Plagiarism and other transgressions of the norms of academic integrity appear to be a persistent problem among upper secondary students. Numerous surveys have revealed high levels of infringement of what appear to be clearly stated rules. Less attention has been given to students’ understanding of academic integrity, and to the potential misconceptions and false beliefs that may make it difficult for them to comply with existing rules and handle complex real-life situations.In this paper we report findings from a survey of (...) European upper secondary students’ views on issues relating to academic integrity. We relate these findings to the students’ training about academic integrity, self-reported level of questionable behavior and country of study.A total of 1654 students at 51 institutions located in 6 European countries participated in the study. The participants generally believed they had a good understanding of the rules applying to them and knew how to behave in compliance with norms of academic integrity. The results indicate, however, that often, in practice, this belief was mistaken. Many students had an inadequate understanding of core elements of academic integrity. They were uncertain about how to act, and they struggled in the handling of complex situations that require context-sensitive judgement. While some differences between countries were identified, they were modest and exhibited no clear pattern. Our results also suggest that reducing students’ level of uncertainty and, to a lesser degree, improving their level of knowledge could lead them to engage less in certain types of questionable behaviours. Surprisingly, the effect of academic training is modest and ambiguous. The study also confirms that perception of peer behaviour has the strongest association with student engagement in questionable behaviours. Thus, academic integrity at the upper secondary level cannot be explained simply in terms of individual ethics or knowledge. (shrink)

Good academic practice is more than the avoidance of clear-cut cheating. It also involves navigation of the gray zones between cheating and good practice. The existing literature has left students’ understanding of gray zone practices largely unexplored. To begin filling in this gap, we present results from a questionnaire study involving N = 1639 undergraduate students from seven European countries representing all major disciplines. We show that large numbers of these students are unable to identify gray area issues and lack (...) sensitivity to the context dependence of these. We also show that a considerable proportion of students have a poor understanding of concepts like plagiarism and falsification, not only in gray zone scenarios, but also in cases of relatively clear-cut cheating. Our results are similar across the faculties and countries of study, and even for students who have attended academic integrity training. We discuss the implications of this for academic integrity training. (shrink)

This study examines how meritocracy as a collective social imaginary promoting social justice and fairness reproduces class and caste inequalities and fosters ethical violence. We interrogate discourse of merit in the narratives of the professional–managerial class-in-making at an Indian business school. Empirically, we draw on interviews, full-text responses to a qualitative questionnaire, and a student’s poem. We describe how business school students articulate merit as a neoliberal ethic, emphasizing prudential, enterprising attitudes, and responsibility. However, this positive, aspirational façade (...) of merit masks practices of ethical violence, wherein individuals invoke an ethical principle as grounds for moral condemnation and linguistic injuries. These practices of ethical violence desubjectify disadvantaged students and result in silence as a form of inequality. We contribute to organizational research on inequalities by foregrounding ethical violence and desubjectification. We detail the possibilities of discursive agency in contesting and interrupting ethical violence. (shrink)

To "look good" and to "be good" have traditionally been considered two very different notions. Indeed, philosophers have seen aesthetic and ethical values as fundamentally separate. Now, at the crossroads of a new wave of aesthetic theory, Marcia Muelder Eaton introduces this groundbreaking work, in which a bold new concept of merit where being good and looking good are integrated into one.

The merit system is based on a person’s ability to achieve. The concept of merit hence rejects a process that awards any particular entitlement explicitly based on disability. Brian Barry says that under the merit principle, people can compete for positions or advantage. This paper argues that the idea of merit, as explained by Barry, is unjust. Iris Marion Young points out that a person with cognitive disability faces a different situation compared to other people. Under (...) normal circumstances, persons can have skills that enable them to do things with ease, something that is not readily available to individuals with autism or Asperger’s syndrome. The problem is also exacerbated by policies that do not recognize the diverse needs of individuals with impairment. In this regard, practical ethics demands that a law or national policy must ensure a level playing field for everyone. (shrink)

Specific studies of the “situated ethics” of international surrogacy that address the structural conditions and local moral economies that sustain the trade are needed. In this essay, I describe the intimate industry of surrogacy in Thailand, exploring the local moral economy in which surrogacy is described as a form of Buddhist merit making and an opportunity to provide for one’s own children. This offers a further example of how other ethical values beyond the strictly economic are negotiated in (...) commercial surrogacy relationships. Situated ethics allow us to locate and understand the tensions, competing logics, and contradictions within ethical practices. (shrink)

