The aim of this series is to bring together important recent writings in major areas of philosophical inquiry, selected from a variety of sources, mostly periodicals.

Is a mathematical theorem proved because provable, or provable because proved? If Brouwer’s intuitionism is accepted, we’re committed, it seems, to the latter, which is highly problematic. Or so I will argue. This and other consequences of Brouwer’s attempt to found mathematics on the intuition of a move of time have heretofore been insufficiently appreciated. Whereas the mathematical anomalies of intuitionism have received enormous attention, too little time, I’ll try to show, has been devoted to some of the temporal anomalies (...) that Brouwer has invited us to introduce into mathematics. (shrink)

It is a widely known but little considered fact that Albert Einstein and Kurt Gödel were best friends for the last decade and a half of Einstein's life. The two walked home together from Princeton's Institute for Advanced Study every day; they shared ideas about physics, philosophy, politics, and the lost world of German science in which they had grown up. By 1949, Gödel had produced a remarkable proof: In any universe described by the Theory of Relativity, time cannot exist (...) . Einstein endorsed this result-reluctantly, since it decisively overthrew the classical world-view to which he was committed. But he could find no way to refute it, and in the half-century since then, neither has anyone else. Even more remarkable than this stunning discovery, however, was what happened afterward: nothing. Cosmologists and philosophers alike have proceeded with their work as if Gödel's proof never existed -one of the greatest scandals of modern intellectual history. A World Without Time is a sweeping, ambitious book, and yet poignant and intimate. It tells the story of two magnificent minds put on the shelf by the scientific fashions of their day, and attempts to rescue from undeserved obscurity the brilliant work they did together. (shrink)

This is an expansion of the author's 1991 work which investigates the implications of Gödel's writings on Einstein's theory of relativity as they relate to the fundamental questions of the nature of time and the possibilities for time travel.

The dead are gone. They count for nothing. Yet, if we count the dead, their number is staggering. And they account for most of what is great about civilization. Compared to the greatness of the dead, the accomplishments of the living are paltry. Which is it then: are the dead still there tobe counted or not? And if they are still there, where exactly is "there"? We are confronted with the ancient paradox of nonexistence bequeathed us by Parmenides. The mystery (...) of death is the mystery of nonexistence.A successful attempt to provide a metaphysics of death, then, must resolve the paradox of nonexistence. That is the aim of this study. At the same time, the metaphysics of death, of ceasing to exist, must serve as an account of birth, of coming to exist; the primary thesis of this book is that thisdemands going beyond existence and nonexistence to include what underlies both, which one can call, following tradition, "being." The dead and the unborn are therefore objects that lack existence but not being. Nonexistent objects - not corpses, or skeletons, or memories, all of which are existentobjects - are what are "there" to be counted when we count the dead. (shrink)

In a recent essay, “Frege's Theory of Sense of Reference: Some Exegetical Notes”, Saul Kripke shows that in addition to being an astute critic of Frege, he is also an insightful interpreter. Kripke's Frege emerges as a closet Russellian, who, like Russell, relies heavily on a doctrine of acquaintance. Is Kripke right? Where exactly does his approach resemble, and where depart from earlier interpretations, and what should one take away about whether or not Frege really was a Russellian and the (...) effect this has on his theory? (shrink)

This is a book about the philosophy of time, and in particular the philosophy of the great logician Kurt Godel (1906-1978). It evaluates Godel's attempt to show that Einstein has not so much explained time as explained it away. Unlike recent more technical studies, it focuses on the reality of time. The book explores Godel's conception of time, existence, and truth with special reference to Plato, Aristotle, Kant, and Frege. In the light of this investigation an attempt is made to (...) shed light on such issues as the precise sense in which Godel believed in the possibility of time travel, the relationship of the reality of time to the objectivity of temporal becoming, and the significance of time for human existence.This is a book about the philosophy of time, and in particular the philosophy of the great logician Kurt Godel (1906-1978). It evaluates Godel's attempt to show that Einstein has not so much explained time as explained it away. Unlike recent more technical studies, it focuses on the reality of time. The book explores Godel's conception of time, existence, and truth with special reference to Plato, Aristotle, Kant, and Frege. In the light of this investigation an attempt is made to shed light on such issues as the precise sense in which Godel believed in the possibility of time travel, the relationship of the reality of time to the objectivity of temporal becoming, and the significance of time for human existence. (shrink)

