In General Relativity (GR), it has been claimed that inertia receives a dynamical explanation. This is in contrast to the situation in other theories, such as Special Relativity, because the geodesic principle of GR can be derived from Einstein’s field equations. The claim can be challenged in different ways, all of which question whether the status of inertia in GR is physically different from its status in previous spacetime theories. In this paper I state the original argument for the claim (...) precisely, discuss the different objections to it and then propose a formulation that avoids the problems the original claim encounters. My conclusion is that one can say meaningfully that inertia is dynamically explained in GR. There are two senses in which the derivation of geodetic motion can be said to provide a (more) dynamical explanation of inertia in GR: it holds for any material test body that is a source of the gravitational field; and it is derivable without assuming inertial structures that are fixed independently of matter. (shrink)

Is democracy a requirement of justice or an instrument for realizing it? The correct answer to this question, I argue, depends on the background circumstances against which democracy is defended. In the presence of thin reasonable disagreement about justice, we should value democracy only instrumentally (if at all); in the presence of thick reasonable disagreement about justice, we should value it also intrinsically, as a necessary demand of justice. Since the latter type of disagreement is pervasive in real-world politics, I (...) conclude that theories of justice designed for our world should be centrally concerned with democracy. (shrink)

The interpretation and justification of Earman’s symmetry principles (stating that any spacetime symmetry should be a dynamical symmetry and vice-versa) are controversial. This is directly connected to the question of how certain structures in physical theories acquire a spatiotemporal character. In this paper I address these issues from a perspective (arguably functionalist) that relates the classical discussion about the measurement and geometrical determination of space with a characterization of the notion of dynamical symmetry in which its application to subsystems that (...) act as measuring devices plays an essential role. I argue that in order to reformulate and justify Earman’s principles, and to provide a general account of the chronogeometrical character of some structures, the existence of a coordination between two notions of congruence, one mathematical and one dynamical, must be assumed for the interpretation of physical theories. This coordination provides the basis on which we can understand space-time in physical theories as the codification (representation) of certain features of the access ideal observers have to experience. (shrink)

Much discussion was inspired by the publication of Harvey Brown's book \textit{Physical Relativity} and the so-called dynamical approach to Special Relativity there advocated. At the center of the debate there is the question about the nature of the relation between spacetime and laws or, more specifically, between spacetime symmetries and the symmetries of laws. Originally, the relation was mainly assumed to be explanatory and the dispute expressed in terms of the arrow of explanation – whether it goes from spacetime (symmetries) (...) to (symmetries of) laws or vice-versa. Not everybody agreed with a setting that involves leaving ontology out. In a recent turn, the relation has been claimed to be analytical or definitional. In this paper I intend to examine critically this claim and propose a way to generally understand the relation between spacetime symmetries and symmetries of laws as deriving from constitutive principles. (shrink)

Dark matter is an essential ingredient of the present Standard Cosmological Model, according to which only 5% of the mass/energy content of our universe is made of ordinary matter. In recent times, it has been argued that certain cases of gravitational lensing represent a new type of evidence for the existence of DM. In a recent paper, Peter Kosso attempts to substantiate that claim. His argument is that, although in such cases DM is only detected by its gravitational effects, gravitational (...) lensing is a direct consequence of Einstein's Equivalence Principle and therefore the complete gravitational theory is not needed in order to derive such lensing effects. In this paper I critically examine Kosso's argument: I confront the notion of empirical evidence involved in the discussion and argue that EEP does not have enough power by itself to sustain the claim that gravitational lensing in the Bullet Cluster constitutes evidence for the DM Hypothesis. As a consequence of this, it is necessary to examine the details of alternative theories of gravity to decide whether certain empirical situations are indeed evidence for the existence of DM. It may well be correct that gravitational lensing does constitute evidence for the DM Hypothesis—at present it is controversial whether the proposed modifications of gravitation all need DM to account for the phenomenon of gravitational lensing and if so, of which kind—but this will not be a direct consequence of EEP. (shrink)

In his recent bookThe Idea of Justice, Amartya Sen suggests that political philosophy should move beyond the dominant, Rawls-inspired, methodological paradigm – what Sen calls ‘transcendental institutionalism’ – towards a more practically oriented approach to justice: ‘realization-focused comparison’. In this article, I argue that Sen's call for a paradigm shift in thinking about justice is unwarranted. I show that his criticisms of the Rawlsian approach are either based on misunderstandings, or correct but of little consequence, and conclude that the Rawlsian (...) approach already delivers much of what Sen himself wants from a theory of justice. (shrink)