Working through Balaska’s deeply perceptive, elegantly written, and profoundly honest book, Wittgenstein and Lacan at the Limit, a reader steeped in the recent academic literature about either or both of its main figures may come to feel herself placed at what is, itself, a certain kind of limit. The limit I mean is the limit of a familiar type of theoretical discourse about the constitution and structure of language and subjectivity as Wittgenstein and Lacan treat them: it includes the discourses (...) that seek, for instance, to articulate how language and sense are constituted in the Tractatus, and thus what is really meant by “logical form” and “nonsense” there; or those that aim to comprehend the true relationship of our biological nature to language, culture, and the advent of freedom in Lacan; or, again, those that try to find, in either thinker’s works, the precise location of the delicate logical buttonhole that would alone permit us entry, from within everyday language and life, to the absoluteness of an ineffable beyond. These discourses all treat of language and life, but handle these phenomena at arm’s length, theorizing the structure of each and the form of their relationship in such a way as to establish, ultimately, their mutual convertibility to one another, their mutual absorption into a third, more inclusive term, or adduce translations from the dense theoretical matrices of one thinker’s treatment of them to the other’s. Balaska’s book, doing none of these things, rather succeeds in bringing out how an interconnected reading of the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus and Lacan may speak to and inform our response to a certain kind of experience that is characteristic for both thinkers, and typical as well of those moments and occasions of our lives in which we may find ourselves drawn to reflect on what meaning is and how we relate to it. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This paper examines the significance to professional decision‐making of the concept of the ‘merits’. The merits serve in practical affairs to delineate considerations appropriate to ethical decision‐making and require in particular the avoidance of ‘self‐interest’. Drawing on the example of politics, it is argued that the boundaries of the ‘merits’are never fixed across professional fields but rather are determined by the distinctive character of the professional's fiduciary responsibilities; and that properly understood, the merits may demand some ‘self‐interested’considerations which in (...) the common conception would be rejected. The political example also suggests how the ‘ethical’conflict over the accepted boundaries of the merits can mask fundamental normative and political differences which would be better made explicit. (shrink)

Transnational surrogacy involves the movement of people, gametes, embryos, and surrogates across international borders. It is now possible to obtain ova from Ukraine and sperm from Denmark, and have the resulting embryos transferred to a Thai surrogate for gestation. This new trend in reproductive travel highlights the increasingly globalized, disaggregated, and commodified nature of reproduction. The demand for transnational surrogacy derives from the differential legal status of surrogacy across jurisdictions. Commercial surrogacy is banned in most European countries, Australia, China, Taiwan, (...) Japan, Mexico, Turkey, and some U.S. states. Other countries, such as Brazil, Israel, and the United Kingdom, have .. (shrink)

My university recently established a business ethics competency exam for graduate business students. The exam is designed to test whether students can demonstrate several abilities that are indicative of competency in business ethics. They are the abilities to speak the language of business ethics, identify business ethics issues, apply theories and concepts to issues, identify connections among theories and concepts as they relate to different issues, and construct and critically evaluate arguments for various positions on business (...) ethics issues. Through this paper, I hope to begin a discussion among business ethicists about both the merits of a competency exam and what the format of such an exam should be. I attempt to do this by explaining the reasons why my institution adopted a competency exam, the goals and purposes of the exam, the format of the exam, and why I believe the exam has merit. (shrink)

To preach morals is easy, to ground them difficult. I think this saying of Schopenhauer is quite true. In the writings of the moral theorists we meet with ample enthusiasm for the beauty and the loftiness of moral principles. But even the best moral sermons are certainly no substitute for philosophical reasoning. To-day more than ever before we need the soundest foundation for a truly fixed ethics. For, to-day there is not a single affirmation in morals, which is not (...) contradicted by its opposite. Eduard von Hartmann, for instance, could in the beginning of the twentieth century still maintain that the differences of opinion in ethics are concerned. (shrink)

Merit has very little to do with the increasing dominance of men in the modern Liberal Party. Yet Liberal women continue to defend it. Until now. ON MERIT explores this imbalance, its implications for the party's future, and how a pair of red shoes may spark a rebellion against the merit myth.