Ce papier décrit la position de l’université au sein du monde contemporain et pose la question de son identité profonde à partir d’une analyse de l’activité universitaire. Cette dernière est considérée sous trois angles qui fournissent les critères selon lesquels elle peut être évaluée. L’accent est mis sur l’importance capitale de la communauté universitaire et les principes éthiques impliqués dans son développement. La responsabilité de l’université est discutée à la lumière d’une épistémologie des vertus et d’une distinction entre la pensée (...) quotidienne et la pensée académique. La vertu de cette dernière est la « pensée critique » qui se concentre sur la poursuite universelle de la compréhension et de la vérité. (shrink)

Ce papier décrit la position de l’université au sein du monde contemporain et pose la question de son identité profonde à partir d’une analyse de l’activité universitaire. Cette dernière est considérée sous trois angles qui fournissent les critères selon lesquels elle peut être évaluée. L’accent est mis sur l’importance capitale de la communauté universitaire et les principes éthiques impliqués dans son développement. La responsabilité de l’université est discutée à la lumière d’une épistémologie des vertus et d’une distinction entre la pensée (...) quotidienne et la pensée académique. La vertu de cette dernière est la « pensée critique » qui se concentre sur la poursuite universelle de la compréhension et de la vérité. (shrink)

Traditionally, skeptics as well as their opponents have agreed that in order to know that p one must be able, by some preferred means, to rule out all the alternatives to p. Recently, however, some philosophers have attempted to avert skepticism not (merely) by weakening the preferred means but rather by articulating a subset of the alternatives to p — the so-called relevant alternatives — and insisting that knowledge that p requires only that we be able (by the preferred means) (...) to rule out members of the set. In this paper I argue that a precise formulation of this new approach reveals it inadequate as a solution to skepticism. (shrink)

