A cross-cultural survey experiment revealed a dominant tendency to rely on a rule’s letter over its spirit when deciding which behaviors violate the rule. This tendency varied markedly across (k = 15) countries, owing to variation in the impact of moral appraisals on judgments of rule violation. Compared with laypeople, legal experts were more inclined to disregard their moral evaluations of the acts altogether and consequently exhibited stronger textualist tendencies. Finally, we evaluated a plausible mechanism for the emergence of textualism: (...) in a two-player coordination game, incentives to coordinate in the absence of communication reinforced participants’ adherence to rules’ literal meaning. Together, these studies (total n = 5,794) help clarify the origins and allure of textualism, especially in the law. Within heterogeneous communities in which members diverge in their moral appraisals involving a rule’s purpose, the rule’s literal meaning provides a clear focal point—an identifiable point of agreement enabling coordinated interpretation among citizens, lawmakers, and judges. (shrink)

A cross-cultural survey experiment revealed a widespread tendency to rely on a rule’s letter over its spirit when deciding which acts violate the rule. This tendency’s strength varied markedly across (k = 15) field sites, owing to cultural variation in the impact of moral appraisals on judgments of rule violation. Compared to laypeople, legal experts were more inclined to disregard their moral evaluations of the acts altogether, and consequently exhibited more pronounced textualist tendencies. Finally, we evaluated a plausible mechanism for (...) the emergence of textualism: In a two-player coordination game, incentives to coordinate in the absence of communication reinforced participants’ adherence to rules’ literal meaning. Together, these studies (Ntotal = 5495) help clarify the origins and allure of textualism, especially in the law. Within heterogeneous communities in which members diverge in their moral appraisals involving a rule’s purpose, the rule’s literal meaning provides a clear focal point—an easily identifiable point of agreement enabling coordinated interpretation among citizens, lawmakers and judges. (shrink)

The process dissociation procedure (PDP) for moral cognition was created to separately measure two dispositions of moral judgment based on the dual-process theory of moral reasoning: deontological and utilitarian inclinations. In this paper we raise some concerns from a psychometrics perspective regarding the structure, reliability, and validity of the moral PDP as a measure of individual differences. Using two simulation studies as well as a real sample ofN= 1,010, we investigate the psychometric properties of the moral PDP. We present novel (...) evidence showing that (1) some correlations between PDP parameters are mathematical artifacts, and as such cannot be taken as evidence in support of a theory, (2) there are severe response inconsistencies within dilemma batteries, and (3) reliability estimates for these scores seem to be far below the accepted standards. We discuss some potential theoretical and content-related reasons for these statistical issues and their implications. We conclude that in their current form, PDP measures of utilitarian and deontological tendencies are sub-optimal for assessing individual differences. (shrink)

Keskustelu tekoälyn soveltamiseen liittyvistä eettisistä ja poliittisista kysymyksistä käy juuri nyt kuumana. Emme halua tässä puheenvuorossa osallistua keskusteluun tarttumalla johonkin tiettyyn eettiseen ongelmaan. Sen sijaan pyrimme sanomaan jotain itsekeskustelusta ja sen vaikeudesta. Haluamme kiinnittää huomiota siihen, kuinka erilaiset ihmismielen ajattelutaipumukset ja virhepäätelmät voivat huomaamattamme vaikuttaa tapaamme hahmottaa ja ymmärtää tekoälyä ja siihen liittyviä eettisiä kysymyksiä. Kun ymmärrämme paremmin sen, kuinka hankalaa näiden kysymysten hahmottaminen arkisen mielemme kategorioilla oikein on, ja kun tunnistamme tästä syntyvät virhepäätelmät ja ajattelun vääristymät, kykenemme entistä korkeatasoisempaan (...) eettiseen arviointiin tekoälyyn liittyvissä kysymyksissä. Tarkoituksemme ei ole tarkastella loogisiavirhepäätelmiä, jotka rikkovat formaalin modus tollensin tai modus ponensin sääntöjä. Sen sijaan esittelemme empiirisiä tutkimustuloksia, jotka havainnollistavat ihmismielen taipumustatehdä systemaattisia virhearviointeja erilaisissa tilanteissa. (shrink)