“I would prefer not”HERMAN MELVILLE, BARTLEBY THE SCRIVENER: A STORY OF WALL STREET (1853), reprinted in THE PIAZZA TALES 32, 48 (London, Sampson Low, Son & Co. 1856). Scholars have recently challenged the claim in classical deterrence theory that law influences behavior only through the expected sanction imposed. Some go further and argue that law may also “shape preferences,” changing people’s wants and values. In this Article, we analyze existing claims that criminal and civil law alter preferences and conclude that (...) none suggest that the law shapes preferences. We first clarify this preference-shaping claim by elaborating the structure of rational choice theory generally and “preference” in particular. We then investigate three mechanisms of legal influence suggested by the preference-shaping literature: (1) the “serious harm” mechanism; (2) the “social norm” mechanism; and (3) the “self-improvement” mechanism. We then show that each of these mechanisms operates by changing the agent’s beliefs about the attributes or consequences of her choice options rather than by changing her preferences. (shrink)

Analyses of complex entities such as bureaucracies, courts, legislatures, and firms typically personify them. A strong conception of personification requires that these entities have rational interests, rational beliefs, and rational normative judgments. On one account of personification, such personified rationality should be aggregate rationality : the interests, beliefs, and normative judgments should depend only on the interests, beliefs, and judgments of the individuals who constitute the complex entity. I argue that aggregate rationality is too strong a normative requirement to impose (...) on courts and legislatures. Key Words: collective rationality • personification • adjudication • doctrinal paradox. (shrink)

This handbook offers a deep analysis of the main forms of legal reasoning and argumentation from both a logical-philosophical and legal perspective. These forms are covered in an exhaustive and critical fashion, and the handbook accordingly divides in three parts: the first one introduces and discusses the basic concepts of practical reasoning. The second one discusses the main general forms of reasoning and argumentation relevant for legal discourse. The third one looks at their application in law as well as at (...) the different areas of legal reasoning. The handbook’s division in three parts reflects its conceptual architecture, since legal reasoning and argumentation are considered in relation to the more general types of reasoning. (shrink)

This essay investigates consequentialist reasoning in law. It begins with a brief exposition of the structure of consequentialist reasoning. It then turns to the role of consequentialist reasoning in two aspects of legal decision-making. Legal officials must reason both about ends and about the choice of means to achieve those ends. Legal instrumentalism, however, takes many forms, and different forms identify different officials to engage in the task of reasoning consequentially to choose means. The essay then considers the difficulties posed (...) by the fact that legal decision-makers choose policies or institutions that structure the outcomes they hope to achieve. Finally, the essay considers the role that consequentialist reasoning may play in choosing ends. (shrink)

This essay disentangles the complex relations between economic logic and legal logic. It distinguishes economic logic as a social process from economic logic as economic reasoning; economic reasoning to explain behavior from economic reasoning to evaluate behavioral outcomes; and legal reasoning in judicial contexts from legal reasoning in other contexts such as legislation and legal enforcement or compliance. It then argues first that economic logic as the logic of social processes deepens our understanding of how law develops and how it (...) influences behavior. But the essay argues second that economic logic plays at best a limited role in the logic of legal reasoning for two reasons. Much legal reasoning seeks to identify the goals we should and do pursue while economic logic takes such goals as given. Further, the instrumental role of economic logic will vary with the institutional context in which legal reasoning occurs. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Introduction A Characterization of Economic Analysis of Law Normativity Preference and Obligation Concluding Remarks Note References.

Constitutional political economy addresses four questions: the causal question: What explains the constitutional institutions we observe? the consequential question: What consequences do constitutional institutional have? the ideal question: What constitutional institutions does justice require? and the design question: What constitutional institutions are best for a polity given the constraints imposed by its current situation? Answers to the ideal and design questions require a theory of behavior that predicts how individuals will behave within constitutional institutions. Analysts usually assume that this theory (...) of behavior corresponds to the explanatory theory developed to answer the second, consequential question. This essay argues that the assumption of rational self-interested behavior as the basis for a behavioral theory is not justified. (shrink)