A globalized world, some argue, needs a global democracy. But there is considerable disagreement about whether global democracy is an ideal worth pursuing. One of the main grounds for scepticism is captured by the slogan: “No global demos, no global democracy.” The fact that a key precondition of democracy—a demos—is absent at the global level, some argue, speaks against the pursuit of global democracy. The paper discusses four interpretations of the skeptical slogan—each based on a specific account of the notion (...) of “the demos”—and concludes that none of them establishes that the global democratic ideal must be abandoned. In so doing, the paper (i) systematizes different types of objections against global democracy, thus bringing some clarity to an otherwise intricate debate and (ii) offers a robust but qualified defense of the global democratic ideal. (shrink)

This article provides a conceptual map of the debate on ideal and non‐ideal theory. It argues that this debate encompasses a number of different questions, which have not been kept sufficiently separate in the literature. In particular, the article distinguishes between the following three interpretations of the ‘ideal vs. non‐ideal theory’ contrast: (i) full compliance vs. partial compliance theory; (ii) utopian vs. realistic theory; (iii) end‐state vs. transitional theory. The article advances critical reflections on each of these sub‐debates, and highlights (...) areas for future research in the field. (shrink)

In this article I present a disagreement between classical and constructive approaches to predicativity regarding the predicative status of so-called generalised inductive definitions. I begin by offering some motivation for an enquiry in the predicative foundations of constructive mathematics, by looking at contemporary work at the intersection between mathematics and computer science. I then review the background notions and spell out the above-mentioned disagreement between classical and constructive approaches to predicativity. Finally, I look at possible ways of defending the constructive (...) predicativity of inductive definitions. (shrink)

If quantum mechanics is correct and there is a finite upper bound for the speed of causal influences (e.g., the speed of light), then quantum mechanics is complete (i.e., it does not admit a more detailed description in terms of hidden variables). Here I show that the conclusion holds if we replace the assumption of bounded velocity by the assumption that there is a finite upper bound to the memory a finite physical system can store (e.g., the Holevo bound). On (...) the way to this conclusion I first show that, although the quantum violation of an inequality valid for any non-contextual model can be explained with a classical contextual model, the inequality can be promoted to a Bell inequality in which, if the model is contextual, then it must be also non-local. This suggests that there is something non-classical in any contextual explanation of the individual systems, and leads us to the question of which are the minimum resources (and specifically memory) any contextual explanation should consume. (shrink)

Kant afirma que espacio y tiempo son condiciones a priori de toda experiencia, a la vez que parece comprometerse con la naturaleza euclidiana del espacio y la simultaneidad absoluta. Su defensa del carácter a priori de estas nociones pasa por considerarlas intuiciones puras, de ahí que su naturaleza newtoniana parecería tener su origen en la configuración de lo que Kant llama intuición. No obstante, como muestran ciertas discusiones recientes, no está claro qué sea la intuición en Kant y cómo se (...) determina el espacio-tiempo a partir de ella. En este artículo, me acerco al debate sobre la procedencia de la síntesis de la intuición pura que, según Kant, determinaría la estructura espacio-temporal y discuto hasta que punto tener en cuenta la participación de las categorías en esta síntesis puede tener un efecto en el compromiso que, según la propuesta kantiana, uno debería asumir con respecto a una métrica determinada a priori. Mi conclusión es que el análisis kantiano da cabida, de forma natural, a que la determinación de la métrica espacio-temporal no esté dada a priori, en el sentido de universal y necesariamente. (shrink)

El artículo propone entender la precariedad en un análisis que sobrepase las condiciones laborales, y que observe la formación de un ciclo vital atravesado por sistemas generales de administración de los medios de subsistencia. Estos sistemas en el contexto neoliberal se han transformado profundamente a través del crédito y la capitalización individual. De modo que el conjunto vital de la población queda precarizado. Se trata entonces del análisis no de trabajos precarios, sino de formas de vida precarizadas. -/- The article (...) proposes that it is necessary to situate the precariousness in an analysis that exceed the working conditions, and to observe the formation of a Lifecycle that is criss-crossed by General Administration of livelihood systems. These systems in the neo-liberal context have been deeply transformed through credit and individual capitalization. So that the life of the population is precarious. It is then not precarious jobs, but life precarized producers forms analysis. (shrink)

El artículo propone una interpretación de la obra literaria "Las Crónicas de Narnia" del autor ingles C. S Lewis. Tal interpretación posibilita considerar la alegoría religiosa que esta obra literaria realiza sobre la experiencia de la divinidad a través de la figura del León.

