The more than 40 readings in this anthology cover the most important developments of the past six decades, charting the rise and decline of logical positivism ...

In his important paper "1953 and All That: A Tale of Two Sciences" (1984), Philip Kitcher defends biological antireductionism, arguing that the division of biology into subfields such as classical and molecular genetics is "not simply... a temporary feature of our science stemming from our cognitive imperfections but [is] the reflection of levels of organization in nature" (p. 371). In a recent discussion of Kitcher's views, Alexander Rosenberg has argued, first, that Kitcher has shown that the reduction of classical to (...) molecular genetics is impossible only because of our intellectual limitations and, second, that this kind of antireductionism supports an instrumentalist approach to biological theory. I argue that both of Rosenberg's claims should be rejected despite the fact that Kitcher misdiagnoses the central reason for the failure of reduction. (shrink)

A few years ago, Bas van Fraassen reminded philosophers of science that there are two central questions that a theory of explanation ought to answer. First, what is a explanation—when has something been explained satisfactorily? Second, why do we value explanations? . For a long time, discussions of explanation concentrated on technical problems connected with the first of these questions, and the second was by and large ignored. But, in fact, I think it is the second question which raises the (...) more fundamental and interesting philosophical issues. I shall offer reasons for thinking that the answer to the first question requires acceptance of the sort of fullblown notion of causation that only a scientific realist can love, and that the answer to the second question requires a realist construal of scientific theories and scientific methodology. My argument will be mainly negative, surveying the problems facing some major alternative accounts of explanation. A full elaboration of the realist perspective will have to await the completion of work in progress. (shrink)

In the article, I argue that Gadamer's hermeneutic phenomenology could serve as a basis for the understanding of contemporary social challenges by providing us with pre-requirements for conducting responsible ethics and politics, particularly due to its exposition of awareness of our finiteness, the importance of conversation and the significance of practical wisdom. I also claim that Gadamer's hermeneutics cannot be fully appropriated and that it should be supplemented with the philosophy that is attentive to the ever-present possibility of radical difference (...) which eludes domestication and demands creative response to its challenge. I emphasize the role of imagination in responsible approaching to the true alterity and investigate Kant's, Castoriadis' and Ricoeur's insights into said faculty. I conclude that both the awareness of our historicity, which orients us in the world, and imagination, which assists us in reaching to the other, must be recognized as the pre-conditions of responsible ethical action in contemporary society. (shrink)