Our intuitive assumption that only organisms are the real individuals in the natural world is at odds with developments in cell biology, ecology, genetics, evolutionary biology, and other fields. Although organisms have served for centuries as nature’s paradigmatic individuals, science suggests that organisms are only one of the many ways in which the natural world could be organized. When living beings work together—as in ant colonies, beehives, and bacteria-metazoan symbiosis—new collective individuals can emerge. In this book, leading scholars consider the (...) biological and philosophical implications of the emergence of these new collective individuals from associations of living beings. The topics they consider range from metaphysical issues to biological research on natural selection, sociobiology, and symbiosis. -/- The contributors investigate individuality and its relationship to evolution and the specific concept of organism; the tension between group evolution and individual adaptation; and the structure of collective individuals and the extent to which they can be defined by the same concept of individuality. These new perspectives on evolved individuality should trigger important revisions to both philosophical and biological conceptions of the individual. -/- Contributors: Frédéric Bouchard, Ellen Clarke, Jennifer Fewell, Andrew Gardner, Peter Godfrey-Smith, Charles J. Goodnight, Matt Haber, Andrew Hamilton, Philippe Huneman, Samir Okasha, Thomas Pradeu, Scott Turner, Minus van Baalen. (shrink)

Building upon a non-standard understanding of evolutionary process focusing on variation and persistence, I will argue that communities and ecosystems can evolve by natural selection as emergent individuals. Evolutionary biology has relied ever increasingly on the modeling of population dynamics. Most have taken for granted that we all agree on what is a population. Recent work has reexamined this perceived consensus. I will argue that there are good reasons to restrict the term “population” to collections of monophyletically related replicators and (...) interactors, which explains why many existing models in population biology exclude by definition many genuine evolving biological individuals such as communities and ecosystems. By studying a case of community evolution (a symbiotic termite–fungus community), we will see that it is variation that is important to evolutionary processes, not populations. Variation within a population is only one of many types of variation that can lead to evolution by natural selection. The upshot of focusing on variation is that cases of community and ecosystem adaptive change become tractable in evolutionary terms. I will show that complex emergent individuals such as communities and ecosystems cannot be fully accommodated by conventional population/reproduction models but can be accommodated by variation/persistence models. (shrink)

¿Es posible un decálogo del agua en la era de la globalización y la liberalización de todos los mercados y recursos naturales? Maude Barlow así lo cree y nos propone 10 principios básicos para mantener un equilibrio del agua entre las necesidades humanas y el mundo natural. El agua no puede concebirse simplemente como un recurso explotable, sino como un patrimonio del planeta y para las próximas generaciones. Los 10 principios de Barlow, más que un código, representan una invitación (...) a pensar la sustentabilidad a partir de lo local. (shrink)

According to moral error theorists, moral claims necessarily represent categorically or robustly normative facts. But since there are no such facts, moral thought and discourse are systematically mistaken. One widely discussed objection to the moral error theory is that it cannot be true because it leads to an epistemic error theory. We argue that this objection is mistaken. Objectors may be right that the epistemic error theory is untenable. We also agree with epistemic realists that our epistemological claims are not (...) systematically in error. However, this is not because there are robustly normative facts, but rather because the truth of our epistemic claims doesn’t turn on whether there are such facts. Epistemic facts, we argue, are not robustly or categorically normative. Moral error theorists should therefore respond to the objection that their view does not commit them to the epistemic error theory. (shrink)

For many epistemologists and normativity theorists, epistemic norms necessarily entail normative reasons. Why or in virtue of what do epistemic norms have this necessary normative authority? According to what I call epistemic constitutivism, it is ultimately because belief constitutively aims at truth. In this paper, I examine various versions of the aim of belief thesis and argue that none of them can plausibly ground the normative authority of epistemic norms. I conclude that epistemic constitutivism is not a promising strategy for (...) grounding epistemic normativity. (shrink)

Despite the rapid adoption of technology in human resource departments, there is little empirical work that examines the potential challenges of algorithmic decision-making in the recruitment process. In this paper, we take the perspective of job applicants and examine how they perceive the use of algorithms in selection and recruitment. Across four studies on Amazon Mechanical Turk, we show that people in the role of a job applicant perceive algorithm-driven recruitment processes as less fair compared to human only or algorithm-assisted (...) human processes. This effect persists regardless of whether the outcome is favorable to the applicant or not. A potential mechanism underlying algorithm resistance is the belief that algorithms will not be able to recognize their uniqueness as a candidate. Although the use of algorithms has several benefits for organizations such as improved efficiency and bias reduction, our results highlight a potential cost of using them to screen potential employees during recruitment. (shrink)

