In this paper the role of incomprehensibility in the conceptualization of the DSM-IV definition of delusion is discussed. According to the analysis, the conceptual dependence of DSM-IV definition of delusion on incomprehensibility is manifested in several ways and infested with ambiguity. Definition of bizarre delusions is contradictory and gives room for two incompatible readings. Also the definition of delusion manifests internal inconsistencies and its tendency to account for delusions in terms of misinterpretation is bound to miss the content of the (...) traditional comprehension of delusionality. It is suggested that the ambiguities in defining delusions has to do with the question whether psychiatric practice is better accounted for in terms of the grammar of incorrectness or of incomprehensibility. (shrink)

The recent discussion in scientific psychiatry has paid increasing attention to the role of concepts of the person in psychiatric discourse. What are the uses of concepts of the person, such as self or person, in psychiatric discourse? Does describing these uses clarify the significance of conceptual and empirical elements in conceptions of mental illness? I try to answer these questions in a philosophically informed textual analysis of one representative psychiatric article. I conclude that concepts of the person are used (...) largely interchangeably in their various relevant meanings. The interplay between different uses of the concepts of the person allows us to conceptualize psychopathology and to conceive possibilities of overcoming this vague usage. My results underline the importance of a sensitivity to the ways concepts of the person are used in psychiatry and manifest the embeddedness of the language of psychopathology in everyday "person discourse.". (shrink)

This study in the philosophy of psychiatrydeals with the concept `psychosis'. Methodologicallyit follows Wittgenstein's proposal to `dissolve'philosophical problems by studying the actual use ofthe relevant concepts. Philosophical problemsconcerning both identification of psychosis and themeaning of this concept are pointed out. The logicaldependencies between `psychosis' and `understanding'and between `understanding' and the concept ofperson are demonstrated. Studying theinterdependence of these concepts in the light ofthe actual uses of `madness' shows how the use of`psychosis' implies a radical loss of understanding.The status and legitimacy (...) of `psychosis' as a psychiatric concept is then demonstrated. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 12.1 (2005) 25-26 [Access article in PDF] Past Personal Identity Markus L. A. Heinimaa Keywords consciousness, Freud, Locke, personal identity, self-understanding Schechtman's paper presents us with two lines of reasoning, which deserve separate discussion. First, she proposes a novel reading of John Locke's well-known discussion of personal identity and, second, she suggests a way of surmounting difficulties she sees both Lockean view and psychological continuity (...) theories have in dealing with the notion of nonconscious experiences.The criticism that she makes on contemporary theorists basing their view on Locke's work on personal identity (in terms of psychological continuity) seems by and large valid. Schechtman aptly points out that by concentrating on memory as the main constituent of personal identity, they are compelled to appeal to intuitions that are the very target of Locke's criticism (Schechtman 2005, 9) and she proposes that we should focus on Locke's original contention that consciousness is the unifying feature of personal identity. In her reading, this is spelled out as self-referential intelligibility, as capacity to understand oneself as a coherent "process." As far as I can see this description certainly gives a truer reading of Locke than a memory-based account.The second line of reasoning concerns the seeming dilemma she faces when accounting for "unconscious experiences" impact on personhood, as they clearly are "part of our psychological lives" (Schechtman 2005, 16). Here she suggests that developing "Locke's insight in a more satisfying way" is possible in terms of "self-understanding view." She points out how this experiential intelligibility is threatened by in everyday life prevalent bafflement on some of the feelings we have and acts we do. Following Descartes and Freud's examples, this (apparent) unintelligibility is dealt by hypothesizing unconscious "memories or desires or motivations," which then impact our "psychological lives."A question arises here: Is Schechtman's account of personal identity really threatened by the notion of "unconscious experience"? As I see it, a certain streak of psychologism in her writing makes her otherwise coherent account vulnerable in this respect. When assuming that "experiences of which we are not conscious can be a part of our psychological lives" (Schectman 2005, 16), she effectively equates being a person with "psychological being" or being a "psychological subject" (Schechtman 2005, 17). But what work is the notion "psychological" doing here? As far as I can see it, Schechtman could account for Lockean conception of "personal identity" in terms of "consciousness" solely in terms of "process of self-understanding." Of course psychological accounts of personal identity or consciousness are readily available, but the suggested description of the logic of these concepts does [End Page 25] not necessitate them—any such an account is in a sense extraneous to the logic of these concepts.What is suggested here does not basically contradict Schechtman's account of the relation of unconscious to personal identity but only suggests that this account is superfluous. Further, her (mainstream) reading of Freud misses some interesting features of Freud's problematic. In his paper "Psychoanalysis and the personal," Morris Eagle (1988) proposes interpreting Freud's distinction between conscious and unconscious psychological phenomena as the distinction between what is experienced as belonging to one's person and what is experienced as alien in this respect—in terms of "ownership and disownership of mental contents" (Eagle 1988, 92) and concludes that Freudian psychoanalytic theory can be read as being primarily concerned with the problems a person encounters in trying to keep his experience of himself as a person coherent.This reading of Freud has implications for Schechtman's reinterpretation of Locke's conception of personal identity as self-understanding, as the question on the impact of nonconscious phenomena on personal identity would seem to lose its significance here. A more deep going probing into the logic of the Freudian concept of unconscious would be warranted in this context.All in all, Schechtman's account of "personal identity" clearly moves into a sound direction. Yet, one could focus even more closely on Locke's original work and ask about the... (shrink)