This article analyzes Aristotle's argument on form as the primary substance and principle in Metaphysics Zeta 17 from the point of departure of the sense-perceptible substances subject to the becoming.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Recent and Classic References at the Interface of Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Abnormal PsychologyArticlesAggernaes, A. 1972. The expanded reality of hallucinations and other psychological phenomena. Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica 48: 220–238.Anonymous. 1991. Child sexual abuse and the limits of responsibility. Lancet 337: 890.Anonymous. 1993. Mental incapacity and medical treatment. Lancet 341: 1123–1124.Appelbaum, M. D., and A. Creer. 1993. Confidentiality in group therapy. Hospital and Community Psychiatry 44: 311–312.Beatson, J. A. 1993. (...) The psychiatrist and peer review—a psychodynamic review of the literature. Australia and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry 27: 311–318.Berrios, G. E. 1987. Dementia during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: a conceptual history. Psychological Medicine 17: 829–837.Blackburn, R. 1988. On moral judgments and personality disorders: the myth of psychopathic personality revisited. British Journal of Psychiatry 153: 505–512.Blackmon, W. D. 1993. Are psychoanalytic billing practices ethical? American Journal of Psychotherapy 47: 613–620.Blashfield, R. K., and J. G. Draguns. 1976. Evaluative criteria for psychiatric classification. Journal of Abnormal Psychology 85, no. 2: 140–150.Blashfield, R. K., J. Sprock, and A. K. Fuller. 1990. Suggested guidelines for including or excluding categories in the DSM-IV. Comprehensive Psychiatry 31, no. 1: 15–19.Blashfield, R. K., J. Sprock, D. Haymaker et al. 1989. The family resemblance hypothesis applied to psychiatric classification. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease 177: 492–497.Borys, D. S. 1994. Maintaining therapeutic boundaries: the motive is therapeutic effectiveness not defensive practice. Ethics and Behavior 4, no. 3: 267–273.Brown, W. M. 1985. On defining disease. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 10: 311–328.Bub, J. 1994a. Is cognitive neuropsychology possible? Proceedings of the Biennial Meetings of the Philosophy of Science Association 1: 417–427.Bub, J. 1994b. Testing models of cognition through the analysis of brain-damaged performance. British Journal of Philosophy of Science 45, no. 3: 837–855.Buck, C. 1989. Problems with the Popperian approach: A response to Pearce and Crawford-Brown. Journal of Clinical Epidemiology 42: 185–187.Buck, R. 1994. The neuropsychology of communication: spontaneous and symbolic aspects. Journal of Pragmatics 22, no. 3-4: 265–278.Camp, N. M. 1993. The Vietnam war and the ethics of combat psychiatry. American Journal of Psychiatry 150: 1000–1009.Crockett, C. 1961. Ethics, metaphysics, and psychoanalysis. Inquiry 4: 37–52.Dalton, E., K. Hopper, and S. Reiner. 1976. Ethical issues in behavior control. Values and Ethics in Health Care 2: 1–40.Faust, D. 1993a. Use and then prove, or prove and then use? Some thoughts on the ethics of mental health professionals’ courtroom involvement. Ethics and Behavior 3, no. 3-4: 359–380.Fodor, J., and E. Lepore. 1994. What is the connection principle? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54: 4.Foss, L. 1994. Putting the mind back into the body: a successor scientific medical model. Theoretical Medicine 15, no. 3: 291–313.Galletly, C. A. 1993. Psychiatrist-patient sexual relationships: the ethical dilemmas. Australia and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry 27: 133–139.Glymour, C. 1994. On the methods of cognitive neuropsychology. British Journal of Philosophy of Science 45, no. 3: 815–835.Gottlieb, M. C. 1994. Ethical decision making, boundaries, and treatment effectiveness: a reprise. Ethics and Behavior 4, no. 3: 287–293.Gutheil, T. G. 1994. Discussion of Lazarus’s “How certain boundaries and ethics diminish therapeutic effectiveness”. Ethics and Behavior 4, no. 3: 295–298.Helme, T. 1993. A special defence—a psychiatric approach to formalising euthanasia. British Journal of Psychiatry 163: 456–466.Kovel, J. 1976–77. Therapy in late capitalism. Telos 30: 73–92.Lazarus, A. A. 1994a. How certain boundaries and ethics diminish therapeutic effectiveness. Ethics and Behavior 4, no. 3: 255–261.Lazarus, A. A. 1994b. The illusion of the therapist’s power and the patient’s fragility: my rejoinder. Ethics and Behavior 4, no. 3: 299–306.Lehrman, N. S. 1980. Psychiatric power and responsibility: Abuse and abdication, a proposed corrective conference. The Humanist 40: 9–13.Lockhart, T. 1992. Professions, confidentiality, and moral uncertainty. Professional Ethics: A Multidisciplinary Journal 1, no. 3-4: 33–52.Margolin, S. G. 1964. The scientific status of psychoanalytic clinical evidence (II). Inquiry 7: 37... (shrink)