According to epistemic instrumentalism, epistemic normativity arises from and depends on facts about our ends. On that view, a consideration C is an epistemic reason for a subject S to Φ only if Φ-ing would promote an end that S has. However, according to the Too Few Epistemic Reasons objection, this cannot be correct since there are cases in which, intuitively, C is an epistemic reason for S to Φ even though Φ-ing would not promote any of S’s ends. After (...) clarifying both EI and the Too Few Epistemic Reasons objection, I examine three major instrumentalist replies and argue that none of them is satisfactory. I end by briefly sketching a fourth possible response, which is, I suggest, more promising than the other three. (shrink)

What is the source of epistemic normativity? In virtue of what do epistemic norms have categorical normative authority? According to epistemic teleologism, epistemic normativity comes from value. Epistemic norms have categorical authority because conforming to them is necessarily good in some relevant sense. In this article, I argue that epistemic teleologism should be rejected. The problem, I argue, is that there is no relevant sense in which it is always good to believe in accordance with epistemic norms, including in cases (...) where the matter at hand is completely trivial. Therefore, if epistemology is normative, its normativity won't come from value. (shrink)

Maud Boyer Arnaud Destrebecqz Axel Cleeremans.

« Il y a 9 mois, pour que les choses changent et après avoir travaillé sur mon sujet depuis plus de 15 ans, je fais le choix d'abandonner mon confort en devenant (bénévolement) la nouvelle déléguée nationale à l'Environnement chez Les Républicains. Je l'ai accepté dans le but unique de porter mes convictions. J'y ai proposé un programme précis, destiné à être appliqué. Puis je suis partie en campagne pour les régionales et j'ai été élue vice-présidente au développement durable, à (...) l'énergie et à la mer en PACA. J'ai la volonté de transformer ma région en un laboratoire d'idées. Je suis déterminée pour qu'elle devienne le porte-drapeau d'une écologie qui rime avec économie. Je veux agir dans ma région sans langue de bois, faire progresser l'écologie en étant réaliste et cohérente. Il est temps de dire la vérité. Je veux donner les vrais chiffres, arrêter le catastrophisme, « l'écologiquement correct », ne pas faire de calcul populiste. On est en 2016, il serait temps de secouer les choses et de changer de modèle. Je suis prête à en payer le prix, ma cause en vaut la peine : des tempêtes j'en ai vu d'autres. Je veux aussi parler de la place des femmes en politique, du sexisme. De l'intérieur, je vais vous raconter ce basculement d'une vie de sportive ayant été nommée personnalité de l'année par le Times magazine, à un milieu d'hommes auxquels seule la loi impose la mixité. Je veux agir pour la qualité de notre environnement et sur nos choix énergétiques comme on monte une entreprise, avec sérieux mais sans oublier qui je suis. Osons! J'ai décidé de remettre en jeu tout ce que j'avais construit/acquis ces dernières années pour faire avancer mes convictions pour l'environnement. L'avenir me dira si le jeu en valait la chandelle. » Maud Fontenoy. (shrink)

Epistemology is widely seen as a normative discipline like ethics. Just like moral facts, epistemic facts – i.e. facts about our beliefs’ epistemic justification, rationality, reasonableness, correctness, warrant, and the like – are standardly viewed as normative facts. Yet, whereas many philosophers have rejected the existence of moral facts, few have raised similar doubts about the existence of epistemic facts. In recent years however, several metaethicists and epistemologists have rejected this Janus-faced or dual stance towards the existence of moral and (...) epistemic facts. As recent developments in metaethics and normativity theory have made clear, objections to the existence of moral facts really are metanormative objections that target the existence of normative facts more generally. But since epistemic facts are no less normative than moral facts, the argument goes, the existence of the former is equally threatened by metaethical objections. In this thesis, I argue that this rejection of the dual stance fails because epistemic facts are not normative facts. Although they imply norms, they do not imply genuine normativity since the epistemic norms of belief that they imply lack necessary normative authority or force. Unlike moral norms and just like e.g. norms of etiquette and the law, there is not automatically a normative reason to conform to epistemic norms. Therefore, even if metaethical objections target all normative facts, it does not follow that they also target epistemic facts. I offer a two-part abductive argument in favour of that conclusion. First, I argue that epistemic facts lack five commonly cited features of normative facts (but not of merely norm-implying facts). Then, I argue that this is best explained by the thesis that epistemic facts are merely norm-implying and not genuinely normative. I end by exploring the potential consequences of this conclusion for epistemology and metaethics. (shrink)

