The paper discusses an ethical analysis of three common cases involving the most popular requests in rhinoplasty. As the nose plays a fundamental role in the aesthetics and physiognomy of the human face, the request for rhinoplasty may be an expression of both subjective discomfort and objective dysfunction. The paper aims, therefore, to fill the gap between qualitative-subjective impressions related to bodily self-perception and its quantitative-objective assessment. Ethical evaluation should start with consideration of the formal object and circumstances of the (...) act, by posing the following question: Is this a real clinical case? Only after an undoubtedly positive answer to this question, should we consider specific case-related aspects; i.e., the best scientific evidence, available nosography and informed consent, before conducting an ethical evaluation of the case. DOI: 10.5294/pebi.2016.20.1.8. (shrink)

We develop a new version of the causal theory of spacetime. Whereas traditional versions of the theory seek to identify spatiotemporal relations with causal relations, the version we develop takes causal relations to be the grounds for spatiotemporal relations. Causation is thus distinct from, and more basic than, spacetime. We argue that this non-identity theory, suitably developed, avoids the challenges facing the traditional identity theory.

En el presente trabajo se analiza la conexión existente entre la etapa marxista de juventud y la neoaristotélica de madurez en el pensamiento de Alasdair MacIntyre, enfatizando el problema que representa para él la posibilidad de criticar y justificar racionalmente una teoría moral. A través de una lectura comparativa de obras de ambos períodos se muestra cómo la incapacidad para dar una respuesta satisfactoria a esta preocupación temprana es una de las razones que llevan al abandono de la tradición marxista, (...) y cómo su formulación aristotélica madura busca superar esta dificultad, manteniendo constantes otros presupuestos y compromisos teóricos previos. (shrink)

Scientists from Einstein to Sagan have linked emotions like awe with the motivation for scientific inquiry, but no research has tested this possibility. Theoretical and empirical work from affective science, however, suggests that awe might be unique in motivating explanation and exploration of the physical world. We synthesize theories of awe with theories of the cognitive mechanisms related to learning, and offer a generative theoretical framework that can be used to test the effect of this emotion on early science learning.

La société contemporaine est constamment confrontée aux problèmes religieux. Cependant, la tradition républicaine française abandonne la religion à la sphère privée, comme si elle n'avait pas, par essence, une existence dans la Cité. Il ne s'agit pas pour autant de réduire la religion à sa dimension politique, voire au militantisme fanatique. La critique des réductions illégitimes de la religion est donc la première tâche. Il est aussi impossible de privatiser la religion que de la politiser. La réduire au lien social (...) n'est pas plus satisfaisant, même si c'est une tentation des sociologues. La religion ne se réduit pas davantage à la religiosité du sublime ou de l'idéal démocratique. Contre la notion scabreuse de " religions sans Dieu ", il vaut mieux admettre qu'il existe du religieux diffus sans religion, et garder le terme pour désigner une relation à la transcendance divine (une ou multiple) à la fois et indissolublement singulière et collective. Ainsi, il n'y a pas de religion sans prière individuelle, contrairement à ce que Kant souhaitait. Mais cette prière n'a aucun sens si elle ne s'adosse pas à un message intersubjectif, celui d'une communauté inspirée qui s'inscrit dans la Cité par sa dimension sociale et son histoire. La dimension personnelle de la religion (foi et méditation) s'appuie donc sur le symbolique, le témoignage et la communauté. Pour le philosophe d'aujourd'hui, les religions se présentent comme l'attestation multiple de la présence d'une transcendance divine et d'une vie spirituelle dans la société et dans l'histoire. Mettre la religion entre parenthèses, c'est s'exposer à ne rien comprendre de l'histoire du monde. (shrink)

On a voulu montrer dans ce livre que, reflete a travers les miroirs differents que sont les genies philosophiques et politiques de l'epoque, l'idealisme allemand forme une incontestable unite de langage philosophique. A l'interieur de cette grande unite, ou la philosophie ne cesse de se confronter aux plus hauts problemes de l'homme, le clivage entre un idealisme transcendantal et l'idealisme speculatif apparait comme une faille profonde, en ce que la description de la finitude humaine, et par consequent la comprehension des (...) limites de l'homme, est l'objet du premier alors que le rapport d'expression du fini a l'infini est au coeur du second. L'attitude idealiste symbolisee par Hegel a eu de nombreuses consequences. Mais les critiques qui ont ete faites aux successeurs de Hegel ne doivent pas nous faire oublier la presence de l'idealisme allemand. C'est cette presence philosophique que ce livre espere restituer. (shrink)

