L’esigenza di conferire alla filosofia lo status di scienza per il tramite della forma sistematica è una delle caratteristiche principali dell’idealismo tedesco e, conseguentemente, una peculiarità ravvisabile nella filosofia e di Kant e di Hegel. Il presente contributo mira precisamente a comparare il sistema della ragione kantiano e hegeliano, al fine di metterne in luce gli elementi teoretici distintivi. In tal modo, sarà possibile rilevare non solo l’influsso esercitato dal filosofo di Königsberg sul pensatore di Stoccarda, ma anche l’originalità con (...) la quale il secondo assimila l’istanza sistematica del primo. In particolare, la tesi che si intende sostenere è la seguente: laddove per Kant, in ultima analisi, la dimensione morale è necessaria al fine di realizzare il sistema della ragione, per Hegel è fondamentale la dimensione teoretica, ovvero quella logica-concettuale. (shrink)

The problem of the nature of probability laws in physics is a central one from the epistemologic point of view : perhaps the most central one for twentieth century physics, if we consider, on the one hand, the harsh debates to which it has given rise in the recent past (left unconcluded by the protagonists and most often by their successors) and the vagueness of the answers which are generally proposed by contemporary physicists when asked about this problem ; and, (...) on the other hand, the perspectives of theoretical physics as it is developing under our eyes in the various domains - and, perhaps above all, in the "frontier" domains such as particle symmetry fields and cosmology, or, differently, dynamics of continuous media, turbulences and chaos, where probability is a - if not the - fundamental concept. (shrink)

While ancient civilizations worshipped strong, active emotions, modern societies have favored more peaceful attitudes, especially within the democratic process. We have largely forgotten the struggle to make use of _thymos_, the part of the soul that, following Plato, contains spirit, pride, and indignation. Rather, Christianity and psychoanalysis have promoted mutual understanding to overcome conflict. Through unique examples, Peter Sloterdijk, the preeminent posthumanist, argues exactly the opposite, showing how the history of Western civilization can be read as a suppression and return (...) of rage. By way of reinterpreting the _Iliad_, Alexandre Dumas's _Count of Monte Cristo_, and recent Islamic political riots in Paris, Sloterdijk proves the fallacy that rage is an emotion capable of control. Global terrorism and economic frustrations have rendered strong emotions visibly resurgent, and the consequences of violent outbursts will determine international relations for decades to come. To better respond to rage and its complexity, Sloterdijk daringly breaks with entrenched dogma and contructs a new theory for confronting conflict. His approach acknowledges and respects the proper place of rage and channels it into productive political struggle. (shrink)

pt. I. Matter: 1. Philosophy as worldview ; 2. Classical matter: bodies and fields ; 3. Quantum matter: weird but real ; 4. General concept of matter: to be is to become ; 5. Emergence and levels ; 6. Naturalism ; 7. Materialism -- pt. II. Mind: 8. The mind-body problem ; 9. Minding matter: the plastic brain ; 10. Mind and society ; 11. Cognition, consciousness, and free will ; 12. Brain and computer: the hardware/software dualism ; 13. Knowledge: (...) genuine and bogus -- pt. III. Appendices: 14. Appendix A: Objects ; 15. Appendix B. Truths. (shrink)

A idéia da “universalidade da ciência” é objeto, nos debates atuais, de posições muito opostas, que dependem de o ponto de vista ser o de uma “ciência ideal” ou aquele da “produção social das ciências”. No primeiro caso, a ciência é concebida como o “núcleo duro” de suas proposições e de seus resultados na época considerada, e sua suposta universalidade igno­ra os fatores que tornam relativos seus conteúdos de conhecimento e que podem ser tanto de natureza conceitual como social. Inversamente, (...) uma atenção exclusiva com os aspectos so­ciais da produção dos conhecimentos científicos ignora o caráter objetivo daqueles conteúdos de conhecimento, que tanto tratam dos objetos do pensamento, como aqueles da matemática, quanto dos fenômenos do mundo real, sejam psicobiológicos, sejam humanos e sociais. Essas duas posições extremas, caricaturais e, entretanto, freqüentemente encontradas ilustram a ausência ou o desconhecimento de análises interdisciplinares entre a filosofia, a ciência e a história da ciência. Consideraremos inicialmente alguns elementos das críticas que são feitas à universalidade da ciência, tal como a entendemos hoje, e que provêm da filosofia do conhecimento, sociologia do conhecimento, história da ciência, história e antropologia. Tentaremos, então, estabelecer o problema da universalidade da ciência como uma idéia filosófica intimamente vinculada à ciência e à filosofia, desde sua gênese. Através das diferentes etapas da história do pensamento, confrontaremos o enunciado filosófico da universalidade da ciência com a realidade histórica da produção, difusão e assimilação ou apropriação do conhecimento científico concebido segundo suas diferentes dimensões, incluindo suas aplicações e suas ligações com a técnica e a tecnologia. (shrink)

