Contre les économistes classiques qui se sont pour la plupart concentrés sur l’échange et la valeur, Marx propose dans les Manuscrits de 1844 une réflexion précise sur l’argent qui prend ainsi place dans le procès global de l’aliénation. L’argent se caractérise notamment par sa forme pure et abstraite et participe d’une création de besoins artificiels qui accroissent la dépendance de l’individu. Ce faisant, l’argent est cause d’une aliénation spécifique : il transforme la quantité pure en une valeur à l’aune de (...) laquelle tout est réévalué. Cette abstraction croissante de ce qui au départ n’est qu’un moyen explique qu’il constitue progressivement la règle de tout commerce. Les échanges ne sont plus alors que les occasions de manifester l’argent lui-même. Si c’est bien sur la propriété privée que se fonde la puissance de l’argent, celui-ci a aussi son mécanisme propre.Against the classical econonics who focuses on the problems of exchange and value, Marx thinks in the Manuscripts of 1844 about money and especially its place in the global alienation process. Money is particularly described as an abstraction and plays a role in the making of artificial needs who alienate men. That is why money is a specific form of alienation : it transforms pure quantity in value in order to estimate everything. This increasing abstraction of a simple tool makes money the rule of every deal. Therefore exchanges become only occasions to make money appear. Despite the fact that the power of money is based on the property, money is also a specific form of alienation. (shrink)

Lévinas never clarified his method himself. This article is an attempt to account for such an omission and also for the non-classical notion of method as it was constructed. By observing the originality of the means by which this philosophy operates, we come to understand that phenomenology is a necessary beginning to perceive the essential ambiguity of phenomenon and the “trace” of alterity. But since this can only be an indicative process, Lévinas must find alternative means of justification, as new (...) forms of reduction. This contingency implies a notion of truth as testimony. The last stage in the method of alterity consists of an “ethical vigilance” in order to distinguish what in Same is Other. (shrink)

Lévinas never clarified his method himself. This article is an attempt to account for such an omission and also for the non-classical notion of method as it was constructed. By observing the originality of the means by which this philosophy operates, we come to understand that phenomenology is a necessary beginning to perceive the essential ambiguity of phenomenon and the “trace” of alterity. But since this can only be an indicative process, Lévinas must find alternative means of justification, as new (...) forms of reduction. This contingency implies a notion of truth as testimony. The last stage in the method of alterity consists of an “ethical vigilance” in order to distinguish what in Same is Other. (shrink)

Lévinas never clarified his method himself. This article is an attempt to account for such an omission and also for the non-classical notion of method as it was constructed. By observing the originality of the means by which this philosophy operates, we come to understand that phenomenology is a necessary beginning to perceive the essential ambiguity of phenomenon and the “trace” of alterity. But since this can only be an indicative process, Lévinas must find alternative means of justification, as new (...) forms of reduction. This contingency implies a notion of truth as testimony. The last stage in the method of alterity consists of an “ethical vigilance” in order to distinguish what in Same is Other. (shrink)

ABSTRACTEmmanuel Lévinas is unquestionably the philosopher of ethics par excellence. One of the major themes of his thought, or rather the key to understanding his work—work that spans over many fields—is one's responsibility toward the Other. This article attempts to reconsider this determining aspect of his writings from the perspective of contemporary individualism. We argue that Lévinas's ethics of responsibility in no way obliterates “the share of the Ego in the eminence of the Other.” On the contrary, in his approach (...) to otherness, he takes the Self entirely into account. In other words, our interpretation is that the commonly held view that Lévinas's philosophy consists of normative interpretation of the human condition leading to the sacrifice of the self is imputable to a misunderstanding caused by the polysemous and ambivalent character of the concept of individualism. (shrink)