This article explores the theme of presence of the psychotherapist, a concept that has been of particular interest in humanistic and existential approaches. Presence was first associated with the humanistic attitudes of the practitioner and the way he or she embodies these attitudes in the here and now of the encounter. Since the publication in 2002 of Geller and Greenberg’s model of therapeutic presence, several quantitative studies have explored the relationship between the therapist’s perception of presence and other dimensions of (...) the therapeutic process. However, qualitative explorations still seem necessary to account for the complexity of the therapist’s presence and its role in the therapeutic process. Centered on the therapist’s perspective, we use an idiographic methodology and refer to lived clinical experience to highlight the dimension of sensory contact that, through the body, actualize a connection to a virtual space of the therapeutic relationship. We so describe how a therapist can achieve an embodied processing to clinical material from what we describe as “traces of presence” of the other. From this point of view, the patient’s presence incorporates itself into the therapist’s experience and the therapist can perceive aspects of this presence in a tangible, concrete, and useful way. The therapist’s presence thus takes on a meaning that is not reduced to what the patient will perceive and interpret of his or her attitude. It becomes the main material from which the therapist orients his or her clinical interventions. (shrink)

Thick terms and concepts, such as honesty and cruelty, are at the heart of a variety of debates in philosophy of language and metaethics. Central to these debates is the question of how the descriptive and evaluative components of thick concepts are related and whether they can be separated from each other. So far, no empirical data on how thick terms are used in ordinary language has been collected to inform these debates. In this paper, we present the first empirical (...) study, designed to investigate whether the evaluative component of thick concepts is communicated as part of the semantic meaning or by means of conversational implicatures. While neither the semantic nor the pragmatic view can fully account for the use of thick terms in ordinary language, our results do favour the semanticist interpretation: the evaluation of a thick concept is only slightly easier to cancel than semantically entailed content. We further discovered a polarity effect, demonstrating that how easily an evaluation can be cancelled depends on whether the thick term is of positive or negative polarity. (shrink)

Previous studies suggest that small rural schools experience a range of challenges relating to their size, financial difficulties and geographical isolation, as well as potential opportunities relating to their position within their communities. In Northern Ireland, these schools are situated within the comparatively rare context of a religiously divided school system. However, research on these schools in this jurisdiction is scarce. The notion of consociationalism is highlighted as central to an understanding of the prevailing schooling system and the peace process (...) in Northern Ireland as a post-conflict society. Set against this backdrop, the paper reports on a survey of principals of small rural schools in Northern Ireland; the challenges they face and their engagement with the communities they serve. The findings reveal how these small rural primary schools, while encountering many similar challenges to such schools globally, continue to play a central consociational role in serving their respective divided communities. Their relationship with the Church is seen as particularly important. The findings raise important broader questions as to the extent to which the current system of schooling is able to contribute to the building of a more integrated society. (shrink)

What is the connection between causation and responsibility? Is there a best way to theorize philosophically about causation? Which factors determine and influence what we judge to be the cause of something? Bringing together interdisciplinary research from experimental philosophy, traditional philosophy and psychology, this collection showcases the most recent developments and approaches to questions about causation. Chapters discuss the diverse theoretical ramifications of empirical findings in experimental philosophy of causation, providing a comprehensive survey of key issues such as the perception (...) and learning of causal relations, omission, normative considerations, mechanism, voluntariness and legal theories of causation. With novel contributions from both experts and rising stars, Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Causation demonstrates the value of empirical work and opens new domains of inquiry at the cutting edge of the field. (shrink)

