Background: Ethical climate and moral distress have been shown to affect nurses’ ethical behaviour. Despite the many ethical issues in paediatric oncology nursing, research is still lacking in the field. Research aim: To investigate paediatric oncology nurses’ perceptions of ethical climate and moral distress. Research design: In this cross-sectional study, data were collected using Finnish translations of the Swedish Hospital Ethical Climate Survey–Shortened and the Swedish Moral Distress Scale–Revised. Data analysis includes descriptive statistics and non-parametric analyses. Respondents and research context: (...) Ninety-three nurses, working at paediatric oncology centres in Finland, completed the survey. Ethical considerations: According to Finnish legislation, no ethical review was needed for this type of questionnaire study. Formal research approvals were obtained from all five hospitals. Return of the questionnaire was interpreted as consent to participate. Results: Ethical climate was perceived as positive. Although morally distressing situations were assessed as highly disturbing, in general they occurred quite rarely. The situations that did appear often reflected performing procedures on school-aged children who resist such treatment, inadequate staffing and lack of time. Perceptions of ethical climate and frequencies of morally distressing situations were inversely correlated. Discussion: Although the results echo the recurrent testimonies of busy work shifts, nurses could most often practise nursing the way they perceived as right. One possible explanation could be the competent and supportive co-workers, as peer support has been described as helpful in mitigating moral distress. Conclusion: Nurturing good collegial relationships and developing manageable workloads could reduce moral distress among nurses. (shrink)

This research examined the experiences of authors of academic journal articles in the educational sector of all eight universities in Finland. The ethical principles of peer review and best and worst review processes were in focus. Data were gathered by electronic questionnaire, which was completed by 121 respondents who represented well the heterogeneity of the staff in the educational sector. Out of nine ethical principles honesty, constructiveness, and impartiality were appreciated but promptness, balance, and diplomacy were criticized. According to two (...) open questions, a third of authors praised and blamed reviewers as experts and non-experts. The accuracy of feedback was more often present in the best rather than in the worst experienced review processes. Journals’ editors and their decision-making called forth more negative than positive accounts. The results were discussed in the context of ethical codes for reviewers and researchers’ findings regarding the ethical responsibilities to promote good science with thorough, appropriate, and honest feedback and feedforward. (shrink)

AbstractForeign direct investment (FDI) in offshore financial centers (OFCs) is gaining increased attention in business ethics research. Much of this research tends to focus on OFCs as locations where firms can avoid taxes, considering such behavior as unethical. Yet, there is dearth of studies on capital round-tripping by emerging market firms, which is an integral part of this phenomenon. Such round-tripping involves firms sending capital into OFCs only to invest it back in the home country under the guise of “foreign” (...) investment. Presently there is little discussion of the ethical implications of such round-trip FDI activities. In this paper, we conceptualize round-tripping as institutional arbitrage and look at the determinants and ethical implications of such investments into OFCs. Exploring Russian round-tripping we note that firms tend to invest more funds in OFCs that offer a combination of tax and secrecy, or secrecy and property rights protection arbitrage opportunities. In either case firms exploit the opportunities provided by institutional differences between the OFC and Russia while investing back into Russia. Our results tend to indicate that equating OFC investment to tax avoidance and thus deeming it as unethical behavior is too narrow an explanation in the case of emerging economy round-tripping. This is because such investments are often motivated by the unethical behavior of home country stakeholders and may in fact provide benefits to society. (shrink)