When Aristotle argues at the Metaphysics Z.17, 1041b11–33 that a whole, which is not a heap, contains ‘something else’, i.e. the form, besides the elements, it is not clear whether or not the form is a proper part of the whole. I defend the claim that the form is not a proper part within the context of the relevant passage, since the whole is divided into elements, not into elements and the form. Different divisions determine different senses of (...) ‘part’, and thus the form is not a part in the same sense as the elements are parts. I object to Koslicki’s (2006) interpretation, according to which the form is a proper part along the elements in a single sense of ‘part’, although she insists that the form and the elements belong to different categories. I argue that Koslicki’s reading involves a category mistake, i.e. the conjunction of items that do not belong to the same category (Goldwater 2018). Since for Aristotle parthood presupposes some kind of similarity of parts, the conjunction of form and elements requires treating these items as somehow belonging to the same category, e.g. ‘being’, but no such category exists. (shrink)

Aristotle’s main thesis in Metaphysics Z.17, which takes substance to be a principle and a cause of some sort (1041a9–10, 1041b7–9, b30–31), is of a piece with the assumption that hylomorphic compounds are unified wholes (1041b11–12) – an assumption that proves critical to settling an important controversy about the form-matter relationship in that chapter, i. e. whether matter and form are mutually indistinguishable or rather just accidentally the same. By rejecting these interpretive options, this paper argues that form (...) and matter are bound together by an essential link which, nevertheless, is able to preserve both (i) the different explanatory roles that each of those principles play vis-à-vis specific substances and (ii) the compound’s proper unity. (shrink)

One of the unresolved issues in Aristotle’s hylomorphism is the part-whole puzzle. Some scholars suppose that in Metaphysics Z 17, 1041b11-33 he endorses non-mereological hylomorphism. This kind of interpretation, however, has been challenged by K. Koslicki who argues that if the evidence in Metaphysics Z 17 is combined with some related textual and conceptual considerations, then a convincing case can be made for a mereological construal of Aristotelian hylomorphism. This paper does four things. First, it scrutinizes these opposing (...) approaches to Aristotle’s theory. Second, it suggests that to adjudicate the dispute at hand one ought to determine how Aristotle deals with what has come to be known as ‘Ackrill’s problem’. It is proposed that if we consider Aristotle’s theory in light of some distinctions drawn in contemporary discussions of hylomorphism, then it transpires that he does have a solution to Ackrill’s problem. Third, it is shown that his solution to this problem suggests a particular way of settling the debate over the part-whole puzzle. And finally, it is argued that the suggested reconstruction of Aristotelian hylomorphism is consistent with the textual evidence in Metaphysics Z 17 and its associated texts. (shrink)

This collection of essays is about some of the most fundamental issues connected with metaphysics, theory of values and philosophy of man. What is particularly intriguing about this collection is its unique and fruitful combination of different methodologies and traditions in one rich and persuasive picture of the most basic philosophical problems.