Palle Yourgrau; XI*—The Path Back to Frege, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 87, Issue 1, 1 June 1987, Pages 169–210, https://doi.org/10.1093/ari.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume and Davidson on Pride Pall S. krdal In reading the Treatise one has to be alive to the fact that Hume gives certain crucial words new meanings. He does not always draw the reader's attention to this and sometimes explicitly claims to be using terms with their ordinarymeaningswhen heis clearlygiving the words special technical uses by expanding or contracting their usual meanings. "Passion," "love," "hatred," "pride," and "humility" (...) have special meanings in Hume's psychological scheme. He also sometimes uses important terms with more than one meaning, as in the case of "justice." The word "justice" both is the title of Book 3, Part 2 of the Treatise, which deals with a number ofartificial virtues, and alsorefers to the much narrower concept ofthe respectfor property. The following two questions should be borne in mind: "What did Hume have to say about what he calls justice, passion, love, etc.?" and "What did Hume have to say about what we refer to by the same terms?" Thus, Books 2 and 3 of the Treatise may be described as attempting to show how unbiased evaluations are possible, in spite ofthe fact that our passions are naturally biased and judgments of virtue and vice are passions. This clearly involves a discussion of how we can do justice to our own and other peoples' qualities ofmind or character. Hume, therefore, had something very important to say about what we call justice, but his contribution to issues involving what we call justice today is obscured by his terminology. In what follows I shall be claiming that Hume's account of pride throws light upon what we call pride although he clearly was not aiming to do so. Donald Davidson, in a footnote to "Hume's Cognitive Theory of Pride," points out that there is a close similarity between his reading ofHume on pride andmy own treatment ofprideinPassionand Value. Since the two accounts were arrived at completely independently, each ofus can see the other'sinterpretation as some confirmation ofhis own. The accounts are not identical, however, and without aiming at a comprehensive comparison, I shall attempt to decide whether one or two ofthe apparent differences between our accounts indicate substantial disagreement. I shall try not to confuse the following four questions: "What did Hume thinkconstitutes pride?""Whatlesson do I, and whatlesson does Davidson think one could learn from Hume's account?" and finally, "What constitutes pride?" Davidson and I agree that a lesson is to be Volume XV Number 2 387 PALL ARDAL learned from Hume's account, but disagree about the nature of this lesson because of a disagreement about the nature of pride. Both Davidson and I think that Hume's claim that pride is a simple impression is an embarrassment to him. It does not have any immediate appeal and also leads him to clearly misrepresent the relation between pride and its object. Pride has self as its object in the sense that it is a form of self-evaluation. Hume misrepresents this relation as a causal relation between pride and the thoughtofoneself. Whenever one is proud, one's thought is drawn to oneself, but according to Hume it couldhave been otherwise. Itjust so happens that the feeling ofpride makes one think of oneself, that when you are already proud your thought turns to yourself. Hume, it is true, does not always represent the relation between the object of pride and the passion itself as contingent. Much ofwhathe says suggests the more plausible view that pride is essentially a form of self-evaluation, but the lesson we can learn from Hume we can learn in spite ofhis atomism, so let us follow Davidson and disregard the atomism, while admitting its presence in Hume's account. Davidson points out that the pride Hume is talking about is pride for a reason. I follow Hume in talking about the cause ofpride, or what makes one proud, but the two accounts seem to me to be very similar on this issue. The two accounts are alsoin agreement thatHume should have said that the proud person must see the cause of pride as having value rather than as an independent source of pleasure, but we are... (shrink)

I MAKE NO APOLOGIES for writing about this well-worn topic. For, although there has been an enormous amount written about the account Hume gives of the nature of moral evaluation, commentators are as far from agreement as ever. My own contribution to the controversy has, if anything, not only added to the variety of opinions but also has increased the general confusion. For this I must accept some responsibility. I have certainly laid myself open to some misinterpretation, and the view (...) I have so far expressed in print may also need some modification. I shall here attempt to clarify what precisely my view now is, and why I prefer it to some alternative views advanced by those who find my interpretation of this aspect of Hume's philosophy unacceptable. II. Since what I want to defend is in all important respects my earlier interpretation of the Treatise, 2 I shall for the most part, though not exclusively, be concerned with what Hume says in this, his early, but major, work. (shrink)

This thesis is neither e page to page commentary nor en assessment of Hume's place in the history of Philosophy. It mainly consists in an attempt at justifying a certain approach to the Interpretation of his theory of value with special reference to morals.

'You ask me about the idiosyncrasies of philosophers? There is their lack of historical sense, their hatred of even the idea of becoming, their Egyptianism. They think they are doing a thing honour when they dehistoricize it, sub specie aeternitatis — when they make a mummy of it.'Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols.

Place-lore, which has been systematically collected and archived in Estonia since the 19th century, is a part of various national, communal and institutional practices. Until now, Estonian researchers have resorted to conceptualizing place-lore from the perspective of archival texts, and the focus has been on collecting and archiving the material. At the same time, theoretical study of place-lore has remained in the background. In the article I approach place-lore from the perspective of ecosemiotics and suggest a new definition of place-lore (...) that is based on semiotic relations these narratives have with the environment they represent. Outlining different ways of how vernacular tradition and the environment it represents are semiotically related, and analysing the ways in which these relations are expressed in place-related folklore allows seeing how place-lore can be defined through (1) localizability, (2) representation of the characteristics of a place, and (3) manifestation of place experience. Defining place-lore and presenting the preliminary conceptual tools is much needed in practical collection work and archiving and serves as an important prerequisite for studying the place-related folklore in the context of contemporary challenges, such as changing textual practices, cultural disruptions, and environmental crisis. Examples are drawn from folklore associated with mires, specifically from narratives about the Kakerdaja Bog in northern Estonia. (shrink)

