Leonid Pitamic was convinced that law could not be understood and explored by a single method aiming at a pure object of enquiry. He argued that it was necessary to employ other methods besides the normative one (especially the sociological and axiological methods), which, however, should not be confounded. Methodological syncretism can be avoided by clearly distinguishing between different aspects of law and by allowing the methods to support each other. By following this guideline, and by arguing according to a (...) clear method, we can also open up a space for dialogue and for the juxtaposition of contrasting points of view. (shrink)

English summary: The degree of law will determine how goods are distributed and balanced in legal relationships. The selected essays take up the question of how to understand law, and especially how to behave within the extent of the law. The lawyer is always confronted with the righteousness within and of the law. Justice within the law is not his work. If the lawyer is not satisfied with this kind of justice, he can respond as a moral personality. Justice before (...) the law offers some leeway in which one can make decisions. Therein lies the appeal of the work of the lawyer, and also his considerable responsibility. The legal decision is closely related to legal ethics. This builds on solid traditional values, which must necessarily expand in terms of affairs of time and space, as well as towards the responsibility of future generations. The German and English writings reprinted here are divided into six groups: (I) The equitable allocation as the core of law, (II) probation of law and rule of law, (III) responsible legal decisionmaking, (IV) the correlativity of justice, (V) dialogical nature of jurisprudence, and (VI) from the Slovenian tradition of thought. German and English text. German description: Vom Mass des Rechts hangt es ab, wie die Gueter und Lasten in Rechtverhaltnissen verteilt und ausgeglichen werden. Die ausgewahlten Abhandlungen stellen sich der Frage, wie man Recht verstehen soll - und besonders, wie man sich gegenueber dem Mass des Rechts verhalten soll.Der Jurist ist immer mit der Gerechtigkeit im Gesetz und vor dem Gesetz konfrontiert. Die Gerechtigkeit im Gesetz ist nicht sein Werk. Wenn der Jurist mit dieser Art der Gerechtigkeit nicht einverstanden ist, kann er als Moralpersonlichkeit reagieren. Die Gerechtigkeit vor dem Gesetz bietet einen Spielraum, in dem man Entscheidungen trifft. Darin liegt der Reiz der Arbeit des Juristen und auch seine betrachtliche Verantwortung.Das juristische Entscheiden ist eng mit der Rechtsethik verbunden. Diese baut auf einer festen Wertetradition auf, die sie notwendigerweise im Hinblick auf das Zeit- und Raumgeschehen und auf die Verantwortung gegenueber kuenftigen Generationen erganzen und ausbauen muss.Die hier wieder abgedruckten deutschen und englischen Schriften sind in sechs Gruppen unterteilt: (I) Die gerechte Zurechnung als Kern des Rechts, (II) Bewahrung von Recht und Rechtsstaatlichkeit, (III) Verantwortliches Rechtsentscheiden, (IV) Die Korrelativitat des Rechts, (V) Dialogische Natur der Jurisprudenz und (VI) Aus der slowenischen Denktradition. (shrink)

Law is a system of legal rules and legal principles. The distinction between them is a relative one. Always such definite major and minor premises are to be formed that the case can be subsumed under the rule and a conclusion, which includes the decision, can be drawn. This applies to legal principles that are operationalised by legal rules as well as to statutory forms of legal rules, which are often open as to their meaning and/or contain definitions that comprise (...) elements of principles. The basic characteristic of legal principles is that they are value measures directing the definition of legal rules as to their contents, the understanding of the rules, and the manner of their application. Legal principles aim at a goal, have weight, and define the scope of the meaning within which the legal rules move. The operationalisation of legal principles is the _ratio decidendi_ that the court has to achieve in order to be able to decide in a concrete case. Legal principles live through the rules that are the reasons for the decision in a concrete case. New cases can be solved by a new operationalisation of legal principles or by analogous application of precedents if the new cases, in their essential elements, correspond to cases that have already been decided. (shrink)

The basic question is whether and in what sense it is possible to speak about gaps in the law. If we disagree with Kelsen’s thesis that the nature of gaps in the law is that of an ideological formula, then we have to define them legally and to find the criteria regarding how they can be filled. It is also important that incompletenesses as regards contents - Hart treats them as “open texture” - are organic parts of laws. The Slovene (...) Courts Act is in accord with this thesis and for that very reason provides - the provision was written by the author of this paper - that “the judge has to decide in such a way as if he had in front of him an indefinite number of equal cases”. (shrink)