This essay defends a three-dimensional response-model theory of recognition of persons, and discusses the related phenomenon of recognition of reasons, values and principles. The theory is three-dimensional in endorsing recognition of the equality of persons and two kinds of relevant differences: merits and special relationships. It defends a ‘response-model’ which holds that adequacy of recognition of persons is a matter of adequate responsiveness to situation-specific reasons and requirements. This three-dimen- sional response-model is compared to Peter Jones’s view, which draws the (...) distinction between status and merit recognition, and mediated and unmediated recognition. The essay discusses a number of questions related to how recognition of situation-specific reasons, and more general values and principles, is related to recognition of persons. The three- dimensional response-model of recognition of persons is in principle compatible with a constructivist view, which holds that the validity of values and principles is dependent on acknowledgement or endorsement. But even if one is a realist on that issue and thinks of validity as independent of acknowledgement, acknowledging relevant values, reasons and principles is a hugely important precondition of actual interpersonal recognition. The essay analyses these connections. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to describe the main ethical issues in paediatric nontherapeutic qualitative pain research. It is based on an analysis of the research literature related to ethical issues in research and on experiences from a family interview study focusing on pain assessment and management in children aged 1-6 years. In addition, different views concerning obtaining informed consent from children, as published in the research literature, are compared. Ethical challenges occur during all stages of qualitative research. The (...) risks of emotional distress and possible benefits of the results must be assessed prior to conducting a study. However, risks and harm are difficult to avoid in a study in which the research area, pain, raises emotional distress in both parents and children. The children’s assent and parental permission are both required. It is essential to obtain informed consent from all family members when family research is conducted. Participants’ privacy and confidentiality should be protected during data collection, analysis and publication. Protecting children from harm may be impossible during pain research in which they are required to recall a painful postoperative period. However, after data collection they can be assisted to focus on pleasant activities, for example, by engaging in playful activities with them. Finally, the role of the nurse and the researcher should be carefully assessed, especially in qualitative research, in order to be able to analyse the data and report the findings in an unbiased manner. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Life and World of a Singer:Finding My WayPäivi JärviöThe subject of my research is the performing practice of so-called early music, particularly the vocal music of the Italian Early Baroque era (ca. 1600–1630). The central figure in my study is Claudio Monteverdi and I am focusing my attention on the recitatives in his early operas, especially in Orfeo (1607). Or, should I say, these were the subject, focus, (...) and central figure of my research but they have been at least temporarily replaced by a more fundamental issue. Studying the performing practice of Italian Early Baroque vocal music1 made me realize how little has been revealed by research of the facts of performing practice and how much more I know from my own experience as a singer and as a teacher.This led me to ask what it meant to be a performer for the performer has been virtually absent from the literature on the performing practice of early music. Who was a singer of early music and what did she do? What happens when teaching this repertoire to others? I found it difficult to determine a point of view because first, the human being was missing altogether in my thinking; second, working with my own experience has required me to find a new way of talking/writing about it.Initially, my own experience functioned only as an illustrative example in my texts, if it was present at all. As my own experience as a performer and pedagogue started to take on greater significance in my research, I experimented for a long time with other types of writing, often with the result that the voices of others (philosophers and writers on performing practice) disappeared totally from the page or appeared only in footnotes. But such a way of writing raised questions about the validity and value of my own experiences. It was as if I needed some theoretical grounding, some sense of a larger guiding viewpoint which resonated with my own view of the performer, but which would allow me to open my experience and explore its possibilities. The search led me to the phenomenology of Michel Henry and to a new focus on the living body of a singer. Henry's thinking has radically transformed my understanding of what a human being is and how he is in Life and in the world.According to Henry, the subjective body has an affective and sensing relation to that which it is not, to the world. The world, in Henry's thinking, is not the transcendent horizon of classical phenomenology. Rather it is a world for life, a living cosmos, lived by the subject. I have access only to the world that I inhabit. I have no access to objects; rather, objects can be given to me and in me. The givenness happens in me, as a pathos. [End Page 65]Because I have only my experience, I read, write, and understand beginning from this experience. In this paper I will discuss the moment of starting a phrase with a vowel. I will first try to describe the experience of singing a note on the vowel "a," my example being from the entrance of the Messenger in the Orfeo singing "Ahi, caso acerbo" (Ah, hard fate!). Then I will discuss some points of view regarding this experience of singing one sound that are relevant for teaching singing and for art.Living in the Movement of My BreathI stand in a small, ascetically furnished room: there is nothing but a piano, a chair and a music stand. I look at the score on the music stand. I know how to read it: reading it makes the music happen in me even if no sound is heard in the room. I hear the continuo instruments and I feel and hear myself singing. My body reads the score, singing silently. My body is this ability to read music and to sing.When a pendulum swings there is a moment at the end of the upward movement where the pendulum stops, after which the movement turns downward. The pendulum feels weightless in the air until the... (shrink)