I provide a theory of the metaphysical foundations of identity: an account what grounds facts of the form a=b. In particular, I defend the claim that indiscernibility grounds identity. This is typically rejected because it is viciously circular; plausible assumptions about the logic of ground entail that the fact that a=b partially grounds itself. The theory I defend is immune to this circularity.

Things metaphysics can learn from physics Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-3 DOI 10.1007/s11016-010-9515-z Authors Isabelle Drouet, Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, Université Catholique de Louvain, Place du cardinal Mercier 14, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium Journal Metascience Online ISSN 1467-9981 Print ISSN 0815-0796.

I present two puzzles about the metaphysics of stores, restaurants, and other such establishments. I defend a solution to the puzzles, according to which establishments are not material objects and are not constituted by the buildings that they occupy.

The pandemic has adversely impacted children. The vaccine roll-out to children aged 12 - 17 years is important to curb the spread of the virus and allow children to revert to some form of normality. Children’s rights to equality, education, health and food have been impeded during the pandemic. However, there is a persistent hesitancy towards the vaccine roll-out. This is apparent from a case before the High Court in Pretoria, in the pending matter between the African Christian Democratic Party (...) and others v The Minister of the National Department of Health: Dr M Phaahla and Others. SECTION27’s intervention as amicus curiae highlights the importance of vaccines, and provides evidence to illustrate the adverse impact of the pandemic on learners’ rights to equality, education, food and health. Further, the evidence illustrates the inequalities that exist among learners. (shrink)

One of the central questions of material-object metaphysics is which highly visible objects there are right before our eyes. Daniel Z. Korman defends a conservative view, according to which our ordinary, natural judgments about which objects there are are more or less correct. He begins with an overview of the arguments that have led people away from the conservative view, into revisionary views according to which there are far more objects than we ordinarily take there to be or far (...) fewer. Korman criticizes a variety of compatibilist strategies, according to which these revisionary views are actually compatible with our ordinary beliefs. He goes on to respond to debunking arguments; objections that the conservative's verdicts about which objects that are and aren't are objectionably arbitrary; the argument from vagueness; the overdetermination argument; the argument from material constitution; and the problem of the many. (shrink)

Conceptions of omissions standardly come in two flavours: omissions are construed either as mere absences of actions or are closely related to paradigmatic ‘positive’ actions. This paper shows how the semantics of the verb ‘to omit’ constitutes strong evidence against the view of omissions as involving actions. Specifically, by drawing from an influential fourfold typology of verbal predicates popularised by Zeno Vendler, I argue that declarative statements involving reference to omissions are semantically stative, which is a finding that makes serious (...) trouble for the conception of omissions as being closely related to paradigmatic actions. But references to omissions, in certain linguistic contexts, undergo a shift of meaning to describe processes or activities engaged in by the agent. Still, despite the semantic flexibility of the verb ‘to omit’, its processive reading does not straightforwardly support the second conception of omissions. A subsidiary aim of this paper is to offer a sketch of the metaphysics of processive action in order to show what those who claim that omissions are closely related to actions might be committed to. (shrink)

Evolutionary debunking arguments abound, but it is widely assumed that they do not arise for our perceptual beliefs about midsized objects, insofar as the adaptive value of our object beliefs cannot be explained without reference to the objects themselves. I argue that this is a mistake. Just as with moral beliefs, the adaptive value of our object beliefs can be explained without assuming that the beliefs are accurate. I then explore the prospects for other sorts of vindications of our object (...) beliefs—which involve “bootstrapping” from our experiences as of midsized objects—and I defend bootstrapping maneuvers against a variety of objections. Finally, I argue for an explanatory constraint on legitimate bootstrapping and show how some attempts to respond to debunking arguments run afoul of the constraint. (shrink)