Ethics guidelines and commentary suggest that a central function of research ethics committees is to assess the scientific merit of the protocols they review. However, some commentators object to this role, and evidence suggests that the assessment of scientific merit is a significant source of confusion and animosity between ethics committees and clinical investigators. In this essay, we argue that ethics committees should assess the scientific value and validity of research protocols and that new (...) decision-making tools are needed to help them do so in a systematic, transparent, and reliable way. We present a novel ethical framework that can assist in this task. (shrink)

In this paper, we analyse the Wittgensteinian critique of the orthodoxy in animal ethics that has been championed by Cora Diamond and Alice Crary. While Crary frames it as a critique of “moral individualism”, we show that their criticism applies most prominently to certain forms of moral individualism (namely, those that follow hedonistic or preference-satisfaction axiologies), and not to moral individualism in itself. Indeed, there is a concrete sense in which the moral individualistic stance cannot be escaped, and we (...) believe that it is this particular limitation that justified Crary’s later move to a qualified version of moral individualism. At the same time, we also argue that there are significant merits to the Wittgensteinian critique of moral individualism, which pertain to its attack on the rationalism, naturalism, and reductionism that characterise orthodox approaches to animal ethics. We show that there is much of value in the Wittgensteinians’ call for an ethics that is more human; an ethics that fully embraces the capacities we are endowed with and one that pays heed to the richness and complexity of our moral lives. (shrink)

Education for participation – Philosophizing back a "new" life after acquired brain injury.

Introduction : the faces of merit -- Republic of merit -- Merit and the culture of public life -- Small worlds : competition in the colleges -- Making the grade : managed competition and schooling -- The scientific measurement of merit -- The "presumption of merit" : institutionalizing merit -- Squeeze play : merit in government -- Merit in crisis -- Epilogue : merit, equality, consent.

Based on over 20 years of theory and research in human judgment, decision making and social psychology, this unique book brings together for the first time what ...

Many ethical systems hold that agents earn merit and demerit through their good and bad deeds. Some of these ethical systems also accept merit transference, allowing merit to be transferred, in certain circumstances, from one agent to another. In this article, I argue that there is a previously unrecognized paradox for merit transference involving a phenomenon I call “merit inflation”. With a particular focus on Buddhist ethics, I then look at the options available for (...) resolving this paradox. I conclude that merit inflation poses a serious challenge for any ethical system that broadly permits the transfer of merit. (shrink)

The merited response argument is an argument in favor of artistic ethicism. According to this view, the interaction between art and morality is such that a moral defect in a work of art negatively influences the work's artistic value (and a moral merit, when relevant, is always an artistic merit). I contend that the argument relies on a criterion of aesthetic and artistic relevance that, when properly understood, fails to constitute a premise that either the artistic contextualist or (...) the autonomist would accept. I then offer a version of the merited response argument that supports artistic contextualism and argue that, given certain controversial assumptions, immoral art in the Western tradition is more common than typically acknowledged in the recent literature on the topic. (shrink)

According to what I call the Merit Principle, roughly, works of art that attempt to elicit unmerited responses fail on their own terms and are thereby aesthetically flawed. A horror film, for instance, that attempts to elicit fear towards something that is not scary is to that extent aesthetically flawed. The Merit Principle is not only intuitive, it is also endorsed in some form by Aristotle, David Hume, and numerous contemporary figures. In this paper, I show how the (...) principle leads to a novel paradox when applied to an undertheorized class of artworks I call ‘seductive works’. These artworks necessarily invite an unmerited response in order to invite a (merited) repudiation of that response. Thus, according to the Merit Principle, they are necessarily aesthetically flawed, which is counter-intuitive. I consider a number of unsuccessful solutions to the paradox that aim to preserve the Merit Principle, before rejecting that principle as it stands. I discuss what is challenging about seductive artworks, before briefly defending a new principle that appeals to a general way that a work’s aesthetic value is conditioned by the constraints under which it operates. This principle not only resolves the paradox, but explains the competing intuitions that give rise to it. (shrink)

