The first view I shall investigate holds that the art form of tragedy expresses or contains certain eternal, acultural, and ahistorical facts which are "tragic" and present as such in the real or extra-artistic worlds; these facts are merely composed in tragedy as its content such that tragedy may be said to embody some perennial statement or thought about the things that are. The assumption here is that "tragedy" is a noun which can literally be applied to describe certain facts (...) or events we encounter in the everyday world. This term has been more specifically understood to refer to the fact of death , to a way of existence or human existence generally, or to a relationship existing between man and the world, or man and other men, or man and himself . Though tragedy certainly has its preferred topics, and these have sources in a world outside any given world which the particular tragedy constructs, there is surely a distinction between the world in general, with its facts, relationships, significances, and interpretations, and the particular world created by a given tragedy. This purely aesthetical creation of its own facts, relationships, significances, and interpretations is what I shall henceforth call the worked world of tragedy. Leon Rosenstein is currently working on "Hegelian Sources of Freud's Social and Political Philosophy," a four-article series to appear during 1977. He is an associate professor of philosophy at San Diego State University. (shrink)

Let me repeat one of my main points of my article: that "all three subjects of tragedy—plot, character, and thought—are reciprocal and correlative concretizations of a particular action and that thought bears this relation and makes its appearance with respect to each . . . in a definite way."1 This would be "understanding the interdependence or reciprocity of the three objects of imitation as functioning dynamically within an organic unity" . Thus, in one of the instances to which Ford refers, (...) the question I raise as to disjunction of the three subjects of tragedy is not a question for me at all, except rhetorically, since it is based upon the suggestion of Jones, a view which I reject, but the mention of which allowed me to consider its possibilities first. In the other instance, and again with respect to Jones, the "double awkwardness" to which Jones originally refers is alleviated through clarification and interpretation by Jones himself, whose position in this matter I expand upon and interpret more widely. Thus, there is no "disjunction," and there is no "doubleness" of plot and action, nor, as I myself went on to show, any tripleness and quadrupleness either in relation of action, plot, character, and thought. Really, what we have here are different ontological orders of the subject of tragedy, a relation between the general and specific, the abstract and concrete, the concept and its instance, a relation like that of energy to the incandescent light . · 1. "On Aristotle and Thought in the Drama," Critical Inquiry 3 : 561. Leon Rosenstein is an associate professor of philosophy at San Diego State University. (shrink)