P. Ia. Chaadaev continues to attract the attention of researchers of Russian thought. Some recent publications in our press justify the assertion that scholars are interested not only in this or that side of the views of "the philosopher of Basmannaia Street" but also in the very character of his mentality and its place in the history of Russian philosophical thought. Thus, Viacheslav Vsevolodovich Ivanov writes in his article "Chaadaev-Our Contemporary" [Chaadaev-nash sovremennik] : "There are several reasons why Chaadaev is (...) not at home in Russia and in the history of Russian thought. One of them is his extreme rationalism and logical orientation. He is the follower of Western European rationalism, mainly, I think, of the French rationalist tradition. For him the chief achievement of civilization is the syllogism, the deduction of logical conclusions from some kind of premises and he takes history to be a unified whole." The same problem of Chaadaevan mentality is raised by P.V. Kuznetsov in his article "The Metaphysical Narcissus: P. Ia. Chaadaev and the Fate of Philosophy in Russia" [Metafizicheskii nartsiss. P. Ia. Chaadaev i sud'ba filosofii v Rossii] , which contrasts Chaadaev's thought with the Eastern "apophatic consciousness.". (shrink)

The concept of virtue was of great interest and importance for H. Cohen. In the interpretation of this concept in his latest work “Religion of reason from the sources of Judaism” the most important concepts of this work were brought in the focus: the specificity of definition of what is the religion of reason; understanding of the uniqueness of God; correlation; messianism. For Cohen, a single system of virtues presupposes a single and unique ethics and correlates with the idea of (...) the unity of humanity. The last concept, in his opinion, maturated in the fold of monotheism. Humanity is one, because all people are creations of the unique God. “Religion of reason” treats of the common universal virtues. In the religion of reason, the idea of God and morality are inextricably linked. Cohen rejects metaphysical speculation about the nature of God, about the attributes of God inherent in himself. The religion of the mind speaks of God only in correlation with man. God is a moral ideal and reveals himself to man by giving him moral commandments. Morality connects man and God, and this connection is revealed in detail by Cohen in the theme of virtues. Understanding God as Truth is important for the disclosure of this topic. The corresponding virtue for a person is faithfulness to truth, or truthfulness. In addition to truthfulness in the usual sense, for Cohen, faithfulness to truth requires correct worship of God. The correlation culminates in the idea of messianism, which is interpreted by Cohen as an endless movement of a whole humanity to the social justice. (shrink)

From the author of Quantum Mechanics and Experience, a hugely influential book that challenged key assertions by Niels Bohr and other founders of quantum mechanics, A Guess at the Riddle provides a major metaphysical overhaul of one of physics' most intractable problems-the quest to bridge quantum and classical physics in order to understand the nature of reality.

This study is the first work ever to interpret the Meditations as theodicy. I show that Descartes' attempt to define the role of God for man's cognitive fallibility in so far as God is the creator of man's nature, is a reiteration of an old Epicurean argument pointing out the incongruity between the existence of God and evil. The question of the nature and origin of error which Descartes addresses in the First Meditation is reformulated in the Fourth Meditation into (...) broader considerations about the nature and scope of human freedom. ;The point of gravity of my thesis is Descartes' conceptions of human freedom and divine liberty. Since the conception of human freedom is the reversal of the doctrine of divine liberty, I analyze the two conceptions as two sides of the same problem--the problem of man's relation to God, or the problem of the relation of finitude to Infinity. I show that Descartes' quest for Certitude--which runs parallel to his attempt to overcome the problem of an evil deity--can be reformulated into the problem of creation. I present the problem of error as the problem of evil, and the problem of human will I present as the problem of human freedom, and the search for Certitude I interpret as the vindication of God's goodness and omnipotence, that is, theodicy. ;There are several points which are essential for Cartesian metaphysics, and which, as I demonstrate, Descartes borrowed from St. Augustine: the doctrine of the eternal truths , the conception of human freedom, the theory of error and the explanation of the will's propensity towards error , and the account of human nature. It is my contention that as much as Descartes insisted on the timelessness of his philosophy, what he had to say on the relationship between God and man is a reflection of the 17th c. theological debates which were fought by the Augustinians and the Molinists and were expressed by Descartes in the language and categories created by St. Augustine. (shrink)