El presente artículo busca interrogar al fenómeno de la apelación. Para ello, se examinará el vínculo entre fenomenología y apelación preguntándonos qué es preciso entender por la máxima husserliana que conmina a un retorno a las cosas mismas; en segundo lugar, intentaremos dilucidar cómo la obediencia crítica a la consigna fenomenológica ha supuesto una recomprensión de fenómeno al punto de transformar la consigna husserliana en un verdadero “retorno de las cosas mismas”. Finalmente, nos proponemos interrogar la apelación del fenómeno, a (...) partir del diálogo entre Marion y Romano. No solo intentaremos dilucidar cuál es la especificidad de la apelación, sino qué relación estricta hay entre fenómeno, particularmente insigne o saturado y apelación. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Isaac Barrow on the Mathematization of Nature: Theological Voluntarism and the Rise of Geometrical OpticsAntoni MaletIntroductionIsaac Newton’s Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy embodies a strong program of mathematization that departs both from the mechanical philosophy of Cartesian inspiration and from Boyle’s experimental philosophy. The roots of Newton’s mathematization of nature, this paper aims to demonstrate, are to be found in Isaac Barrow’s (1630–77) philosophy of the mathematical sciences.Barrow’s attitude (...) towards natural philosophy evolved from his earnest interest in medicine of around 1650, when a young Cambridge graduate, to natural philosophy (apparently under Henry More’s influence); from his thesis on the insufficiency of the Cartesian hypothesis to geometrical optics and the strong program of mathematization of natural philosophy of the middle 1660s; from Lucasian professor of Mathematics to Chaplain of his Majesty and eminent Restoration divine. Contemporary accounts of Barrow’s life suggest that he grew ever more skeptical about the worth of natural philosophy and mathematics. 1 In his last years he became a prolific [End Page 265] author of sermons and theological works. Published shortly after his death by John Tillotson (1630–94), later archbishop of Canterbury, they occupy over two thousand folio pages. Overloaded with involved philosophical arguments, Barrow’s sermons were apparently not very popular, but they were highly regarded by scholars and the Anglican hierarchy. 2 It is on certain of his sermons, as well as on the philosophical discussions contained in the Mathematical Lectures that our account of Barrow’s philosophy of the mathematical sciences will rest. 3 Barrow’s understanding of the mathematical sciences will allow us to discuss together three issues often analyzed independently: the theological background to English natural philosophy, the changing notion of mixed mathematical sciences during the seventeenth century, and finally the philosophical foundations of modern geometrical optics.It has long been recognized that significant relationships exist between theological voluntarism or intellectualism and views on natural philosophy. In particular Robert Boyle’s theological voluntarism is seen as grounding his experimentalist approach to natural philosophy. It is not quite so clear, however, how well theological voluntarism may relate to a strong program of mathematization such as the one embodied in Newton’s Principia Mathematica. In fact it has been suggested that the relationship is a negative one. This is derived from the necessary character of mathematical laws, which would put unwanted restrictions on God’s absolute dominion over nature, and also from the notion that theological intellectualism is conducive to a deductive, a priori science—the paradigm of which is of course geometry. However, Barrow’s theological voluntarism lead him to heighten the role of mathematics within natural philosophy.During the seventeenth century the so-called mixed or subalternate mathematical sciences changed profoundly. In the Enlightenment mixed mathematics—meaning above all rational mechanics—became one of the most prestigious and influential disciplines. The mixed mathematics of the Enlightenment, however, was markedly different from the Aristotelian [End Page 266] mixed mathematical sciences. The differences are noticeable both in the subject matter and in the substitution of mathematical infinitesimal analysis for geometrical synthesis, but also in the way of grounding mathematical theory on empirical evidence. Barrow’s Mathematical Lectures (delivered at Cambridge from 1664 to 1666) offer a fresh insight into the metamorphosis of these sciences just when Newton’s “mathematical principles” were in the making. Not the least interesting feature of Barrow’s discussion is that God’s omnipotence allows an evaluation of the truth of mathematical theories that do not apply to this world. Therefore, Barrow is led to introduce the distinction between the internal consistency, or mathematical truth, of a mathematical theory and its physical truth. This, in turn, leads him to the notion that theories need testing.Barrow on Matter and GodRecent literature has established significant correlations between theological voluntarism and empiricism, as well as between theological intellectualism and rationalism. As E. B. Davis writes, “the Christian doctrine of creation is a dialogue between God’s unconstrained will, which utterly transcends the bounds of human comprehension, and God’s orderly intellect, which serves as the model for the human mind.” Intellectualist theology considers God’s omniscience His... (shrink)

What are the main features that influence our attribution of moral responsibility? It is widely accepted that there are various factors which strongly influence our moral judgments, such as the agent’s intentions, the consequences of the action, the causal involvement of the agent, and the agent’s freedom and ability to do otherwise. In this paper, we argue that this picture is incomplete: We argue that social roles are an additional key factor that is radically underestimated in the extant literature. We (...) will present an experiment to support this claim. (shrink)

v. 1. Nominalism and realism.--v. 2. A theory of universals.