Cesario criticizes the experimental design of studies of bias by claiming that acting on stereotypes in the experimental situation might not be an “error” from a Bayesian perspective. However, social psychologists might have an ethical reason to label the observed decision-maker biases as “erroneous.” Decision-making can be considered as “biased” and “erroneous,” because it reflects illegal and morally condemnable discrimination.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Life and World of a Singer:Finding My WayPäivi JärviöThe subject of my research is the performing practice of so-called early music, particularly the vocal music of the Italian Early Baroque era (ca. 1600–1630). The central figure in my study is Claudio Monteverdi and I am focusing my attention on the recitatives in his early operas, especially in Orfeo (1607). Or, should I say, these were the subject, focus, (...) and central figure of my research but they have been at least temporarily replaced by a more fundamental issue. Studying the performing practice of Italian Early Baroque vocal music1 made me realize how little has been revealed by research of the facts of performing practice and how much more I know from my own experience as a singer and as a teacher.This led me to ask what it meant to be a performer for the performer has been virtually absent from the literature on the performing practice of early music. Who was a singer of early music and what did she do? What happens when teaching this repertoire to others? I found it difficult to determine a point of view because first, the human being was missing altogether in my thinking; second, working with my own experience has required me to find a new way of talking/writing about it.Initially, my own experience functioned only as an illustrative example in my texts, if it was present at all. As my own experience as a performer and pedagogue started to take on greater significance in my research, I experimented for a long time with other types of writing, often with the result that the voices of others (philosophers and writers on performing practice) disappeared totally from the page or appeared only in footnotes. But such a way of writing raised questions about the validity and value of my own experiences. It was as if I needed some theoretical grounding, some sense of a larger guiding viewpoint which resonated with my own view of the performer, but which would allow me to open my experience and explore its possibilities. The search led me to the phenomenology of Michel Henry and to a new focus on the living body of a singer. Henry's thinking has radically transformed my understanding of what a human being is and how he is in Life and in the world.According to Henry, the subjective body has an affective and sensing relation to that which it is not, to the world. The world, in Henry's thinking, is not the transcendent horizon of classical phenomenology. Rather it is a world for life, a living cosmos, lived by the subject. I have access only to the world that I inhabit. I have no access to objects; rather, objects can be given to me and in me. The givenness happens in me, as a pathos. [End Page 65]Because I have only my experience, I read, write, and understand beginning from this experience. In this paper I will discuss the moment of starting a phrase with a vowel. I will first try to describe the experience of singing a note on the vowel "a," my example being from the entrance of the Messenger in the Orfeo singing "Ahi, caso acerbo" (Ah, hard fate!). Then I will discuss some points of view regarding this experience of singing one sound that are relevant for teaching singing and for art.Living in the Movement of My BreathI stand in a small, ascetically furnished room: there is nothing but a piano, a chair and a music stand. I look at the score on the music stand. I know how to read it: reading it makes the music happen in me even if no sound is heard in the room. I hear the continuo instruments and I feel and hear myself singing. My body reads the score, singing silently. My body is this ability to read music and to sing.When a pendulum swings there is a moment at the end of the upward movement where the pendulum stops, after which the movement turns downward. The pendulum feels weightless in the air until the... (shrink)

This article contributes to the body of stakeholder literature by providing an in-depth analysis of the dynamics of stakeholder relationships as a part of change in value creation. The article presents an argument that the stakeholder salience model as a tool for analyzing stakeholder relationships is not sufficient for understanding business value creation. In the recent stakeholder literature, understanding business value creation has become an important theme. Through an analysis of an empirical case, the article shows how the three stakeholder (...) relationship attributes, legitimacy, power and urgency help to reveal the definitive stakeholders and to capture dynamics of stakeholder relations. However, in the case of strategic change, where the value creation of a firm is in transition, a more profound understanding of stakeholder relationships is needed. As a result of our empirical analysis, six characteristics of stakeholder relationships were identified. To conclude, the question of who and what really counts should be replaced by the question of how value is created in stakeholder relationships. (shrink)

There is an urge to introduce high technology and robotics in care settings. Assisted living is the fastest growing form of older adults’ long-term care. Resident autonomy has become the watchword for good care. This article sheds light on the potential effects of care robotics on the sense of autonomy of older people in AL. Three aspects of the residents’ sense of autonomy are of particular interest: interaction-based sense of autonomy, coping-based sense of autonomy, and potential-based sense of autonomy. Ethnographical (...) data on resident autonomy in an AL facility and existing literature on care robots are utilized in studying what kind of assurances different types of robots would provide to maintain the sense of autonomy in AL. Robots could strengthen the different types of sense of autonomy in multiple ways. Different types of robots could widen the residents’ space of daily movements, sustain their capacities, and help them maintain and even create future expectations. Robots may strengthen the sense of autonomy of older persons in AL; however, they may simultaneously pose a threat. Multi-professional discussions are needed on whether robots are welcomed in care, and if they are, how, for whom, and in what areas. (shrink)

