Agonistic democrats have enriched debates on the political challenge of pluralism by raising awareness for the depth of disagreements and the political potentials of conflict. However, they have so far failed to explore the shape of institutional settings that are conducive to agonism and show how the agonistic stance may, in a very practical sense, strengthen democracies’ capacity to deal with pluralism and conflict. This article argues that this ‘institutional deficit’ of agonistic democracy can be overcome. It develops an approach (...) that reads theories of agonistic democracy as accounts of conflict regulation and uses principles of agonistic politics as measures for a critical assessment of institutional design. A discussion of a test case that is prominent in the recent literature on democratic innovations for pluralist societies—mini-publics—demonstrates that the principles of agonistic conflict regulation as developed by Mouffe, Connolly and Tully provide the basis for both a critique of certain institutions and a development of alternative designs. (shrink)

The titles in this series present well-edited basic texts to be used in courses and seminars and for teachers looking for a succinct exposition of the results of recent research. Each volume in the series presents the fundamental ideas of a great philosopher by means of a very thorough and up-to-date commentary on one important text. The edition and explanation of the text give insight into the whole of the oeuvre, of which it is an integral part.

Few philosophers have devoted more than passing attention to similarities between the thought of Søren Kierkegaard, a Danish Christian, and Emmanuel Levinas, a French Jew. Here, one of philosophy of religion's most distinctive voices offers a sustained comparison. Focusing on questions surrounding otherness, transcendence, postmodernity, and the nature of religious thought, Merold Westphal draws readers into a dialogue between the two thinkers. Westphal's masterful command of both philosophies shows that each can learn from the other. Levinas and Kierkegaard in Dialogue (...) is an insightful and accessible contribution to philosophical considerations of ethics and religion. (shrink)

The article shows that an uncritical view of domination is a weakness of current accounts of realist legitimacy and it argues that an agonistic supplement can help overcome that weakness. Two accounts of realist legitimacy are discussed: the moral minimum account and the acceptance account. In each case, certain modifications of the argument are needed to establish a distance from moralism, but these modifications create an indifference to domination. The incorporation of an agonistic principle into realist legitimacy can solve this (...) problem. The agonistic case for effective possibilities for contestation endows realist legitimacy with a critical stance towards arrangements that are unresponsive to criticism on the part of those who are subject to them without, however, introducing a moralist argument. (shrink)

Overcoming Onto-theology is a stunning collection of essays by Merold Westphal, one of America’s leading continental philosophers of religion, in which Westphal carefully explores the nature and the structure of a postmodern Christian philosophy. Written with characteristic clarity and charm, Westphal offers masterful studies of Heidegger’s early lectures on Paul and Augustine, the idea of hermeneutics, Schleiermacher, Hegel, Derrida, and Nietzsche, all in the service of building his argument that postmodern thinking offers an indispensable tool for rethinking Christian faith. A (...) must read for every student and professor of continental philosophy and the philosophy of religion, Overcoming Onto-theology is an invaluable collection that brings together in one place fourteen provocative and lucid essays by one of the most important thinkers working in American philosophy today. (shrink)

Realist political theory is often confronted with the objection that it is biased towards the status quo. Although this criticism overlooks the fact that realist political theories contain various resources for critique, a realist approach that is strong in status quo critique and contributes, constructively, to the theorising of alternatives to the status quo is a desideratum. The article argues that contextual realism, which sources its normativity from particular contexts, harbours an underexploited potential to establish such a form of political (...) theorising. By drawing on ideas and principles that have guided critical engagements with social and political forms in a particular context, and on widely shared views of need for reform, realists can identify deficits of the status quo and contribute to a debate on how these deficits might be addressed. This article describes and illustrates the idea of a transformative contextual realism, and defends it against some potential objections. (shrink)

Westphal shows us that Kierkegaard's philosophy makes an important contribution to what we now call the 'critique of ideology,' embracing both political and sociological concerns, and squarely based upon as affirmation of human reason-a reason that is fully aware of its own nature, neither shirking its responsibilities nor overstepping its capacities. For those who would like to get beyond the myth of Kierkegaard as an apostle of the 'solitary self,' Kierkegaard's Critique of Reason and Society is just the book to (...) read. -Stephen N. Dunning, University of Pennsylvania. (shrink)

Richard Rorty announces the end of epistemology in Part 3 of Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, entitled “From Epistemology to Hermeneutics.” He makes it clear that he is not offering, with help from Quine and Sellars, a new and better epistemology but a complete abandonment of the whole idea of a theory of knowledge, for which no legitimate task can be identified.