El año 2011 remeció a Chile con un despertar de los movimientos sociales que levantaron sus demandas para la reestructuración del modelo educacional y social chileno heredado de la dictadura. El libro recopila columnas en prensa, artículos de discusión y material de información elaborado por autores y colectivos diversos que desde una perspectiva crítica al modelo y de compromiso con los movimientos sociales activan algunas de las discusiones de este proceso.

In this article, Laura Quintana elaborates on a conceptual distinction between violence and rage. Along with this distinction, she recognises that while rage may possess a destructive potential, it can also be politicised in emancipatory practices that confront conditions of injustice and structural violence. Her analysis centers on contemporary political movements in Latin America, which she views as collective manifestations of rage. Within these movements, the manifestation of rage is intertwined with forms of care and communal labor. Quintana characterises (...) such movements as embodying a “dignified rage” (digna rabia) that calls for an emancipatory transformation of the status quo. She contends that these practices can be understood in terms of the notion of “anti-violence,” as it has been coined by Étienne Balibar. In this she diverges from Judith Butler, since, according to Quintana’s analysis, such practices challenge the demand for non-violence that has often served to neutralise the disruptive force of such manifestations and movements. (shrink)

In this article I argue that characterizations of anger as a hostile emotion may be mistaken. My project is empirically informed and is partly descriptive, partly diagnostic. It is descriptive in that I am concerned with what anger is, and how it tends to manifest, rather than with what anger should be or how moral anger is manifested. The orthodox view on anger takes it to be, descriptively, an emotion that aims for retribution. This view fits well with anger being (...) a hostile emotion, as retribution is punitive. I will argue that a different view of anger deserves our attention. On this alternative view, anger aims for recognition of harms done, rather than for the punishment of those who have committed them. I argue that we have reason to favour a strong view that excludes retribution from anger’s main aims. In addition, I offer a diagnosis of the reasons that led the retributive view of anger to become, and remain, orthodoxy. This diagnosis provides indirect reason to give my descriptive proposal serious consideration, for it highlights that the orthodox view has dominated folk and philosophical conceptions of anger for reasons that do not speak in favour of the view’s veracity. The view that anger is a hostile emotion will therefore emerge as in need of serious scrutiny. (shrink)

Frank Jackson often writes as if his descriptivist account of public language meanings were just plain common sense. How else are we to explain how different speakers manage to communicate using a public language? And how else can we explain how individuals arrive at confident judgments about the reference of their words in hypothetical scenarios? Our aim in this paper is to show just how controversial the psychological assumptions behind in Jackson’s semantic theory really are. First, we explain how Jackson’s (...) theory goes well beyond the commonsense platitudes he cites in its defence. Second, we sketch an alternative explanation of those platitudes, the jazz model of meaning, which we argue is more psychologically realistic. We conclude that the psychological picture presupposed by Jackson’s semantic theory stands in need of a much more substantial defence than he has so far offered. (shrink)

Much contemporary political philosophy claims to be Kant-inspired, but its aims and method differ from Kant's own. In his recent book, Force and Freedom, Arthur Ripstein advocates a more orthodox Kantian outlook, presenting it as superior to dominant (Kant-inspired) views. The most striking feature of this outlook is its attempt to ground the whole of political morality in one right: the right to freedom, understood as the right to be independent of others’ choices. Is Ripstein's Kantian project successful? In this (...) research note I argue that it is not. First, I suggest that Ripstein's notion of freedom is viciously circular. It is meant to ground all rights, but in fact it presupposes an account of those rights. Second, I show that—independently of its inability to ground a whole political morality—such a moralized understanding of freedom is normatively unappealing. (shrink)

A scholarly edition of a work by Adam Smith. The edition presents an authoritative text, together with an introduction, commentary notes, and scholarly apparatus.