This article starts with the idea that the task of social philosophy can be defined as the diagnosis and therapy of social pathologies. It discusses four conceptions of social pathology. The first two conceptions are ‘normativist’ and hold that something is a social pathology if it is socially wrong. On the first view, there is no encompassing characterization of social pathologies available: it is a cluster concept of family resemblances. On the second view, social pathologies share a structure (e.g. second-order (...) disorder). The last two conceptions are ‘naturalist’ and hold that something is wrong because it is pathological. The third view takes it that society is the kind of substance that can fall ill – an organism. The fourth view operates with the notion of a social life that can degenerate. The four conceptions are compared along six criteria: (1) is the view plausible?; (2) is it informative (if true)?; (3) does it help define the task of social philosophy?; (4) does it take naturalistic vocabulary seriously?; (5) does it hold that pathologies share a structure?; and (6) how does it see the primacy of being wrong and being pathological? (shrink)

This article focuses on the justification of taxation, in other words the principled rather than the technical aspect of taxation. We first show how democracy is on the one hand required for legitimate taxation, and how on the other hand democratic communities are dependent on taxation, and argue there is no vicious cirle. We then present a typology of ways of justifying taxation, according to which taxation can base its legitimacy on (1) meeting basic needs, (2) financing public goods, (3) (...) redistribution, or (4) (dis-)incentivising certain types of conduct. We then discuss the applicability of each of these types of justification on the global level, arguing that all of them do apply to the global level. The article further concludes that different normative justifications guide us towards different designs of taxation in practice, so the background justification has to be made clear, especially when designing new taxation systems. (shrink)

We raise the possibility that the roles words typically play in sentence context, rather than their motor or visual associations, determine the organization of language in the brain. We also discuss time-sensitive functional imaging approaches that allow experimentation both on isolated words and connected language.

In the earlier literature the importance of public policies and regulatory changes to firm performance and competitive position has been well established (e.g., Bonardi, 2004). However, little research has been done on the dynamics of this relationship. In this paper, we examine how and why regulatory changes can affect on the evolution of market and nonmarket strategies of a firm. We use a longitudinal case study on Finnish retail industry to illustrate the interactions between regulatory change, strategic responses and firm (...) performance. (shrink)

This multi-centre research investigates the effects of dance movement therapy (DMT) on participants diagnosed with depression. In total, 109 persons participated in the study in various locations in Finland. The participants were 39 years old, on average (range = 18–64 years), and most were female (96%). All participants received treatment as usual (TAU). They were randomised into DMT+TAU (n = 52) or TAU-only (n = 57). The participants in the DMT + TAU group were offered 20 DMT sessions twice a (...) week for 10 weeks in addition to standard care. The measurement points included pre-treatment measurement at the baseline, post-treatment measurement at the end of the intervention, and a follow-up measurement 3 months afterward. The observed effects of the intervention among participants in the DMT+TAU group were a greater reduction in depression (BDI-I) and in indicators of physical and psychological distress (CORE-OM and SCL-90) in comparison to the participants who received TAU-only. At the 3-month follow-up, the corrected between-group effect sizes (ES) were medium and in favour of the DMT+TAU group (d = 0.60–0.72). These results are in line with the increasing number of research studies showing the benefits of DMT intervention among participants with depression, and these results indicate that DMT may improve the effectiveness of standard care. (shrink)

After characterizing Taylor’s general approach to the problems of solidarity, we distinguish and reconstruct three contexts of solidarity in which this approach is developed: the civic, the socio-economic, and the moral. We argue that Taylor’s distinctive move in each of these contexts of solidarity is to claim that the relationship at stake poses normatively justified demands, which are motivationally demanding, but insufficiently motivating on their own. On Taylor’s conception, we need some understanding of extra motivational sources which explain why people (...) do (or would) live up to the exacting demands. Taylor accepts that our self-understanding as members of either particular communities or humanity at large has some motivational power, but he suspects that in many cases the memberships are too thin to resonate deeply and enduringly within us. In Taylor’s view, a realistic picture of what moves people to solidarity has to account for the extra motivation, when it happens. We propose an alternative view in which morality, democracy and socio-economic cooperation can be seen as separate spheres or relations which are normatively justified, motivationally demanding, but also sufficiently motivating on their own. (shrink)

This unique collection examines the connections between two complementary approaches to philosophical social theory: Hegel-inspired theories of recognition, and analytical social ontology.