David Armstrong's book is a contribution to the philosophical discussion about possible worlds. Taking Wittgenstein's Tractatus as his point of departure, Professor Armstrong argues that nonactual possibilities and possible worlds are recombinations of actually existing elements, and as such are useful fictions. There is an extended criticism of the alternative-possible-worlds approach championed by the American philosopher David Lewis. This major work will be read with interest by a wide range of philosophers.

Se interroga la atencionalidad propia del amor en cuanto que experiencia privilegiada y primordial del cuidado. En busca de un acceso al fenómeno del amor, se propone interrogarlo conforme al tipo de atención que promueve, asumiendo y discutiendo los recursos aportados por la fenomenología husserliana, así como por las fenomenologías contraintencionales, en particular la de Waldenfels. De este modo, si para describir este fenómeno es preciso dar cuenta del fundamento afectivo de la atención, también hay que reconocer que el amor (...) es vivido como un hecho original o un acontecimiento que implica para el amante una reorientación existencial y atencional. (shrink)

It has recently been argued that normative considerations play an important role in causal cognition. For instance, when an agent violates a moral rule and thereby produces a negative outcome, she will be judged to be much more of a cause of the outcome, compared to someone who performed the same action but did not violate a norm. While there is a substantial amount of evidence reporting these effects, it is still a matter of debate how this evidence is to (...) be interpreted. In this paper, we engage with the three most influential classes of explanations, namely, (a) the Norm‐Sensitive Cognitive Process View, (b) the Normative Concept View, and (c) the Pragmatics View. We will outline how these theories explain the empirical results and in what ways they differ. We conclude with a reflection on how well these strategies do overall and what questions they still leave unanswered. (shrink)

RESUMEN Se interroga la atencionalidad propia del amor en cuanto que experiencia privilegiada y primordial del cuidado. En busca de un acceso al fenómeno del amor, se propone interrogarlo conforme al tipo de atención que promueve, asumiendo y discutiendo los recursos aportados por la fenomenología husserliana, así como por las fenomenologías contraintencionales, en particular la de Waldenfels. De este modo, si para describir este fenómeno es preciso dar cuenta del fundamento afectivo de la atención, también hay que reconocer que el (...) amor es vivido como un hecho original o un acontecimiento que implica para el amante una reorientación existencial y atencional. ABSTRACT The article inquires into the attentionality inherent to love as a privileged and primordial experience of care. Seeking access to the phenomenon of love, we suggest inquiring into it according to the type of attention it promotes, drawing on and discussing the resources provided by Husserlian phenomenology, as well as by counter-intentional phenomenologies, particularly Waldenfels'. Thus, while it is necessary to account for the affective grounds of attention in order to describe this phenomenon, it is also essential to recognize that love is experienced as an original fact or as an event that entails an existential and attentional reorientation of the lover. (shrink)

How evaluative are legal texts? Do legal scholars and jurists speak a more descriptive or perhaps a more evaluative language? In this paper, we present the results of a corpus study in which we examined the use of evaluative language in both the legal domain as well as public discourse. For this purpose, we created two corpora. Our legal professional corpus is based on court opinions from the U.S. Courts of Appeals. We compared this professional corpus to a public corpus, (...) which is based on blog discussions on the internet forum Reddit. While many linguistic phenomena can give insights into evaluativity, we investigated the use of a wide selection of evaluative adjectives (more specifically, thick adjectives) to gain a more comprehensive picture of the degree of evaluativity in the legal domain. Our analysis shows that legal professionals use thick terms less evaluatively than laypeople, which suggests that legal texts are less evaluative than ordinary discussions. This result, more generally, supports the philosophical idea that thick concepts may vary in their evaluative intensity. (shrink)

RESUMEN Este artículo reconstruye la genealogia arendtiana de las formas extremas de la violencia, tomando como hilo conductor los procesos de desingularización con un doble propósito: por un lado, analizar las (dis)continuidades históricas de dicha genealogia que trasciende la dimensión fisico-instrumental de la violencia y entra conexión con la (des)configuración de la identidad personal; por otro lado, reivindicar la vigencia de la obra de Hannah Arendt para explorar los ecos presentes de esa violencia, sin perder de vista su especificad actual. (...) ABSTRACT This paper reconstructs the Arendtian genealogy of the extreme forms of violence, taking desingularization processes as its guiding thread, with a twofold goal: on the one hand, to analyze the historical (dis)continuities of that genealogy, that goes beyond the physical-instrumental dimension of violence and comes into connection with the (de)configuration of personal identity; on the other hand, to claim the validity of Arendt's work to explore the echoes of that violence, without losing sight of its current specificity. (shrink)