Kant states that space and time are a priori conditions of experience, while apparently being committed to the euclidean nature of space and absolute simultaneity. His defense of the a priori character of spatio-temporal notions stems from taking them as pure intuitions, so its newtonian nature would derive from the configuration of what Kant names as intuition. Nevertheless, according to some recent discussions, it is not clear what intuition means for Kant and how space-time is determined from it. In this (...) paper I look into the debate about the origin of the synthesis of pure intuition that, according to Kant, would determine the spatio-temporal structure. I discuss to what extent taking into account the participation of categories in such a synthesis might have an effect on the commitment that, according to the kantian perspective, one should have with respect to the metric being determined a priori. My conclusion is that kantian analysis can incorporate the idea of a spatio-temporal metric that is not given, in the sense of universally and necessarily, a priori. (shrink)

In this article, I sketch a Kant-inspired liberal account of human rights: the freedom-centred view. This account conceptualizes human rights as entitlements that any political authority—any state in the first instance—must secure to qualify as a guarantor of its subjects' innate right to freedom. On this picture, when a state (or state-like institution) protects human rights, it reasonably qualifies as a moral agent to be treated with respect. By contrast, when a state (or state-like institution) fails to protect human rights, (...) it loses its moral status and becomes liable to both internal and external interference. I argue that this account not only steers a middle course between so-called natural-law and political approaches to human rights but also satisfies three important theoretical desiderata— explanatory power, functional specificity, and critical capacity. (shrink)

Reference to the state is ubiquitous in debates about global justice. Some authors see the state as central to the justification of principles of justice, and thereby reject their extension to the international realm. Others emphasize its role in the implementation of those principles. This chapter scrutinizes the variety of ways in which the state figures in the global-justice debate. Our discussion suggests that, although the state should have a prominent role in theorizing about global justice, contrary to what is (...) commonly thought, acknowledging this role does not lead to anti-cosmopolitan conclusions, but to the defense of an “intermediate” position about global justice. From a justificatory perspective, we argue, the state remains a key locus for the application of egalitarian principles of justice, but is not the only one. From the perspective of implementation, we suggest that state institutions are increasingly fragile in a heavily interdependent world, and need to be supplemented—though not supplanted—with supranational authorities. (shrink)

Predicativity is a notable example of fruitful interaction between philosophy and mathematical logic. It originated at the beginning of the 20th century from methodological and philosophical reflections on a changing concept of set. A clarification of this notion has prompted the development of fundamental new technical instruments, from Russell's type theory to an important chapter in proof theory, which saw the decisive involvement of Kreisel, Feferman and Schütte. The technical outcomes of predica-tivity have since taken a life of their own, (...) but have also produced a deeper understanding of the notion of predicativity, therefore witnessing the " light logic throws on problems in the foundations of mathematics. " (Feferman 1998, p. vii) Predicativity has been at the center of a considerable part of Feferman's work: over the years he has explored alternative ways of explicating and analyzing this notion and has shown that predicative mathematics extends much further than expected within ordinary mathematics. The aim of this note is to outline the principal features of predicativity, from its original motivations at the start of the past century to its logical analysis in the 1950-60's. The hope is to convey why predicativity is a fascinating subject, which has attracted Feferman's attention over the years. (shrink)

The question about the relation between spacetime structure and the symmetries of laws has received renewed attention in a recent discussion about the status of Minkowski spacetime in Special Relativity. In that context we find two extreme positions (either spacetime explains symmetries of laws or vice-versa) and a general assumption about the debate being mainly about explanation. The aim of this paper is twofold: first, to argue that the ontological dimension of the debate cannot be ignored; second, to claim that (...) taking ontology into account involves considering a third perspective on the relation between spacetime and symmetries of laws; one in which both terms would be somehow derived from common assumptions on the formulation of a given physical theory. (shrink)

It has been claimed, recently, that the fact that all the non-gravitational fields are locally Poincaré invariant and that these invariances coincide, in a certain regime, with the symmetries of the spacetime metric is miraculous in general relativity. In this paper I show that, in the context of GR, it is possible to account for these so-called miracles of relativity. The way to do so involves integrating the realisation that the gravitational field equations impose constraints on the behaviour of matter (...) in a novel interpretation of the equivalence principle, which dictates the determination of local inertial frames through gravitational interaction. This proposed explanation of the miracles can also deal with the problematic cases for attempts at explaining them in the context of the standard geometrical perspective on relativity theory. (shrink)