It is often claimed that, in at least some areas of language use, the relation between form and content is such that any attempt at reformulation or paraphrase amounts to a distortion of the significance of the original wording. In this article, I set out to vindicate an undemanding yet nontrivial conception of paraphrase. According to the rhetorical relations account of textual cohesion proposed, the meaning specifications required by a collection of sentences in order to constitute a text pave the (...) way for a kind of reformulation which is in solidarity with the possibility of paraphrase. I substantiate my approach with prosaic and poetic examples from Woolf and Dickinson, respectively. (shrink)

Definite descriptions occurring within the scopes of psychological verbs provide more puzzles than are traditionally acknowledged. This article presents one puzzle that is particularly intriguing.

This article contributes to governmentality studies and state theory by discussing how to understand the centrality and importance of the state from a governmentality perspective. It uses Giorgio Agamben’s critique of Michel Foucault’s governmentality approach as a point of departure for re-investigating Foucault as a thinker of the state. It focuses on Foucault’s notion of the state as a process of ‘statification’ which emphasizes the state as something constantly produced and reproduced by processes and practices of government, administration and acclamation. (...) As a result of this, the state appears as a given entity which is necessary for the multiplicity of governmental technologies and practices in modern society to function. Only by reference to the state can governmental practices be effective and legitimized. Finally, the article conceptualizes the centrality of the state through Foucault’s notions of the state as a ‘practico-reflexive prism’ and a ‘principle of intelligibility’. (shrink)

Frege's extension of his distinction between Sinn and Bedeutung to predicate terms is widely considered to be problematic. Interpreters generally assume that the notion of Bedeutung comprises the name/bearer relation as a prototype and that the extension is justified only in so far as the relation of predicate terms to their alleged referents is analogous to the relation of names to their bearers. However, interpreters have generally paid insufficient attention to Frege's own dealing with the issue. By examining the relevant (...) passages in Frege's writings, I show that the standard ways of talking about Frege's ascription of Bedeutung to predicates as optional, less evident than the ascription of Sinn, and in need of justification are not in accord with Frege's own conception of predicate reference. There is no textual evidence that the extension takes place for analogical reasons and, in particular, no evidence for the claim that the name/bearer relation is used as a prototype. Frege is visibly not concerned with the relation between predicate terms and their referents, but applies the notion of Bedeutung for reasons of principle. There is indeed the invocation of an analogy, but if we consider the argument in which it occurs it appears that it does not play the justificatory role interpreters attribute to it. In sum, Frege's ascription of Bedeutung to predicates does not imply any mysterious or dubious referentiality of predicate terms. (shrink)

Sets are multitudes which are also unities. It is surprising that the fact that multitudes are also unities leads to no contradictions: this is the main fact of mathematics.Kurt Gödel (Hao Wang,A Logical Journey: From Gödel to Philosophy)In what sense can something be at the same time one and many? The problem is familiar since Plato (for example,Republic524e). In recent times, Whitehead and Russell, inPrincipia Mathematica,have been struck by the difficulty of the problem: ‘If there is such an object as (...) a class, it must be in some senseoneobject, yet it is only of classes that many can be predicated. Hence, if we admit classes as objects, we must suppose that the same object can be both one and many, which seems impossible.' It is, however, in Frege's great work,The Foundations of Arithmetic(henceforth,Grundlagen),that many see the final resolution of the old question: how can something be at the same time one and many? (shrink)