This qualitative study explores how business leaders narrate their personal ways of recognizing, reasoning, and resolving moral conflicts and what these stories reveal about their moral identity processes within organizational contexts. Based on interviews with 25 business leaders, 4 moral identity statuses were identified: achievement, moratorium, foreclosure, and diffusion. The moral identity statuses were based on how leaders approached and interpreted moral conflicts and what the influence of the organizational context was in their moral decision-making processes. Some remained steadfast in (...) adhering to their previous value commitments, while others tried to avoid taking any clear moral standpoint. Still others experienced moral conflicts as disequilibrating events that triggered reflective processes and developmental cycles of moral identity change. These moral identity statuses hold implications for facilitating moral identity development among business leaders in the context of work. (shrink)

This is an introduction to a special issue on recognition and democracy. We outline the constitutive and enabling relations between democracy and recognition. We distinguish between pre-political and political forms of identity and recognition, between horizontal and vertical forms of recognition, and between democratic and other ways or arranging the vertical and horizontal aspects of political life. We also distinguish between the roles of a subject and a co-author of law. The intruduction also includes an overview of the individual articles (...) in this special issue. The issue tries to fill some theoretical gaps in theories of democracy and recognition, with a special emphasis on feminist politics. (shrink)

A substantial article length introduction to a collection on social ontology and mutual recognition.

HR/AL: Professor Taylor, what are you working on these days? CT: Well, several things. One of the things I am working on is something I was lecturing this fall at the New School University, and that I have called ‘modern social imaginaries’. It is an attempt to understand western modernity in terms of the different ways in which people imagine their social existence. These imaginaries are a condition for new kinds of practices that are characteristic of modernity. This research is (...) an internal part of a larger project to understand modern secular civilization, the modern west as a secular civilization. What does that notion exactly mean? What does it amount to? How did it happen? (shrink)

This article suggests first that the concept of interpersonal recognition be understood in a multidimensional (as opposed to one-dimensional), practical (as opposed to symbolic), and strict (as opposed to broad) way. Second, it is argued that due recognition be seen as a reason-governed response to evaluative features, rather than all normativity and reasons being seen as generated by recognition. This can be called a response-model, or, more precisely, a value-based model of due recognition. A further suggestion is that there is (...) a systematic basis for distinguishing three dimensions of recognition, depending on whether recognition is given to someone qua a person, qua a certain kind of person, or qua a certain person. Finally, it is argued that recognition is a necessary condition of personhood, but whether it is of direct or indirect relevance depends on our theories of personhood (social vs. capacity-theory) and practical identity (dialogical definition model vs. feature-model). Despite the apparent opposition, it is shown that interpersonal recognition is both a response to value and a precondition of personhood. (shrink)

Charles Taylor is one of the leading living philosophers. In this book Arto Laitinen studies and develops further Taylor's philosophical views on human agency, personhood, selfhood and identity. He defends Taylor's view that our ethical understandings of values play a central role. The book also develops and defends Taylor's form of value realism as a view on the nature of ethical values, or values in general. The book criticizes Taylor's view that God, Nature or Human Reason are possible constitutive (...) sources of value – Laitinen argues that we should drop the whole notion of a constitutive source. (shrink)

This study concerns the sociotechnical bases of human autonomy. Drawing on recent literature on AI ethics, philosophical literature on dimensions of autonomy, and on independent philosophical scrutiny, we first propose a multi-dimensional model of human autonomy and then discuss how AI systems can support or hinder human autonomy. What emerges is a philosophically motivated picture of autonomy and of the normative requirements personal autonomy poses in the context of algorithmic systems. Ranging from consent to data collection and processing, to computational (...) tasks and interface design, to institutional and societal considerations, various aspects related to sociotechnical systems must be accounted for in order to get the full picture of potential effects of AI systems on human autonomy. It is clear how human agents can, for example, via coercion or manipulation, hinder each other’s autonomy, or how they can respect each other’s autonomy. AI systems can promote or hinder human autonomy, but can they literally respect or disrespect a person’s autonomy? We argue for a philosophical view according to which AI systems—while not moral agents or bearers of duties, and unable to literally respect or disrespect—are governed by so-called “ought-to-be norms.” This explains the normativity at stake with AI systems. The responsible people (designers, users, etc.) have duties and ought-to-do norms, which correspond to these ought-to-be norms. (shrink)

