The division of literature by language and nation has become so common that it seems to be obvious and natural. But it is not so, and moreover this not even a very old practice. But the national literary histories, apart from their political-cultural aims, are without justification since the history of literature in its themes, subjects and forms has rarely been confined to one nation. Quite large cultural areas exist, bound by space and time, in which literary phenomena are inextricably (...) linked. This essay therefore proposes a coherent and unified treatment of the literary traditions of Eastern and Western Europe. (shrink)

According to the Austrian philosopher Hans Kelsen (1881-1973), social and institutional entities are the only entities that can be null, void. The starting point of the article, The “Invalid” and the “Nothing”: At the Origins of Social Ontology, is the analysis of Hans Kelsen’s thesis. But: Why are social entities the only entities that can be null, void? In order to answer this question, in the first part of the article, the author uses two new concepts: validity-imperfection and validity-falsification. The (...) second part of the paper deals with a new ontological question: Are null (void) social entities something? (shrink)

When Aristotle introduces the perfect moods, he refers back to the dictum de omni et nullo, a semantic condition for universal affirmations and negations. There recently has been renewed interest in the question whether the dictum validates the assertoric syllogistic. I rehearse evidence that Aristotle provides a mereological semantics for universal affirmations and negations, and note that this semantics entails a nonstandard reading of the dictum, under which the dictum, in the presence of a minimal logical apparatus, indeed validates (...) the assertoric syllogistic. I argue that this mereological validation offers advantages over recent discussions in Morison, Malink, Ebert and Vlasits. (shrink)

Aristotle's explanation of what is said ‘of every’ and ‘of none’ has been interpreted either as involving individuals, or as regarding exclusively universal terms. I claim that Alexander of Aphrodisias endorsed this latter interpretation of the dictum de omni et de nullo. This interpretation affects our understanding of Alexander's syllogistic: as a matter of fact, Alexander maintained that the dictum de omni et de nullo is one of the core principles of syllogistic.

L’article explore les raisons pour lesquelles Łukasiewicz dans son exposé refuse de prendre en compte le dictum de omni et de nullo en qualité d’axiome de la syllogistique aristotélicienne. Après avoir établi la faiblesse de l’argumentation textuelle de Łukasiewicz, il est montré que les réserves de Łukasiewicz à l’égard du dictum doivent être recherchées dans un anti-essentialisme qui lui interdit de suivre Aristote jusqu’au bout de sa logique.

L’article explore les raisons pour lesquelles Łukasiewicz dans son exposé refuse de prendre en compte le dictum de omni et de nullo en qualité d’axiome de la syllogistique aristotélicienne. Après avoir établi la faiblesse de l’argumentation textuelle de Łukasiewicz, il est montré que les réserves de Łukasiewicz à l’égard du dictum doivent être recherchées dans un anti-essentialisme qui lui interdit de suivre Aristote jusqu’au bout de sa logique.

Der Artikel analysiert Seneca, Epistulae morales ad Lucilium 116 didaktisch und stellt eine Unterrichtseinheit für die gymnasiale Oberstufe im Lateinunterricht vor. Beigefügt sind ein Tafelbild sowie Kopiervorlagen mit für den Unterricht aufbereitetem lateinischen Text und Arbeitsaufträgen für die Schüler.

In an earlier article (s. J Gen Philos Sci 40:341-355, 2009), I have rejected an interpretation of Aristotle's syllogistic which (since Patzig) is predominant in the literature on Aristotle, but wrong in my view. According to this interpretation, the distinguishing feature of perfect syllogisms is their being evident. Theodor Ebert has attempted to defend this interpretation by means of objections (s. J Gen Philos Sci 40:357-365, 2009) which I will try to refute in part [1] of the following article. I (...) want to show that (1) according to Aristotle's Prior Analytics perfect and imperfect syllogisms do not differ by their being evident, but by the reason for their being evident, (2) Aristotle uses the same words to denote proofs of the validity of perfect and imperfect syllogisms („apodeixis”, "deiknusthai" etc.), (3) accordingly, Aristotle defines perfect syllogisms not as being evident, but as "requiring nothing beyond the things taken in order to make the necessity evident", i.e. as not "requiring one or more things that are necessary because of the terms assumed, but that have not been taken among the propositions" (APr. I. 1), (4) the proofs by which the validity of perfect assertoric syllogisms can be shown according to APr. I. 4 are based on the Dictum de omni et nullo, (5) the fact that Aristotle describes these proofs only in rough outlines corresponds to the fact that his proofs of the validity of other fundamental rules are likewise produced in rough outlines, e.g. his proof of the validity of conversio simplex in APr. I. 2, which usually has been misunderstood (also by Ebert): (6) Aristotle does not prove the convertibility of E-sentences by presupposing the convertibility of I-sentences; only the reverse is true. (shrink)