Le texte récuse l’opinion selon laquelle la métaphore ne se paraphrase pas. La paraphrase est censée ne rendre que la référence, non le sens d’une expression. Afin de montrer que la paraphrase peut bien intervenir au sens d’une métaphore, le personnage fictif est invoqué comme paradigme pour la constitution du sens. L’entité de sens qu’est un personnage fictif n’est pas réductible à une expression unique, mais dépend de l’interaction au sein d’un réseau d’expressions différentes. Si le sens de la métaphore (...) se constitue de manière analogue, force est de conclure que la reformulation ne relève ni de l’aplatissement ni de la distorsion, mais qu’elle est constitutive du sens.The paper argues against the common assumption that metaphors cannot be paraphrased. Paraphrase is assumed to capture only the reference not the meaning of an expression. In order to show that a paraphrase may well concern the meaning of a metaphor, the case of fictive persons is considered as a paradigm for meaning constitution. The meaning entity that a fictive person constitutes is not reducible to a single expression but depends upon the interaction within a network of different expressions. If the meaning of metaphors is constituted in an analogous way, it must be asserted that reformulations neither trivialize nor distort their meaning but constitute it. (shrink)

In this paper I argue, from the consideration of what I hope is the complete variety of a hearer’s approaches to a speaker’s utterance, that the speaker’s intention does not settle the meaning of her utterance and the hearer does not take a genuine interest in the speaker’s actual intention. The reason why the speaker’s intention does not settle utterance meaning is simply that no utterance meaning determination, as presupposed by intentionalists and anti-intentionalists alike, takes place. Moreover, in the regular (...) course of interpretation the hearer does not care about the speaker’s actual intention, but only about what the speaker presents as her intention: the hearer’s goal is to come up with an interpretation which the speaker will accept rather than an interpretation which corresponds to the speaker’s intention. In cases of accountability, suspicion and lying, the speaker’s actual intention is irrelevant; it is at most the speaker’s hypothetical intention which is at stake. (shrink)

In this paper I argue, from the consideration of what I hope is the complete variety of a hearer’s approaches to a speaker’s utterance, that the speaker’s intention does not settle the meaning of her utterance and the hearer does not take a genuine interest in the speaker’s actual intention. The reason why the speaker’s intention does not settle utterance meaning is simply that no utterance meaning determination, as presupposed by intentionalists and anti-intentionalists alike, takes place. Moreover, in the regular (...) course of interpretation the hearer does not care about the speaker’s actual intention, but only about what the speaker presents as her intention: the hearer’s goal is to come up with an interpretation which the speaker will accept rather than an interpretation which corresponds to the speaker’s intention. In cases of accountability, suspicion and lying, the speaker’s actual intention is irrelevant; it is at most the speaker’s hypothetical intention which is at stake. (shrink)

In a Recent paper to The Joint Session of the AristotelianSociety and Mind Association Professor Neil MacCormick makes some interesting observations about the nature of promises and the source of the obligation to keep them. He rejects the view that an act can count as a promise only because a certain practice exists in a society. One may on the contrary well understand what promises are and know how to make them without there being any special convention making possible the (...) speech act of promising which amounts to no more than …“an utterance of the speaker's about his own future conduct which is essentially characterized by the speaker's intending his addressee to take it as being intended to induce the addressee to rely upon the speaker's taking the action in question.” One needs no special rule to explain why promise-breaking is wrong for …“the fact of the addressee's reliance on the promisor is sufficient ground for asserting that the promisor has an obligation to keep his word.” To bring home the point, MacCormick contrasts promising with divorcing by the simple utterance of 'I divorce thee, I divorce thee.' This is intelligible as an act of divorcing only by presupposing a convention that allows a divorce to be effected in this way. In performing the act by the appropriate formula the person is invoking the conventional rules that must obtain in the society if the act is to be successful. Searle, we are told, fails to see that promises are quite different in that they …“are explicable in terms of an intention to bring about a specific perlocutionary effect, and an intention that that intention be recognized” It is neither here nor there to point out, as Searle does, that ‘I predict’ and ‘I intend’ like ‘I promise’ tend to create expectations for the effect a promise is intended to achieve is reliance and not simply an expectation. (shrink)