In this paper, I address the significance of the key notions of coordination, constitution and convention. My aim in so doing is to provide a better understanding of their relation to conventionalism and to evaluate the prospects for a version of the relativized a priori based on a refinement of the notion of coordination. I stress the Kantian roots of all three concepts. Moreover, I argue that the link between the early logical positivist requirement for the uniqueness of coordination and (...) the Kantian account of empirical objectivity provides an interpretive key that sheds light on the alleged incompatibility between constitutive principles and conventionalism. (shrink)

The aim of this chapter is to discuss the relevance that emotions can play in our epistemic life considering the state of the art of the philosophical debate on emotions. The strategy is the one of focusing on the three main models on emotions as evaluative judgements, bodily feelings, and perceptions, following the fil rouge of emotion intentionality for rising questions about their epistemic functions. From this examination, a major challenge to mainstream epistemology arises, the one that asks to provide (...) prominence to the epistemic agent and to her affects. This chapter discusses these implications, also providing an overview of the many alternatives available nowadays in epistemology, arguing for an open, comprehensive, and interdisciplinary approach to emotions in knowledge. (shrink)

A proof of Bell’s theorem without inequalities is presented in which distant local setups do not need to be aligned, since the required perfect correlations are achieved for any local rotation of the local setups.

Bell non-locality and Kochen–Specker contextuality are logically independent concepts, fuel different protocols with quantum vs classical advantage, and have distinct classical simulation costs. A natural question is what are the relations between these concepts, advantages, and costs. To address this question, it is useful to have a map that captures all the connections between Bell non-locality and KS contextuality in quantum theory. The aim of this work is to introduce such a map. After defining the theory-independent notions of Bell non-locality (...) and KS contextuality for ideal measurements, we show that, in quantum theory, due to Neumark’s dilation theorem, every quantum Bell non-local behavior can be mapped to a formally identical KS contextual behavior produced in a scenario with identical relations of compatibility but where measurements are ideal and no space-like separation is required. A more difficult problem is identifying connections in the opposite direction. We show that there are “one-to-one” and partial connections between KS contextual behaviors and Bell non-local behaviors for some KS scenarios, but not for all of them. However, there is also a method that transforms any KS contextual behavior for quantum systems of dimension d into a Bell non-local behavior between two quantum subsystems each of them of dimension d. We collect all these connections in map and list some problems which can benefit from this map. (shrink)

We introduce a two-party communication complexity problem in which the probability of success by using a particular strategy allows the parties to detect with certainty whether or not some forbidden communication has taken place. We show that theprobability of success is bounded by nature; any conceivable method which gives a probability of success outside these bounds is impossible. Moreover, any conceivable method to solve the problem which gives a probability success within these bounds is possible in nature. This example suggests (...) that a suitaby chosen set of communication complexity problems could be the basis of an information-theoretic axiomatization of quantum mechanics. (shrink)

Recent work at the junction of epistemology and political theory focuses on the notion of epistemic injustice, the injustice of being wronged as a knower. Miranda Fricker (2007) identifies two kinds of epistemic injustice. I focus here on hermeneutical injustice in an attempt to identify a difficulty for Fricker's account. In particular, I consider the significance of background social conditions and suggest that an epistemic injustice should not rely on other forms of disadvantage to achieve its status as an injustice. (...) Thus reformulated, the notion of epistemic injustice can help us to achieve an even deeper understanding of the relationship between knowledge and privilege. (shrink)

A life without liberty and material resources is not a good life. Equally, a life devoid of meaningful social relationships—such as friendships, family attachments, and romances—is not a good life. From this it is tempting to conclude that just as individuals have rights to liberty and material resources, they also have rights to access meaningful social relationships. I argue that this conclusion can be defended only in a narrow set of cases. ‘Pure’ social relationship deprivation—that is, deprivation that is not (...) caused, or accompanied, by deficits in liberties and material resources— mostly generates demands of private beneficence. I suggest that social relationship deprivation is unjust, hence a rights violation, only when it is due to factors—such as one’s race—that are irrelevant to one’s being a good participant in social relationships. I thus conclude that access to meaningful social relationships is not a fundamental concern for theories of justice. (shrink)