artigo parte do suposto de que existe um parentesco manifesto entre asfilosofias destes dois autores. Nas suas últimas obras, Bruaire desenvolve uma metafísica decidida, tal como Blondel na sua Trilogia. Mas se o élan pneumatológico predomina em Blondel, onde o finito busca continuamente a sua adequação ao Infinito, a veia noética é mais sensível em Bruaire: revendicando o direito do conceito e o seu valor ontológico, ela (...) situa-se mais francamente ainda que a de Blondel na senda de uma meditação do Absoluto. Este é explicitado numa filosofia do dom, da superabundância - ou da Ressurreição - em que o finito se descobre incluído e transfigurado no Infinito. Segundo o autor do artigo, estamos aqui perante um progresso decisivo no seio da própria philosophia perennis. /// Recognizing the debt that Bruaire owes to Blondel, there is a manifest relationship between what the two philosophers propose in their respective works. In his last works, Bruaire develops a metaphysical project, rather like the one advanced by Blondel in his trilogy. The pneumatic élan in Blondel's work underscores the finite as persistently seeking the infinite as its adequate objective. For Bruaire's part, the noetic aspect is more accentuated; he defends the rights of the concept in relation to its ontological value, placing even greater emphasis on the Absolute than did Blondel. The Absolute is explicated in terms of a philosophy of gift, of superabundance - or of the Resurrection - where the finite discovers itself included and transfigured in the infinite. This constitutes a decisive progress in what is considered philosophia perennis. (shrink)

What does it mean to aspire to philanthropy? How might this shape popular views about charitable purpose? By one-on-one interviews and a review of the ethics of giving in the American experience, I take a long look at how views on philanthropic giving have changed over time and how this has helped to shape, and re-shape, the ethics of giving.

The reformulation of the subject as the gifted allows Jean-Luc Marion to incorporate saturated phenomena into his phenomenology but also introduces a serious problem to his project. Specifically, when confronted with the choice between absolute, unconditioned phenomena and the active role of the gifted, Marion chooses the unconditioned phenomena, and as a result, his project loses the ability to maintain meaning. In response to this issue, I advocate for a more active role for the gifted by turning to Iain Thomson’s (...) recent work on Heidegger. I conclude by affirming the validity of a more active role for the gifted by turning to Heidegger’s early lectures on the phenomenology of religion. My aim will be to show that this more active role still allows the gifted to be affected by the phenomenon and can avoid the problems of objectivity and ontotheology, while better preserving the account of meaning. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Frederick J. Streng Book Award:An Interview with Paul Ingram and Sallie KingSallie B. King and Paul O. IngramSallie King and Paul Ingram have been named winners of the 2003 Frederick J. Streng Book Award for their edited collection The Sound of Liberating Truth: Buddhist-Christian Dialogues in Honor of Frederick J. Streng (Curzon, 1999). Sallie King is professor of philosophy and religion at James Madison University (...) in Harrisonburg,Virginia. Paul Ingram is professor of religion at Pacific Lutheran University in Tacoma,Washington. Both are past presidents of the Society for Buddhist-Christian Studies. There is some irony that they have won this award named after Fred Streng, one of the founders of the Society for Buddhist-Christian Studies, for a volume that is a essentially a festschrift honoring the work of Fred Streng. Following is an edited interview with both of the winners.Buddhist-Christian Studies: What made each of you want to put together this collection of essays?Paul Ingram: Before I met Fred at the first "East-West Religions in Encounter" meeting organized by David Chappell in 1980 in Hawai'i, I was well acquainted with his work in history of religions. Fred by this time was recognized as one of the most important scholars in the field, and I deeply admired his work, particularly his book on Nagarjuna. As it turns out, he had read some of my work on Pure Land Buddhism and was as interested in meeting me as I was in meeting him. We became friends and colleagues. Because of our mutual interest in interreligious dialogue in general and in Buddhism in particular, he suggested that we should co-edit a volume of selected papers from the 1980 conference. This volume, Buddhist-Christian Dialogue: Mutual Renewal and Transformation, was subsequentlypublishedby the Universityof Hawai'i Press in 1986 and is still in print.Sallie King: I had long admired Fred's book on Nagarjuna, which uniquely and powerfullyopenedup the religiousmeaningof Nagarjuna'swork.I later metFred through the Society for Buddhist-Christian Studies and discovered that this admirable scholar was also a most admirable human being. We had lengthy, in-depth conversations when our paths crossed at various conferences. After Fred died, David Chappell, who had become the president of the Society for Buddhist-Christian Studies, suggested to Paul and me that we edit a volume of this kind in honor of Fred. Neither Paul nor I hesitated. For my part, I felt such a loss when Fred died that I was very happy [End Page 313] and honored to have this opportunity to make a gesture of respect and gratitude toFred.Besides his obvious scholarly achievements, what were Fred Streng's other gifts?PI: Fred was always generous in his support of colleagues. Many of us in the Society for Buddhist-Christian Studies are where we are professionally because of Fred's celebration of our work in all its diversity. He was one of the founding members of the Society, and he worked long and hard to make it a place for not only scholarly Buddhist-Christian encounter, but also a venue for nonspecialists to engage in Buddhist-Christian dialogue. All of us have been creatively transformed by Fred's work. After Fred's death in 1993, David Chappell invited Sallie and me to co-edit a volume of essays to honor Fred's memory and celebrate his work. We did so gladly and without reservation.SK: Fred was a very balanced person who had seriously engaged with all the important areas of human life. He was profoundly spiritual, seriously concerned about social issues, unfailingly kind and generous to others. Though he was at the top of his field, he remained straightforward and natural and always met even far-junior scholars as equals; he could not have been more encouraging and supportive. His spirituality, his scholarship, his engagement with social issues and his caring for others were all interdependent, mutually constructive of who he was and of his various projects.Were assignments for the book difficult to make?PI: The most difficult problem was selecting who to invite. Sallie and I identified five themes in Fred's scholarship, and we needed... (shrink)