Background In June 2016, the Parliament of Canada passed federal legislation allowing eligible adults to request Medical Assistance in Dying (MAID). Since its implementation, there likely exists a degree of hesitancy among some healthcare providers due to the law being inconsistent with personal beliefs and values. It is imperative to explore how nurses in Quebec experience the shift from accompanying palliative clients through “a natural death” to participating in “a premeditated death.” Research question/aim/objectives This study aims to explore how Quebec (...) nurses personally and professionally face the new practice of MAID and their role evolution. Research design A grounded theory design was used. Participants and research context We recruited 37 nurses who participated in or coordinated at least one MAID. Semi-structured interviews and focus groups were conducted and audiotaped. Data collection and analysis followed Strauss and Corbin steps. Ethical considerations Ethics approval was received from the investigator’s affiliated University. Participants were informed regarding the research goal, signed a written consent, and were assigned pseudonyms. Findings/results Results show that nurses experienced the wide range of paradoxe during MAID centering around the following eight elements: 1) confrontation abouth death, 2) choice, 3) time of death, 4) emotional load, 5) new Bill, 6) relationship with the person, 7) communication skills, and 8) healthcare setting. The shifting of views and values in this new role is presented by the contradiction of opposites. Conclusions A better understanding of the paradox experienced by nurses involved with MAID paves the way for the development of interventions. (shrink)

Epistemic instrumentalism views epistemic norms and epistemic normativity as essentially involving the instrumental relation between means and ends. It construes notions like epistemic normativity, norms, and rationality, as forms of instrumental or means-end normativity, norms, and rationality. I do two main things in this paper. In part 1, I argue that there is an under-appreciated distinction between two independent types of epistemic instrumentalism. These are instrumentalism about epistemic norms and instrumentalism about epistemic normativity. In part 2, I argue that this (...) under-appreciated distinction matters for the debate surrounding the plausibility of EI. Specifically, whether we interpret EI as norm-EI or as source-EI matters for the widely discussed universality or categoricity objection to EI, and for two important motivations for adopting EI, namely naturalism and the practical utility of epistemic norms. I will then conclude by drawing some lessons for epistemic instrumentalism going forward. (shrink)

Clinical trials emerged in rapid succession as the COVID-19 pandemic created an unprecedented need for life-saving therapies. Fair and equitable subject selection in clinical trials offering investigational therapies ought to be an urgent moral concern. Subject selection determines the distribution of risks and benefits, and impacts the applicability of the study results for the larger population. While Research Ethics Committees monitor fair subject selection within each trial, no standard oversight exists for subject selection across multiple trials for the same disease. (...) Drawing on the experience of multiple clinical trials at a single academic medical centre in the USA, we posit that concurrent COVID-19 trials are liable to unfair and inequitable subject selection on account of scientific uncertainty, lack of transparency, scarcity and, lastly, structural barriers to equity compounded by implicit bias. To address the critical gap in the current literature and international regulation, we propose new ethical guidelines for research design and conduct that bolsters fair and equitable subject selection. Although the proposed guidelines are tailored to the research design and protocol of concurrent trials in the COVID-19 pandemic, they may have broader relevance to single COVID-19 trials. (shrink)

En comparant sur plusieurs scènes la réception de mes recherches sur le travail bénévole – désenchantement pour les un.es, truisme pour les autres – et en prenant au sérieux le processus de politisation par l’enquête qui a été le mien, cet article propose une analyse située à la fois socialement et politiquement du désenchantement que produirait la sociologie catégorisée comme critique. Il met en lumière deux défenses de l’autonomie de l’engagement, au cœur de la critique de la critique : celui (...) de l’autonomie de « l’engagement citoyen » des acteur.trices et de leur rapport au travail, et celui de l’autonomie du travail du chercheur.se et de ses « engagements », généralement présenté sous le topos de la « neutralité » de la recherche. Ce retour réflexif sur les effets de l’enquête sur les autres, mais aussi sur moi-même, vient questionner in fine la portée sociale et politique de cette « conception des mondes antagonistes » inscrite dans une « doctrine de la séparation des sphères » du travail et de l’engagement qui concerne ici tant l’objet que la pratique de recherche. (shrink)

Espace d'expression et de discussion, les forums médiatiques font se rencontrer des individus aux opinions et appartenances variées. Il s'agit d'observer le rôle du dispositif communicationnel et la manière dont ses membres en usent: privilégient-ils la dimension conversationnelle ou publicitaire? quelle est la nature de cet espace public et des échanges qui s'y déroulent? L'analyse statistique et de contenu des courriels révèle un espace interactionnel de groupe où la publicité l'emporte sur la sociabilité, ainsi qu'une parole publique dégradée marquée par (...) l'incommunication et une dérive ethniciste.Space for expression and discussion forums are media meet individuals with varied opinions and affiliations. It is to observe the role of communicative device and how its members wear: they prefer the conversational dimension or advertising? What is the nature of public space and exchanges that take place? Statistical analysis and content of emails reveals a group interactional space where advertising outweighs sociability, and a degraded public speech marked by miscommunication and a drift ethnocentric. (shrink)