In this article, I shall consider medieval discussions of the principles of Aristotelian syllogistic which were called the dictum de omni et nullo and the expository syllogism. I am particularly interested in how theological questions contributed to the introduction of some influential new medieval ideas, such as the extensional sameness of the subject as the basis of predication, the interpretation of the expository syllogism from this point of view, and the explication of the logical subject of universal and particular (...) syllogistic premises with the phrase `Anything/something which is A. . .'. I end with some remarks about the increasing medieval awareness that these developments were beyond Aristotle's purview. (shrink)

This chapter discusses the relation between Kant’s views on the foundations of syllogistic inference in ‘The False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures’, the views of eighteenth-century German authors who wrote on syllogism, and the conception of metaphysics that Kant developed in 1762-1764. Kant’s positions are, on the whole, rather original, even though they are not as independent from the intellectual context as Kant’s later, Critical philosophy. Despite Kant’s polemical tone, his views on syllogism are not primarily motivated by polemical (...) purposes. They are strongly influenced by his views on the method of metaphysics. (shrink)

This paper (1) criticizes Patzig's explanation of Aristotle's reason for calling his first figure syllogisms perfect syllogisms, i.e. the transitivity relation: it can only be used for Barbara, not for the other three moods. The paper offers (2) an alternative interpretation: It is only in the case of the (perfect) first figure moods that we can move from the subject term of the minor premiss, taken to be a predicate of an individual, to the predicate term of the major premiss. (...) This contention is supported (i) by Aristotle's wording of the dictum de omni et nullo and (ii) by Aristotle's use of a formula which puts the minor term in the first position when he first states Barbara and Celarent. (shrink)

Excerpt from Poetarum Philosophorum Fragmenta Plagulis correctis indicibusque non sine taedio confectis dum respiro et laetiore animo quid praefandum sit meditor, ecce nuntius longe tris tissimus afi'ertur, georgium kaibelium nobis litterisque acerba morte ereptum esse, qui non solum studiorum societate inde a beatissimo oon tu'oernio - Bonnensi mihi erat coniunctissimus, sed in hoc quoque communi amicorum opere velut auspex et signifer, cuius auctoritatem me aequi et decebat et iuvabat. Nam singularis graecae artis cognitio, quae in illo fuit, in nullo (...) genere litterarum magis enituit quam in Comicis, unde splendidum ante biennium factum est huius Corporis initium. Iam adu lescentem prima tirocinia in Aristophane ponere memini eundemque audio supremam fuisse moribundi curam ac querelem. Inter bos vitae laboriosae et fructuosae terminos omnem graecitatem peragravit et undique messem uberrimam rettulit; at nusquam libentius et intentius versabatur quam in atticae comoediae reliquiis. Dorienses enim, quos edidit, propter illos cpinor tetigerat.' quodsi verum est cum primi illins voluminis perfectione vix unam alteramve aequalium editionem recte posse eom parari, quid prasstaturum eum fuisse credimus, si fatum concessisset, ut ipsam 'atticam comoediam nobis ex fragmentis instauraret, in qua totus habitabat et spirabat! Aut nemo mortalium aut, si quisquam, ille et natus erat et paratus ad Menandri et aequalium umbras ex inferis citandas et in vitae lucem revocandas. Adeo in intimam eorum consuetudinem inde fesso labore atque fortasse magis etiam sensus quadam cognatione se insinuaverat. Nam tota eius indoles ad atticum istum saporem facta erat. Ut scripture eius elegantia apicum prae ceteris nitebat, ut suavissima sermocinatio mirum quantum amicos tenebat, priusquam morbi ingra veseentie tormentis animi serenitas obscurari coepta est, ita tota eius ars versus graecos et exblicandi et pangendi Praxiteleo quodam perfusa erat nitore. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