KANT IS, TO BORROW ONE OF HIS OWN METAPHORS, the keystone of the modern defense of religion. This defense turns on the contention that religion is not to be understood in terms of its own metaphysical claims--the most notable being that God exists--for this claim, as well as the obvious counterclaim, cannot be demonstrated. The existence of God is an antinomy--a claim that theoretical reason can neither prove nor disprove. Religion, however, can be, indeed must be defended, because of the (...) claims that a completely dispassionate, even irreligious, reason must make consequent to an analysis of morality. If we understand the nature of duty, conscience, and the moral law, and the end or good to which the moral law obligates us, we will conclude, Kant argues, that we must accept the existence of God as a postulate of practical reason. Kant's defense of religion rests on a strategy that aims to prove the limits of theoretical reason and the necessity of assuming the primacy of practical reason. (shrink)

One of the few serious attempts undertaken during the last decade to develop a logic of questions. Belnap's theory comprises three parts so far: a) an informal syntactical treatment of the question-answer relationship, aimed at determining the policies involved in setting up a formalization of questions and answers; b) such a formalization itself ; and c) a semantical analysis leading to explicit definitions of adjectives like "rhetorical," "interesting," "foolish" as applied to questions; "direct," "complete," "corrective," and again "foolish" as applied (...) to answers. This study is a remarkable contribution to a new and rather intricate field of logical inquiry.—A. Z. B. (shrink)

Thomas S. Kuhn's singular voice was stilled by cancer on June 17, 1996, some 49 years after his initial encounters with past science had drawn him into a career in the history and philosophy of science. One of the most widely-read and influential academics of the 20th century, Kuhn was educated at Harvard University, where he received an S.B. in Physics in 1943 and a Ph.D. in the subject in 1949. He remained there until 1956, first as a Junior Fellow (...) in the Society of Fellows from 1948 to 1951, when he in effect retrained himself as a historian of science, and then as an Assistant Professor of General Education and History of Science. He joined the faculty of the University of California, Berkeley, in 1956, becoming Professor of History of Science in 1961. From 1964 to 1979 he was on the faculty of the History of Science Program of Princeton University, and from 1972 to 1979 also a member of the Institute for Advanced Study. He moved to the Department of Linguistics and Philosophy of Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1979, where he became Professor Emeritus in 1991. He was President of the History of Science Society in 1968—70 and of the Philosophy of Science Association in 1988–90. He received the George Sarton Medal of the History of Science Society in 1982 and the John Desmond Bernal Award of the Society for the Social Studies of Science in 1983. (shrink)

I am concerned with epistemic closure—the phenomenon in which some knowledge requires other knowledge. In particular, I defend a version of the closure principle in terms of analyticity; if an agent S knows that p is true and that q is an analytic part of p, then S knows that q. After targeting the relevant notion of analyticity, I argue that this principle accommodates intuitive cases and possesses the theoretical resources to avoid the preface paradox.

A spirit is haunting contemporary thought -- the spirit of Hegel. All the powers of academia have entered into a holy alliance to exorcize this spirit: Vitalists and Eschatologists, Transcendental Pragmatists and Speculative Realists, Historical Materialists, and even "Liberal Hegelians." Which of these groups has not been denounced as metaphysically Hegelian by its opponents? And which has not hurled back the branding reproach of Hegelian metaphysics in its turn? Progressives, liberals, and reactionaries alike receive this condemnation. In light of (...) this situation, it is high time that true Hegelians should openly admit their allegiance and, without obfuscation, express the importance and validity of Hegelianism to the contemporary intellectual scence"-- Back cover. (shrink)

A successful attempt to provide an accurate, non-technical introduction to philosophy which begins with the discussion of logic, moves to epistemology and metaphysics, then takes up political philosophy, ethics, and the philosophy of religion, and concludes with a special section on contemporary philosophy. There are references throughout to philosophers, such as Malebranche and Plotinus, who are frequently neglected in introductory texts. --D. Z. L.

