The author discusses Aristotle’s notion of deliberation and shows that it differs considerably from the model of deliberation as is common in contemporary discussions of free will and moral responsibility. As opposed to the contemporary model, Aristotle’s account does not require that the deliberator has any belief (or lack thereof) concerning the availability of possible courses of action. However, the action chosen by deliberation, before it is performed, is still contingent––i.e. such that it can both be and not be done––and (...) up to us. Moreover, the action’s being up to us can be seen as grounded in our having rational capacities that are necessarily two-sided. This might suggest that the agent can do otherwise than she has decided by deliberation. The author argues that this is not the case: after deliberation, or after forming the relevant desire, the agent can actualize only one arm of her two-sided capacity, and hence, she cannot act differently than as decided by deliberation. If it makes sense to say that she can act differently, it is only because there may occur, in the interval between deliberation and action, some other desire which takes over a role of the decisive factor. (shrink)

Esse artigo examina a crítica de Hans Jonas à utopia marxista, questionando os limites ecológicos existentes para se atingir o ideal de uma sociedade de abundância e afirma que sua concepção de uma vida módica e respeitadora daqueles limites coincide com as tendências e propostas mais avançadas que surgiram nos últimos tempos como alternativas ao crescimento e ao desenvolvimento.

In diesem aufsatz erortert der verfasser die grundlegenden heideggerschen begriffe der "befindlichkeit" und des "verstehens," und auf diese weise bestimmt er sein eigenes verhaltnis zu heidegger. ausgehend von der heideggerschen these uber die destruktion der metaphysik stellt er in diesem zusammenhang die frage nach der destruktion dieser destruktion, namlich der destruktion der vernunft-losigkeit der moderne, um dadurch eine neue stellung zur philosophie und ihrer tradition zu gewinnen.

Leonid Pitamic was convinced that law could not be understood and explored by a single method aiming at a pure object of enquiry. He argued that it was necessary to employ other methods besides the normative one (especially the sociological and axiological methods), which, however, should not be confounded. Methodological syncretism can be avoided by clearly distinguishing between different aspects of law and by allowing the methods to support each other. By following this guideline, and by arguing according to a (...) clear method, we can also open up a space for dialogue and for the juxtaposition of contrasting points of view. (shrink)

English summary: The degree of law will determine how goods are distributed and balanced in legal relationships. The selected essays take up the question of how to understand law, and especially how to behave within the extent of the law. The lawyer is always confronted with the righteousness within and of the law. Justice within the law is not his work. If the lawyer is not satisfied with this kind of justice, he can respond as a moral personality. Justice before (...) the law offers some leeway in which one can make decisions. Therein lies the appeal of the work of the lawyer, and also his considerable responsibility. The legal decision is closely related to legal ethics. This builds on solid traditional values, which must necessarily expand in terms of affairs of time and space, as well as towards the responsibility of future generations. The German and English writings reprinted here are divided into six groups: (I) The equitable allocation as the core of law, (II) probation of law and rule of law, (III) responsible legal decisionmaking, (IV) the correlativity of justice, (V) dialogical nature of jurisprudence, and (VI) from the Slovenian tradition of thought. German and English text. German description: Vom Mass des Rechts hangt es ab, wie die Gueter und Lasten in Rechtverhaltnissen verteilt und ausgeglichen werden. Die ausgewahlten Abhandlungen stellen sich der Frage, wie man Recht verstehen soll - und besonders, wie man sich gegenueber dem Mass des Rechts verhalten soll.Der Jurist ist immer mit der Gerechtigkeit im Gesetz und vor dem Gesetz konfrontiert. Die Gerechtigkeit im Gesetz ist nicht sein Werk. Wenn der Jurist mit dieser Art der Gerechtigkeit nicht einverstanden ist, kann er als Moralpersonlichkeit reagieren. Die Gerechtigkeit vor dem Gesetz bietet einen Spielraum, in dem man Entscheidungen trifft. Darin liegt der Reiz der Arbeit des Juristen und auch seine betrachtliche Verantwortung.Das juristische Entscheiden ist eng mit der Rechtsethik verbunden. Diese baut auf einer festen Wertetradition auf, die sie notwendigerweise im Hinblick auf das Zeit- und Raumgeschehen und auf die Verantwortung gegenueber kuenftigen Generationen erganzen und ausbauen muss.Die hier wieder abgedruckten deutschen und englischen Schriften sind in sechs Gruppen unterteilt: (I) Die gerechte Zurechnung als Kern des Rechts, (II) Bewahrung von Recht und Rechtsstaatlichkeit, (III) Verantwortliches Rechtsentscheiden, (IV) Die Korrelativitat des Rechts, (V) Dialogische Natur der Jurisprudenz und (VI) Aus der slowenischen Denktradition. (shrink)

In this paper I take a closer look at Sextus Empiricus’ arguments in his Outlines of Pyrrhonism I.25-30 and try to make sense of his account of Skepticism as a goal-directed philosophy. I argue that Sextus fails to mount a convincing case for the view that tranquility, rather than suspension of judgment, is the ultimate goal of his inquiries.

