The general notion of relative freedom is introduced. It is a kind of freedom that is observed everywhere in nature. In biology, incomplete knowledge is defined for all organisms. They cope with the problem by Popper’s trial-and-error processes. One source of their success is the relative freedom of choice from the basic option ranges: mutations, motions and neuron connections. After the conjecture is adopted that communicability can be used as a criterion of consciousness, free will is defined as a conscious (...) version of relative freedom. The resulting notion is logically self-consistent and it describes an observable phenomenon that agrees with our experience. (shrink)

We recall the notions of weak and strong Euler characteristics on a first order structure and make explicit the notion of a Grothendieck ring of a structure. We define partially ordered Euler characteristic and Grothendieck ring and give a characterization of structures that have non-trivial partially ordered Grothendieck ring. We give a generalization of counting functions to locally finite structures, and use the construction to show that the Grothendieck ring of the complex numbers contains as a subring the ring of (...) integer polynomials in continuum many variables. We prove the existence of a universal strong Euler characteristic on a structure. We investigate the dependence of the Grothendieck ring on the theory of the structure and give a few counter-examples. Finally, we relate some open problems and independence results in bounded arithmetic to properties of particular Grothendieck rings. (shrink)

Theoria, Volume 88, Issue 4, Page 799-811, August 2022.

An overarching aim of education is the promotion of children’s personal well-being. Liberal educationalists also support the promotion of children’s personal autonomy as a central educational aim. On some views, such as John White’s, these two goals—furthering well-being and cultivating autonomy—can come apart. Our primary aim in this paper is to argue for a species of a stronger view: assuming preferentism as our axiology, we suggest that there is an essential association between the autonomy of our springs of action, such (...) as desires and beliefs, on the one hand, and personal well-being, on the other. If we are right about this link, then we have at our disposal a partial (non-instrumental) validation of the liberal ideal of autonomy. (shrink)

Recently, Neil Levy has proposed that an agent can acquire freedom‐relevant agential abilities by virtue of the conditions in which she finds herself, and in this way, can be thought of as partially constituted by those conditions. This can be so even if the agent is completely ignorant of the relevant environmental conditions, and even if these conditions play no causal role in what the agent does. Drawing upon these resources, Levy argues that Frankfurt‐style examples are not cogent. In this (...) paper, we explain why his argument fails. (shrink)

Determinism is, roughly, the thesis that facts about the past and the laws of nature entail all truths. A venerable, age-old dilemma concerning responsibility distils to this: if either determinism is true or it is not true, we lack "responsibility-grounding" control. Either determinism is true or it is not true. So, we lack responsibility-grounding control. Deprived of such control, no one is ever morally responsible for anything. A number of the freshly-minted essays in this collection address aspects of this dilemma. (...) Responding to the horn that determinism undermines the freedom that responsibility (or moral obligation) requires, the freedom to do otherwise, some papers in this collection debate the merits of Frankfurt-style examples that purport to show that one can be responsible despite lacking alternatives. Responding to the horn that indeterminism implies luck or randomness, other papers discuss the strengths or shortcomings of libertarian free will or control. Also included in this collection are essays on the freedom requirements of moral obligation, forgiveness and free will, a "desert-free" conception of free will, and vicarious legal and moral responsibility. The authors of the essays in this volume are philosophers who have made significant contributions to debates in free will, moral responsibility, moral obligation, the reactive attitudes, philosophy of action, and philosophical psychology, and include John Martin Fischer, Robert Kane, Michael McKenna, Alfred Mele, and Derk Pereboom. (shrink)

In this engaging, highly instructive, well-written, and carefully constructed work, Bernstein inquires into the qualities that confer moral patienthood on an individual. To be a moral patient is to be an individual deserving of moral consideration ; and to be so deserving requires that the individual have a “welfare” in that it must be capable of being made better or worse off. An individual qualifies as a moral patient if and only if it has a welfare. In the first part (...) of the two-part book, Bernstein discusses three theories of personal welfare—three ways of conceiving how individuals can be made better or worse off—that yield three different conceptions of moral patienthood. (shrink)

Reflection Principles are commonly thought to produce only strong axioms of infinity consistent with V = L. It would be desirable to have some notion of strong reflection to remedy this, and we have proposed Global Reflection Principles based on a somewhat Cantorian view of the universe. Such principles justify the kind of cardinals needed for, inter alia , Woodin’s Ω-Logic.