Rose and Schaffer (forthcoming) argue that teleological thinking has a substantial influence on folk intuitions about composition. They take this to show (i) that we should not rely on folk intuitions about composition and (ii) that we therefore should not reject theories of composition on the basis of intuitions about composition. We cast doubt on the teleological interpretation of folk judgments about composition; we show how their debunking argument can be resisted, even on the assumption that folk intuitions have a (...) teleological source; and we argue that, even if folk intuitions about composition carry no weight, theories of composition can still be rejected on the basis of the intuitions of metaphysicians. (shrink)

The article is devoted to the well-known dispute between R. Carnap and W.V.O. Quine on the meaning of statements with names of abstractions, which also revealed their disagreements on the more general question of the nature of the dependence of ontology on the choice of language of knowledge. According to Quine, the choice of language carries with it certain ontological commitments – judgments of existence that must be true for anyone who appropriately uses the language in question. The language of (...) abstractions (using appropriate names and indications) is widely used not only in philosophy and everyday communication, but also in the sciences, including natural sciences. The names of abstractions (or, alternatively, quantification by corresponding entities) cannot be completely excluded from science, as Carnap, in particular, points out. He also considers it wrong to attribute to a scientist with empiricist views the belief in the existence of something that he, as an empiricist, is not ready to consider existing. In his view, the choice of language (framework) does not carry any ontological obligations: it determines what should be the correct answer to the so-called internal questions of the theory but does not affect metaphysical questions. Carnap interprets meaningful statements about abstractions as analytical truths, while Quine believes that most references to abstractions are removable from the language of science, and those that are not removable create additional ontological obligations, which, however, for some reason say nothing about reality itself. But why this is so, if the theory implicating them claims to describe reality, is not clear. This debate about the role of judgments about abstractions in scientific knowledge gave rise to a whole branch of metaphysical and ontological research, best known as metaontology. The main parties in this dispute are realists, who interpret irreducible abstractions as part of reality and denotations of certain names, and anti-realists, who, as a rule, deny the connection of statements with such names with reality, treating them as pseudo-statements or something similar. The solution to the problem, which is proposed in this article, consists in abandoning the belief, widespread both in philosophy and in everyday thought, which can be generally called “The theory of reference” and which consists in the fact that the contribution of names and certain other types of expressions to communication is their denotations. If we assume that names have no denotations at all and their semantic contribution to statements is only their senses or something similar, then the names of abstractions in this respect will be no different from other types of names. In this case, it would be no need to either assume that they designate some “Platonic” entities in order for some statements with them being true, nor interpret these judgments as pseudo-statements or as truths of some special kind that are not related to reality. The interpretation of statements with such names and their evaluation will not pose any special problem for the empiricist with this approach. (shrink)

Particularists in material-object metaphysics hold that our intuitive judgments about which kinds of things there are and are not are largely correct. One common argument against particularism is the argument from arbitrariness, which turns on the claim that there is no ontologically significant difference between certain of the familiar kinds that we intuitively judge to exist (snowballs, islands, statues, solar systems) and certain of the strange kinds that we intuitively judge not to exist (snowdiscalls, incars, gollyswoggles, the fusion of (...) the my nose and the Eiffel Tower). Particularists frequently respond by conceding that there is no ontologically significant difference and embracing some sort of deflationary metaontology (relativism, constructivism, quantifier variance). I show -- by identifying ontologically significant differences -- that the argument can be resisted without retreating to any sort of deflationary metaontology. (shrink)

This book seeks to read the political thought of classic thinkers of the liberal tradition in the context of their metaphysical and theological writings. Sokolowski demonstrates that the political measures offered by political theorists to remedy the state of unrest and instability are intrinsically connected to their metaphysical conception of order, the self, and the interaction between the two.

