As it has historically been the case with many pandemics, the Covid-19 experience will induce many philosophers to reconsider the value of medical practice. This should be a good opportunity to critically scrutinize the way medical research and medical interventions are carried out. For much of its history, medicine has been very inefficient. But, even in its contemporary forms, a review of common protocols in medical research and medical interventions reveal many shortcomings, especially related to methodological flaws, and more importantly, (...) conflicts of interests due to profit incentives. In the face of these problems, we propose a program of “gentle medicine”. This term, originally formulated by philosopher Jacob Stegenga, describes a form of medicine in which physicians intervene less than they currently do. As part of this general program, we advance a series of reform recommendations that could be enacted both by medical staff in their everyday practice, but also by public health officials and policymakers. (shrink)

The first part of this work analyses the universalist and the particularist conceptions of reasons. The second part projects this analysis to the legal domain. The author stresses that universalism and particularism regarding reasons are mutually exclusive theories linked to incompatible conceptions of norms, i.e. norms as strict universal conditionals and norms as defeasible conditionals. In giving an account of this tenet, different meanings of universality and defeasibility are explored. A parallel debate regarding reasons can be found in the legal (...) domain, where two contrasting categories of norms are usually distinguished: rules and principles. On this issue the author argues that the conception of legal reasons depends on the way in which this contrast between different kinds of legal norms is shaped. (shrink)

Incest taboos are universal, but it is questionable whether consensual incest should continue to be illegal. The most common argument in favor of the illegalization of consensual incest appeals to genetic risks and the harm to potential offspring. In this article, we examine whether public health concern is a sufficient reason to illegalize consensual incest. We posit that indeed, incest represents a risk, but this is not reason enough to illegalize incest. For, other circumstances of sexual intercourse may lead to (...) similar risks, and yet, such practices are not illegal. While those practices may represent an added risk to public health, to forbid them as a way to improve the genetic pool would be akin to eugenic program, and that is morally objectionable. This does not imply that consensual incest ought to be legal, for there may be other good reasons to illegalize it. But they do not relate to public health and genetic risks, and consequently, medical practitioners and public health officials ought to avoid using their medical authority as a platform to make moral pronouncements. (shrink)

En este trabajo analizo la concepción de Eugenio Bulygin respecto de aquellos enunciados jurídicos que afirman que una cierta acción es jurídicamente obligatoria, prohibida o permitida. Conforme a Bulygin, estos enunciados son ambiguos. Ellos pueden ser enunciados empíricos externos que afirman la existencia o validez de una norma, o pueden ser enunciados normativos internos que expresan una norma, o una actitud moral absoluta. En el trabajo sostengo que, para una concepción positivista, si el derecho es concebido como un conjunto de (...) normas, los enunciados bajo análisis no enuncian un hecho empírico, pero tampoco expresan una actitud moral absoluta. Ellos ciertamente enuncian un hecho normativo: la validez o existencia jurídica de una entidad normativa, que es relativa a un determinado tiempo y lugar. En mi opinión, la dificultad de Bulygin para admitir este tipo de enunciados se debe fundamentalmente a la presuposición de una falsa dicotomía entre dos modos en los que una entidad puede existir: uno empírico y otro normativo. Con el fin de criticar esta aparente dicotomía presento brevemente una concepción constructivista de la existencia de normas. Si mi razonamiento es correcto, esta concepción es adecuada para explicar, desde una perspectiva teórica positivista, aquellos enunciados que expresan el hecho normativo de la existencia o validez jurídica de una norma. In this paper I analyze Bulygin's conception of those legal statements asserting that a certain action is legally obligatory, prohibited or permitted. According to Bulygin, these statements are ambiguous. They can be external, empirical statements expressing the existence or validity of a legal norm, but they can also be internal, normative statements expressing a norm or an absolute, moral attitude. In the paper I attempt to defend that for a positivist theory, if law is conceived as a set of norms, this kind of statements do not report an empirical fact, but do not express an absolute moral attitude either. They surely assert a normative fact: the legal existence or validity of a normative entity, which is relative to a certain time and place. In my view, Bulygin's failure to see this point is fundamentally due to the assumption of a false dichotomy between two ways in which an entity can exist: one empirical, the other normative. In order to criticize this apparent dichotomy, I briefly sketch a constructivist conception in which we can say that legal norms exist. If my reasoning is correct, this conception is apt to explain those statements expressing the normative fact that a norm exists or is legally valid. (shrink)