Justifications and excuses are defenses that exculpate. They are therefore much more like each other than like such defenses as diplomatic immunity, which does not exculpate. But they exculpate in different ways, and it has proven difficult to agree on just what that difference consists in. In this paper I take a step back from justification and excuse as concepts in criminal law, and look at the concepts as they arise in everyday life. To keep the task manageable, I focus (...) primarily on excuses and excusing activities, distinguishing them from justifications as well as from other close relatives, in particular, forgiving and pardoning. I draw upon J.L. Austin’s classic A Plea for Excuses, but expand on his account, suggesting that we offer excuses for reasons besides those he mentions. My hope is that my examination of excuses and excusing activities will help us rethink our views on just how justifications and excuses differ, views which often are worked out without much attention to how these concepts function in everyday life and to the connection between offers of excuses and justifications and the rules of civility. (shrink)

This paper argues that Deonna and Teroni's attitudinal theory of emotions faces two serious problems. The first is that their master argument fails to establish the central tenet of the theory, namely, that the formal objects of emotions do not feature in the content of emotions. The second is that the attitudinal theory itself is vulnerable to a dilemma. By pointing out these problems, our paper provides indirect support to the main competitor of the attitudinal theory, namely, the perceptual theory (...) of emotions. (shrink)

On a voulu montrer dans ce livre que, reflete a travers les miroirs differents que sont les genies philosophiques et politiques de l'epoque, l'idealisme allemand forme une incontestable unite de langage philosophique. A l'interieur de cette grande unite, ou la philosophie ne cesse de se confronter aux plus hauts problemes de l'homme, le clivage entre un idealisme transcendantal et l'idealisme speculatif apparait comme une faille profonde, en ce que la description de la finitude humaine, et par consequent la comprehension des (...) limites de l'homme, est l'objet du premier alors que le rapport d'expression du fini a l'infini est au coeur du second. L'attitude idealiste symbolisee par Hegel a eu de nombreuses consequences. Mais les critiques qui ont ete faites aux successeurs de Hegel ne doivent pas nous faire oublier la presence de l'idealisme allemand. C'est cette presence philosophique que ce livre espere restituer. (shrink)

Thomas Kuhn is mostly known for his contributions to the philosophy of science. However, it was chiefly to investigations in philosophy of language that he dedicated the last part of his career. The aim of this paper is to present a systematic view of Kuhn’s main ideas on this subject. I start by describing his theory of concept, in particular what he says about kind terms. Such terms, acquired in blocks that form contrast sets or “taxonomies,” are learned through ostensible (...) definitions. Next, I analyze Kuhn’s concepts of “meaning” and “truth.” Finally, I discuss a second type of kinds terms, not fully investigated by him, which is learned together with scientific laws. Resumo Thomas Kuhn é conhecido principalmente por suas contribuições para a filosofia da ciência. No entanto, foi em grande medida à filosofia da linguagem que ele dedicou a última parte de sua carreira. O objetivo deste artigo é apresentar uma visão sistemática das principais ideias de Kuhn sobre esse assunto. Começo descrevendo sua teoria do conceito, em particular o que ele diz sobre termos para espécie. Tais termos, aprendidos em blocos que formam conjuntos de contraste ou “taxonomias”, são aprendidos através de definições ostensivas. Em seguida, analiso as concepções de Kuhn de “significado” e “verdade”. Finalmente, discuto um segundo tipo de termo para espécies, não totalmente investigado por ele, que é aprendido junto com as leis científicas. (shrink)

In this paper, we consider the question of whether there exists an essential relation between emotions and wellbeing. We distinguish three ways in which emotions and wellbeing might be essentially related: constitutive, causal, and epistemic. We argue that, while there is some room for holding that emotions are constitutive ingredients of an individual’s wellbeing, all the attempts to characterise the causal and epistemic relations in an essentialist way are vulnerable to some important objections. We conclude that the causal and epistemic (...) relation between emotions and wellbeing is much less strong than is commonly thought. (shrink)

Almost every contemporary theory of knowledge is a version of fallibilism, yet an adequate statement of fallibilism has not yet been provided. Standard definitions cannot account for fallibilistic knowledge of necessary truths. I consider and reject several attempts to resolve this difficulty before arguing that a belief is an instance of fallibilistic knowledge when it could have failed to be knowledge. This is a fully general account of fallibilism that applies to knowledge of necessary truths. Moreover, it reveals, not only (...) the connection between fallibility and error, but the connection between fallibility and accidental truth as well. (shrink)