Neste artigo é defendida a tese de que a noção aristotélica de perfeição silogística não é completamente arbitrária e reflete características lógicas, apesar de alguns aspectos não lógicos. Em consonância com a sugestão de alguns intérpretes de que a validade dos silogismos em primeira figura se fundamenta no dictum de omni et nullo, será apontado como essa fundamentação se desdobra em procedimentos dedutivos encontrados nos textos de Aristóteles. Tomando definições ou explicitações das proposições categóricas como parâmetro, a perfeição ou (...) imperfeição de um silogismo, independentemente das relações de prova que se adote entre as figuras silogísticas, não se mostra arbitrária. (shrink)

In his Res Gestae, the historian Ammianus Marcellinus describes the Egyptian city of Thebes and the obelisks that can be found there. There is an unusual passage in which he describes hieroglyphic writings. He goes on to show, through two examples, how hieroglyphs might seem bizarre, but in fact contain their own logic which can be explained : non enim ut nunc litterarum numerus praestitutus et facilis exprimit quicquid humana mens concipere potest, ita prisci quoque scriptitarunt Aegyptii, sed singulae litterae (...) singulis nominibus seruiebant et uerbis; non numquam significabant integros sensus. cuius rei scientiam his inseram duobus exemplis. per uulturem naturae uocabulum pandunt, quia mares nullos posse inter has alites inueniri rationes memorant physicae, perque speciem apis mella conficientis indicant regem moderatori cum iucunditate aculeos quoque innasci debere his signis ostendentes. et similia plurima.For the ancient Egyptians did not write as nowadays, when a prescribed and easy series of letters expresses whatever the human mind can imagine; but individual characters served as individual nouns and verbs; and sometimes they signified whole ideas. I will show the knowledge of this with these two examples. They represent the word for ‘nature’ by a vulture, because no males can be found among these birds, as natural history records; and by the figure of the bee making honey they indicate ‘a king’, showing by these signs that in a ruler stings also ought to arise from sweetness. And there are many similar instances. (shrink)

This inquiry starts from two passages in book 1 of Cicero's de Re Publica, both concerned with the failings of democracy as a political form. The first occurs in Scipio Aemilianus' opening criticism of the three unmixed constitutions. The weakness of democracy is that cum omnia per populum geruntur quamvis iustum atque moderatum, tamen ipsa aequabilitas est iniqua, cum habet nullos gradus dignitatis.

Resumen En esta contribución ofrecemos una interpretación del pons asinorum que se basa en una lógica de términos contemporánea. Esto nos permite revitalizar la idea del pons asinorum para generar el -políticamente correcto- pons scholasticorum, una versión terminística del pons asinorum que conecta la inventio medii con el dictum de omni et nullo.In this contribution we offer an interpretation of the pons asinorum by using a contemporary term logic. This interpretation allows us to revitalize the concept of the pons (...) asinorum in order to produce the -politically correct- pons scholasticorum, a terministic version of the pons asinorum that relates the inventio medii with the dictum de omni et nullo. (shrink)

at ego tibi sermone isto Milesio varias fabulas conseram auresque tuas benivolas lepido susurro permulceam, modo si papyrum Aegyptiam argutia Nilotici calami inscriptam non spreveris inspicere. figuras fortunasque hominum in alias imagines conversas et in se rursum mutuo nexu refectas, ut mireris, exordior. ‘quis ille?’ paucis accipe. Hymettos Attica et Isthmos Ephyrea et Taenaros Spartiatica, glebae felices aeternum libris felicioribus conditae, mea vetus prosapia est; ibi linguam Atthidem primis pueritiae stipendiis merui, mox in urbe Latia advena studiorum Quiritium indigenam sermonem (...) aerumnabili labore nullo magistro praeeunte aggressus excolui. en ecce praefamur veniam, si quid exotici ac forensis sermonis rudis locutor offendero. iam haec equidem ipsa vocis immutatio desultoriae scientiae stilo quern accessimus respondet. fabulam Graecanicam incipimus. lector intende: laetaberis. (shrink)