Il semble que la science, au sens de l'activité des scientifiques, ne soit pas vraiment la même que celles dont s'occupent, chacune de leur coté, la réflexion philosophique et la recherche historique. Les scientifiques eux-mêmes ne sont pas toujours sensibles au lien que leur travail entretient avec la philosophie et avec l'histoire des sciences, bien qu'il concerne des significations et soit en situation d'état provisoire, entre une connaissance passée et des développements ou des interprétations futures. Cependant, les leçons de la (...) découverte et du travail scientifique, telles que ceux-ci se révèlent à travers la formulation par Einstein de la théorie de la relativité restreinte, cas étudié ici à titre d'exemple, montrent les rapports réciproques et nécessaires entre ces diverses dimensions de ce qu'on appelle la science. Cette mise en relation permet d'aborder d'une manière renouvelée certains problèmes ou certaines apories traditionnelles de la pensée de la connaissance scientifique. (shrink)

Les notions ou catégories de causalité et de déterminisme ont accompagné la formation des sciences modernes, et en premier lieu celle de la physique. L'usage courant de nos jours tend souvent, à tort, à les confondre, dans les remises en cause qui en sont faites en physique même. Nous nous proposons, dans ce travail, de clarifier la première de ces notions, plus exactement la causalité physique, en suivant son élaboration avec les débuts de la dynamique, à travers ses premières mises (...) en œuvre et conceptualisations qui accompagnent la mathématisation de la mécanique, avant d'être étendue à la physique d'une manière générale. Nous verrons comment, tout en s'appuyant sur l'un des aspects philosophiques traditionnels de l'idée de causalité (celui de « cause efficiente »), la causalité physique s'établit en rupture avec le sens métaphysique qui lui était précédemment attaché. Bien plutôt que dans les Principia de Newton, c'est dans la ré-élaboration par d'Alembert, dans son Traité de dynamique, des lois du mouvement formulés comme des principes, et exprimées par le calcul différentiel, que l'idée de causalité physique est expressément considérée indissociablement de son effet, qui est le changement de mouvement. Les pensées respectives de Newton et de d'Alembert sur les notions de cause et de force sont à cet égard en opposition en ce qui concerne la nature proprement physique de ce changement, considéré par d'Alembert comme immanent au mouvement, selon la cause circonscrite par son effet, alors qu'il reste mathématique et métaphysique dans la conception newtonienne de la force externe, comme substitut mathématique des causes, telle qu'elle se proposait avant Lagrange. C'est la conception physique, héritée de d'Alembert, qui devait par la suite prévaloir, à travers la mécanique analytique lagrangienne, qui permettait de réintégrer physiquement et rationnellement le concept de force dans sa transcription eulérienne différentielle. Les avatars ultérieurs de la notion de causalité, qui comprennent la causalité relativiste et les développements sur le déterminisme, font l'objet d'un travail complémentaire. (shrink)

RésuméDe l'delimination des causes finales par la mathématisation de la physique à l'hypothèse de Kant‐Laplace sur la formation du système solaire, puis au développement des sciences de la vie qui déterminent un nouveau champ de rationalité, le théme de la création au 18ème siècle est parti‐culièrement apte a manifester l'évolution des rapports entre sciences, philosophie et métaphysique, jusqu'à son progressif effacement dans des philosophies aussi differentes que celles de Diderot, Hume et Kant.

