The right to resist has been discussed ever since human collectivity has been regulated by law and political power. One crucial systematic problem is to legitimize a right above the law. After the right to resist became positive law in Germany, the discussion focussed on the question how a law like this is possible according to the logic of legislation. On the other hand the ethical theory of human rights claimed it to be an element of natural law. This paper (...) argues that both interpretations fall short of the eminent political dimension of political resistance. This is shown by a critique of the attempts to legitimize the right to resist in the history of political thought. The missing of a consistent legal or moral argumentation for it may open the perspective on the basic political problems. (shrink)

In diesem Beitrag wird die Bedeutung von Kants Begriff des ethischen Gemeinwesens für die Frage des Kosmopolitanismus herausgearbeitet. Kosmopolitanismus ist für Kant zunächst eine Konsequenz der Rechtslehre: Der Rechtszustand kann nur als globaler peremtorisch wirklich sein. Diese Einsicht kollidiert jedoch mit der Voraussetzung souveräner bürgerlicher Staaten, so dass der politische oder juridische globale Rechtszustand die moralische Forderung des Kosmopolitanismus nicht erfüllt. Es lässt sich zeigen, dass diese Kollision in der antagonistischen Form der modernen Gesellschaft gründet, deren politische Instrumente die Staaten (...) sind. Im Unterschied zu den rechtsphilosophischen Schriften konstruiert Kant in der Religionsschrift ein weltbürgerliches ethisches Gemeinwesen, das von der Idee einer moralisch organisierten Gesellschaft ausgeht. Dieses Modell wird im Rahmen der Religionsphilosophie entwickelt. Darüber hinaus weisen Überlegungen Kants zur Pädagogik: Die Überwindung gesellschaftlich bedingter Partikularität und Konkurrenz kann als Bildungsaufgabe formuliert werden. (shrink)

This paper discusses Fichte’s doctrine of resistance as a phenomenon of transition from the early modern concept of sovereignty to the constitutional state of rule of law. Therefor in particular the doctrine of the Ephorat, in the version of Grundlage des Naturrechts, in its context of development, is interpreted as a constitutional self-limitation of political power, which is to preserve both the sovereign claim of identity and the constitutional claim of control. This thesis is developed in opposition to Kant and (...) Hegel and in dependence on Condorcet’s project of a constitution. Whereas Kant and Hegel discuss the right to resist on the basis of a traditional concept of sovereignty and – in spite of all oppositional interpretations – reject it, Fichte tries to develop in dependence on the French discussion on the constitution the theory of a juridical practice which allows to save the identity of law even in the case of conflict. The intention of the juridical structure of this practice can be found in the constitutional forms of self-limitation of modern states.Der Beitrag erörtert Fichtes Lehre vom Widerstandsrecht als Phänomen des Übergangs vom frühen neuzeitlichen Souveränitätsverständnis zum Rechts- und Verfassungsstaat. Dafür wird insbesondere die Lehre vom Ephorat in der Fassung der Grundlage des Naturrechts, im Kontext ihrer Entwicklung, als konstitutionelle Selbstbegrenzung der Staatsgewalt interpretiert, die sowohl den souveränen Einheitsanspruch als auch den konstitutionellen Kontrollanspruch wahren soll. Diese These wird in Abgrenzung zu Kant und Hegel und in Anlehnung an Condorcets Verfassungsentwurf entwickelt. Während Kant und Hegel das Widerstandsrecht aufgrund einer traditionellen Souveränitätsauffassung diskutieren und – allen entgegengesetzten Interpretationen zum Trotz – abweisen, will Fichte in Anknüpfung an die französische Verfassungsdiskussion die Theorie eines rechtlichen Verfahrens zur Wahrung der Identität des Rechts auch im Konfliktfall entwickeln, dessen rechtstheoretische Intention sich in den konstitutionellen Schranken moderner Staatsgewalt wiederfindet. (shrink)

The relation between human beings and nature is basically technical. Humans are compelled to transform the natural conditions of life through their labor, using technical equipment. Thus – and this is a specifically human characteristic – they set themselves apart from their natural surroundings. As a result of the same process, untouched nature exists no more. Therefore it is not a matter of how to absolutely preserve parts of nature from technical alteration, but rather a question of what the dominant (...) ends are in the technical development of modern society and whether these ends are reasonable or not. The ideas of Karl, Hegel and Marx concerning the connection between society and its ends will be discussed. The resulting combination of technical and moral moments, rather than an external ethical view, includes the proposal to revisit the concept of education and research. (shrink)

The concepts of autonomy and subjectivity are crucial not only for modern philosophy of law but also for its practice. Nevertheless, postmodern philosophy and postmodern theory of law claim to suspend these concepts, interpreting them as hypostatized narratives. The article argues that contrary to the postmodern reading, already the early modern concept of subjectivity is very fragile: It has no reality outside of a historical process in which the principle of subjectivity is connected to its external objective conditions of existence. (...) These conditions are both theoretical and practical; the former are acquired by science, the latter by social, political, and legal history. This history has not been the pure realization of rationality. The development of the state of law from the state of nature, including the original appropriation and legalization of private property, has been a history of violence. This violence has not simply been overcome but is preserved in modern legal systems, too. It takes a materialistic social theory to tell this story in opposition to the narrative of modern law as a pure triumph of human freedom. This also entails that the subjectivity that stands at the end of this story is not only fragile but also fragmented. (shrink)