En "Legal Reasons, Sources and Gaps", Raz señala que las lagunas jurídicas existen sólo cuando el derecho habla con voz incierta o cuando habla con muchas voces, pero que no hay lagunas cuando el derecho guarda silencio. En este último caso habría reglas de clausura, analíticamente verdaderas, que impiden la ocurrencia de esas lagunas. Según Raz, si hay una laguna en un sistema jurídico, entonces no es verdadero ni falso que exista una razón concluyente para ejecutar cierta acción. Así, una (...) de las contribuciones más importantes de Raz a la solución del problema de las lagunas jurídicas es subrayar que el discurso jurídico no está completamente controlado por la bivalencia. Sin embargo, a menudo se sostiene que el rechazo de la bivalencia conduce a contradicciones. Si esta afirmación fuese verdadera, entonces la solución de Raz al problema de las lagunas jurídicas se vería seriamente amenazada. En este artículo mostramos, con ayuda de una herramienta analítica sofisticada, i.e., la lógica de la verdad de G.H. von Wright, que el rechazo de la bivalencia sólo nos compromete a aceptar la conclusión trivial de que puede haber proposiciones que no son verdaderas ni falsas. Por esta razón, el trabajo de Raz todavía puede ser considerado un buen punto de partida para analizar las relaciones entre normas, razonamiento práctico y lagunas jurídicas. Sin embargo, también mostramos que para admitir proposiciones que no son verdaderas ni falsas, las tesis de Raz deben ser reformuladas. De otra manera, la tesis de que no existen lagunas cuando el derecho guarda silencio no sería compatible con el rechazo de la bivalencia. /// In his paper "Legal Reasons, Sources and Gaps", Raz says that legal gaps only exist when law speaks with uncertain voice or when it speaks with many voices, but there are no gaps when law is silent. In this later case, rules of closure, which are analytically true, prevent from the occurrence of gaps. According to Raz, if there is a gap in a legal system, then both the claim that there is a conclusive legal reason to perform a certain action, and its negation are neither true nor false. Therefore, one of the Raz's most important contributions to the solution of the problem of legal gaps is to remark that legal discourse is not altogether governed by the principie of bivalence. However, philosophers often claim that the denial of bivalence leads to a logical inconsistency. If this claim were true, then Raz's solution to the problem of gaps would be seriously threatened. In this paper we show--with the aid of a sophisticated analytical tool, i.e., von Wright's truth-logic--that the rejection of bivalence only commits us to accept the trivial conclusion that propositions can lack truth-values. For this reason, Raz's paper can still be regarded as a good starting-point for analyzing the relationships between norms, practical reasoning and legal gaps. However, we also show that in order to admit propositions which are neither true nor false, Raz's theses must be reformulated. Otherwise, the claim that there is no gap when law is silent would not be compatible with the rejection of bivalence. (shrink)

RESUMEN: Los cambios en la nueva concepción del Estado Democrático de Derecho que surgen a partir de la toma de conciencia de la existencia de determinados derechos que se consideran como fundamentales por la comunidad internacional, influyen de modo directo en el diseño de políticas públicas, de creación de normas jurídicas y en el modo de resolver los casos judiciales. Es así que se presenta a la Teoría Neoconstitucional como una nueva teoría del derecho que permite integrar los derechos con (...) sus respectivas garantías, y que se ocupa tanto de las normas como de los principios y los valores de Derechos Humanos y de su internalización en los ordenamientos de los Estados, es decir, se ocupa del fenómeno de mundialización de estos derechos. Dentro de los derechos fundamentales encontramos los que poseen las mujeres en lo que concierne a vivir una vida libre de toda violencia en la que se respete su dignidad y autonomía de la voluntad, amén de que los índices de violencia contra ellas aumentan día a día en todos los países del mundo. De este modo los Estados deberán cumplimentar con las medidas de acciones positivas tendientes a garantizar el efectivo goce de los derechos reconocidos por los Pactos internacionales de Derechos Humanos.ABSTRACT: The changes in the new conception of the Democratic State of Law that arise from the awareness of the existence of certain rights that are considered fundamental by the international community, have a direct influence on the design of public policies, the creation of legal norms and how to solve judicial cases. This is how the Neoconstitutional Theory is presented as a new theory of law that allows integrating rights with their respective guarantees, and that deals with both the norms and the principles and values of Human Rights and their internalization in the legal systems. of the States, that is, deals with the phenomenon of globalization of these rights. Within the fundamental rights we find those that women possess in what concerns to live a life free of all violence in which their dignity and autonomy of the will is respected, in addition to that the indices of violence against them increase every day in all the countries of the world. In this way, the States must comply with the measures of positive actions tending to guarantee the effective enjoyment of the rights recognized by the International Covenants on Human Rights.PALABRAS CLAVE: violencia, género, derechos humanos, neoconstitucionalismo, EstadosKEYWORDS: violence, gender, human rights, neoconstitutionalism, States. (shrink)

