Philippa Foot, like others of her philosophical generation, was much concerned with the status and authority of morality. How universal are its demands, and how dependent on the idiosyncrasies of individuals? In the early years of her career, she was persuaded that Kant and his twentieth-century followers had been wrong to insist on the centrality to morality of absolute and unconditionally binding moral imperatives. To that extent, she wrote, there was indeed ‘an element of deception in the official line about (...) morality’. In this paper, I shall explore her early alternative: a system of merely ‘hypothetical’ imperatives, imperatives that depend on the motivations of particular individuals. Could so contingent a system deserve to be termed a morality? How revisionary a proposal was this, and how serious its costs? And how might we reconcile ourselves to a morality stripped of what she called the ‘fictions’ that surrounded it? Foot's early answer, tentative and exploratory, remains of interest, long after she herself abandoned it. (shrink)

Many moral philosophers tend to construe the aims of ethics as the interpretation and critique of ‘common-sense morality’. This approach is defended by Henry Sidgwick in his influential The Methods of Ethics and presented as a development of a basically Socratic idea of philosophical method. However, Sidgwick's focus on our general beliefs about right and wrong action drew attention away from the Socratic insistence on treating beliefs as one expression of our wider dispositions. -/- Understanding the historical contingency of Sidgwick's (...) approach to ethics can help us reflect on whether there are other ways in which modern ethics can be Socratic. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe Victorian period in Britain saw the curious emergence of the word ‘brick’ as a term of high praise, picking out for commendation certain qualities of character: reliability and a lack of whimsy. The novels and everyday conversation of the period were full of such phrases as ‘you’re a brick’ or ‘he’s a regular brick’. In this paper, I trace the history of this phrase in the respectable as well as popular literature of the period, including some ironic attempts to (...) claim for it a classical pedigree. I offer some hypotheses about how we might understand the metaphor of the brick in terms of the needs and values of mainstream British culture in the period. As an illuminating contrast, I consider the fate of a similar metaphor from mid-twentieth-century culture, ‘square’, which picks out roughly similar qualities of character but to reprove them. I conclude with some theoretical reflections on how the study of outdated colloquialisms might bring the resources of historical linguistics to bear on the study of the history of moral concepts. (shrink)