China’s historical mixed-ownership reform (the Reform) has prioritized enhancing the efficiency and financial performance of its large state-owned enterprises (SOEs) through introduction of partial private-sector equity ownership. However, the presence of a significant gap between China’s private enterprises’ corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices and those of its SOEs suggests potential for Reform-related ownership changes to negatively impact economy-wide CSR performance. We therefore examine the Reform’s impact on private acquirer firms’ CSR practices. We use a proprietary data set of firms listed (...) on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, covering the 2011–2015 period. Our findings identify that private firms can enhance their economic and political status through acquiring equity in state-controlled or SOEs and, following this, improve their CSR practices. Our findings have policy implications in the context of the world’s largest emerging market and, more generally, for SOE ownership reform in emerging and transition economies. (shrink)

Third-party fairness maintenance could win some reputational benefits, and it includes two methods: punishment and compensation. We predicted that the third parties' preference between punishment and compensation are affected by whether they are free to choose between the two methods, and the affection could be interpreted through reputational benefits. The present study includes two sections. In Study 1, the participants acted as fourth parties who were asked to rate the reputations of the third parties who had chosen different response methods (...) to an unfair result of the dictator game. The results showed that there was no reputational difference between the two methods when third parties were not free to choose, but the reputation of compensation was better when third parties were free to choose. In Study 2, the participants acted as third parties. The participants were asked to choose a method to respond to an unfair result of the dictator game. There were two reputational contexts: secret and open. The results showed that when third parties were not free to choose, they had no preference between the two methods under the two reputational contexts, but when third parties were free to choose freely, they prefer punishment under the secret context but prefer compensation under the open context. This study systematically reveals a reputational interaction between fourth and third parties, and verifies the affection of reputational benefits on the third parties' preference between punishment and compensation. (shrink)