In an earlier article (see J Gen Philos Sei (2010) 41: 341-355) I have compared Aristotle's syllogistic with Kant's theory of "pure ratiocination". "Ratiocinia pura" („reine Vernunftschlüsse") is Kant's designation for assertoric syllogisms Aristotle has called 'perfect'. In Kant's view they differ from non-pure ratiocinia precisely in that their validity rests only on the validity of the Dictum de omni et nullo (which, however, in Kant's view can be further reduced to more fundamental principles) whereas the validity of non-pure (...) ratiocinia additionally presupposes the validity of inferences which Kant calls consequentiae immediatae. I have argued that Kant's view is in some (not in all) essential features in accordance with Aristotle's view concerning perfect syllogisms and certainly leading to a tenable and interesting logical theory. As a result I have rejected not only the interpretation of Aristotle adopted by Theodor Ebert, but also the objections he has raised against Kant's logical theory. As far as Aristotle is concerned, Ebert has attempted to defend his position in the first part of his reply to my article published in J Gen Philos Sei (2009) 40: 357-365, and I have argued against this defence in issue 1 of the J Gen Philos Sei (2010) 41: 199-213 (cf. Ebert's answer in the same issue pp. 215-231). In the following discussion I deal with Eberts defence of his criticism of Kant published in the second part of his reply to my article (see J Gen Philos Sei (2009) 40: 365-372). I shall argue, that Kant's principle 'nota notae est nota rei ipsius' and his use of technical vocabulary stand up to the objections raised by Ebert. His attempts to prove that Kant's logical theory is defective are based on several misinterpretations. (shrink)

The Logic of Port-Royal, first published in 1662 by the Jansenists Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole, is a work that underlines the inadequacies of the traditional logic. Traditional logic, which included the texts of Aristotle's Organon and the works of the scholastics, was experiencing a mild renaissance in the seventeenth century following its outright and brutal discrediting by the humanists of the previous two centuries. Arnauld and Nicole introduce a fairly original system of logic that attempts to remedy the shortcomings (...) of the revived tradition; they dismiss the Aristotelian "Categories", "Predicables", and "Topics", ignore the scholastic "Doctrine of Terms and Consequence", and suggest a single "General Principle" by means of which the validity of all arguments can be decided. The Principle is based on a notion of containment, divided into entendue and comprehension , which applies to all terms. Because the notion of containment is linked to the objective reality of Cartesian ideas, the authors can claim that their system of logic properly describes reality. The General Principle also suggests that terminist logic is logically and epistemologically prior to sentential logic because, Arnauld and Nicole claim, it governs the Dictum de Omni et Nullo and the Nota Notae. The self-evidence of the two dicta confirmed the validity of all syllogisms of the first figure; furthermore, all syllogisms of other figures could be reduced to one of the first figure. With the General Principle, however, there is no need for such reduction to the first figure. This additional result makes the theorem of sentential logic, "$\supset$r)$\approx$$\supset$-q)", which was needed for the reductions of Baroco and Bocardo, unnecessary. The fact that no theorem of sentential logic is needed to underline term logic guarantees the autonomy of the latter. (shrink)