Karen McCarthy Brown Mama Lola:. Vodou Priestess in Brooklyn Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991. ISBN 0‐520‐07073‐9. Hardcover, $24.95. Pp. x+405.

U ovom članku raspravljamo o hipotezi proširenog jastva Andyja Clarka i Davida Chalmersa, a osobito o prigovoru prema kojemu proširenom jastvu nedostaje stabilnost i kontinuitet koji su potrebni da bismo ga smatrali identičnim kroz vrijeme. Pokušavamo pokazati da je taj prigovor neodrživ. Raspravljamo i o gledištu prema kojemu se drugi tip jastva, to jest narativno jastvo, također može shvatiti kao prošireno, i tvrdimo da stabilnost i kontinuitet toga tipa jastva također nisu ugroženi ako ga proširimo izvan granica čovjekova tijela. Stoga, (...) barem što se tiče tih tipova jastva, kada razmišljamo o problemima osobnog identiteta, nije potrebno ograničiti se na internalizirano jastvo. (shrink)

Sextus Empiricus portrays the Pyrrhonian sceptics in two radically different ways. On the one hand, he describes them as inquirers or examiners, and insists that what distinguishes them from all the other philosophical schools is their persistent engagement in inquiry. On the other hand, he insists that the main feature of Pyrrhonian attitude is suspension of judgement about everything. Many have argued that a consistent account of Sextan scepticism as both investigative and suspensive is not possible. The main obstacle to (...) characterizing Pyrrhonism as both investigative and suspensive is the fact that it seems that the mature sceptics, after they have suspended judgement and thus reached tranquillity, have no motivation for further inquiry. Any inquiry they seem to be interested in after they have suspended judgement is the refutation of beliefs needed for maintaining tranquillity. I try to show that the mature sceptics' removal of distress does not ipso facto mean removal of the desire for knowledge. This is because distress is not just a matter of unsatisfied desire, but of belief that one of the opposed appearances must be true, or, more generally, of belief that the truth is the only worthwhile epistemic goal. Having abandoned this belief, the sceptics can still engage in philosophical inquiries. This is because Sextus does not assume that philosophy is the search for truth: it is so only for the dogmatists. In a more general sense, applicable to the sceptics as well, philosophy is just an inquiry into certain things, and for the sceptics, its epistemic goal is still open. (shrink)

Law is a system of legal rules and legal principles. The distinction between them is a relative one. Always such definite major and minor premises are to be formed that the case can be subsumed under the rule and a conclusion, which includes the decision, can be drawn. This applies to legal principles that are operationalised by legal rules as well as to statutory forms of legal rules, which are often open as to their meaning and/or contain definitions that comprise (...) elements of principles. The basic characteristic of legal principles is that they are value measures directing the definition of legal rules as to their contents, the understanding of the rules, and the manner of their application. Legal principles aim at a goal, have weight, and define the scope of the meaning within which the legal rules move. The operationalisation of legal principles is the _ratio decidendi_ that the court has to achieve in order to be able to decide in a concrete case. Legal principles live through the rules that are the reasons for the decision in a concrete case. New cases can be solved by a new operationalisation of legal principles or by analogous application of precedents if the new cases, in their essential elements, correspond to cases that have already been decided. (shrink)

The basic question is whether and in what sense it is possible to speak about gaps in the law. If we disagree with Kelsen’s thesis that the nature of gaps in the law is that of an ideological formula, then we have to define them legally and to find the criteria regarding how they can be filled. It is also important that incompletenesses as regards contents - Hart treats them as “open texture” - are organic parts of laws. The Slovene (...) Courts Act is in accord with this thesis and for that very reason provides - the provision was written by the author of this paper - that “the judge has to decide in such a way as if he had in front of him an indefinite number of equal cases”. (shrink)

This paper is a discussion of Aristotle’s account of actions that come about because of ignorance as found in his Nicomachean Ethics 3.1. I argue that such actions do not originate in the agent, bu...

This paper is an analysis of Aristotle's "Nicomachean Ethics 7.3." Aristotle's discussion in this chapter is motivated by the Socratic doctrine, elaborated in Plato's "Protagoras," according to which it is impossible to know what is good and act against this knowledge. Aristotle wants to rebut this doctrine and show that there is a sense of "know" such that this is possible. I argue that this is all that he wants to do in EN 7.3, and that his discussion is not (...) meant to provide an explanation of akrasia, as is usually supposed by commentators. Since the akratic knows that the action she is performing is not good for her, and actions are particulars, the akratic's knowledge is about a particular. I argue that Aristotle's discussion in EN 7.3 adds strength to the idea that knowledge of a particular is explainable only in terms of knowledge of a universal. More determinately, knowledge of a particular is explainable in terms of the actualization or use of knowledge of a universal, and such an actualization is in turn explainable by means of the syllogistic form. Thus, I argue that syllogisms in 7.3 (esp. at 1146 35-1147 10) are not "practical syllogisms", but that their function is epistemological: they are meant to reveal the structure and content of the akratic's knowledge, not to explain her actions. (shrink)

