The purpose of this article is to consider an answer to the question whether Searle’s idea of sentence in a literary text is still relevant. Understanding literary utterances as specific speech acts, pretended illocutions, is inherent in the process of considering the sentence in a literary text in broader terms. Accordingly, it appears necessary to outline it. Reference to other ideas formulated both in the theory of literature as a speech act [R. Ohmann, S. Levin] as well as in logic, (...) ontology and the theory of literature [J. Pelc, H. Markiewicz, R. Ingarden] will render it possible to adequately place and assess Searle’s theory. Confronting Searle’s theory with the order in a literary work (the relation between the text and the literary work, the status of the presented world, the issue of reference and fiction) will in turn render it possible to determine how empirically adequate Searle’s theory is. (shrink)

„Książka dr Marzenny Cyzman stanowi na gruncie literaturoznawstwa współczesnego niezwykle cenne opracowanie problematyki badawczej, skupionej wokół teorii nazw własnych w dziele literackim. Choć autorka podejmuje głównie refleksję teoretyczną, nie brak w jej pracy znakomitej prezentacji materiału analitycznego w postaci przywoływanych przykładów artystycznej funkcjonalizacji nazw własnych w konkretnych utworach literackich". Z recenzji wydawniczej prof. Joanny Ślósarskiej, Katedra Teorii Literatury, Uniwersytet Łódzki „Praca dr Marzenny Cyzman należy do tego nurtu teorii literatury, który rozwija się w bliskim związku z filozofią. Dlatego sądzę, że (...) pracą będą zainteresowani nie tylko teoretycy literatury czy językoznawcy, ale i filozofowie, szczególnie zajmujący się filozofią języka i ontologią. Praca Pani dr Cyzman dostarcza bowiem ciekawej ontologicznie koncepcji antroponimów i to nie tylko z punktu widzenia ontologii dzieła literackiego, ale i samej ontologii, gdyż to w ontologii rozstrzyga się kwestie związane z istnieniem i naturą przedmiotów intencjonalnych, w tym fikcyjnych". Z recenzji wydawniczej prof. Urszuli Żegleń, Instytut Filozofii, Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika. (shrink)

PHILOSOPHY OF CHANGE — CHANGE IN PHILOSOPHY. REMARKS ON NON-DUALIZING PHILOSOPHY OF JOSEF MITTERER The present paper is aimed at a short presentation of the nondualizing way of speaking formulated by Josef Mitterer, the Austrian philosopher. In the first part I focus on metaphilosophical conception of the non-dualism which is assumed as alternative for the dualizing way of speaking (dominating not only in the philosophical discourses but also in ordinary acts of speech). According to the from-object-cognition (which is understood as (...) the option for traditional epistemology directed towards the object), there is no distinction between object and description. Thus, in the non-dualizing way of speaking, one speaks from the object, not about the object. This is impossible to present the object without a rudimentary description. As a consequence, the discourses are directed towards the change, not toward the truth (which is understood as the aim of the dualizng discourses). In the second part of the paper there is a short critique of Mitterer’s analyses, especially the notion of contingency and the notion of description. Assuming that one can formulate any kind of description from the object, Mitterer reaches the idea of anything goes which is unacceptable also from constructivist point of view (S. Fish’s notions, especially institutional nesting, are used in order to provide more acceptable solution: our conceptions are always based on pre-understandings and conventions). The notion of description, the central point of Mitterer’s deliberations, is involved in dualizing and this seems not to be the best way to present the different way of speaking. (shrink)