Se busca aportar elementos conceptuales para una filosofía del consentimiento, al interrogar el privilegio que otorga Paul Ricoeur a la afirmación con respecto a las múltiples formas de negatividad inscritas en el ser humano y en sus acciones. Para ello, se propone un análisis del consentimiento próximo a Le volontaire et l'involontaire, en el que se tiene siempre en la mira la hermenéutica del sí-mismo y del homo capax, desarrolladas por Ricoeur desde 1990. Se defiende que el consentimiento va siempre (...) acompañado de la paciencia, y que ambos pueden y deben ser pensados como elementos estructurales que constituyen al sí-mismo. (shrink)

El siguiente ensayo busca tematizar los alcances y posibilidades de una fenomenología hermenéutica del testigo en la obra de Paul Ricoeur. Dos objetivos dan cuerpo a este intento: 1) situar el lugar del testigo en el marco de la fenomenología contemporánea, particularmente, de Husserl, Sartre y Lévinas; 2) preguntarse por la condición pasible del testigo, condición que a mí juicio hace de éste un respondiente, inscribiendo la obra ricoeuriana, con todas las cautelas correspondientes, que deben ser muchas, al inicio de (...) lo que puedo llamar el avance de diversos intentos de conducir una fenomenología de la responsividad (Jean-Louis Chrétien, Emmanuel Housset, Claude Romano), siendo cada uno de ellos, en todo caso, tan singular y original que habría que probar si son o no coincidentes. En este sentido, este ensayo es un prolegómeno a otro futuro que tendría por tarea tomar en serio a cada uno de estos fenomenólogos franceses. (shrink)

Se busca aportar elementos conceptuales para una filosofía del consentimiento, al interrogar el privilegio que otorga Paul Ricoeur a la afirmación con respecto a las múltiples formas de negatividad inscritas en el ser humano y en sus acciones. Para ello, se propone un análisis del consentimiento próximo a Le volontaire et l'involontaire, en el que se tiene siempre en la mira la hermenéutica del sí-mismo y del homo capax, desarrolladas por Ricoeur desde 1990. Se defiende que el consentimiento va siempre (...) acompañado de la paciencia, y que ambos pueden y deben ser pensados como elementos estructurales que constituyen al sí-mismo. By inquiring into the privilege granted by Paul Ricoeur to affirmation with respect to the multiple forms of negativity inscribed in human beings and their actions, the article seeks to contribute conceptual elements for a philosophy of consent. To this effect, it proposes an analysis of consent along the lines of Le volontaire et l'involontaire, bearing in mind the hermeneutics of self and of homo capax, developed by Ricoeur since 1990. The paper argues that consent goes hand in hand with patience, and that both can and should be thought as structural elements that constitute the oneself. Neste artigo, procura-se contribuir elementos conceituais para uma filosofia do consentimento, ao interrogar o privilégio que outorga Paul Ricoeur à afirmação a respeito das múltiplas formas de negatividade inscritas no ser humano e em suas ações. Para isso, propõe-se uma análise do consentimento próximo a Le volontaire et l'involontaire, no qual se tem sempre no alvo a hermenêutica do si-mesmo e do homo capax, desenvolvidas por Ricoeur desde 1990. Defende-se que o consentimento vai sempre acompanhado da paciência e que ambos podem e devem ser pensados como elementos estruturais que constituem o si-mesmo. (shrink)