Abstract: In this paper I discuss Sextus Empiricus' response to the dogmatists' objection that the skeptics cannot inquire into philosophical theories and at the same time suspend judgment about everything. I argue that his strategy consists in putting the burden of proof on the dogmatists: it is they, and not the skeptics, who must justify the claim to be able to inquire into the nature of things. Sextus' arguments purport to show that if we consider the dogmatists' inquiry, we should (...) conclude either that it is impossible or that it does not supply the skeptics with satisfactory starting-points for further inquiry. (shrink)

In this paper, we show that there are some strong philosophical and exegetical reasons to argue that according to the view developed in the first chapter of Aristotle’s De Memoria, the objects of memory are non-present, or absent, things and events rather than our past acts of awareness of them. We argue that on Aristotle’s account, the objects of memory can be particulars or universals, perceptibles or intelligibles, and that all these kinds of things are past in the same sense, (...) namely, in the sense of previously having been present to the perceiver or knower. Aristotle’s claim that we remember that we previously learned or saw something is the description of how, rather than what, we remember. Keywords: Aristotle, memory, past, pathos, present. (shrink)

This book consists of eleven new essays that provide new insights into classical and contemporary issues surrounding free will and human agency. They investigate topics such as the nature of practical knowledge and its role in intentional action; mental content and explanations of action; recent arguments for libertarianism; the situationist challenge to free will; freedom and a theory of narrative configuration; the moral responsibility of the psychopath; and free will and the indeterminism of quantum mechanics. Also tackling some historical precursors (...) of contemporary debates, taken together these essays demonstrate the need for an approach that recognizes the multifaceted nature of free will. This book provides essential reading for anyone interested in the current scholarship on free will. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss some problems with Aristotle’s characterization of lucky events as events which are “for the sake of something”. I argue that there is no special sense of the phrase “for the sake of something” when applied to lucky events. Qua event, a lucky event has come about for the sake of something and thus unqualifiedly belongs among things that come about for the sake of something. But qua lucky event, it has not come about for the (...) sake of that thing it has come about qua event, but it nevertheless is, or turns out to be, for the sake of something. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss Aristotle's notion of rational powers as presented in his Metaphysics Θ.2 and Θ.5. I argue, first, that his account cannot serve as the model for explaining human rational actions in general. The role of rational powers is restricted to the explanation of arts and their exercises, including the exercises of knowledge through teaching. The exercises of character virtues do not follow the same pattern that is discernible in the exercises of rational powers. Second, I try (...) to show that the similarities between Aristotle's rational powers and powers as they are commonly understood in contemporary accounts of agency, especially regarding their two-sidedness and up-to-usness, are only superficial. Aristotle's rational powers are not genuinely two-sided, and their being up to the agent has nothing to do with the availability of alternative courses of action. (shrink)

In this paper I offer a close reading of Aristotle’s argument in the Nicomachean Ethics 3.5.1114a31–b25 and try to show that despite considerable interpretive difficulties, some clear structure can nevertheless be discerned. While Aristotle’s main concern in this passage is to refute the so-called asymmetry thesis – the thesis that virtue is voluntary, but vice is not – there is much more in it than just a dialectical encounter. Aristotle wants to respond to a more general objection, which has as (...) its target the voluntariness of both virtue and vice, and which is provoked by some of his ideas in EN 3.4 and 3.5. Further, I will try to show why Aristotle thinks that we are only co-causes of our dispositions. In my opinion, his reasons have nothing to do with compatibilist or incompatibilist considerations as they are commonly understood in modern philosophy. In particular, he does not want to argue that nature is aitios of our dispositions just as ourselves are. Rather, we are co-causes of our dispositions because we are causal origins of actions without which a certain good, which is the final cause of our actions and of our dispositions, cannot be achieved. Finally, I will try to show that Aristotle’s discussion implies that there is no more to the responsibility for dispositions than there is to the responsibility for actions. (shrink)

The article tries to show that Aristotle's refutation of causal determinism in Metaph. 6.3 is grounded mainly on two assumptions: a. that there must be a first member of any causal chain, and b. that the origin and the outcome of the chain have to be of equal status.

In this paper I argue that the basic form of good luck (eutuchia) that Aristotle identifies in his Eudemian Ethics 8.2 is the divine good luck, which is not also natural good luck, as is commonly assumed by interpreters. The property of being lucky is neither a primitive nor a natural property, nor such that it is based on some natural property, but a property bestowed by god. Hence, the only satisfactory explanation of good luck must be theological. Furthermore, I (...) argue that Aristotle’s account is neutral in regard to character, intellectual, and physical dispositions of those who are subject to good luck. (shrink)