Quomodo versus lyrici legendi sint, plerumque inter metricos constat, licet de origine singulorum versuum vel colorum dubia moveantur; at ne illud quidem confirmari potest in genere illo peculiari, quo multae strophae Pindari et Bacchylidis et nonnullae poétarum scenicorum compositae sunt. Quod in talibus versibus maxime conspicuum est, hoc est, quod metra τоû σоυ et διπλασíоυ γéνоυς; in eis coniunguntur vel coniungi videntur, ita, ut ambitus utriusque partis aut par aut non multum maior minorve sit. lam antiqui metrici parum compertum habebant, (...) qua ratione eiusmodi versus explicarent. Cum maior pars ceterorum versuum lyricorum etiam post Alexandri aetatem in usu essent et doctrina grammaticorum hanc quoque materiam complecteretur, pauca versuum illorum vestigia remanebant, postquam chori lyrici et dramatici conticuerunt. Habemus quidem Meliambos Cercidae eodem genere carmina pangere conati, quo clarissimi illi veteres, sed eos perlegentes statim sentimus artem intermortuam non ab isto Megalopolitano nova vita donatam esse; nihil enim frigidius cogitari potest, quam si quis oda pindarica recitata ad Cercidae versus se convertat eosque alta voce pronuntiare conetur. Metrici graeci et romani praeter paucos versus eosque singillatim genus nostrum non tractant nee quisquam ex eorum numero de genere toto disseruit. Horatium et suamet ipsum arte prae ceteris excellentem et doctrina metrica haud mediocriter imbutum non aliter ac nos huius aevi philologos nescire, quomodo carmina pindarica ab ipso poeta componerentur, ex Oda notissima patet, in qua Pindarum quisquis studet aemulari frustra in re desperata desudare perhibetur. Ad universam lyricorum graecorum artem pertinent, quae a Cicerone in Oratore affirmantur, qui tamen clausulis orationis numerosae operam dans rem metricam non neglexit: sed in versibus res est apertior, quamquam etiam a modis quibusdam cantu remoto soluta esse videatur oratio, maximeque id in optima quoque eorum poëtarum, qui λυρικоí a graecis nominantur, quos, cum cantu spoliaveris, nuda paene remanet oratio. Causam hanc vel maximam esse puto in nullo alio carmina pangendi genere musicam, saltationem, metrum tam arte cohaesisse; cum poësis non iam pars habebatur υθμιξου, quod φθγγοδ, σχμα, συλλαβ definiebant, ut Aristoxeni terminis utar , via stabilita ambitum singulorum versuum ac colorum statuere conarentur et indoloem pedum metricorum conicendo indicarent. (shrink)

Monades non sunt in loco nisi per harmoniam, id est per consensum cum phaenomenis loci, a nullo influxu sed sponte rerum ortum.

Monades non sunt in loco nisi per harmoniam, id est per consensum cum phaenomenis loci, a nullo influxu sed sponte rerum ortum.

Monades non sunt in loco nisi per harmoniam, id est per consensum cum phaenomenis loci, a nullo influxu sed sponte rerum ortum.

Monades non sunt in loco nisi per harmoniam, id est per consensum cum phaenomenis loci, a nullo influxu sed sponte rerum ortum.