This paper argues that relations of mutual recognition (love, respect, esteem, trust) contribute directly and non-reductively to our flourishing as relational selves. -/- Love is important for the quality of human life. Not only do everyday experiences and analyses of pop culture and world literature attest to this; scientific research does as well. How exactly does love contribute to well-being? This chapter discusses the suggestion that it not only matters for the experiential quality of life, or for successful agency, but (...) that it actualizes our nature as “relational selves” (Chen, Boucher & Kraus 2011). I defend a hybrid or pluralist theory, which sees humans not only as subjects of experiences, or agents, or valuers, but also as relational selves. Expanding from love to other interpersonal relations, thriving relations of mutual recognition (love, respect, esteem, trust), contribute directly and non-reductively to our flourishing as relational selves. The paper will start by putting forward the proposal (Section 2), and then discussing it in relation to important alternatives. The focus is on alternatives which hold that love, and other forms of mutual recognition, are important for well-being, but only indirectly. One kind of challenge against the constitutive role of relations to others for well-being comes from the traditional theories that accommodate relations in some indirect ways (Section 3). A second kind of challenge admits that perhaps love is central to well-being in a direct way, but do we have reason to believe that other forms of mutual recognition are as well? (Section 4) Yet another kind of challenge is that love matters for the quality of lives in some other way than contributing to its prudential value: love is good, but is it good for us? (Section 5) A fourth kind of challenge concerns what we are, and the nature of “essentialism” involved in the approach stressing relational selfhood: cannot, say, motherhood contribute to one’s good life even if motherhood is contingent and not essential? (Section 6). In debates on recognition the idea that mutual recognition is also relevant for well-being has been put forward, for example in Axel Honneth’s (1992, ch.9 ) ”formal” theory of good life. Whatever else constitutes good life, relations of recognition form its backbone (cf. Ikäheimo 2014). Surprisingly little however is written about mutual recognition and well-being in detail, or recognition in comparison to traditional theories of well-being. This chapter aims to fill some of that void, and at the same time defend the view that well-being is one of the normative notions with which mutual recognition has a constitutive relationship. (shrink)

This paper examines how three central aspects of personhood — the capacities of individuals, their normative status, and the social aspect of being recognized — are related, and how personhood depends on them. The paper defends first of all a ‘basic view’that while actual recognition is among the constitutive elements of full personhood, it is the individual capacities (and not full personhood) which ground the basic moral and normative demands concerning treatment of persons. Actual recognition depends analyti- cally on such (...) pre-existing normative requirements: it is a matter of responsiveness to them. The paper then discusses four challenges. The challenges claim that pace the basic view, the relevant capacities depend on recognition, that recognition seems to have normative rele- vance, and that the basic view cannot as such explain the equality either of persons, or of humans. Responding to these challenges amounts to refining the basic view accordingly. (shrink)

Child abuse within the family is a highly sensitive issue and therefore difficult to research. This article is based on our experiences of a child abuse research project in Finland. Special attention is given to ethical considerations during the initiation of the study, and in the sampling procedures, data collection and reporting. Most importantly, all those taking part in studies on sensitive issues must be guaranteed full confidentiality and anonymity. There are also other ethical considerations that go beyond the usual (...) concerns in the research process. (shrink)

The aim of this book is to provide an in-depth account of Hegel’s writings on human action as they relate to contemporary concerns in the hope that it will encourage fruitful dialogue between Hegel scholars and those working in the philosophy of action. During the past two decades, preliminary steps towards such a dialogue were taken, but many paths remain uncharted. The book thus serves as both a summative document of past interaction and a promissory note of things to come. (...) We begin this introduction with some general words regarding the philosophy of action before singling out reasons for exploring Hegel’s thought in relation to it. We next present a brief overview of studies conducted to this day, followed by a thematic appraisal of the contributions appearing in this volume. (shrink)

A substantial article-length introduction to the theme of personhood.