Modern scholarship on decision behavior dates from the late 1940s. But that scholarship has been preoccupied with two ideas that are much older. One is the notion of expected utility, first articulated in the scholarly literature by Daniel Bernoulli in 1738. In its simplest form, the expected utility concept applies to monetary gambles. Imagine you are asked to choose between two gifts, either gamble G, which you would then play and get either $9 or nothing, or else a simple, direct (...) payment of $3. As shown in the decision tree in figure 10.1, you receive gamble G's $9 payoff if the toss of a fair die yields one or two pips, but you receive nothing otherwise. (In decision trees, choice points are represented by square nodes, chance points by circular nodes.) The expected value or expectation of a gamble is the sum of its payoffs, each weighted (i.e., multiplied) by its probability. Thus, the expected value of G is EV(G) = (1/3)($9) + (2/3)($0) = $3, the same as the direct payment. So, if you generally make decisions like this one so as to maximize expected value, you would be indifferent between the present options. However, if you are like most people, you are not indifferent. Instead, you are risk‐averse, preferring the guaranteed $3. Why? (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Semiotica Jahrgang: 2018 Heft: 225 Seiten: 77-102.

It has been forty-four years since an important American philosopher, Ralph Barton Perry, gave two cheers for Puritans in Puritanism and Democracy. Obviously, since we have neglected the deepest heritage of American history and use "Puritan" only in the disparaging sense of "puritanical," Neville must reassure us that he is far from a stereotype. He has written a charmingly personal book. On the cover is the smiling Leonora, a daughter, in white neck piece, as in our pictures of the first (...) Thanksgiving, photographed by her sister Naomi. Bob's gifted artist wife Beth designed the cover of the book, and on the back we see the author enjoying the art of fencing. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:What Does It Mean to Believe? Faith in the Thought of Joseph Ratzinger by Daniel CardóJean-Paul JugeWhat Does It Mean to Believe? Faith in the Thought of Joseph Ratzinger by Daniel Cardó (Steubenville, OH: Emmaus Academic, 2020), xv + 116 pp.Father Daniel Cardó's book What Does It Mean to Believe? is a concise and penetrating synopsis of Joseph Ratzinger's theology of faith, especially "faith as an act" (...) (7). As any reader familiar with Ratzinger knows, the subject of faith or belief is the very axis on which his theology turns. Ratzinger identifies this question of belief as the impetus of his theological research: "I chose fundamental theology as my field because I wanted first and foremost to examine thoroughly the question: Why do we believe?" (13). Cardó has thus chosen the perfect topic to introduce readers to Ratzinger who might otherwise be too intimidated by the Pope emeritus's countless homilies, lectures, and writings. Yet, Cardó has not merely provided us with another introduction to Ratzinger; rather, we may justly apply the author's words regarding Ratzinger to this book and say that its "simplicity almost hides [its] erudition" (3). In this book, Cardó assembles what might be compared to a medieval catena or florilegium, as he gathers excerpts from a wide variety of Ratzinger's works and conveniently organizes them for the reader.From the outset, Cardó contextualizes his book by presenting faith in God as the only adequate response to the contemporary scandals within the Church. In this way, he aligns his position with Ratzinger's 2019 essay on the sexual abuse scandal, wherein the Pontiff writes: "Only where faith no longer determines the actions of man are such offenses possible.... Ultimately, the reason is the absence of God" (5). Thus, the origin of this book, explains