The forms of status quo critique that current approaches to realist political theory enable are unsatisfactory. They either formulate standards of constructive critique, but remain uncritical of a great range of political situations, or they offer means for criticising basically all political situations, but neglect constructive critique. As part of the endeavour to develop a status quo critique that is potentially radical and constructive, realists might consider possibilities to use non-standard social practices – social practices that function differently than stipulated (...) by existing political forms – as resources for critique. The article shows how the capacity of non-standard social practices to serve as resources for critique might be exploited. It also defends the proposed procedure against the likely objection that it relies on moralist argumentation. The evaluation of the status quo and the selection of social practices need normative argumentation, but such argumentation can be grounded in the actual to an extent that safeguards its realist nature. (shrink)

This book focuses on the idea of a modus vivendi as a way of governing political life and addressing problems characterized by pluralism or deep-rooted diversity. The individual essays illustrate both the merits and the limitations of a political theory of modus vivendi; how it might be interpreted and developed; specific challenges entailed by articulating it in a convincing form; what its institutional implications might be; and how it relates to other seminal issues and concepts in political theory; such as (...) legitimacy, toleration, the social contract, etc. The book makes a significant contribution to the discussion on the scope and limits of liberal political theory, and on how to deal politically with deep-rooted diversity. (shrink)

Westphal shows us that Kierkegaard's philosophy makes an important contribution to what we now call the 'critique of ideology,' embracing both political and sociological concerns, and squarely based upon as affirmation of human reason-a reason that is fully aware of its own nature, neither shirking its responsibilities nor overstepping its capacities. For those who would like to get beyond the myth of Kierkegaard as an apostle of the 'solitary self,' Kierkegaard's Critique of Reason and Society is just the book to (...) read. -Stephen N. Dunning, University of Pennsylvania. (shrink)

"This fairly small book must take its place as the best introductorystudy of Hegel's Phenomenology available." -- Philosophy and PhenomenologicalResearch "Westphal's book is a comprehensive guide to theargument of the entire phenomenology.... will repay close study by seriousundergraduate and graduate students of philosophy." --Choice This detailed interpretation of Hegel's Phenomenology ofSpirit seeks to show that the unity of this classic work may be found in theintegration of its transcendental and sociological-historical themes.

"An illuminating and powerful reading of three of the most important contemporary professedly antireligious thinkers... stinging critiques of Freud, Marx, and Nietzsche."-C. Stephen Evans, Society of Christian Philosophers.

This introductory chapter gives an overview of the debate on realism in political theory and sets out two themes that are particularly important for this debate: the role of practice in realist political theory and the nature and place of normativity in realist political theory. These two themes are not only among the most discussed topics in the debate on possibilities to do realist political theory. Answers to the question of what more applied forms of realist political theory might look (...) like will also depend significantly on how realists specify the role of practice in political theory and the meaning of realist normative argumentation. We outline some of the main positions in the field and highlight questions that have been insufficiently addressed. Finally, we give an overview of the arguments of the articles assembled in this collection and how they contribute to the ongoing debates on the two themes. (shrink)

"... a profoundly stimulating and satisfying piece of philosophy.... It is a book from which one really can learn something worthwhile." —Idealistic Studies "... exceptionally well-written philosophy of religion... " —Mentalities "... a most impressive phenomenology of religion... a splendid achievement... " —The Reformed Theological Review "... challenging to scholars... interesting to general audiences." —International Journal for Philosophy of Religion "... equal in clarity of thought and comprehensiveness of scope.... profoundly original." —The Reformed Journal "Challenging and thought-provoking, this makes a (...) fine... textbook in the philosophy of religion." —Religious Studies Review "... its virtues as a textbook in phenomenology or philosophy of religion are extraordinary." —Faith and Philosophy Examples from the writings of Kierkegaard, Freud, Heidegger, Dostoyevsky, Nietzsche, and Tolstoi illuminate Westphal’s thesis that guilt and death are the central problems of human existence. (shrink)