In this paper we elucidate the notion of ‘social wrongs’. It differs from moral wrongness, and is broader than narrowly political wrongs. We distinguish conceptually monadic wrongness (1.1), dyadic wronging (1.2), and the idea of there being something ‘wrong with’ an entity (1.3). We argue that social and political wrongs share a feature with natural badness or wrongness (illnesses of organisms) as well as malfunctioning artifacts or dysfunctional organizations: they violate so called ought-to-be norms; they are not as they ought (...) to be; there is something wrong with them. In contrast, moral wrongs are violations of ought-to-do norms. Social wrongs typically, but not invariably, include dyadic wronging. We examine who or what can wrong whom or what, and by what means: we can be wronged by individuals and groups, as well as by practices, institutions or structures (2.1–2.3). The notion of structural injustice is compared to the notion of social wrongs in 2.4. Social wrongs are defined as there being something wrong with the social reality (3.3), in comparison to there being something wrong with an organism or a system (3.1), including the narrowly political wrongs of systems of governance (3.2). (shrink)

In this collection, philosophers, social psychologists, and social scientists approach contemporary social reality from the viewpoint of solidarity. They examine the nature of solidarity and explore its normative and explanatory potential.

This chapter distinguishes between several senses of “normativity”. For example, that we ought to abstain from causing unnecessary suffering is a normative, not descriptive, claim. And so is the claim that we have good reason, and ought to drive on the right, or left, side of the road because the law requires us to do that. Reasons and oughts are normative, by definition. Indeed, it may be that “[t]he normativity of all that is normative consists in the way it is, (...) or provides, or is otherwise related to reasons” (Raz 1999, 67) . That is what the “reasons-first” view holds, but there are also other views, and what is by definition a normative statement, or a normative fact if you like, depends on how we define normativity. -/- It may seem that requirements are also by definition normative. But it seems that there can also be requirements that one has no reason to meet: it is less clear whether such requirements are normative in the same sense that reasons and oughts are normative. This paper will go through various further phenomena, which are candidates for being normative in some other sense than normative reasons and oughts, defending however the view that not all of them are. But arguably four or so different senses of normativity can be distinguished. -/- The paper will accept the view that the normativity of reasons and oughts, which is here called normativity1, is central. It is an open question whether all requirements or expectations or socially constructed norms are normative in that sense. Arguably it depends on the contents and content-independent authority of the legislators, whether we have good reasons, or ought, to meet the requirements, obey the law, or to follow the etiquette, or to conform to others’ interpersonal expectations, requests, demands or prescriptions. Whether and when we do have such reasons is a difficult and important substantive question, which concerns the normativity1 of requirements of law. -/- In another sense, norms (intended to guide behavior) are trivially or by definition normative, and constitute normativity: some forms of behavior are ruled as acceptable (e.g. driving on the right) and others as unacceptable (e.g. driving on the left) in light of the norm. Even in the case of a bad norm (that we have no reason to follow, and which ought to be changed, and ought not prevail) classifies behaviours as acceptable or unacceptable in light of the norm. Surely norms are by definition normative? Call this conformity to social norms and actual expectations normativity2. It is not an open question whether social norms are normative in that sense – they are by definition normative2. But importantly, it is an open question whether one has good reasons, or sufficient reason, or ought, to follow any social norm – that is, whether the norm in question is normative1. -/- The first section of the article characterizes further the difference between these two senses of normativity, and additionally introduces various other candidate senses of “normativity”. These possible senses of “normativity” may be at stake in the debates about normative requirements of rationality , about so called ought-to-be -rules , about normativity of linguistic meaning , about “directions of fit” of beliefs and desires , about subjective authority of intentions and decisions and interpersonal authority or co-authority of concrete others. -/- In later sections these cases are discussed. Do they constitute separate senses of normativity? And are the later phenomena such that they give agents good reasons: do they include normativity1 – the core sense? A “normative power -model” is suggested as a framework for examining whether actual social norms, laws, expectations provide good reasons and oughts or not. Once we understand the relation between the first two senses of normativity, do the later phenomena follow the same pattern – is the “normative powers – model” relevant for them as well? (shrink)

The idea that there are representations with a double direction of fit has acquired a pride of place in contemporary debates on the ontology of institutions. This paper will argue against the very idea of anything at all having both directions of fit. There is a simple problem which has thus far gone unnoticed. The suggestion that there are representations with both directions of fit amounts to a suggestion that, in cases of discrepancy between a representation and the world, both (...) should change—the representation and the world. But that would merely amount to another discrepancy, and so both should change again, ad infinitum. The paper will first elucidate the notion of a “direction of fit” and clarify how the criticism to be presented here differs from earlier criticisms (Section 1).The next section sheds some light on why and how acts and attitudes with both directions of fit have seemed to play a part in explaining the existence of institutional reality (Section 2). The next sections present the argument against any representations with both directions of fit, relying on a normative understanding of the distinction. The argument will have three steps (Sections 3, 4, and 5). The section that follows shows that the criticism also applies to the dispositional understanding of the notion of a direction of fit (Section 6), and then the paper asks whether a third kind of reading would be available (Section 7) and whether the infallibility of the relevant representations would be of help (Section 8). Finally, the paper assesses briefly the consequences of dropping the notion of two directions of fit (Section 9). (shrink)