My primary objective is to motivate the concern that leading libertarian views of free action seem unable to account for an agent’s behavior in a way that reveals an explanatorily apt connection between the agent’s prior reasons and the intentional behavior to be explained. I argue that it is this lack of a suitable reasons explanation of purportedly free decisions that underpins the objection that agents who act with the pertinent sort of libertarian freedom cannot be morally responsible for what (...) they do because their intentional behavior is a matter of luck. The accounts scrutinized include a Kane-type event-causal view, Clarke’s account that appeals to both agent causation and event causation in the production of free action, and O’Connor’s pure agent-causal account. I conclude by discussing an advantage these libertarian accounts enjoy over compatibilist contenders: they possess a feature necessary to accommodate the truth of judgments of moral obligation. (shrink)

This article critically examines Kadri Vihvelin's proposal that to have free will is to have the ability to make choices on the basis of reasons, and to have this ability is to have a bundle of dispositions that can be exercised in more than one way. It is argued that partisans of Frankfurt examples can still make a powerful case for the view that being able to do otherwise, even on Vihvelin's compatibilist explication of ‘could have done otherwise,’ is not (...) required for moral responsibility. (shrink)

In their paper ‘Designing AI for mental health diagnosis: challenges from sub-Saharan African value-laden judgements on mental health disorders’, Ugar and Malele focused on the challenges and considerations surrounding the design and implementation of artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) technologies for diagnosing mental health disorders in South Africa. Although the authors recognise the application of AI and ML in healthcare, they put forward the challenges, particularly in adopting Wakefield’s hybrid theory, where elements of naturalism and normativism are combined (...) in defining mental disorders. They argue that a generic or universally designed AI or ML would not be appropriate in countries with strong and varied local contexts. Hence, they believe that current and future AI developers should consider the cultural nuances, value systems and contextual factors in designing and implementing AI technologies for mental health diagnosis in Africa. When the authors argue that a universal definition of mental health may not be appropriate in Africa, we would like to offer something in contrast. If nomenclature like the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) can be widely accepted, why does AI, which relies on these codes, encounter scepticism? Recognising the significant influence of culture on all aspects of patient care in psychiatry, the DSM-IV introduced the …. (shrink)

A human who open their eyes to life finds themselves within a religious tradition and culture. They encounter religious objects and places, meets religious people and live in communication with them. They learn about religion from their family and their surroundings; they see people who perform their religious worship, and from time to time, they themselves participate in these worships. They ask questions, do research, and turn to the use of religious words and concepts. Childhood period has a significant impact (...) on the formation of religious belief, attitudes and behaviours in adulthood, in other words, on the construction of religious identity. The study examined the origins of individual and collective religious identity, religious experiences from childhood to adulthood and cultural contexts. Thus, it was investigated that how participants constructed their religious identities by making sense of the reference frameworks that they acquired from religious narratives and traditions. In this context, the factors that shape and define the construction of religious identity have been analysed in two dimensions, theoretical and field research. 60 participants aged 25 to 75 living in Kahramanmaraş were interviewed in between 2021 and 2022. The study analysed findings about how adult religious individuals build their religious identities using phenomenological patterns from qualitative data collection methods. In the study, the participants were selected with the purposeful sampling method identified with the phenomenological pattern and the study conducted 40-160 minutes of face-to-face in-depth interviews with semi- structured questions prepared separately for 5 main and 13 sub-categories. The data obtained was analysed and categorised using the MAXQDA 12 package program. At this point in our research, the question of what are the factors that influence the formation and maintenance of a person’s religious identity is sought in the framework of the research findings. According to the findings obtained as a result of the study which is based on the basic approaches of role theory it has been observed that the family factor is prominent in building an individual’s religious identity. In addition to the influence of parents on family members in shaping religious identity, it has been observed that some participants are influenced by extended family members such as grandparents. On the other hand, it has been found that schools and courses attended under the referral of the family or the society, the religious officials and religious groups met, and media programmes followed are factors that influence the building of the individual’s religious identity after the family. It has been determined that religious texts and folkloric elements provide stereotyped roles in making choices such as the style of clothing eating and drinking, which are symbolically reflected in the individual’s life, in the implementation of religious orders and moral principles, in short, the construction of religious identity. (shrink)