En el presente artículo se analizan cinco modos de entender el ideal de completitud de los sistemas jurídicos, teniendo como punto de referencia las ideas de Carlos Alchourrón. En este trabajo se propone distinguir los criterios de identificación de los textos jurídicamente relevantes; los métodos o reglas que permiten pasar de un contenido C a un contenido C1, y los criterios de validez o pertenencia de normas al sistema. En la concepción predominante entre los teóricos del derecho, las reglas lógicas (...) sirven para justificar el paso de un contenido a otro, sin embargo, no se admiten como criterios de pertenencia de normas al sistema jurídico. Esto significa que el derecho no es concebido como un sistema deductivo y que un ideal de completitud absoluta es lógicamente posible. En el trabajo se llega a la conclusión de que hay sólo dos formas no banales de entender el ideal de completitud absoluta de los sistemas jurídicos. O bien, en un espíritu formalista, mediante la introducción de reglas residuales de clausura o bien, en un espíritu moralista, aceptando que la moral crítica funcione como criterio de pertenencia al derecho. This paper analyses five different ways of understanding completeness as an ideal of legal systems. In doing so it essentially relies on the thesis discussed by Carlos Alchourrón regarding this subject. The paper stresses the need to distinguish the criteria for the identification of the legally relevant texts, the methods or rules that justify the passage from a content C to another content C1 and, the criteria for the identification of valid norms belonging to the system. According to the dominant conception in legal theory, the rules of logic justify the passage from a content to another; such rules, however, are not accepted as membership criteria. This means that the notion of system that legal theorists use to organize the law is not the notion of a deductive system. In this conception the ideal of absolute completeness is a logically possible ideal. The conclusion reached in the article is that there are only two ways of understanding the ideal of "plenitude" or absolute completeness of a legal system: in a formalist view, through the introduction of residual rules of closure, or, in a moralistic view, by accepting critical morality as a criterium for legal validity. (shrink)

This article is primarily focused on two interconnected discussions presented by John Gardner in Law as a Leap of Faith. The first one is related to the thesis which, according to Gardner, all positivists agree on; the second one is referred to the positivist’s position regarding the connection between law and morality. In order to address these issues I rely on the distinction between two kinds of criteria: the conceptual criteria and the validity criteria. On this basis, and against what (...) Gardner asserts, I try to defend two main ideas. Firstly, that the thesis on which all positivists agree is not one about the validity criteria that norms must satisfy in order to belong to a legal system, but rather one concerning the conceptual criteria delimiting the concept of law. By the same token, I argue that, according to the positivist understanding of the concept of law, there is no necessary connection between law and morality. (shrink)

Juan de Vera’s El Enbaxador (1620) was one of the main treatises on the role of the ambassador in Early Modern Europe and the first one published in Spanish. At the time, Spain was no exception to the influence of Tacitus as a significant ancient author to inspire the political practice of the age. Juan de Vera, a nobleman and writer, soon an ambassador and entitled count, incorporated his own reading of Tacitus into El Enbaxador. Justus Lipsius, the outstanding editor (...) of Tacitus’ works, was also a main source for this book which was defined by John Elliott as a ‘quintessentially Lipsian handbook for diplomats’. The focus of this article is on Tacitus’ citations in El Enbaxador and their contexts within the book. My aim is to identify the specific themes for which Tacitus served as an exemplary source of guidance according to this particular text. Notably, some of such themes pertain to ambassadorial affairs, while others are common political topics in Early Modern Europe. Vera's reading of Tacitus in El Enbaxador gained wider dissemination beyond Spain as the work was subsequently translated into French and Italian. (shrink)

In 1989, Thomas Donaldson requested the California courts to allow physicians to hasten his death. Donaldson had been diagnosed with brain cancer, and he desired to die in order to cryonically preserve his brain, so as to stop its further deterioration. This case elicits an important question: is this a case of euthanasia? In this article, we examine the traditional criteria of death, and contrast it with the information-theoretic criterion. If this criterion is accepted, we posit that Donaldson’s case would (...) have been cryocide, but not euthanasia. We then examine if cryocide is an ethically feasible alternative to euthanasia. To do so, we rely on the ethical doctrine of double effect. (shrink)