ABSTRACT Martin Hollis, in Market Equality and Social Freedom [1], used the Dewsbury case to illustrate the tension between individual freedom and the public good. Like others engaged in the public debate on multicultural education in general, and Dewsbury in particular, Hollis avoided the main issue: “What should be the curriculum in a school attended by pupils from different cultural backgrounds?’’Rational debate in this highly controversial area requires an analysis of two fundamental concepts—multicultural education and respect. The former can take (...) three forms, each corresponding with a distinctive curriculum model. One—the Equality option—is inimical to parental rights as guaranteed under the European Convention, but it attracts support because of a widespread failure to recognise that one can respect someone's right to hold and propagate a particular faith (or opinion) without necessarily respecting that faith (or opinion). It is shown that this failure has come about through very lax usage of ‘respect’. It is argued that by respecting persons whatever their values the potential conflict between liberty and equality can be resolved in a free society. (shrink)

This article reports on a survey of the moral problems that Dutch nurses experience during their everyday practice. A questionnaire was developed, based on published literature, panel discussions, in-depth interviews and participation observations. The instrument was tested in a pilot study and proved to be useful. A total of 2122 questionnaires were sent to 91 institutions in seven different health care settings. The results showed that nurses were not experiencing important societal issues such as abortion and euthanasia as morally the (...) most problematic, but rather situations such as verbally aggressive behaviour of colleagues towards patients, keeping silent about errors, and medical treatment given against the wishes of patients. Moral problems occurred especially when nurses experienced feelings of powerlessness with regard to the well-being of patients. Moreover, these moral problems proved to be related to institutional organization, leadership, and collaboration with colleagues and other disciplines. Nurses appeared to have a limited awareness of the moral dimensions of their practice. (shrink)

This article reports on a survey of the moral problems that Dutch nurses experience during their everyday practice. A questionnaire was developed, based on published literature, panel discussions, in-depth interviews and participation observations. The instrument was tested in a pilot study and proved to be useful. A total of 2122 questionnaires were sent to 91 institutions in seven different health care settings. The results showed that nurses were not experiencing important societal issues such as abortion and euthanasia as morally the (...) most problematic, but rather situations such as verbally aggressive behaviour of colleagues towards patients, keeping silent about errors, and medical treatment given against the wishes of patients. Moral problems occurred especially when nurses experienced feelings of powerlessness with regard to the well-being of patients. Moreover, these moral problems proved to be related to institutional organization, leadership, and collaboration with colleagues and other disciplines. Nurses appeared to have a limited awareness of the moral dimensions of their practice. (shrink)

Harry g frankfurt gave what has been taken to be a counter-Example to the principle that, "a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise." I argue that in his case the agent cannot be morally responsible for what he did, Because it was not within his power not to be compelled to do it. So frankfurt's case is not a counter-Example to this principle.

Professor Tucker in the C.R. vol. xi. pp. 341 sqq. has revolutionized our notions of ‘doubtful syllables’: we have now learned that such syllables are normally short, and that lengthening is the licence.

In the Netherlands, euthanasia and assisted suicide are formally forbidden by criminal law, but, under certain strictly formulated conditions, physicians are excused for administering these to patients on the basis of necessity. These conditions are bound up with a long process of criteria development. Therefore, physicians still live in uncertainty. Future court decisions may change the criteria. Apart from that, physicians can always be prosecuted. The position of nurses, however, is perfectly clear; they are never allowed to administer euthanasia or (...) assisted suicide. Nevertheless, they should be involved in the decision-making process because they are an important source of information and have consultation skills. The openness of the discussion about these issues in the Netherlands may prevent an escalation of medical or nursing responsibility and falling victim to the ‘slippery slope’. (shrink)

Most of our memories are inferential, so says Sven Bernecker in Memory: A Philosophical Study. I show that his account of inferentially remembering that p is too strong. A revision of the account that avoids the difficulty is proposed. Since inferential memory that p is memory that q (a proposition distinct from p) with an admixture of inference from one’s memory that q and a true thought one has that r, its analysis presupposes an adequate account of the (presumably non-inferential) (...) memory that q. Bernecker’s account of non-inferentially remembering that is shown to be inadequate. A remedy lies in strengthening the account by requiring the rememberer to have had prima facie justification to believe that q, any defeaters of which were misleading. (shrink)

For cases in which to remember that p is to have (strict) nonbasic, unmixed memory knowledge that p; in which there is at most one prior time, t, from which one remembers; in which one knew at t that p; and in which there can arise a sensible question whether one remembers that p from t — a person, B, remembers that p from t if and only if: (1) There is a set of grounds a subset of which consists (...) of (i) only those grounds B has at both t and the present for B to be sure that p, and (ii) enough such grounds to make it reasonable at both t and the present for B to be sure that p (I call any such subset a set of “adequate original grounds dating from t”), and (2) there is no time prior to t such that B has a set of adequate original grounds dating from that time. The way in which the crucial terms in this explication are being used is explained. And the explication is defended by showing how it can deal with cases that are counterexamples to explications recently offered by Malcolm and by Munsat. (shrink)