Few, including moral and political philosophers, economists, and sociologists, would deny the importance of the reactive attitudes such as forgiveness, guilt, repentance, gratitude, and indignation in our lives. Echoing Hume, Peter Strawson, for example, suggests that a number of these attitudes are required to sustain good interpersonal relationships or personal integrity. Much more strikingly, like Hume, Strawson argues that the moral sentiments constitute the very framework within which issues of freedom and responsibility arise. For these and other reasons, in much (...) of this paper, I shall take it for granted that we value these attitudes or sentiments, and we do so insofar as we believe that they have legitimate grounds. A world with these attitudes or sentiments but without rational grounds for them would be a world deprived of something deemed morally valuable. (shrink)

An agent who is the victim of covert and nonconstraining control is unaware of being controlled and controllers get their way by manipulating the victims so that they willingly do what the controllers desire. Our primary objective is to argue that if cases of CNC manipulation undermine compatibilist accounts of the sort of control required for moral responsibility, they also undermine various agent‐causal and non‐agent‐causal libertarian accounts as well.

On mission of da'wah in accordance with Islamic ethics in Malaysia.

Blasphemy law has become a central issue for the international community in various parts of the world in the last three decades. In almost every case involving the BL, especially in Muslim countries, such as Pakistan, Malaysia, and Indonesia, they are always responded with violence or threats of attack that cause many victims, loss of homes, damage to places of worship, evictions, stigma of being heretical, severe punishments, or extra-judicial killings. When international human rights law and declaration of the right (...) to peace are adopted by the international community, at the same time, the number of violence related to the application of BL continues to increase. This paper aims to examine the ambiguity of the concept of the BL in Pakistan, Indonesia, and Malaysia, and how its lead to the weak of enforcement that creates social injustice and inequality. Then, referring to Galtung’s theory of structural violence and other experts of peace studies, this paper argues that blasphemy law should be included as a form of structural violence. Therefore its challenges these States to reform their BL in which its provisions accommodate the state’s neutrality and content high legal standards. Thus, through guarantee the fully enjoyment of human rights for everyone may support the States to achieve sustainable peace. (shrink)

An ideal of education is to ensure that our children develop into autonomous critical thinkers. The ‘indoctrination objection’, however, calls into question whether education, aimed at cultivating autonomous critical thinkers, is possible. The core of the concern is that since the young child lacks even modest capacities for assessing reasons, the constituent components of critical thinking have to be indoctrinated if there is to be any hope of the child's attaining the ideal. Our primary objective is to defuse this objection. (...) We argue, first, that even if the indoctrination objection can be dealt with at the level of beliefs by an account that distinguishes between beliefs instilled in the child at the non‐rational stage that are indoctrinative and those that are non‐indoctrinative, there can be non‐autonomous ‘proto critical thinkers’ who lack autonomy with respect to the requisite motivational components. We then ask what must be added to the account to ensure that proto critical thinkers develop into autonomous ones. We suggest that motivational elements, even if instilled at a stage at which the child has insufficiently developed cognitive capacities, can be ‘truly the child's own’ only relationally: the autonomous motivational elements are ones with respect to which the future child is self‐governing. (shrink)

This book explores the epistemic or knowledge requirement of moral responsibility. Haji argues that an agent can be blamed (or praised) only if the agent harbors a belief that the action in question is wrong (or right or obligatory). Defending the importance of an "authenticity" condition when evaluating moral responsibility, Haji holds that one cannot be morally responsible for an action unless the action issues from sources (like desires or beliefs) that are truly the agent's own. Engaging crucial arguments in (...) moral theory to elaborate his views on moral responsibility, Haji addresses as well fascinating, underexamined topics such as assigning blame across an intercultural gap and the relevance of unconscious or dream thoughts when evaluating responsibility. (shrink)

