This collection addresses a post-WWII shift in the hierarchy of scientific explanations, where the highest goal moves from reductionism towards some ...

This article opens a special section on the politics of opacity and openness. The rise of transparency as a political and cultural ideal has left secrecy to accumulate negative connotations. But the moral discourse that condemns secrecy and rewards transparency may cause us to misread the symbiotic relationship between these terms. After providing a historical account of transparency in public and political life, this article therefore makes the case for working with the tension between these terms rather than responding to (...) the dyad as a choice. We need to find different ways of staying with the aporia of transparency-as-secrecy and secrecy-as-transparency. Despite common demands to support either transparency or secrecy in political and moral terms, we live with the tension between these terms and its inherent contradictions daily. The theoretical questions posed by this material reality need to be asked and responded to. This article and the special section as a whole begin such an enterprise. (shrink)

For the theorists of crisis, the revolutionary state comes into existence through violence, and due to its inability to provide an authoritative katechon (restrainer) against internal and external violence, it perpetuates violence until it self-destructs. Writing during extreme economic depression and growing social and political violence, the crisis theorists––Joseph de Maistre, Juan Donoso Cortés, and Carl Schmitt––each sought to blame the chaos of their time upon the Janus-faced postrevolutionary ideals of liberalism and socialism by urging a return to pre-revolutionary moral (...) and religious values. They are united by three counterrevolutionary principles, all of which are purported to remedy revolutionary violence: traditional constitutional fidelity, the philosophy of the decision, and opposition to bourgeois liberalism. This essay is followed by the first complete English translation and publication of Donoso’s letter of October 24, 1851, which contains Donoso’s only reference to the “discussing class,” a political entity later popularized by Schmitt in his 1922 work Political Theology. (shrink)

Though far from new, the rhetoric of transparency is on the ascent in public and political life. It is cited as the answer to a vast array of social, political, financial and corporate problems. With the backing of a ‘movement’, transparency has assumed the position of an unassailable ‘good’. This article asks whether the value ascribed to transparency limits political thinking, particularly for the radical and socialist Left. What forms of politics, ethics, of being-in-common, might it be possible to think (...) if we pay attention to secrecy rather than transparency? (shrink)

This article attempts to question modes of sharing and watching to rethink political subjectivity beyond that which is enabled and enforced by the current data regime. It identifies and examines a ‘shareveillant’ subjectivity: a form configured by the sharing and watching that subjects have to withstand and enact in the contemporary data assemblage. Looking at government open and closed data as case studies, this article demonstrates how ‘shareveillance’ produces an anti-political role for the public. In describing shareveillance as, after Jacques (...) Rancière, a distribution of the sensible, this article posits a politico-ethical injunction to cut into the share and flow of data in order to arrange a more enabling assemblage of data and its affects. In order to interrupt shareveillance, this article borrows a concept from Édouard Glissant and his concern with raced otherness to imagine what a ‘right to opacity’ might mean in the digital context. To assert this right is not to endorse the individual subject in her sovereignty and solitude, but rather to imagine a collective political subjectivity and relationality according to the important question of what it means to ‘share well’ beyond the veillant expectations of the state. (shrink)

In much of the current academic and public discussion, conspiracy theories are portrayed as a negative phenomenon, linked to misinformation, mistrust in experts and institutions, and political propaganda. Rather surprisingly, however, philosophers working on this topic have been reluctant to incorporate a negatively evaluative aspect when either analyzing or engineering the concept conspiracy theory. In this paper, we present empirical data on the nature of the concept conspiracy theory from five studies designed to test the existence, prevalence and exact form (...) of an evaluative dimension to the ordinary concept conspiracy theory. These results reveal that, while there is a descriptive concept of conspiracy theory, the predominant use of conspiracy theory is deeply evaluative, encoding information about epistemic deficiency and often also derogatory and disparaging information. On the basis of these results, we present a new strategy for engineering conspiracy theory to promote theoretical investigations and institutional discussions of this phenomenon. We argue for engineering conspiracy theory to encode an epistemic evaluation, and to introduce a descriptive expression—such as ‘conspiratorial explanation’—to refer to the purely descriptive concept conspiracy theory. (shrink)

Para abordar a questão moral do aborto de fetos sem cérebro, inicialmente são apresentados e considerados insatisfatórios dois argumentos que defendem a punição para a gestante que aborta: a sacralidade da vida e a atribuição ao feto do caráter de “pessoa”. Em seguida, são apresentados e considerados satisfatórios quatro argumentos contra a punição da gestante: a morte certa do feto, o caráter terapêutico e não-eugênico do aborto, o sofrimento, sem fi nalidade evidente, dos envolvidos na situação e o direito da (...) mulher sobre seu corpo. Na terceira seção, discutem-se as exigências da compaixão. Chega-se à conclusão de que abortar ou não fetos anencefálicos deve ser uma decisão individual, não coletiva, que deveria ser tomada por cada mulher, e não pelo Estado democrático e então imposta às mulheres. A mulher tem o direito moral tanto de continuar quanto de interromper a gravidez de fetos anencefálicos. To approach the moral issue of the abortion of anencephalic fetuses, we fi rstly present and consider unsatisfactory two arguments for the punishment of the pregnant woman who makes an abortion: that of the sanctity of life and of the attribution of the status of a person to the fetus. After that, we present and consider satisfactory four arguments against the punishment of the pregnant woman: the certain death of the fetus, the therapeutic and non-eugenic character of the abortion, the inutility of the suffering brought by the situation to the woman and other people and the woman’s right over her body. On the third section, we discuss the demands for compassion. The conclusion is that the decision about the abortion of anencephalic fetuses should be an individual decision and not a collective one; it should be made by each woman, not by the democratic Estate and then imposed on women. The woman has the right of interrupting and of continuing the pregnancy of an anencephalic fetus. (shrink)