Social esteem, based on contributions the common good, or to the good of others, is an important phenomenon, and following Axel Honneth, it can be seen as an important subspecies of interpersonal recognition, side by side with respect and love. In this paper we will contrast two accounts of this phenomenon, hoping that this kind of cross-illumination will prove useful by clarifying a number of conceptual questions and options that one needs to be conscious of indiscussions about esteem as a (...) form of recognition. (shrink)

This paper critically examines Christopher Zurn’s suggestion mentioned above that various social pathologies (pathologies of ideological recognition, maldistribution, invisibilization, rationality distortions, reification and institutionally forced self-realization) share the structure of being ‘second-order disorders’: that is, that they each entail ‘constitutive disconnects between first-order contents and secondorder reflexive comprehension of those contents, where those disconnects are pervasive and socially caused’ (Zurn, 2011, 345-346). The paper argues that the cases even as discussed by Zurn do not actually match that characterization, but that (...) it would be premature to conclude that they are not thereby social pathologies, or that they do not have a structure in common. It is just that the structure is more complex than originally described, covering pervasive socially caused evils (i) in the social reality, (ii) in the first order experiences and understandings, (iii) in the second order reflection as discussed by Zurn, and also (iv) in the ‘third order’ phenomenon concerning the pre-emptive silencing or nullification of social criticism even before it takes Place. -/- Research Interests: Critical Theory, Social Theory, Political Theory, Recognition - Social Pathologies, Axel Honneth, Mutual recognition and Dani Zubair . (shrink)

`Due recognition is a vital human need', argues Charles Taylor. In this article I explore this oft-quoted claim from two complementary and equally appealing perspectives. The bottom—up approach is constructed around Axel Honneth's theory of recognition, and the top—down approach is exemplified by T. M. Scanlon's brief remarks about mutual recognition. The former can be summed up in the slogan `wronging by misrecognizing', the latter in the slogan `misrecognizing by wronging'. Together they provide two complementary readings of the claim that (...) due recognition is a vital human need: one starts from needs, shows how we have a multifarious need for adequate recognition and builds up to a view about wronging; the other starts from wronging and discusses the kind of interest or need that we have of standing in relations where wronging is absent. (shrink)

A resale copy of a special issue of Journal of Consciousness Studies (Volume 14, Issue 5-6, 2007). This collection of original articles considers the perennial question ‘What are persons?’ It aims first of all to clarify the nature of the question and its relation to associated questions such as the nature of the human animal; how the concepts of human being, person, subject, and self are related; the persistence and unity of persons; and questions as to the conditions for personhood (...) and personality.The ‘dimensions’ of the book’s title reflects the volume’s focus on the relations that persons have with themselves and each other. (shrink)

This paper is an introduction to the special issue on Pathologies of Recognition. The first subsection briefly introduces the notion of recognition and trace its development from Fichte and Hegel to Honneth and his critics, and the second subsection turns to the concept of a social pathology. The third section provides a brief look at the individual papers. -/- The special issue focuses on two central concepts in contemporary critical social theory: namely ‘recognition’ and ‘social pathology’. For defenders of a (...) theory of recognition, adequate recognition is itself a key normative criterion for analysing social wrongs and pathologies which fall short of the ideal. For critics, the focus on recognition – even at its best – rather conceals social wrongs. While the contributors in this collection represent slightly different approaches, the general consensus amongst them is that recognition as such is a good ideal but like all good ideals it can go wrong in various ways and take pathological forms itself. In this introduction we focus first briefly on the concepts of recognition and social pathology, and finally present the papers of this special issue. (shrink)

The essays in this volume offer a range of new perspectives on Charles Taylor's philosophy. Part one addresses key metaphilosophical themes such as the role of transcendental arguments, the critique of representationalism, and the dialectics of Enlightenment. Part two critically examines Taylor's views on personhood, selfhood and interpersonal recognition. Part three discusses issues in Taylor's moral and political theory, including the nature of his moral realism, his theory of modernity, and his critical appropriation of the liberal tradition. The book concludes (...) with an interview with Taylor in which he summarizes his work and comments on some key contemporary issues. (shrink)