This detailed interpretation of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit seeks to show that the Unity of this classic work may be found in the integration of its transcendental and sociological-historical themes. Merold Westphal argues that the key to this unity lies in Hegel's radical discovery that transcendental subjectivity has a social history and that absolute knowledge is a historically conditioned and essentially collective or social event. His distinctive interpretation emphasizes the relevance of Hegel's Phenomenology to contemporary philosophical issues.

Marx, Nietzche, and Freud are among the most influential of modern atheists. The distinctive feature of their challenge to theistic and specifically Christian belief is expressed by Paul Ricoeur when he calls them the "masters of suspicion." While skepticism directs its critique to the truth or evidential basis of belief, suspicion asks two different, intimately intertwined questions: what are the motives that lead to this belief? and what function does it play, what work does it do for the individuals and (...) communities that adopt it.What suspicion suspects is that the survival value of religious beliefs depends on satisfying desires and interests that the believing soul and the believing community are not eager to acknowledge because they violate the values they profess, as when, for example, talk about justice is a mask for deep-seated resentment and the desire for revenge. For this reason, the hermeneutics of suspicion is a theory, or group of theories, of self-deception: ideology critique in Marx, genealogy in Nietzsche, and psychoanalysis in Freud.Suspicion and Faith argues that the appropriate religious response ("the religious uses of modern atheism") to these critiques is not to try to refute or deflect them, but rather to acknowledge their force in a process of self-examination. (shrink)

The kind of phenomenology that can be useful to theology will be a hermeneutical phenomenology, one that takes us beyond the Cartesian/Husserlian ideal of presuppositionless intuition. It will also be a phenomenology of inverse intentionality, one in which the constituting subject is constituted by the look and the voice of another. In light of these suggestions, the phenomenology of Jean-Luc Marion is defended against three critiques, namely that it compromises the boundary between phenomenology and theology, that the theology it serves (...) is a bad one to boot, and that it has an inadequate account of the subject. At the heart of this defense is Marion's clear distinction between phenomenology as a description of possible experience, and theology as the claim that a certain kind of experience, namely revelation or epiphany, is not merely actual but veridical. Phenomenology says, If revelation occurs it will be in the form of a saturated phenomenon. Theology says, for example, the burning bush was an epiphany, or Jesus Christ is a revelation. The attentive reader should have no trouble distinguishing Marion's phenomenological analyses, which should be persuasive to believer and unbeliever alike, from his theological claims. Marion's account of the subject falls under the heading of inverse intentionality, and there are hints that vision is aufgehoben in the voice. The seer is first of all the one seen, but above all the one addressed, called forth into response-able being. (shrink)

Two reasons are given for speaking of “reason” even where Kierkegaard’s pseudonym, Climacus, speaks of “understanding.” First, we are dealing with a significant contribution to a centuries-old discussion of an issue that goes by the name of “faith and reason.” Second, whereas Kant and Hegel sharply distinguish mere understanding from reason, no such distinction is at work in Kierkegaard’s text. At issue is the quite different distinction of unaided human reason and divine revelation. It is not just any notion of (...) reason that is the target of Kierkegaard’s critique, but an autonomous reason, independent of revelation, that claims hegemony over biblical faith in both its popular and academic forms. This hegemony expresses itself in both outright rejection of and radical reinterpretation of elements of biblical faith. (shrink)