It is generally argued that if the wave-function in the de Broglie–Bohm theory is a physical field, it must be a field in configuration space. Nevertheless, it is possible to interpret the wave-function as a multi-field in three-dimensional space. This approach hasn’t received the attention yet it really deserves. The aim of this paper is threefold: first, we show that the wave-function is naturally and straightforwardly construed as a multi-field; second, we show why this interpretation is superior to other interpretations (...) discussed in the literature; third, we clarify common misconceptions. (shrink)

Classical philosophical Daoism as it is expressed in the Dao-De-Jing and the Zhuang-Zi is often interpreted as lacking a capacity for critique and resistance. Since these capacities are taken to be central components of Enlightenment reason and action, it would follow that Daoism is incompatible with Enlightenment. This interpretation is being refuted by way of developing a constructive dialogue between the enlightenment traditions of critical theory and recent philosophy of action from a Daoist perspective. Daoism's normative naturalism does neither rest (...) on a primitivist call for a return to the past, nor does it suggest future-directed activism. By way of reconstructing its descriptive, explanatory and emancipatory dimensions, it is shown that Daoism constitutes an alternative form of critical theory. In contrast to future-directed purposive action or blind rule-following, Daoism's key normative concept of "wu-wei" emphasizes effortless non-calculative responsiveness in the present. Drawing on recent insights in the philosophy of action, a reconstruction of wu-wei allows to conceive of a promising form of emancipatory agency. (shrink)

Let R be an o-minimal expansion of an ordered group R has no poles, R cannot define a real closed field with domain R and order R is eventually linear and every R -definable set is a finite union of cones. As a corollary we get that Th has quantifier elimination and universal axiomatization in the language with symbols for the ordered group operations, bounded R -definable sets and a symbol for each definable endomorphism of the group.

I want to combine two hitherto largely independent research projects, scientific understanding and mechanistic explanations. Understanding is not only achieved by answering why-questions, that is, by providing scientific explanations, but also by answering what-questions, that is, by providing what I call scientific descriptions. Based on this distinction, I develop three forms of understanding: understanding-what, understanding-why, and understanding-how. I argue that understanding-how is a particularly deep form of understanding, because it is based on mechanistic explanations, which answer why something happens in (...) virtue of what it is made of. I apply the three forms of understanding to two case studies: first, to the historical development of thermodynamics and, second, to the differences between the Clausius and the Boltzmann entropy in explaining thermodynamic processes. (shrink)

The ontological models framework distinguishes ψ-ontic from ψ-epistemic wave- functions. It is, in general, quite straightforward to categorize the wave-function of a certain quantum theory. Nevertheless, there has been a debate about the ontological status of the wave-function in the statistical interpretation of quantum mechanics: is it ψ-epistemic and incomplete or ψ-ontic and complete? I will argue that the wave- function in this interpretation is best regarded as ψ-ontic and incomplete.

Philosophers now seem to agree that frequentism is an untenable strategy to explain the meaning of probabilities. Nevertheless, I want to revive frequentism, and I will do so by grounding probabilities on typicality in the same way as the thermodynamic arrow of time can be grounded on typicality within statistical mechanics. This account, which I will call typicality frequentism, will evade the major criticisms raised against previous forms of frequentism. In this theory, probabilities arise within a physical theory from statistical (...) behavior of almost all initial conditions. The main advantage of typicality frequentism is that it shows which kinds of probabilities (that also have empirical relevance) can be derived from physics. Although one cannot recover all probability talk in this account, this is rather a virtue than a vice, because it shows which types of probabilities can in fact arise from physics and which types need to be explained in different ways, thereby opening the path for a pluralistic account of probabilities. (shrink)

What does it take to understand a phenomenon ideally, or to the highest conceivable extent? In this paper, we answer this question by arguing for five necessary conditions for ideal understanding: (i) representational accuracy, (ii) intelligibility, (iii) truth, (iv) reasonable endorsement, and (v) fitting. Even if one disagrees that there is some form of ideal understanding, these five conditions can be regarded as sufficient conditions for a particularly deep level of understanding. We then argue that grasping, novel predictions, and transparency (...) are not reasonable conditions for ideal understanding. (shrink)

Suppose G is a definably connected, definable group in an o-minimal expansion of an ordered group. We show that the o-minimal universal covering homomorphism equation image: equation image→ G is a locally definable covering homomorphism and π1 is isomorphic to the o-minimal fundamental group π of G defined using locally definable covering homomorphisms.