The 3rd Pan-African Ethics Human Rights and Medical Law (3rd EHRML) conference was held in Johannesburg on July 7, 2013, as part of the Africa Health Congress. The conference brought together bioethicists, researchers and scholars from South Africa, Zimbabwe, Kenya and Nigeria working in the field of bioethics as well as students and healthcare workers interested in learning about ethical issues confronting the African continent. The conference which ran with a theme of "Bioethical and legal perspectives in biomedical research (...) and medical practice in Africa with a focus on: Informed consent, HIV-AIDS & Tuberculosis, leadership & organizational ethics, patients and healthcare workers rights," was designed to expand the dialogue on African bioethics beyond the traditional focus on research ethics and the ethical dilemmas surrounding the conduct of biomedical research in developing countries. This introductory article highlights some of areas of focus at the conference including issues of leadership, organizational ethics and patients and healthcare workers rights in Africa. We analyze the importance of free speech, public debate of issues, argumentation and the need to introduce the teaching and learning of ethics to students in Africa in accordance with UNESCO guidelines. This article also focuses on other challenges confronting Africa today from an ethical standpoint, including the issues of poor leadership and organizational ethics which are main contributors to the problems prevalent in African countries, such as poverty, poor education and healthcare delivery systems, terrorism, social inequities, infrastructural deficits and other forms of 'structural violence' confronting vulnerable African communities. We believe that each of the eight articles included in this supplement, which have been rigorously peer-reviewed are a good example of current research on bioethics in Africa, and explore some new directions towards broadening the African bioethics agenda as we move forward to a new dawn for Africa in the 21st century. (shrink)

Merit review of scientific projects involving laboratory animals is a central issue in the current debate over the ethics of animal experimentation. In this essay, I examine several conceptual, regulatory, and practical problems inherent in the merit review process. Contemporary challenges to the existing merit review system and suggestions for reform are also discussed. The essay concludes with comments on legal and political questions relevant to the future of merit assessment.

What follows is an argument that can be used to justify the introduction of philosophical, and specifically ethical, discourse into a wide range of university courses. The argument advanced is, we hope, both sufficiently formal to convince administrators, and sufficiently broad to convince students, of the practical importance that at least one area of philosophy has for the successful pursuit of even the most praxis-oriented career.

Virtue ethics has been dogged by the objection that it lacks the ability to provide adequate action-guidance, that it is agent-centered rather act-centered. Virtue ethics has also been faulted for devolving into moral cultural relativism. Rosalind Hursthouse has presented an action-based, naturalistic theory of virtue ethics intended to defuse these charges. Despite its merits, I argue that Hurthouse’s theory fails to successfully solve the problems associated with action guidance and relativism precisely because her attempt to provide a (...) non-cultural basis for virtue ethics undermines the possibility of using virtue ethics to derive useful action-guidance. The action-guiding power of virtue is derived from culture; seeking to avoid the cultural grounding of virtue merely brings one back to the problem of how virtue ethics can provide action-guidance. (shrink)

Recently there has been a somewhat surprising interest among Kantian theorists in the moral standing of animals, coupled with a no less surprising optimism among these theorists about the prospect of incorporating animal moral standing into Kantian theory without contorting its other attractive features. These theorists contend in particular that animal standing can be incorporated into Kantian moral theory without abandoning its logocentrism: the claim that everything that is valuable depends for its value on its relation to rationality. In this (...) essay I raise doubts about the prospects for accommodating animal moral standing within a logocentric Kantianism. I argue instead that the best way to incorporate animal moral standing into Kantian theory is to admit more radical departures from Kant’s position by maintaining that consciousness is a locus of moral standing independent from rationality. I propose that we should attribute moral standing to all conscious animals because the capacity of consciousness is the criterion distinguishing individuals whose well-being generates reasons from individuals whose well-being fails to do so. We need such a criterion because we speak of the well-being of things, such as artifacts and meteorological phenomena, which clearly lack moral standing. Having already argued against the Kantian view that the criterion of moral standing is rationality, I proceed to argue that consciousness is also superior to its other principal rival for the criterion of moral standing: life. On the view that emerges from this discussion, we have obligations to show concern for conscious individuals by treating their well-being as providing us with reasons for action; the view thus endorses the criterion of moral standing typically advanced by utilitarians. On this view we also have a distinct class of obligations to show respect for conscious rational individuals; the view thus endorses the Kantian claim that persons have a distinctive moral status in virtue of their possession of rational capacities. In this essay thus begin to show how a principal insight of each leading approach to modern moral theory may be captured in a unified theory. (shrink)