According to epistemic deontologism, attributions of epistemic justification are deontic claims about what we ought to believe. One of the most prominent objections to this conception, due mainly to William P. Alston, is that the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ rules out deontologism because our beliefs are not under our voluntary control. In this paper, I offer a partial defense of Alston’s critique of deontologism. While Alston is right that OIC rules out epistemic deontologism, appealing to doxastic involuntarism is not (...) necessary for generating that tension. Deontologists would still have a problem with OIC if doxastic voluntarism turned out to be true or if deontologism did not require voluntarism. This is because, in short, epistemic justification does not imply ‘can’. If, as deontologists maintain, epistemic justification implies ‘oughts’, then epistemic justification must also imply ‘can’ given OIC. But since epistemic justification does not imply ‘can’, OIC dictates that we reject deontologism. I end by exploring the possible consequences of this incompatibility between OIC and deontologism. My conclusion is that at least one of the following claims must be true. Either ‘ought’ does not imply ‘can’, attributions of epistemic justification are not deontic claims, or epistemic claims lack necessary or categorical normative authority. (shrink)

This article addresses the conditions that are necessary for non-Indigenous people to learn from Indigenous people, more specifically from women and feminists. As non-Indigenous scholars, we first explore the challenges of epistemic dialogue through the example of Traditional Ecological Knowledge. From there, through the concept of mastery, we examine the social and ontological conditions under which settler subjectivities develop. As demonstrated by Julietta Singh and Val Plumwood, the logic of mastery—which has legitimated the oppression and exploitation of Indigenous peoples—has been (...) reproduced in academia, leaving almost no room for Indigenous knowledge and epistemes. In the same vein, Sámi scholar Rauna Kuokkanen reclaims and suggests the logic of the gift as a means to render academia more hospitable to Indigenous peoples and epistemes. In our view, reclaim as a concept-practice is a promising way to disrupt colonial, racist, and sexist power relations. Thus, we in turn propose to reclaim vulnerability as defined by Judith Butler in order to deconstruct masterful settler subjectivities and reconstruct relational ones instead. As theorized by Erinn Gilson, we propose epistemic vulnerability to imagine the conditions of our learning from Indigenous peoples and philosophies. (shrink)

À partir des deux théophanies de Nicolas de Cues et de Leibniz, qui donnent à l’homme une place privilégiée au sein du monde créé, du fait de son statut de miroir ou image vivante qui reflète ou exprime le monde dans sa totalité, et de conceptions qui pensent la présence de l’infini dans le fini, on s’interroge ici sur la conception de la connaissance comme perspective de la monade chez Leibniz et la connaissance « quo modo capere possunt » des (...) créatures connaissantes dans l’univers cusain afin de voir si se tissent des liens de filiation évidents. On se demandera enfin si le système de l’expression, chez Leibniz, qui fait que toute monade exprime l’univers tout entier – ce qui semble proche de l’idée cusaine de la mens comme miroir ou image vivante – ne dépasse pas le perspectivisme « restrictif » de la conception cusaine et n’inscrit pas la démarche leibnizienne dans un dessein beaucoup plus large, qui nécessite un tissu de relations entre les différentes monades que constitue la compossibilité. Tout mouvement de connaissance est connaissance de toutes choses, mais dans un système de relations qui précède l’existence de la monade et qui résulte du calcul du meilleur, soumis au principe de non-contradiction.Ainsi, si un héritage réel semble se dessiner entre Nicolas de Cues et Leibniz, qui place le sujet connaissant au centre de l’édifice créé par Dieu, ou Création, dans une démarche à la fois libre et dépendante du principe premier, il faut comprendre que les deux systèmes de pensée ne répondent pas tout à fait au même dessein. (shrink)

Le diptyque « Corps/Guerre(s) » s’impose comme une problématique essentielle au cœur du renouvellement de la connaissance du phénomène guerrier. La réflexion autour de la corporéité de la guerre a ouvert de nouveaux territoires afin de repenser l’expérience guerrière, notamment par une réévaluation des expériences collectives et intimes des violences. Les deux numéros de la revue Quasimodo s’inscrivent dans cet axe – au travers d’une démarche comparatiste, pluridisciplinaire et chronologique...