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain (...) in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Thoroughly updated, the second edition of this highly successful textbook continues to represent the most comprehensive and authoritative collection of canonical readings in metaphysics. In addition to updated material from the first edition, it presents entirely new sections on ontology and the metaphysics of material objects.

Two families of positions dominate debates over a metaphysically reductive analysis of knowledge. Traditionalism holds that knowledge has a complete, uniquely identifying analysis, while knowledge-first epistemology contends that knowledge is primitive—admitting of no reductive analysis whatsoever. Drawing on recent work in metaphysics, I argue that these alternatives fail to exhaust the available possibilities. Knowledge may have a merely partial analysis: a real definition that distinguishes it from some, but not all other things. I demonstrate that this position is attractive; (...) it evades concerns that its rivals face. (shrink)

Five reasons are given for why Wittgensteinianism, though a major movement in philosophy of religion, has never been a dominant one. The remainder of the chapter is divided as follows: - I: The influence of Descartes’ Legacy. - II: Philosophy of Religion’s epistemological inheritance as seen in Reformed epistemology and the influence of Thomas Reid, and in neo-Kantianism. - III: The return from metaphysical reality in Wittgenstein. - IV: Difficulties in the metaphysical notion of God: as being itself or pure (...) consciousness. - V: The importance of ordinary certitudes in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty. - VI: The sense of God’s “otherness” from the world. - VII: Religion and contemplative philosophy. (shrink)

Parry’s volume is not an elementary book, but it is apparently intended as an introduction to Locke’s political thought for students. While he definitely has a point of view of his own, he attempts to draw together much of the recent critical thought on Locke. Parry’s volume differs from much of the recent work on Locke in being, one might say, "sweet-tempered." He is sweet-tempered in the first place toward Locke. Unlike so much of the recent scholarly-historical literature, he clearly (...) respects Locke. In a field marked by acrimony among scholars, Parry is also remarkably sweet tempered toward other Locke scholars; he builds on the work of others where possible, rather than emphasizing his own novelty and uniqueness. He thus produces a far more balanced treatment than most. For example, he accepts willingly the Laslett-sponsored arguments that the Second Treatise is aimed against Filmer as was the First, but he refuses to toss out entirely the older view that it is aimed in some measure against Hobbes. Although Parry is probably least tolerant towards the Strauss approach to Locke, he is even able to find large areas where he endorses moderate versions of that position, for example, on the important range of similarities between Hobbes and Locke. Parry’s "harmonizing approach" shows up also in the unusually wide range of Lockean sources from which he draws. He uses not only the standard fare of the Second Treatise and the Essays on the Law of Nature, but also the works on education, toleration, and economics to good effect. Disappointingly scanty, however, is the place of the First Treatise and even the Essay. His harmonizing approach shows up most importantly, however, in his attempt to combine the two chief sorts of attention Locke has received in recent years. On the one hand, there is the Locke scholarship properly so-called. While there are several varieties and orientations within this literature, no doubt the leading one has taken a very historical approach—attempting to understand Locke in his historical context and deploying religious or theological categories as the chief means for doing so. This approach shuns "present-mindedness" above all other intellectual vices. While Parry announces his general adherence to this approach he attempts to take account of the other main sort of interest in Locke today—as a source and inspiration for a very live contemporary tradition of political thinking, represented by Nozick and Rawls. Parry uses these contemporary "Lockeans" to help interpret the Second Treatise, leaning for example on Rawls’s formulation of the problem social contact theory attempts to answer, and Nozick’s doctrine of "entitlements." Parry’s refusal to be terrified by the strictures against "present-mindedness" produce some of the best and most valuable features of the book, as when he seriously asks what Locke means today, or how other contemporary political views differ from Locke’s. On the other hand, his reading of Locke on political economy suffers a bit perhaps from over-domination by Nozick’s restatement. Parry attempts to give both devils their due by agreeing with the historical school that Locke’s thought must be read historically, as Christian or theological, in a form that could hardly be acceptable to any contemporary political thinkers, and agreeing with the contemporary Lockean tradition that "to a very considerable extent" Locke’s position "can and must be…assessed and understood apart from its theological substructure." Those theological foundations are, Parry admits, very problematical. In fact, with a post-Humean eye, "it can become difficult to persuade oneself even that Locke could have found his position consistent." Yet Parry affirms "there is no doubt that Locke found the argument satisfying." But he supplies no reason—other than the fact that Locke deployed such arguments on more than one occasion—for this conclusion. Surely gross inconsistencies in argument are grounds for doubt. Parry should have at the least entertained Leo Strauss’s hypothesis about Locke’s manner of expression in light of his own views that Locke’s expressed theological underpinnings are unacceptable philosophically, and that Locke’s position can rest on altogether independent nontheological grounds. Moreover, Parry’s concession that Locke cannot move successfully from those religious underpinnings to the all-important content of the law of nature supplies further grounds for considering the same hypothesis. Parry’s treatment shares with most of the historical approaches to Locke the defect of "slackness"—when we come to something inconsistent or difficult to understand, we write it off as the product of Locke’s faith, internally meaningful, believable to him. Only in Parry’s case this is more problematical yet, for he rightly insists that we see Locke’s position as nonarchaic, and thus makes the reader eager for probing analysis and justification rather than loose appeals to Locke’s times. In order to connect the theological underpinnings to the political arguments, Parry is driven to some most un-Lockean notions such as the duty of "an individual to stretch himself to the full." For a similar reason, we suspect, freedom, which plays an extremely large part in Parry’s exposition, nowhere receives an adequate rooting in Locke’s discussion in the Essay, nor does Locke’s hedonism play a sufficient part in Parry’s interpretation.—M.Z. (shrink)