The goal of this paper is to offer a new theory of moods, according to which moods are perceptual experiences that represent undetermined objects as possessing specific evaluative properties. I start by listing a series of features that moods are typically taken to possess and claim that a satisfactory theory of moods must be able either to explain why moods genuinely possess these features or to explain these appearances away in a non-ad hoc way. I show that my account provides (...) a plausible explanation of all the main features of moods. I conclude by addressing some objections against my account. (shrink)

Anscombe famously said that there are some act types that can only be done intentionally. We defend this claim: some act types are essentially intentional. We argue that Ving intentionally is itself essentially intentional: it is not possible to be non-intentionally Ving intentionally. And we show how this explains why various other act types—such as trying, lying, and thanking—are essentially intentional. Finally, building on Piñeros Glassock (2020) and Beddor & Pavese (2022), we explain how this makes trouble for the thesis (...) that if I am Ving intentionally, I know that I am Ving. (shrink)

Mechanisms are a way of explaining how biological phenomena work rather than why single elements of biological systems are there. However, mechanisms are usually described as physiological entities, and little or no attention is paid to malfunction as an independent theoretical concept. On the other hand, malfunction is the main focus of interest of applied sciences such as medicine. In this paper I argue that malfunctions are parts of pathological mechanisms, which should be considered separate theoretical entities, conceptually having a (...) priority over physiological sequences. While pathological mechanisms can be described in terms of a Cummins-like mechanistic explanation, they show some unnoticed peculiarities when compared to physiological ones. Some features of pathological mechanisms are considered, such as outcome variability, ambivalence and dependence on a range. (shrink)

I aim to present a solution to the apparent paradox of the Tractatus by means of a minimalist reading grounded in the idea that the correct logical symbolism alone “finally solves” in essentials the philosophical problems. I argue that although the sentences of the Tractatus are nonsensical, rules presented in its symbolism are not. The symbolism itself expresses only a priori rules of logic through schematic variables that do not say anything. I argue that this reading correctly expresses the ladder (...) structure of the book, and that it can account for Wittgenstein's critique of the Tractatus in Some Remarks on Logical Form. (shrink)

This essay intends to identify intentionalism (infinity given by rules, not by extensions) and the idea of multiple complete mathematical systems (several “mathematics”) as the central characteristics of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mathematics. We intend to roughly show how these ideas come up, interact to each other, how they develop and, in the end, how they are abandoned in the late period. According to the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, infinities can only be given by rules and there is a single numerical system (the (...) number’s essence is the general idea of ordering). Intentionalism is up to at least 1933, but the idea of a single system is abandoned in 1929-30 (already in the Philosophische Bemerkungen). In its place one finds the idea of multiple, independent and complete numerical systems. This idea will engender some key moves in Wittgenstein’s philosophy of Mathematics. The notion of “seeing an aspect” from the Big Typescript, of instance, comes up so as to explain such systems. From 1934 onwards, Wittgenstein gradually abandons intentionalism and the idea of multiple, independent and complete systems. In his late philosophy, both ideas are used only as instruments to dissolve philosophical prose regarding mathematics. (shrink)

Neste artigo começo por argumentar que devemos ver o Big Typescript como algo muito diferente de um livro planejado para a publicação. Ele deve ser tomado meramente como uma coleção de observações, que expressam a concepção de Wittgenstein de “gramática” por volta de 1932-33, quando as observações foram reunidas. Em seguida, explico a concepção substancial de “gramática” do BT. Espero tornar claro, nesta segunda parte, que o BT e o Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus são próximos no sentido de que partilham a idéia (...) de que a linguagem tem uma estrutura que opera de acordo com regras fixas de sentido (um cálculo). (shrink)

Il existe un lien intuitif entre le bien-être et le bonheur. Nous souhaitons proposer une nouvelle théorie selon laquelle le bien-être consiste en un bonheur approprié. Notre théorie peut être considérée comme la combinaison de quatre thèses. La première thèse est que le bonheur psychologique consiste en une balance largement positive d’états affectifs tels que les émotions, les humeurs et les plaisirs sensoriels. La seconde est que les émotions, les humeurs et les plaisirs sensoriels sont différents types d’expériences perceptuelles de (...) propriétés évaluatives. Il s’ensuit que le bonheur consiste en une balance largement positive d’expériences perceptuelles de propriétés évaluatives. La troisième thèse est que, dans la mesure où le bonheur est constitué par des états qui ont des conditions d’adéquation, alors le bonheur aussi peut être évalué comme étant approprié ou inapproprié. La quatrième thèse est une thèse concernant le bien-être : elle affirme que le bien-être consiste en un bonheur approprié ainsi défini. (shrink)