Peut-on être blâmé pour ses croyances? Bien qu’il s’agisse d’une pratique courante et en apparence légitime, le blâme doxastique entre en conflit avec deux thèses intuitivement plausibles. D’un côté, il semble que nous puissions seulement être blâmés pour ce qui est sous notre contrôle volontaire. Mais de l’autre, il est largement admis que la croyance est un état fondamentalement passif et involontaire. Il s’ensuit que nous ne pouvons jamais être blâmés pour nos croyances. Le présent article examine la réponse que (...) propose Christoph Jäger à cet argument. Sa stratégie consiste à invoquer le rejet, par Harry Frankfurt, du principe des possibilités alternatives contre la thèse voulant que nous puissions seulement être blâmés pour nos croyances si elles sont sous notre contrôle volontaire. J’aimerais montrer que l’argument de Jäger n’est pas concluant et, plus généralement, que la stratégie qu’il adopte aboutit inévitablement à un dilemme. (shrink)

According to the deontological conception of epistemic justification, a belief is justified when it is our obligation or duty as rational creatures to believe it. However, this view faces an important objection according to which we cannot have such epistemic obligations since our beliefs are never under our voluntary control. One possible strategy against this argument is to show that we do have voluntary control over some of our beliefs, and that we therefore have epistemic obligations. This is what I (...) call the voluntarist strategy. I examine it and argue that it is not promising. I show how the voluntarist attempts of Carl Ginet and Brian Weatherson fail, and conclude that it would be more fruitful for deontologists to look for a different strategy. (shrink)

ABSTRACT According to G.E. Moore’s ‘Open Question’ argument, moral facts cannot be reduced or analyzed in non-normative natural terms. Does the OQA apply equally in the epistemic domain? Does Moore’s argument have the same force against reductionist accounts of epistemic facts and concepts? In a recent article, Daniel Greco has argued that it does. According to Greco, an epistemological version of the OQA is just as promising as its moral cousin, because the relevant questions in epistemology are just as ‘open’ (...) as those in ethics. In this paper, I offer a two-part reply to Greco. First, I argue that his argument in favor of the openness of epistemology is not persuasive. Second, I offer a case against the openness of epistemology. Unlike claims linking natural and moral properties, claims linking natural and epistemological properties do give rise to closed questions. An epistemological OQA is therefore not as promising as its moral cousin. (shrink)

Our intuitive assumption that only organisms are the real individuals in the natural world is at odds with developments in cell biology, ecology, genetics, evolutionary biology, and other fields. Although organisms have served for centuries as nature's paradigmatic individuals, science suggests that organisms are only one of the many ways in which the natural world could be organized. When living beings work together--as in ant colonies, beehives, and bacteria-metazoan symbiosis--new collective individuals can emerge. In this book, leading scholars consider the (...) biological and philosophical implications of the emergence of these new collective individuals from associations of living beings. The topics they consider range from metaphysical issues to biological research on natural selection, sociobiology, and symbiosis. (shrink)

Cet ouvrage collectif est issu d’un colloque international qui s’est tenu à l’École française de Rome en 2016, pour marquer le vingt-cinquième anniversaire de la publication des cinq volumes de L’Histoire des femmes en Occident (en italien : Storia delle donne in Occidente) dirigés par Michelle Perrot et Georges Duby, et de Storia delle donne in Italia, paru cinq ans plus tard. Les directrices de ce volume mettent la publication de ces deux sommes en perspective et proposent une première tent...

The contemporary books of Cassius Dio's Roman History are known for their anecdotal quality and lack of interpretive sophistication. This paper aims to recuperate another layer of meaning for Dio's anecdotes by examining episodes in his contemporary books that feature masquerades and impersonation. It suggests that these themes owe their prominence to political conditions in Dio's lifetime, particularly the revival, after a hundred-year lapse, of usurpation and damnatio memoriae, practices that rendered personal identity problematic. The central claim is that narratives (...) in Dio's last books use masquerades and impersonation to explore paradoxes of personal identity and signification, issues made salient by abrupt changes of social status at the highest levels of imperial society. (shrink)

Anti-Academy examines the ideas, processes, workshops and legacies of three radical educational models in 1960s Japan, the USA and Denmark. Comprised of three sections, each relating to one of these school's programmes, Anti-Academy explores life at Bigakko, Tokyo, The Intermedia Programme at the University of Iowa, and Ex-School, Copenhagen. Anti-Academy is a comprehensive interpretation of how these three academies situated themselves on the peripheries of the art world, existing in opposition to the mainstream, and responding to the political and social (...) climate, location and cultural context of the day.Published alongside an exhibition of the same name, 21 November 2013 - 18 February 2014. (shrink)