Cardó, is his conviction that "understanding more deeply the richness of the act of believing can help renew our faith" (6). Following his introduction, Cardó divides his book intro three parts, each a different angle of approach to the act of faith.The first part situates the act of belief in the context of two contemporary challenges, agnosticism and relativism, and explains how doubt (not as an act of defiance but as the experience of uncertainty) is a necessary, rather than incompatible, component to trust in God. In this section, Cardó draws heavily from Ratzinger's Introduction to Christianity, which remains an accurate assessment of faith's place in a secular society a half-century after it was first delivered as a series of university lectures. Moreover, Cardó summarizes Ratzinger's argument that we must reclaim a notion of faith not as a subjective feeling or opinion, but as a mode of accessing and entrusting oneself to a reality that transcends the human [End Page 979] capacity to examine empirically or recreate it and is for this reason the only sure ground on which to base one's life. Agnosticism and relativism, the twin diseases of our era, deprive humans of their only reliable existential footing. Cardó writes: "Without truth, it is impossible to believe with certainty in anyone or anything. The common inability to trust and to have deep interpersonal relationships... are some of the characteristics of a society that believes that one cannot believe anymore" (34).In the second part of his book, Cardó considers the act of faith both as given by God and as received by humans. Just as God cannot be confined to human techne or faciens, neither can the act of faith be reduced to human effort; rather, Cardó writes, "faith is a gift that God gives to us,... [and] God's giving of the gift takes precedence over human initiative" (36). Faith, according to Cardó, is an "act that has the character of an answer: that is, it is a response to the initiative of God" (35). Cardó characterizes this response as encompassing the entirety of one's daily existence, which is carried out on the foundation of a logos that both causes and transcends human reason.The third and final section of the book describes faith as personal, integral, and ecclesial. In short... (shrink)

It has become widespread, not only among pastors and conference speakers but also among scholars such as Vern Poythress and John Frame, to utilize the threefold offices of Christ as a typology for church leadership. According to this application of the threefold office, different church leaders possess prophetic, priestly, and kingly capacities in differing degrees, and the most appropriate role for each leader depends on which of these capacities happens to be strongest. According to some proponents, the offices of prophet, (...) priest, and king function as leadership personality types, with prophets identified as those leaders who are gifted as teachers, priests as those who care for people’s needs, and kings as planners and organizers. This article undertakes an exploration of these three leadership roles and contends that, though the munus triplex itself is a venerable and biblical structure, the appropriation of prophet, priest, and king as typological categories for church leadership is not. Through examination both of relevant Old Testament texts and of New Testament appropriations of these offices of leadership, it is demonstrated that the typological categorization of leaders as prophets, priests, or kings falls far short when it comes to biblical support. Particularly absent in Scripture is any clear identification of these offices with specific traits that different church leaders possess in differing degrees. Kingship and priesthood in particular are not individualized traits but a communal identity, shared by the whole people of God and grounded in union with Christ. (shrink)