A seleção genética de embriões humanos algumas vezes é criticada porque se considera que de alguma maneira ela possa prejudicar os portadores de deficiências que já existem. O artigo defende que essa crítica é injustificada. A primeira seção apresenta as questões morais colocadas pelos portadores de deficiências. Em seguida, são apresentados os três argumentos contra a seleção de embriões baseados nos direitos dos portadores de deficiências – o Argumento do Apoio Social, o Argumento da Diversidade e o Argumento da Ofensa. (...) Dentre eles, o terceiro foi considerado o mais consiste e, por isso, a terceira seção é dedicada a sua análise, cuja conclusão é de que a seleção de embriões é consistente com o respeito aos direitos dos portadores de deficiências. (shrink)

In this article, we apply the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights to the private equity (PE) business model. PE firms often adopt a controversial, ‘value extractive’, business model based on high debt and extreme cost-cutting to generate investor returns. PE firms own large numbers of companies, including in many rights-related sectors. The model is linked to increased human rights risks to workers, housing tenants, and in privatized health and social care. We map these risks and analyse the (...) human rights responsibilities of PE firms. Our analysis has major implications for understandings of human rights responsibility. We argue that value extractive methods are the root cause of eventual harm to human rights, even though they may not harm rights directly. To respect human rights, PE firms must mitigate the risks of these value extractive methods. We define how human rights due diligence (HRDD) could achieve this and argue that given the extent of harm and the lack of a business case for adopting such a view of human rights responsibility, business strategy level HRDD should be a core component of forthcoming HRDD laws. (shrink)

Romain Ducoulombier, author ofCamarades!, a study of the origins of the French Communist Party, belongs to a different ideological context to earlier authors on the subject, such as Kriegel, Wohl or Robrieux. But though Ducoulombier claims originality for his work, there is little genuinely new here. He fails to grasp the impact of the Russian Revolution on the French working class and has little understanding of the dynamics of the Communist International. He stresses the ‘asceticism’ and ‘messianism’ of the early (...) Communist Party without giving a precise meaning to these terms. Worst of all, Ducoulombier concentrates on archival material while saying remarkably little about the French Communist Party’s actual activities, notably work in the trade unions, anti-militarism and anti-colonialism. (shrink)

Given that the Obama administration still relies on many strategies we would think of as sitting on the side of secrecy, it seems that the only lasting transparency legacy of the Obama administration will be data-driven or e-transparency as exemplified by the web interface ‘data.gov’. As the data-driven transparency model is exported and assumes an ascendant position around the globe, it is imperative that we ask what kind of publics, subjects, and indeed, politics it will produce. Open government data is (...) not just a matter concerning accountability but is seen as a necessary component of the new ‘data economy’. To participate and benefit from this info-capitalist-democracy, the data subject is called upon to be both auditor and entrepreneur. This article explores the implications of responsibilization, outsourcing, and commodification on the contract of representational democracy and asks if there are other forms of transparency that might better resist neoliberal formations and re-politicize the public sphere. (shrink)

The French journal Clarté had its origins in a movement launched just after the end of World War I by Henri Barbusse. It was soon taken over by a group of more radical intellectuals, who were close to the French Communist Party but not under its direct control. The journal combined politics and culture. It attempted to analyse the changing world-conjuncture, and in particular the significance of the defeated revolutions in Germany and China. But it also developed a theory of (...) culture under the influence of the Russian proletcult, Victor Serge, Georges Sorel and surrealism. In 1927, under the influence of Pierre Naville, Clarté broke with the Moscow-dominated Communist Party and became the organ of the French Left Opposition. Cuenot has given a well-researched and balanced account of its development. (shrink)

The paper is an attempt to make sense of Hegel's notion of aufheben. The double meaning of aufheben and its alleged ?rise above the mere ?either?or?; of understanding? have been taken, by some, to constitute a criticism of the logic of either?or. It is argued, on the contrary, that Hegel's notion of aufheben, explicated in its primary and philosophical context, turns out to be a substantiation of that logic. The intelligibility of the formula of either?or depends, for example, on the (...) categories of Being and Not?Being. But if these categories are regarded as particular finite determinations themselves subject to the formula of either?or, then the formula, far from being intelligible, ?falls apart?. Hegel is arguing, in other words, that if we are to substantiate the logic of either?or, we must, at the same time, ?rise above? that logic. The role of aufheben is then considered in the special sciences. Here it is argued that we must distinguish between empirical transitions, governed by the finite determinations of things, and logical or dialectical transitions, governed by considerations of the intelligibility of the notions involved. Applying the notion of aufheben to the former transitions suggests wrongly that empirical transitions have an objective or philosophic necessity. Finally, the place of ?immanent transformation? in the context of aufheben is examined. It is concluded that if there is to be a transformation, then a distinction must be drawn between thought and its content, but then the transformation cannot be regarded as immanent. (shrink)

Les sujets numérisés sont façonnés par ce qu’il faudrait appeler, à la suite de Rancière, le partage numérique du sensible – un arrangement qui détermine ce qui est visible, dicible et connaissable. Or cet arrangement implique des formes de surveillance distribuée, qu’on appellera « distriveillance », caractérisées par un transfert de la surveillance d’État vers les sujets eux-mêmes. Il est urgent d’interrompre ce partage de données automatisé pour ouvrir à nouveau à d’autres mises en commun.

Bioethics has paid surprisingly little attention to the special problems faced by women and to feminist analyses of current health care issues other than ...