Two reasons are given for speaking of “reason” even where Kierkegaard’s pseudonym, Climacus, speaks of “understanding.” First, we are dealing with a significant contribution to a centuries-old discussion of an issue that goes by the name of “faith and reason.” Second, whereas Kant and Hegel sharply distinguish mere understanding from reason, no such distinction is at work in Kierkegaard’s text. At issue is the quite different distinction of unaided human reason and divine revelation. It is not just any notion of (...) reason that is the target of Kierkegaard’s critique, but an autonomous reason, independent of revelation, that claims hegemony over biblical faith in both its popular and academic forms. This hegemony expresses itself in both outright rejection of and radical reinterpretation of elements of biblical faith. (shrink)

"This volume represents a fine assessment of the continuing applicability of Kierkegaard’s thought for the 21st century."—The Reader’s Review "Matustík and Westphal have set some agile minds to the task of drawing out the threads of Kierkegaard’s influence on postmodern and contemporary philosophy, from gender to politics and from Buber to Derrida." —Choice "... Usefully and effectively establishes Kierkegaard as a living presence in contemporary thought. It will help students of Kierkegaard attend to aspects of his thought that have eluded (...) their attention, and it will challenge those engaged with contemporary continental philosophy not to shelter themselves from the provocations and interrogrations still uncomfortably pressing in Kierkegaard’s writings." —International Philosophical Quarterly "The standard of the essays and the calibre of the contributors are uniformly high. This is indeed one of the better collections relating to Kierkegaard published in recent years, and should do much to extend discussion of his work..." —Modern Believing "... a text of immense significance and value.... As a research tool it will surely prove indispensable." —Søren Kierkegaard Newsletter "It will be a helpful supplementary areading for teaching... the contemporary readings of Kierkegaard introduced here continue to reveal new and more exciting depths to his extraordinary philosophy." —Teaching Philosophy These essays engage Kierkegaard in conversation with critical social theory and postmodern thought. Covering a diversity of themes, this collection still reflects consensus—Kierkegaard is to be taken seriously as a philosopher at the turn of the twenty-first century. (shrink)

Highlights the intersection of Hegel's thinking on politics, religion, and knowledge, which, claims Westphal (philosophy, Fordham U.), addresses better than any modern thinker, the essential dilemma that a religious society tends to be ...

A triple sampling of the rich diversity of philosophical reflection on religion and on the relation of philosophy to religion within “continental” traditions. The first part explores three accounts of the relation of phenomenology to religion as presented by Heidegger, Ricoeur, and Marion. The second part explores Heidegger’s critique of metaphysics in its onto-theological constitution with detailed attention to just what he means by this notion and with special reference to the religious and theological motivations one might have for wanting (...) to avoid onto-theological thinking. The third part explores the renewed interest in negative theology that revolves around the conversation between Derrida and Marion. (shrink)

The introduction by Merold Westphal sets the scene: "Two books, two visions of philosophy, two friends and sometimes colleagues...". Modernity and Its Discontents is a debate between Caputo and Marsh in which each upheld their opposing philosphical positions by critical modernism and post-modernism. The book opens with a critique of each debater of the other's previous work. With its passionate point-counterpoint form, the book recalls the philosphical dialogues of classical times, but the writing style remains lucid and uncluttered. Taking the (...) failure of Englightenment ideals as their common ground, the debaters challenge each other's ideas on the nature of post-foundationalist critique. At the core of the argument lies the timely question of the role that each person can play in creating a truly humane society. (shrink)

Religious faith is often critiqued as irrational either because its beliefs do not rise to the level of knowledge as defined by some philosophical theory or be­cause it rests on emotion rather than knowledge. Or both. Kierkegaard helps us to see how these arguments rest on a misunderstanding of all three terms: faith, reason, and emotion.

