This paper considers traditional debates and position regarding time and the future in relation to Einstein's physics of space-time.

The point of this paper is to show that one of the three traditional theories, namely, that usually attributed to Aristotle on the strength of the famous "sea fight" passage, is indefensible. To this end I will first present the traditional theories and some of the reasons which philosophers have given for holding them. Then I will show how proponents of two of these theories can develop an invincible argument against the third.

A distinction is made between the indexicality theme and the elapsive theme. The first theme is concerned with the question of whether nowness and other irreducibly indexical A-determinations are mind-dependent or not. It is argued that there are no such A-determinations, within or outside of mind. The second, elapsive theme, which is often not distinguished from the first, deals with whether or not non-indexical felt transiency or elapsiveness is mind-dependent. Four arguments for the mind-dependence of "temporal becoming" are assessed as (...) they apply to these two kinds of temporal becoming. (shrink)

THIS ARTICLE TRIES TO SHOW THAT NONE OF THE FOLLOWING CLAIMS ARE A PRIORI OR DEFINITIONAL TRUTHS: 1) MIRACLES ARE RARE, OR GO AGAINST UNIFORMITIES OBSERVED IN THE WORLD; 2) MIRACLES VIOLATE NOMIC LAWS, OR STATEMENTS THAT WOULD BE LAWS BUT FOR THE OCCURRENCE OF MIRACLES; 2) MIRACLES ARE OUTSIDE THE REALM OF NOMIC LAW, ARE EITHER PARTLY OR COMPLETELY UNEXPLAINABLE IN TERMS OF NOMIC LAWS; 4) SUPERNATURAL BEINGS ARE OUTSIDE THE REALM OF NOMIC LAWS; 5) IT IS ALWAYS RATIONAL (...) TO DISCOUNT ANY OSTENSIBLE EVIDENCE FOR MIRACLES; TO EXPLAIN IT IN SOME TERMS OTHER THAN BY SAYING GENUINE MIRACLES ACTUALLY OCCURRED. (shrink)

Several philosophers have argued that "temporal becoming" is mind-dependent, a claim they see as analogous to the traditional one about the mind-dependence of secondary qualities. They have tended to assume that the classical secondary qualities are mind-dependent, and also that the close analogue for time of directly experienced secondary qualities is an irreducibly indexical nowness. In an earlier article it was argued that we should reject the second assumption. Here it is shown why there is indeed a genuine problem of (...) the ontological status of directly experienced temporality and spatiality, a problem analogous to the traditional one about secondary qualities. (shrink)

The central point of the book is this: We deliberate about what to do. This presupposes that what we are deliberating about is a real causal contingency; that it is not, as yet, either causally necessitated or precluded. But if determinism is true then there are no causal contingencies. So rational deliberators should reject determinism, on pain of inconsistency.