A challenger of traditions and boundaries A pivotal figure in 20th-century philosophy, Nelson Goodman has made seminal contributions to metaphysics, epistemology, aesthetics, and the philosophy of language, with surprising connections that cut across traditional boundaries. In the early 1950s, Goodman, Quine, and White published a series of papers that threatened to torpedo fundamental assumptions of traditional philosophy. They advocated repudiating analyticity, necessity, and prior assumptions. Some philosophers, realizing the seismic effects repudiation would cause, argued that philosophy should retain the (...) familiar framework. Others considered the arguments compelling, but despaired of doing philosophy without the framework. Goodman disagreed with both factions. Rather than regretting the loss of structure, he capitalized on the opportunities that arise when the strictures of tradition are loosened. (shrink)

A challenger of traditions and boundaries A pivotal figure in 20th-century philosophy, Nelson Goodman has made seminal contributions to metaphysics, epistemology, aesthetics, and the philosophy of language, with surprising connections that cut across traditional boundaries. In the early 1950s, Goodman, Quine, and White published a series of papers that threatened to torpedo fundamental assumptions of traditional philosophy. They advocated repudiating analyticity, necessity, and prior assumptions. Some philosophers, realizing the seismic effects repudiation would cause, argued that philosophy should retain the (...) familiar framework. Others considered the arguments compelling, but despaired of doing philosophy without the framework. Goodman disagreed with both factions. Rather than regretting the loss of structure, he capitalized on the opportunities that arise when the strictures of tradition are loosened. (shrink)

A challenger of traditions and boundaries A pivotal figure in 20th-century philosophy, Nelson Goodman has made seminal contributions to metaphysics, epistemology, aesthetics, and the philosophy of language, with surprising connections that cut across traditional boundaries. In the early 1950s, Goodman, Quine, and White published a series of papers that threatened to torpedo fundamental assumptions of traditional philosophy. They advocated repudiating analyticity, necessity, and prior assumptions. Some philosophers, realizing the seismic effects repudiation would cause, argued that philosophy should retain the (...) familiar framework. Others considered the arguments compelling, but despaired of doing philosophy without the framework. Goodman disagreed with both factions. Rather than regretting the loss of structure, he capitalized on the opportunities that arise when the strictures of tradition are loosened. (shrink)