I filosofi che possono essere considerati grandi e classici sono quelli che hanno saputo integrare l’aspetto prettamente argomentativo con l’aspetto che potrebbe essere chiamato “narrativo”. Da un lato, infatti, la filosofia procede da premesse e arriva a conclusioni, attraverso passaggi regolati da una logica; dall’altro essa può costruire narrazioni sul destino dell’uomo e del mondo. Il grande filosofo — quello che diventa un classico — è tale perché racconta storie e insieme fornisce gli strumenti per saggiarne la fondatezza e la (...) consistenza. Emanuele Severino appartiene ormai a pieno titolo ai classici della filosofia; il presente volume vuole essere una testimonianza di come le sue opere e i suoi insegnamenti continuino a far “partorire” idee nuove, riconoscendo nella filosofia severiniana un punto di partenza imprescindibile. (shrink)

In Parmenides’ B 8 37–41, we find a question that raises a difficult problem: how can Parmenides handle the opposition between “being and not” in the same way as the oppositions which characterize the mortals’ opinions? This question is especially relevant for answering the following theoretical question: how do we to treat the fundamental philosophical question of oppositions at large? To answer these question we need to reinterpret some major points of Parmenides’ thought: the second part of his poem, but (...) also the identification of πέλειν and εἶναι in B 6 8, as well as other passages of the poem. But, above all, the question makes us introduce some distinctions within the concept of negation and, consequently, between difference and negation. This allows us to distinguish the affirmation of the truth of being from the negation of the negation of being. This distinction has a major philosophical relevance, as can be seen by referring it to such thinkers as Plato, Hegel and Heidegger. (shrink)

Worldwide wisdom teaches, and philosophy demonstrates, that universally valid is only the perspective able to recognize everybody’s right to be treated in a just manner. From this point of view we have to recognize that all propositions are in some sense true, and hence that even those who are wrong are, from a particular point of view, right. Therefore, we have the duty to understand in which sense even populist stances are, at least in some sense, true. For instance, they (...) can help us to keep in mind the limits of democracy and, in this way, to escape the dangerous “democratic superstition.”. (shrink)