Building on an illustrative case of a systemic environmental threat and its multi‐stakeholder response, this paper draws attention to the changing political impacts of corporations in the digital age. Political Corporate Social Responsibility (PCSR) theory suggests an expanded sense of politics and corporations, including impacts that may range from voluntary initiatives to overcome governance gaps, to avoiding state regulation via corporate political activity. Considering digitalization as a stimulus, we explore potential responsibilities of corporations toward public goods in contexts with functioning (...) governments. We show that digitalization—in the form of transparency, surveillance, and data‐sharing—offers corporations’ scope for deliberative public participation. The starry sky beetle infestation endangering public and private goods is thereby used to illustrate the possibility of expanding the political role of corporations in the digital sphere. We offer a contribution by conceptualizing data‐deliberation as a Habermasian variation of PCSR, defined as the (a) voluntary disclosure of corporate data and its transparent, open sharing with the public sector (b) along with the cooperation with governmental institutions on data analytics methods for examining large‐scale datasets (c) thereby complying with existing national and international regulations on data protection, in particular with respect to privacy and personal data. (shrink)

We argue that the asymmetry between diverging and converging electromagnetic waves is just one of many asymmetries in observed phenomena that can be explained by a past hypothesis and statistical postulate (together assigning probabilities to different states of matter and field in the early universe). The arrow of electromagnetic radiation is thus absorbed into a broader account of temporal asymmetries in nature. We give an accessible introduction to the problem of explaining the arrow of radiation and compare our preferred strategy (...) for explaining the arrow to three alternatives: (i) modifying the laws of electromagnetism by adding a radiation condition requiring that electromagnetic fields always be attributable to past sources, (ii) removing electromagnetic fields and having particles interact directly with one another through retarded action-at-a-distance, (iii) adopting the Wheeler-Feynman approach and having particles interact directly through half-retarded half-advanced action-at-a-distance. In addition to the asymmetry between diverging and converging waves, we also consider the related asymmetry of radiation reaction. (shrink)

Philosophy is sometimes perceived as an abstract and nerdy discipline dealing with problems of its own creation in an isolated chamber of the Ivory Tower. And there is some truth to this view. But philosophy can help us deal with common problems, such as the disagreements we have in our everyday lives.

Contributed reserach papers on theory of knowledge in Indian philosophy, presented at seminar organized by Rashtriya Sanskrit Sansthan, Srisadasiva Campus, Orissa.

This volume has 41 chapters written to honor the 100th birthday of Mario Bunge. It celebrates the work of this influential Argentine/Canadian physicist and philosopher. Contributions show the value of Bunge’s science-informed philosophy and his systematic approach to philosophical problems. The chapters explore the exceptionally wide spectrum of Bunge’s contributions to: metaphysics, methodology and philosophy of science, philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of physics, philosophy of psychology, philosophy of social science, philosophy of biology, philosophy of technology, moral philosophy, social and (...) political philosophy, medical philosophy, and education. The contributors include scholars from 16 countries. Bunge combines ontological realism with epistemological fallibilism. He believes that science provides the best and most warranted knowledge of the natural and social world, and that such knowledge is the only sound basis for moral decision making and social and political reform. Bunge argues for the unity of knowledge. In his eyes, science and philosophy constitute a fruitful and necessary partnership. Readers will discover the wisdom of this approach and will gain insight into the utility of cross-disciplinary scholarship. This anthology will appeal to researchers, students, and teachers in philosophy of science, social science, and liberal education programmes. 1. Introduction Section I. An Academic Vocation Section II. Philosophy Section III. Physics and Philosophy of Physics Section IV. Cognitive Science and Philosophy of Mind Section V. Sociology and Social Theory Section VI. Ethics and Political Philosophy Section VII. Biology and Philosophy of Biology Section VIII. Mathematics Section IX. Education Section X. Varia Section XI. Bibliography. (shrink)

When modeling informal proofs like that of Euclid’s Elements using a sound logical system, we go from proofs seen as somewhat unrigorous – even having gaps to be filled – to rigorous proofs. However, metalogic grounds the soundness of our logical system, and proofs in metalogic are not like formal proofs and look suspiciously like the informal proofs. This brings about what I am calling here the groundedness problem: how can we decide with certainty that our metalogical proofs are rigorous (...) and sustain our logical system? In this paper, I will expose this problem. I will not try to solve it here. (shrink)

