This paper examines the connection between Kierkegaard’s philosophy of existence and Graham Harman’s object-oriented ontology. The claim is that Harman’s position provides a conceptual apparatus that can beneficially address some basic ontological points in Kierkegaard about actuality, the self and the reality of individual subsisting mind-independent entities. On the other hand, Kierkegaard’s emphasis on the human self as a place situated in existence can provide a supplement to Harman’s realism which implicitly relies on topological notions. If we define an entity, (...) in a broad sense of the term, as something in its own right irreducible to its being-in-a-relation, but we do not want to end up in a frozen universe of isolated monads, we must revisit the notion of relationality in terms of vicarious causation (Harman) or indirect communication (Kierkegaard). (shrink)

This article poses a question for Object-Oriented Ontology (OOO) in general and Harman’s position in particular. It is Heidegger’s question: “How do matters stand with nothingness?” First, I present the basic outline of Harman’s OOO which is presented as a theory of everything. In order to pin down the question of nothing, I begin by asking about “something”: what is an object? And what does it mean that objects exist? Then I pursue by identifying two notions of nothing in OOO: (...) the withdrawal of objects and the in-between of two objects. The first, I call infrastructural nothing. The second, I call interrelational nothing. The latter is derived from the former. I argue that OOO is very close to Kierkegaard’s account of nothing as the space of possibility of possibilities, since an object is defined as its own interior space which must hold something in reserve in order to allow for change and emergence. Nothing is not merely nothing but something – a bounded openness. (shrink)

What makes us the same person across time? The different solutions to this problem known as personal identity can be divided into two camps: A numerical and a practical approach. While the former asks for the conditions of identity based on the question “what is a person?,” the latter is concerned with what we identify with in everyday life as essential in order to form a narrative of one’s life as a whole based on the question “who am I?” However, (...) by emphasizing the cognitive and/or experiential capacities as the sole condition for self or personhood, both approaches fail to offer an adequate account of birth and death. The one being born is not yet someone with such cognitive capacities and the one who dies is unable to experience his or her own death. By invoking conceptual frameworks of Kierkegaard and Romano, I argue that birth and death must be considered both as events and conditions constitutive of personal identity rather than a set of derivative problems arising from an already established definition of self or person. (shrink)

Abstract:In the past twenty years, the Anthropocene debate in the humanities and social sciences has focused on two basic approaches concerning the rise and challenge of anthropogenic climate change. The former critically addresses the socio-political underbelly of the re-centering of the human species as a geological force as proposed by the natural sciences through the guiding question: Who is the Anthropos? The latter examines the ethical challenges we face in the wake of deep timespans and fragmented agencies. This article presents (...) the upshots of this ongoing debate and suggests an ontological framework of distributed identities between different conceptual horizons of humanoid formations between the 'Anthropos' (plurality as a single whole) and what I call 'anthropo(i)s' (singulars within plural wholes) to address the tension between individual responsibility (not everyone is equally guilty) and agential response-ability (humans, not tortoises, caused climate change). (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that the debate in the environmental humanities about the reconceptualization of the human being as one vs. many in light of the Anthropocene, resembles the very structure of Kierkegaard’s notion of the public as a compound object composed of individuals. Further, I argue that the public provides not only a model for understanding the ontological makeup of the Anthropos but also serves as an early version of it. Hence, the public plays a role in the (...) very emergence of the Anthropocene itself. (shrink)

This paper explores the notion of hospitality and faith in Derrida and Kierkegaard. The aim is to trace the topological core of existence in relation to an ongoing debate in contemporary continental philosophy of religion about khôra. The paper shows how khôral traces are at work in Kierkegaard’s thinking in relation to the topological proximity of love. The claim is, that Kierkegaard emphasizes, not a hostility but a vulnerability of what I coin khôral love – the vibrating space between the (...) anonymous and the amorous, call and response. The unknown X of the khôral becomes the topos of existence – the “stepping out”, the “you are here (X)”. A “you” called forth by the commandment of love or the visitation of the stranger. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to explore the connection between moods and meteors or atmospheric phenomena in Heidegger’s thinking. The idea of the weather as something affecting our emotional state is not new but goes all the way back to Homer. However, the ontological basis of this connection is missing. In this paper, I argue that Heidegger provides exactly such an ontological account of moods and meteors not as two separate spheres but as a common atmosphere of attuned elementality—a (...) dynamic interface where beings bend into being. Being can no longer be understood solely as that which determines beings qua beings but beings inform/transform being as well. (shrink)

In this article, I examine the possible link between Nietzsche’s philosophy of the will to power and the new movement in continental philosophy known as speculative realism. Nietzsche is never invoked as a possible (re)source in the war against anti-realism, nor is he identified as a leading officer behind enemy lines but remains in the neutral zone. Although Meillassoux does seem to place Nietzsche in the camp of anti-realists, he is not the main target but only mentioned in a passing (...) remark. In this article, I interpret Nietzsche into the framework of speculative realism and argue that he can be said to occupy a position in-between Graham Harman’s object-oriented ontology and Meillassoux’s speculative materialism. (shrink)

In this article, I examine the possible link between Nietzsche’s philosophy of the will to power and the new movement in continental philosophy known as speculative realism. Nietzsche is never invoked as a possible (re)source in the war against anti-realism, nor is he identified as a leading officer behind enemy lines but remains in the neutral zone. Although Meillassoux does seem to place Nietzsche in the camp of anti-realists, he is not the main target but only mentioned in a passing (...) remark. In this article, I interpret Nietzsche into the framework of speculative realism and argue that he can be said to occupy a position in-between Graham Harman’s object-oriented ontology and Meillassoux’s speculative materialism. (shrink)