The article aims at exposition, commenting and interpreting Frege’s theory of meaning, based on the requirement to distinguish, in the meaning of a sign, the level of sense (Sinn) and the correlative level of reference (Bedeutung). The author directs attention to some logico-linguistic reasons which seem to have urged Frege to advocate the differential conception of meaning. In accordance with Frege’s decision to use the theoretical notions of sense and reference, the relevant semantic features of a proper name as well (...) as of a declarative sentence are explored. Since only something which constitutes what someone who understands the word or expression implicitly grasps can be counted as a possible ingredient in meaning, the claim is made that entities on the level of reference (objects, truth-values) are not undeniable ingredients of meaning. Sense therefore is left in the role of a genuine semantic concept. Keywords: Frege, language, meaning, sense, reference. (shrink)