_Critical Essays _ contains essays on literature and philosophy from a highly formative period of French philosopher and leading existentialist Jean-Paul Sartre’s life, the years between 1938 and 1946. This period is particularly interesting because it is before Sartre published the magnum opus that would solidify his name as a philosopher, _Being and Nothingness_. Instead, during this time Sartre was emerging as one of France’s most promising young novelists and playwrights—he had already published _Nausea, The Age of Reason, The (...) Flies, _and_ No Exit_. Not content, however, he was meanwhile consciously attempting to revive the form of the essay via detailed examinations of writers who were to become central to European cultural life in the immediate aftermath of World War II. Collected here are Sartre’s experiments in reimagining the idea and structure of the essay. Among the distinguished writers he analyzes are Francis Ponge, Georges Bataille, Vladimir Nabokov, Maurice Blanchot, and, of course, Albert Camus, whose novel _The Stranger _Sartre endeavours to explain in these pages. _Critical Essays _ also contains a famous attack on the Catholic novelist François Mauriac, studies of the great American literary iconoclasts Faulkner and Dos Passos, and brief but insightful essays on aspects of the philosophical writings of Husserl and Descartes. This new translation by Chris Turner reinvigorates the original skill and voice of Sartre’s work and will be essential reading for fans of Sartre and the many writers and works he explores. “For my generation he has always been one of the great intellectual heroes of the twentieth century, a man whose insight and intellectual gifts were at the service of nearly every progressive cause of our time.”—Edward Said. (shrink)

The association of God with eternity, and eternity with timelessness, harms Christian spiritual life. If eternity is superior to time, then God’s placement of human beings within time is ungenerous. Fortunately, the Christian concept of God as triune commends divine becoming through time. In particular, the social Trinitarian view that God is three persons united through love demands divine temporality. Relationality relies on change for its content. So, for God to be internally related, God must be internally timeful. Moreover, to (...) assert that the Trinitarian persons relate through time places a high value on human relationships. Created in the image of God, we are called to create ever-closer community through time. This effort sanctifies time, rendering kairos of chronos. Kairos is the experience of time as sacred, whereas chronos is the experience of time as purposeless. For the three persons of the Trinity, all time is kairos. For us, every moment contains the potential for kairos because God sustains the universe continually. Through faith, the moment-by-moment progression of time can become the grace-by-grace gift of God. (shrink)

New Blackfriars, Volume 102, Issue 1101, Page 728-744, September 2021.

Paul Ricoeur's understanding of the relations of faith, love, and hope suggests a unique approach to theological ethics, one that holds fresh promise for bringing together considerations of the good (teleology) and the right (deontology) around the notion of an "economy of the gift." The economy of the gift articulates Ricoeur's distinctively dialectical understanding of the relation of the human and the divine, and the resulting dialectical moral relation of the self and the other. Despite our fallen (...) condition, Ricoeur suggests, we are called by the divine to embrace the radical possibility of the reconciliation of human goods under the requirement of accountability to human diversity and otherness. (shrink)

This paper examines the meaning of what Karol Wojtyła/John Paul II calls “The Law of the Gift,” namely, “Man, who is the only creature on earth which God willed for itself, can fully find himself only through a sincere gift of himself.” After explaining what it means to be “willed for itself,” I consider how “finding oneself only through a gift of self ” is justified. I then argue that in his theory of self-gift,Wojtyła/John (...) class='Hi'>Paul II espouses an “embodied” altruism. Two objections to Wojtyła/John Paul II’s account are also addressed: (1) the idea that finding fulfillment (moral goodness) through self-giving is incompatible with altruism and (2) that reciprocal self-giving is incompatible with altruism. I defend Wojtyła/John Paul II’s notion of self-giving against these objections in several ways, but focus on evidence for the compatibility of subjective enrichment and altruism. (shrink)