In this paper I present the philosophical backdrop to Russell's 1923 "Vagueness" paper. I argue that his view of vagueness in 1923 is the result of a rise in the importance of symbolism in his thinking coupled with a new interest in psychology. I show how these new interests are related to concerns he had with his theory of judgment as well as his logicist project. I attend to the two major complaints against his view of vagueness: that all language (...) is vague and his purported conflation of vagueness with generality. I lastly show how Russell's view is distinct from modern approaches to vagueness in so far as he is not concerned with truth-value gaps but instead sees vagueness as applying primarily to what is cognitive and as a transitory position between ignorance and knowledge. (shrink)

In this paper I explore a neglected discussion of vagueness put forward by Wittgenstein in his Philosophical Grammar (1932–34). In this work, unlike Philosophical Investigations (1953), Wittgenstein not only discusses the venerable Sorites paradox but provides a novel conception of vagueness using an analogy with coin tossing and converging intervals. As he sees it, the problematic picture of vagueness arises because we conflate aspects of the functioning of vague concepts with those of non-vague ones. Thus, while we accept that vague (...) concepts have no sharp cut-off points (are boundaryless), we nevertheless retain the idea that we can progress towards the penumbra the way we progress towards the cut-off points of non-vague concepts. As a potential remedy, Wittgenstein's analogy with coin tossing and converging intervals replaces this picture and provides an understanding of the functioning of vague concepts in which no notion of a progression arises. (shrink)

Abstract:It is widely accepted that Russell wrongly took Wittgenstein to be concerned with the conditions required for an ideal language in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Given Russell’s relatively extensive communications with Wittgenstein, this misunderstanding is puzzling. I argue that Russell’s mistake rests on two prior assumptions for which he had some justification. First, communications with Wittgenstein were plausibly interpreted by Russell as confirming, rather than refuting, the belief that Wittgenstein shared with him the view that psychology, epistemology, and logic are interdependent. (...) Second, results from these areas in turn led Russell to the view that ordinary language is irredeemably vague and, as such, in need of replacement with an ideal language. In truth, however, Wittgenstein severed psychology and epistemology from his work and saw vagueness as a surface phenomenon only. (shrink)