A common assumption in non-relativistic quantum mechanics is that self-adjoint operators mathematically represent properties of quantum systems. Focusing on spin, we argue that a natural view considers observables as determinable properties and their eigenvalues as their corresponding determinates. We provide a taxonomy of the different views that one can hold, once it is accepted that spin can be modelled with the determinable-determinate relation. In particular, we present the two main families of views, dubbed Spin Monism and Pluralism, and we show (...) that the current literature does not take a stance between the two. Then we put forward two arguments in favour of the former. Finally, we present a new account of Spin Monism, that is absent in current literature; such a view is worth discussing, or so we contend, because several compelling considerations support it, and it opens new ways of thinking about the ontology of quantum mechanics. (shrink)

This paper aims to characterise properly entanglement as an external relation obtaining between multiple quantum degrees of freedom. In particular, we argue that the entanglement relation is a unique relation fully characterised by mutual information, i.e. a quantity standardly used as a measure of entanglement. This analysis leads us to propose a new metaphysical account of entanglement, which we call Relational Entanglement Tesseract. Such an account characterises entanglement for both bipartite and multipartite cases, and, at the same time, it satisfies (...) what we argue are three important desiderata of any metaphysical account of entanglement. (shrink)

Quantum Theory and Humeanism have long been thought to be incompatible due to the irreducibility of the correlations involved in entangled states. In this paper, we reconstruct the tension between Humeanism and entanglement via the concept of causal structure, and provide a philosophical introduction to the ER=EPR conjecture. With these tools, we then show how the concept of causal structure and the ER=EPR conjecture allow us to resolve the conflict between Humeanism and entanglement.

This paper presents a philosophical analysis of the structure of black holes, focusing on the event horizon and its fundamental status. While black holes have been at the centre of countless paradoxes arising from the attempt to merge quantum mechanics and general relativity, recent experimental discoveries have emphasised their importance as objects for the development of Quantum Gravity. In particular, the statistical mechanical underpinning of black hole thermodynamics has been a central research topic. The Quantum Membrane Paradigm, proposed by Wallace (...) (Stud Hist Philos Sci Part B 66:103-117, 2019), posits a real membrane made of black hole microstates at the black hole horizon to provide a statistical mechanical understanding of black hole thermodynamics from an exterior observer’s point of view. However, we argue that the Quantum Membrane Paradigm is limited to low-energy Quantum Gravity and needs to be modified to avoid reference to geometric notions, such as the event horizon, which presumably do not make sense in the non-spatiotemporal context of full Quantum Gravity. Our proposal relies on the central dogma of black hole physics. It considers recent developments, such as replica wormholes and entanglement wedge reconstruction, to provide a new framework for understanding the nature of black hole horizons in full Quantum Gravity. (shrink)