Many fourteenth-century logicians took affirmative propositions to maintain that the subject term and the predicate term stand or supposit for the same. This is called the identity theory of predication by historians and praedicatio identica by Paul of Venice and others. The identity theory of predication was an important part of early fourteenth-century Trinitarian discussions as well, but what was called praedicatio identica by Duns Scotus and his followers in this context was something different. After some remarks on Scotus’s view (...) and its background, I shall analyse Adam Wodeham’s explanation of Scotus’s praedicatio identica and how he understood the assumptions pertaining to supposition in the Scotist approach. I also describe Wodeham’s own solution to Trinitarian sophisms, which did not deviate from the identity theory of predication. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:[Quaestio prima: quomodo est anima omnia]“Anima quodammodo est omnia.”2Verbum Philosophi est et abbreviatum; non autem omnibus satis manifestum. Quid me, Vir Dei,3 iam sollicitas in isto? Scis enim quod imperitussum scientia, et iste sermo profunda forte indiget exquisitione. Quaeris ergo specificari tibi illud quod dico ‘quodammodo’; quomodo enim erit anima omnia? Istum modum velles tibi specificari: autin summa dictione una, aut secundum singula entia singulos modos explicare.Videtur ergo ipse (...) Philosophus declarare istam propositionem inductive sic:‘sensus est quodammodo sensibilia, intellectus est quodammodo intelligibilia’,4igitur etc.[Obiectiones]Hic statim duo obicis:Primum quod cum anima tres partes habeat – vegetativam, sensitivam,intellectivam – in hac ostensione Philosophi ipsum vegetativum nulli entium attribuitur per quodammodo essendi idem, ergo videtur quod non debeatdicere: anima simpliciter quodammodo est omnia, sed secundum aliquas parteseius solum.Item, videtur quod debeat dici quod solum intellectivum sit quodammmodo omnia; nam omnia omnino sunt intelligibilia: universalia, singularia. Omnes naturae vere et simpliciter intelligibiles sunt quantum in ipsis est, licet prima et remotissima principia a nobis non intelligantur. Defectus enim in nobis est sicut in oculis vespertilionis, quibus non videt solem.[2] Item, quomodo est sensus ipsa sensibilia et intellectus ipsa intelligibilia?Aeque enim ignotae sunt hae assumptiones sicut et conclusio. Nam sensitivum res vivens est et substantia; sensibilia, res non-viventes et accidentia, qualitates de tertia specie qualitatis.5 Quomodo ergo est haec illa? Iam enim patet quod non conveniunt nisi in esse et ente tantum; in nullo enim genereomnino. Igitur videtur quod nihil sit dictu ‘sensus est quodammodo sensibilia’.Nam multo magis proprie et vere dictum videretur si diceret quis ‘homoquodammodo est asinus’, nam haec conveniunt in genere et generibus.Similiter, quaeris ex parte intellectus et intelligibilium. Intelligibilia enimsunt et substantiae et accidentia, et res viventes et non-viventes; ipsum autem intellectivum, solum substantia et res vivens.[Prima responsio Philosophi ad obiectionem secundam: Sensus est in potentia tale quale sensibile in actu]6Vir Dei, dices mihi, colligendo ex ipso eodem auctore, et respondebis |A 281vb| mihi cum quaero: sensus quomodo est ipsum sensibile? Respondebis cum Philosopho, quia hoc modo, scilicet quod ‘sensus est in potentia tale quale est ipsum sensibile in actu’,7 et illud pertractabis ad singulos sensus et sensibilia. Sic visus est in potentia tale quale est ipsum visibile in actu, et ita de aliis.Sed ego contra: Vir Dei, si ‘sensus est in potentia tale etc.’, ergo aliquando erit in actu tale, etc.Ad idem: sentire quoddam pati est et quaedam alteratio. Est enim sensus de genere virtutum passivarum secundum eundem Philosophum.8 Agens autem et patiens in principio sunt dissimilia; in fine vero, cum passum est, sunt similia.Igitur sensitivum ex quo sentiendo quodammodo patitur et passivum est. Infine cum passum est, simile erit ipsi activo, scilicet sensibili. Tunc igitur erit‘sensus tale in actu quale est etiam ipsum sensibile in actu’.Sed nunc quaero quid hoc sit dictu, scilicet quod aliquando ipsum sensitivum in actu sit tale quale ipsum sensibile. Quid dicis ‘tale quale’? Numquid si actu video colorem, est virtus visiva oculi mei actu color? Aut non dicis talis estcolor? Quaero, si in qualitate assimilabitur illa virtus visiva actu colori, nihil videtur huiusmodi expositio. |E 107vb| Sicut enim superius dictum est, non videntur convenire nisi in solo ente et esse.9Confiteor, Vir Dei, quia haec ultimo obiecta tentativa sunt, sed necessaria tamen ad propositum si recte dissolvantur, per gratiam ergo Dei et per orationes tuas, Vir Dei, spero ad haec quandoque redire.[Secunda responsio Philosophi ad obiectionem secundam: homo ut mundus minor]Sed nec illud quod legimus videtur sufficere ad propositum problema, Vir Dei: ‘homo est quodammodo omnis creatura et mundus’, minor scilicet,10 et communicans cum omnibus creaturis, hoc modo: “esse cum lapidibus, vivere cum plantis, sentire cum brutis, intelligere cum angelis,” et tandem cum Deo.11Si secundum hunc modum velim praedictum sermonem exponere, non erit.. (shrink)