The ethical conduct of research is central to the integrity of universities, where research and graduate education are inseparable.In the medical sciences, those who first describe a new feature, whether it's an anatomical structure, clinical sign or symptom, disease, physiological entity, or surgical procedure, often have their discoveries named after them. The insider knows what is meant by such eponymous, abstract designations as Padget's disease, the circle of Willis, Pavlov's dog, Asperger's syndrome, or the Papanicoulaou test. This kind of acknowledgment (...) is not just restricted to medicine, it also applies to other fields of science and technology, where terms like the Heisenberg uncertainty principle .. (shrink)

This paper starts with Immanuel Kant’s definition of “eudaimonism” (a term he created) as a single‐source account of motivation, and explains why he thinks the eudaimonist is unacceptably self‐regarding. In order to modify and improve Kant’s account, the paper then revisits the Christian scholastics. Scotus is distinguished from Aquinas on the grounds that Scotus has a more robust conception of the will that encompasses the ranking of the affection for advantage (for the agent’s happiness and perfection) and the affection for (...) justice (for what is good in itself, independent of this relation to the agent). This is a double‐source account of motivation. With these conceptual resources in hand, the paper goes on to examine Jean Porter’s defense of eudaimonism, urging that she begs the question against the Scotist view. Finally, the paper makes a conciliating suggestion that preserves most, but not all, of what the eudaimonist wants. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to explain why creativity is an artistic merit. Artworks and non-artworks can both be creative. But creativity does not help make many other creative things good of their kind. A creative explanation is not a better explanation in virtue of being creative. Why, then, is a creative artwork a better artwork in virtue of being creative? Understanding this will give us a better understanding of the nature of artistic merit. The approach adopted (...) in this paper is as follows. First, I say what creativity is and what an artistic merit is. Second, I identify reasons to doubt that creativity is an artistic merit. A good explanation of the merit of creativity should address these doubts. Third, I develop a theory of artistic merit that appeals to the final value of acting excellently – for example, virtuously or skilfully. Finally, I argue that this enables us to explain why creativity is an artistic merit. This account also enables us to argue that artistic merits give some things final value, and not merely instrumental value. It also provides reason to believe that ethical qualities of artworks enhance their artistic merit for the same reason creativity does. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore our common-sense thinking about the relation between moral value, moral merit, and well-being. Starting from Ross’s observation that welfarist axiologies ignore our intuitions about desert, I focus on axiologies that take moral merit and well-being to be independent determinants of value. I distinguish three ways in which these axiologies can be formulated, and I then consider their application to the issue of punishment. The objection that they recommend penalties in circumstances in which intuitively (...) we would judge them to be unjustified is examined, and I suggest that it can be met by incorporating temporal information into the way in which value, well-being and moral merit are linked. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore our common-sense thinking about the relation between moral value, moral merit, and well-being. Starting from Ross’s observation that welfarist axiologies ignore our intuitions about desert, I focus on axiologies that take moral merit and well-being to be independent determinants of value. I distinguish three ways in which these axiologies can be formulated, and I then consider their application to the issue of punishment. The objection that they recommend penalties in circumstances in which intuitively (...) we would judge them to be unjustified is examined, and I suggest that it can be met by incorporating temporal information into the way in which value, well-being and moral merit are linked. (shrink)

The university has long been oriented toward a meritocratic ideal that emphasizes individual labor and individual measures of success. However, recent studies showing the professorate to be depressed, lonely, and extremely anxious about their future careers raise questions about the merits of such meritocracy. Drawing upon classical sociological theories of solidarity as well as recent scholarship on meritocracy in American culture this essay argues that the meritocratic ideals of contemporary academia have stripped it of the ability to produce the genuine (...) solidarity that sustains communities. (shrink)

In the contemporary moral responsibility debate, most theorists seem to be giving accounts of responsibility in the ‘desert-entailing sense’. Despite this agreement, little has been said about the notion of desert that is supposedly entailed. In this paper I propose an understanding of desert sufficient to help explain why the blameworthy and praiseworthy deserve blame and praise, respectively. I do so by drawing upon what might seem an unusual resource. I appeal to so-called Fitting-Attitude accounts of value to help inform (...) a conception of desert or merit, one that can be usefully applied to discussions of moral responsibility. I argue that the view, which I call, Desert as Fittingness (DAF), merits additional attention. I do so by making two claims: First, that it does better than extant Fitting Attitude accounts of blameworthiness and praiseworthiness; second, that it has an initial plausibility with respect to informing a general account of desert. While these reasons are insufficient to show the view is true, they do make the case for taking the view seriously. (shrink)