Deployment Realism resists Laudan’s and Lyons’ objections to the “No Miracle Argument” by arguing that a hypothesis is most probably true when it is deployed essentially in a novel prediction. However, Lyons criticized Psillos’ criterion of essentiality, maintaining that Deployment Realism should be committed to all the actually deployed assumptions. But since many actually deployed assumptions proved false, he concludes that the No Miracle Argument and Deployment Realism fail. I reply that the essentiality condition is required by Occam’s razor. In (...) fact, there is a simpler formulation of essentiality which escapes Lyons’ criticisms and rescues the No Miracle Argument and Deployment Realism from their purported historical counterexamples: a hypothesis is essential when it has no proper parts (in Yablo’s sense) sufficient to derive the same prediction. Although essentiality so conceived cannot be detected prospectively, this is just natural, and it is not a problem but an advantage for Deployment Realism. (shrink)

This paper examines the view of ethical language that Wittgenstein took in later years. It argues that according to this view, ethics falls into place as a part of our natural history, while every sense of the mystical or supernatural that once surrounded it is irrevocably lost. Moreover, Wittgenstein argues that ethical language does not correspond to reality “in the way” in which a physical theory does. I propose an interpretation of this claim that shows how it sets his view (...) apart from a “realist” theory of ethics. The reality of which he speaks is the reality of human life. (shrink)

Predictivists use the no miracle argument to argue that “novel” predictions are decisive evidence for theories, while mere accommodation of “old” data cannot confirm to a significant degree. But deductivists claim that since confirmation is a logical theory-data relationship, predicted data cannot confirm more than merely deduced data, and cite historical cases in which known data confirmed theories quite strongly. On the other hand, the advantage of prediction over accommodation is needed by scientific realists to resist Laudan’s criticisms of the (...) no miracle argument. So, if the deductivists are right, the most powerful argument for realism collapses. There seems to be an inescapable contradiction between these prima facie plausible arguments of predictivists and deductivists; but this puzzle can be solved by understanding what exactly counts as novelty, if novel predictions must support the no miracle argument, i.e., if they must be explainable only by the truth of theories. Taking my cues from the use-novelty tradition, I argue that (1) the predicted data must not be used essentially in building the theory or choosing the auxiliary assumptions. This is possible if the theory and its auxiliary assumptions are plausible independently of the predicted data, and I analyze the consequences of this requirement in terms of best explanation of diverse bodies of data. Moreover, the predicted data must be (2) a priori improbable, and (3) heterogeneous to the essentially used data. My proposed notion of novelty, therefore, is not historical, but functional. Hence, deductivists are right that confirmation is independent of time and of historical contingencies such as if the theorist knew a datum, used it, or intended to accommodate it. Predictivists, however, are right that not all consequences confirm equally, and confirmation is not purely a logical theory-data relation, as it crucially involves background epistemic conditions and the notion of best explanation. Conditions (1)–(3) make the difference between prediction and accommodation, and account for the confirming power of theoretical virtues such as non ad-hocness, non-fudging, non-overfitting, independence and consilience. I thus show that functional novelty (a) avoids the deductivist objections to predictivism, (b) is a gradual notion, in accordance with the common intuition that confirmation comes in degrees, and (c) supports the no miracle argument, so vindicating scientific realism. (shrink)

This paper seeks to establish whether the categories of MacIntyrean virtue ethics as applied to business organizations are meaningful in a non-western business context. It does so by building on research reported in Moore : 363–387, 2012) in which the application of virtue ethics to business organizations was investigated empirically in the UK, based on a conceptual framework drawn from MacIntyre’s work. Comparing these results with an equivalent study in Sri Lanka, the paper finds that the categories are meaningful but (...) that there are both similarities to and considerable differences in the content of these categories from the UK study. The paper draws on aspects of institutional theory to explore and explain these findings. Overall, there is supportive evidence that the categories of MacIntyrean virtue ethics are generalizable, and so can be used to characterize problems of organizational virtue and vice around the world, while providing evidence that there may be polities which are more conducive to the ‘practice-like conduct of production’ : 77–91, 2008). (shrink)