To write of “the” philosophy of transhumanism is a little daring. The growth of transhumanism as a movement and philosophy means that differing perspectives on it have formed.

In the past, it was possible to approach transhumanism as primarily involving philosophical discussion and technological speculation. While transhumanist goals such as radical life extension, uploading, and cognitive, sensory, and physical enhancement were speculative they were also considered scientifically feasible, even if the technologies to achieve those goals appeared remote.

Stefan Sorgner (2009) says that on becoming familiar with transhumanism, he “immediately thought that there were many fundamental similarities between transhumanism and Nietzsche’s philosophy, especially concerning the concept of the posthuman and that of Nietzsche’s overhuman.” In contrast to Bostrom (2005), Sorgner sees significant and fundamental similarities between the posthuman and the overhuman. (I will adopt his use of “overhuman” in place of “overman” or Übermensch.) This overall view seems to me highly plausible. I agree with most of Sorgner’s comments (...) in this respect. My intent is to give further support to the conceptual parallels. In addition, I argue that these are not merely parallels: transhumanist ideas were directly influenced by Nietzsche. (shrink)

Dear Mother Nature: Sorry to disturb you, but we humans – your offspring – come to you with some things to say. (Perhaps you could pass this on to Father, since we never seem to see him around.).

Vernor Vinge's “singularity” is a worthy contribution to the long tradition of contemplations about human transcendence. Throughout history, most of these musings have dwelled upon the spiritual – the notion that human beings can achieve a higher state through prayer, moral behavior, or mental discipline.

In this chapter the author argues that the desire to improve on the human body and eventually to replace it with post‐biological alternatives does not imply that we loathe the flesh in which we are currently embodied. The appeal of post‐biology lies in the opportunities for expanding not only our cognition and sensory richness and for sculpting and refining our emotions but also for deeper self‐understanding. The chapter points out that post‐biological beings are not truly disembodied. All thinking beings rely (...) ultimately on physical processes, even if those processes are distributed across numerous computational devices. Whatever senses are built into the bodies we choose to inhabit, we will also be able to expand our perceptual range enormously by connecting to external sensors. If we can accomplish the transition to post‐biological being, the result will not be mechanization and restriction; it will be greater richness of being and existential freedom. (shrink)