Against two recent critiques, I defend my thesis that such later writings of Kierkegaard as Works of Love and Practice in Christianity introduce an understanding of Christianity that I call Religiousness C, into which Religiousness B as presented in ConcludingUnscientific Postscript is teleologically suspended. For Religiousness B, Christ is the Paradox to be believed, while for Religiousness C, Christ is the Pattern, Paradigm, or Prototype to be imitated. In the former case, the offense to be overcome in becoming a Christian (...) concerns the metaphysics and epistemology of the Incarnation. In the latter case, the offense involves the ethics and politics of the Incarnation. I argue that this Aufhebung is Hegelian only in a formal sense and, so far from compromising Kierkegaard’s critique of Hegel, actually intensifies it. (shrink)

According to the article, the references of Emmanuel Levinas to Kierkegaard are varied. Indeed, there are times in which Levinas seems to misunderstand or completely ignore important writings of the Danish thinker. There are also times in which Levinas understands Kierkegaard well enough to see quite precisely where they disagree. And yet there are also times in which Levinas raises important objections that call for a response from Kierkegaard. Accordingly, the primary goal of this essay is to separate the moments (...) of genuine engagement from those in which Levinas' comments miss their target altogether. /// As referências que Emmanuel Levinas faz à obra de Kierkegaard são de diverso tipo. Por vezes, ele parece não compreender ou completamente ignorar escritos importantes do pensador dinamarquês. Outras vezes, porém, ele dá a impressão de compreender Kierkegaard suficientemente bem até ao ponto de precisar exactamente quais os pontos de desacordo entre os dois. Mas há ainda um outro registo, aquele em que Levinas levanta importantes objecções a Kierkegaard, exigindo deste uma resposta. O principal objectivo do artigo é, assim, separar os momentos de compromisso genuíno daqueles em que os comentários de Levinas pura e simplesmente parecem falhar o seu alvo. (shrink)

For Heidegger, onto-theology is the use of abstract, impersonal categories under the principle of sufficient reason that has one goal and two results. The goal is to make God fully intelligible to human understanding. The results are the disappearance of mystery from our understanding of God and the loss of any religious significance for the “God” that results. I argue that Aquinas is not guilty of onto-theology because his use of abstract, impersonal categories is subsumed (aufgehoben, teleologically suspended) in his (...) use of personal categories and because his doctrine of analogy retains mystery in our understanding of God. (shrink)

We argue that a reinvention of the plebeian tribunate should play a key role in addressing the challenges stemming from increasing concentrations of, and inequalities in, social, political, economic, and cultural power in liberal democracies. Addressing these challenges, which negatively affect parliamentary representation, requires a form of institutional innovation that gives voice to non-elites who are ruled but do not rule. We propose revisions of the composition and tasks of the tribunate that are tailored to these current challenges. Our fully (...) randomly selected tribunate emerges as a vehicle not only for contesting concentrated power but also for articulating lines of conflict, disruptive agenda-setting, and political experimentation. Our proposal contributes to developing realist democratic theory. We argue that the reinvented tribunate not only meets realist commitments to avoiding moralization and idealization but also demonstrates the underexploited capacity of realism to inform institutional innovation and thus contribute to substantial political analysis. (shrink)

Hegel introduced the Phenomenology of Mind as a work on the problem of knowledge. In the first chapter, entitled “Sense Certainty, or the This and Meaning,” he concluded that knowledge cannot consist of an immediate awareness of particulars ). The tradition discusses sense certainty in terms of this failure of immediate knowledge without, however, specifically addressing the problem of reference. Yet reference is distinct from knowledge in the sense that while there can be no knowledge of objects without reference, there (...) may be reference without knowledge. If that is the case, then the failure of immediate knowledge does not entitle us to conclude anything about the success or failure of reference. It is not surprising, then, that a few scholars have begun to examine sense certainty primarily as a thesis about reference. (shrink)

Against two recent critiques, I defend my thesis that such later writings of Kierkegaard as Works of Love and Practice in Christianity introduce an understanding of Christianity that I call Religiousness C, into which Religiousness B as presented in ConcludingUnscientific Postscript is teleologically suspended. For Religiousness B, Christ is the Paradox to be believed, while for Religiousness C, Christ is the Pattern, Paradigm, or Prototype to be imitated. In the former case, the offense to be overcome in becoming a Christian (...) concerns the metaphysics and epistemology of the Incarnation. In the latter case, the offense involves the ethics and politics of the Incarnation. I argue that this Aufhebung is Hegelian only in a formal sense and, so far from compromising Kierkegaard’s critique of Hegel, actually intensifies it. (shrink)