Moral philosophers draw an important distinction between two kinds of moral responsibility. An agent can be directly morally responsible, or they can be derivatively morally responsible. Direct moral responsibility, so many believe, presupposes that the agent could have behaved differently. However, in some situations, we hold agents responsible even though they could not have behaved differently, such as when they recklessly cause an accident or do not take adequate precautions to avoid harmful consequences. Moral philosophers typically argue that what we (...) ascribe in these cases is derivative moral responsibility. In this paper, I apply this conceptual distinction to the experimental debate about so-called folk-compatibilism. I argue that experimental philosophers have failed to consider this distinction when designing experiments and interpreting their results. I demonstrate that while compatibilism requires judgments of direct moral responsibility, participants in some of the most influential studies ascribed derivative moral responsibility. For this reason, these studies do not speak in favour of compatibilism at all. (shrink)

This is a study of a crucial and controversial topic in metaphysics and the philosophy of science: the status of the laws of nature. D. M. Armstrong works out clearly and in comprehensive detail a largely original view that laws are relations between properties or universals. The theory is continuous with the views on universals and more generally with the scientific realism that Professor Armstrong has advanced in earlier publications. He begins here by mounting an attack on the orthodox and (...) sceptical view deriving from Hume that laws assert no more than a regularity of coincidence between instances of properties. In doing so he presents what may become the definitive statement of the case against this position. Professor Armstrong then goes on to establish his own theory in a systematic manner defending it against the most likely objections, and extending both it and the related theory of universals to cover functional and statistical laws. This treatment of the subject is refreshingly concise and vivid: it will both stimulate vigorous professional debate and make an excellent student text. (shrink)

The doxastic zoo contains many animals: belief, acceptance, belief in, belief that, certainty, conjecture, guess, conviction, denial, disbelief in, disbelief that, judgment, commitment, etc. It also contains belief’s “strange bedfellows”: credences, partial beliefs, tacit beliefs, subdoxastic states, creedal feelings, feelings of knowing, in-between believings, pathological beliefs, phobias, aliefs, delusions, biases, besires. How to order the zoo? I propose to distinguish doxastic attitudes from non-doxastic epistemic attitudes. The criterion is the existence of correctness conditions. Most bedfellows do not have such normative (...) conditions. So they should not be allowed in the Doxastic Club. (shrink)

Imagine you and your friend Pierre agreed on meeting each other at a café, but he does not show up. What is the difference between a friend’s not showing up meeting? and any other person not coming? In some sense, all people who did not come show the same kind of behaviour, but most people would be willing to say that the absence of a friend who you expected to see is different in kind. In this paper, I will spell (...) out this difference by investigating laypeople’s conceptualisation of absences of actions in four experiments. In languages such as German, French, Italian, or Polish, people consider a friend’s not coming an omission. Any other person’s not coming, in contrast, is not considered an omission at all, but just a mere nothing. This use of the term omission differs from the usage in English, where ‘omission’ refers to all kinds of absences. In addition, ‘omission’ is not even an everyday term, but invented by philosophers for the sake of philosophical investigation. In other languages, ‘omission’ is part of an everyday vocabulary. Finally, I will discuss how this folk concept of omission could be made fruitful for philosophical questions. (shrink)

El presente artículo busca interrogar el atender en su doble acepción, en tanto atención perceptiva y en tanto cuidado. Lo que parece interesante del examen del vínculo entre ambos sentidos es que pone en juego un sujeto que se comprende en relación estricta con la alteridad cuyo modo de ser está determinado por sus respuestas. En este sentido, el examen progresivo que va de la atención perceptiva a la atención en cuanto cuidado aporta recursos importantes para pensar la dimensión responsiva (...) del sí-mismo al alero de los aportes de la fenomenología contemporánea que va de Ricoeur, pasando por Levinas, Marion, Chrétien, Housset y Romano. This paper tries to interrogate the verb "to attend" in its double acceptation, as perceptive attention and as care. What seems interesting in the study of the link between both meanings is that it puts into play a subject who understands himself or herself in strict relationship with an otherness whose way of being is determined by his or her answers. In this sense, the progressive examination that goes from perceptive attention to attention as care brings important resources to think the responsive dimension of the self under the auspices of contemporary phenomenology: Ricoeur, but also Levinas, Marion, Chrétien, Housset and Romano. (shrink)