1. T'oegye wa Hip'ok'ŭrat'esŭ ka mannagi kkaji -- 2. Taehwa e ch'amyŏ hasin pundŭl -- 3. Che 1-il. 'Kojŏn muksang' : kijon ŭi palgyŏndŭl ŭl ch'ulbalchŏm ŭro samaya -- 4. Che 2-il. 'Chonjaeron': mom an ŭi param ŭn hohŭp, mom pak ŭi param ŭn konggi -- 5. Che 3-il. 'Chŏngsŏ haengdongnon': chari ŭi ch'ai ro inhae sŏro tarŭda -- 6. Che 4-il. 'Kongburon': chonjae haji annŭn ŭisul ŭn ŏpta -- 7. Che 5-il. 'Chihaengnon': maŭm i p'yŏnhaji anŭl ttae nŭn han (...) kŏrŭm kŏrŏra -- 8. Che 6-il. 'Yulliron': kajang hullyunghan ŭihak ŭn ŭihak ŭl p'iryo ro haji ank'e hanŭn kŏt -- 9. Che 7-il. 'Chilli nŭn kat'ŭn kot e': modŭn kŏt ŭi sijak kwa kkŭt ŭn hana ida -- 10. Hip'ok'ŭrat'esŭ myŏngŏndŭl. (shrink)

Inleidend overzicht van de wijsgerige ethiek.

인간의 이성적 의식과 법의 관계를 밝히고 법의 해석 과 판단에 인간의 의식이 어떻게 작용하는가를 고찰 한 저술. 제1부에서는 법의 형이상학적인 측면에서 법의 실체, 그리스의 법, 데카르트의 법, 로크와 법, 칸트와 법, 헤겔과 법, 아담스미스의 법의 경제, 중국의 도덕과 법사상을 다루었다. 제2부에서는 심리학적 분석으로 헌법의 심리학적 해석, 법의 판결절차, 증거법, 형법과 죄, 청소년과 가족법, 조세법, 플라톤의 법, 칸트의 도덕론의 경험적 확인, 헤겔의 자아와 노동법, 법의 4차원에 대해 다뤘다.

To have free will with respect to an act is to have the ability both to perform and to refrain from performing it. In this book, Ishtiyaque Haji argues that no one can have practical reasons of a certain sort - "objective reasons" - to perform some act unless one has free will regarding that act.

abstract An appeal to children's authenticity is widespread in major debates in the philosophy of education. However, no evident uniform conception of authenticity informs the dialectic. We begin with examples that confirm this multiplicity. We then uncover a common strand that unifies these seemingly differing conceptions: authenticity is exemplified by motivational elements, such as the agent's desires, when these elements are, in a manner to be explicated, ‘truly the agent's own’. It is this view of authenticity that is the mainstay (...) of a predicament in the philosophy of education: if education entails intentional instilment of certain motivational elements in the child but such intentional moulding, in the absence of the agent's consent, is generally incompatible with authenticity, how is an authentic education possible? We respond by developing a relational account of authenticity that denies that motivational elements are authentic in their own right; they are authentic only relative to ensuring certain ends. (shrink)

This book addresses a dilemma concerning freedom and moral obligation (obligation, right and wrong). If determinism is true, then no one has control over one's actions. If indeterminism is true, then no one has control over their actions. But it is morally obligatory, right or wrong for one to perform some action only if one has control over it. Hence, no one ever performs an action that is morally obligatory, right or wrong. The author defends the view that this dilemma (...) can be evaded but not in a way traditional compatibilists about freedom and moral responsibility will find congenial. For moral obligation is indeed incompatible with determinism but not with indeterminism. He concludes with an argument to the effect that, if determinism is true and no action is morally obligatory, right or wrong, then our world would be considerably morally impoverished as several sorts of moral appraisal would be unjustified. (shrink)

Something is subject to luck if it is beyond our control. In Luck's Mischief, Haji argues that owing frequently to precluding our being able to otherwise, luck limits both the range of what is morally obligatory for us and things for which we are morally responsible.

The role of freedom in assigning moral responsibility is one of the deepest problems in metaphysics and moral theory. _Incompatibilism’s Allure_ provides original analysis of the principal arguments for incompatibilism. Ishtiyaque Haji incisively examines the consequence argument, the direct argument, the deontic argument, the manipulation argument, the impossibility argument and the luck objection. He introduces the most important contemporary discussions in a manner accessible to advanced undergraduates, but also suited to professional philosophers. The result is a unique and compelling account (...) for incompatibilism’s continuing allure. (shrink)

Introduction: The metaphysics of responsibility and philosophy of education -- Moral responsibility, authenticity, and the problem of manipulation -- A novel perspective on the problem of authenticity -- Forward-looking authenticity in the internalism/externalism debate -- Authentic education, indoctrination, and moral responsibility -- Moral responsibility, hard incompatibilism, and interpersonal relationships -- On the significance of moral responsibility and love -- Love, commendability, and moral obligation -- Love, determinism, and normative education.