Este artículo se propone interrogar la relación entre sufrimiento y atención desde una perspectiva fenomenológica. A partir de este análisis intentaremos clarificar el fenómeno del sufrimiento mismo. Un fenómeno singular que ocurre de acuerdo a una saturación particular como un acontecimiento personal y dramático, y que puede ser experienciado en tanto que se impone irreversible e irrevocable. Así, cada una de estas notas constitutivas del sufrimiento revelarán la transformación y transmutación que este producen despliegue de nuestra atención, afectando la propia (...) relación con nosotros mismos, con los otros y con el mundo. Este camino interrogativo toma su impulso desde las caracterizaciones ricoeurianas del sufrimiento, entendido por el filósofo francés como la forma más vivas de consciencia de sí. (shrink)

RESUMEN El artículo examina el consuelo como una cuestión filosófica en cuanto que concreción de la solicitud, y muestra los recursos que aporta para comprender al ser humano como sujeto sufriente y respondiente. Se analiza el consuelo en cuanto que fenómeno de acceso a otras dimensiones constitutivas del ser humano, como la afectividad, la apelación y el cuidado. ABSTRACT The article examines consolation as a philosophical issue insofar as it is a materialization of attentiveness, and explains the resources it offers (...) to understand human beings as suffering and caring subjects. It analyzes consolation as a phenomenon that provides access to other constitutive dimensions of the human being, such as affectivity, appeal, and care. (shrink)

El artículo examina el consuelo como una cuestión filosófica en cuanto que con-creción de la solicitud, y muestra los recursos que aporta para comprender al ser humano como sujeto sufriente y respondiente. Se analiza el consuelo en cuanto que fenómeno de acceso a otras dimensiones constitutivas del ser humano, como la afec-tividad, la apelación y el cuidado.

RESUMEN En el siguiente texto se intentará dilucidar si acaso es posible hacer la experiencia de las cosas en su momento no temático ni objetivo con los recursos que aporta la nueva fenomenología, en particular, los propios de las obras de Marion y Maldiney. Con este fin, se interrogará la fenomenalidad propia de los objetos, para luego avanzar hacia el examen de dos experiencias privilegiadas buscando dilucidar lo que significa e implica hacer el encuentro de las cosas a-temáticamente, esto es: (...) la mirada estética y la experiencia de la sorpresa. ABSTRACT The following paper will attempt to elucídate if it is possible to make the experience of things neither in its thematics nor objective perceptual moment, through the use of some resources provided by the new phenomenology, in particular, those that are found in Marion's and Maldiney's philosophical works. To achieve this, on the one hand, we will investigate the proper phenomenality of objects, on the other, we will research two privileged experiences to understand what it means and implies to make an a-thematical encounter of things, namely: the aesthetics view and the experience of surprise. (shrink)

En el siguiente texto se intentará dilucidar si acaso es posible hacer la experiencia de las cosas en su momento no temático ni objetivo con los recursos que aporta la nuevafenomenología, en particular, los propios de las obras de Marion y Maldiney. Con este fin, se interrogará la fenomenalidad propia de los objetos, para luego avanzar hacia el examen de dos experiencias privilegiadas buscando dilucidar lo que significa e implica hacer el encuentro de las cosas a-temáticamente, esto es: la mirada (...) estética y la experiencia de la sorpresa. (shrink)

El siguiente artículo interroga dos concepciones que Ricoeur desarrolla sobre la vida en dos momentos distintos de su obra: el primero corresponde a una filosofía de la voluntad desarrollado a lo largo de una década (1950-1960), y el segundo a una hermenéutica de los textos que elabora particularmente a partir de su trilogía Temps et récit. Nuestra tesis de lectura consiste en afirmar que los discursos que Ricoeur ha elaborado sobre la vida, tanto fenomenológico como hermenéutico, están marcados por el (...) predominio de la afirmación, de la potencia del sí que se sobrepone a las diversas figuras de la negatividad, cobrando sentido el título de su obra póstuma Vivo hasta la muerte. Consentir y narrar son dos modos de afirmar a pesar de su opacidad y negatividad. The following article examines two manner of understandings life that Ricoeur develops in two different moments of his work: the first moment corresponds to a philosophy of the will developed during the decade of the 50th and the second corresponds to a hermeneutics of the texts that Ricoeur develops particularly in his trilogy Temps et récit. My thesis is that the different discourses that Ricoeur has elaborated about life, phenomenological and hermeneutical, are marked by the idea of affirmation, that is, by the potency of a self that overcomes the different figures of negativity. Then, we can make sense of the title of Ricoeur posthumous work Living Up to Death. Consent and narrate are two ways to affirm despite its opacity and negativity. (shrink)

Anger and disgust may have distinct roles in sexual morality; here, we tested hypotheses regarding the distinct foci, appraisals, and motivations of anger and disgust within the context of sexual offenses. We conducted four experiments in which we manipulated whether mutual consent (Studies 1–3) or desire (Study 4) was present or absent within a counter-normative sexual act. We found that anger is focused on the injustice of non-consensual sexual acts, and the transgressor of the injustice (Studies 1 and 3). Furthermore, (...) the sexual nature of the act was not critical for the elicitation of anger—as anger also responded to unjust acts of violence (Study 3). By contrast, we hypothesised and found that disgust is focused on whether or not a person voluntarily engaged in, desired or consented to a counter-normative sexual act (Studies 2–4). Appraisals of abnormality and degradation were the primary appraisals of disgust, and the sexual nature of the act was a critical elicitor of disgust (Study 3). A final study ruled out victimisation as the mechanism of the effect of consent on disgust and indicated that the consenter's sexual desire was the mechanism (Study 4). Our results reveal that anger and disgust have differential roles in consent-related sexual offenses due to the distinct appraisals and foci of these emotions. (shrink)

Two distinguished philosophers present opposing views on the questions of howthe objects of consciousness are perceived. (Philosophy).

Acts that are considered undesirable standardly violate our expectations. In contrast, acts that count as morally desirable can either meet our expectations or exceed them. The zone in which an act can be morally desirable yet not exceed our expectations is what we call the zone of moral indifference, and it has so far been neglected. In this paper, we show that people can use positive terms in a deflated manner to refer to actions in the zone of moral indifference, (...) whereas negative terms cannot be so interpreted. (shrink)

This paper deals with Hobbes's theory of optical images, developed in his optical magnum opus, ‘A Minute or First Draught of the Optiques’, and published in abridged version in De homine. The paper suggests that Hobbes's theory of vision and images serves him to ground his philosophy of man on his philosophy of body. Furthermore, since this part of Hobbes's work on optics is the most thoroughly geometrical, it reveals a good deal about the role of mathematics in Hobbes's philosophy. (...) The paper points to some difficulties in the thesis of Shapin and Schaffer, who presented geometry as a ‘paradigm’ for Hobbes's natural philosophy. It will be argued here that Hobbes's application of geometry to optics was dictated by his metaphysical and epistemological principles, not by a blind belief in the power of geometry. Geometry supported causal explanation, and assisted reason in making sense of appearances by helping the philosopher understand the relationships between the world outside us and the images it produces in us. Finally the paper broadly suggests how Hobbes's theory of images may have triggered, by negative example, the flourishing of geometrical optics in Restoration England. (shrink)

"I know of no religious writer more pertinent to our time."—T. S. Eliot, Introduction to Pensees Intended to prove that religion is not contrary to reason, Pascal's Pensees rank among the liveliest and most eloquent defenses of Christianity. Motivated by the seventeenth-century view of the supremacy of human reason, Pascal (1623–1662) had intended to write an ambitious apologia for Christianity in which he argued the inability of reason to address metaphysical problems. His untimely death prevented the work's completion, (...) but the fragments published posthumously in 1670 as Pensees remain a vital part of religious and philosophical literature. W. F. Trotter translation. Introduction by T. S. Eliot. (shrink)

The omission effect, first described by Spranca and colleagues, has since been extensively studied and repeatedly confirmed. All else being equal, most people judge it to be morally worse to actively bring about a negative event than to passively allow that event to happen. In this paper, we provide new experimental data that challenges previous studies of the omission effect both methodologically and philosophically. We argue that previous studies have failed to control for the equivalence of rules that are violated (...) by actions and omissions. Once equivalent norms are introduced, our results show that the omission effect is eliminated, even if the negative outcome of the behavior is foreseen and intended by the agent. We show that the omission effect does not constitute a basic, moral disposition but occurs exclusively in complex moral situations. Building on these empirical results, we cast doubt onto two influential explanations of the omission effect, the Causal Relevance Hypothesis and the Overgeneralization Hypothesis, and provide a novel explanation of the phenomenon. Furthermore, we discuss various ramifications of the interplay between our understanding of omissions and legal systems. (shrink)