This work presents an hydrodynamical model of heat stroke, which is a physiopathological state of stress, due to an exposure of animals to an ambient temperature of approximatively 40°C during two hours. The evolution of body temperature during this stress process is characterised by three phases. A first phase of increase is followed by a plateau which occurs before a second phase of increase which can be lethal. The model is based on the analogy of a boat progressively caught in (...) a whirlpool. The evolution of the degree of freedom lost by the boat is mathematically analysed and this study leads to the same three phases. The theoretical curves calculated during this study are well in agreement with the experimental curves obtained with animals. This analogy is compared to a previous one which has been made during another experiment with animals constrained by chemical intoxications. It seems that stress can be considered as a vital vorticity and that hydrodynamic models are powerful tools in understanding this physiopathological state. (shrink)

El presente volumen recoge seis ensayos publicados originalmente en inglés en revistas especializadas y volúmenes colectivos a lo largo de la última década. Tratan de las consecuencias de desarrollos recientes en el análisis del conocimiento para la evaluación de los argumentos escépticos tradicionales. Los argumentos escépticos pretenden mostrar que es imposible conocer el mundo. Forman parte de la tradición filosófica occidental desde la antigüedad, y han tenido una influencia importantísima en el desarrollo de la filosofía desde entonces hasta nuestros días. (...) Sin embargo, los principales argumentos escépticos parecen descansar sobre premisas acerca de la naturaleza del conocimiento que han sido puestas en tela de juicio en la epistemología actual. Esto se debe sobre todo a los análisis externistas del conocimiento, que conciben la formación de creencias como un fenómeno natural y el conocimiento como una característica objetiva de este fenómeno. Muchos epistemólogos contemporáneos piensan que si el externismo es verdadero los argumentos escépticos carecen de valor. Los trabajos recogidos aquí consideran diversos aspectos de esta situación, estudiando en detalle la interacción entre principios externistas específicos y las líneas argumentativas principales del escepticismo. (shrink)

Nous chercherons ici à montrer comment le projet Tela Botanica permet à la fois une transformation et une actualisation du savoir botanique. Trois éléments particuliers retiendront notre attention : la libre circulation et la mise à disposition des données les plus récentes du travail des botanistes ; l’articulation nouvelle entre le travail scientifique des amateurs et celui des professionnels ; la création d’une forme organisationnelle hybride combinant des éléments propres au milieu associatif et à l’entreprise privée. Nous utiliserons ces (...) trois axes d’analyse tour à tour, en fournissant des exemples et des réflexions théoriques pour chacun.This article illustrates how the Tela Botanica project is simultaneously transforming botanical knowledge and breathing new life into the field of botany. We discuss three characteristics in particular: the ready availability and free circulation of the most up-to-date botanical data, new links between the scientific work of amateur and professional botanists and the appearance of a hybrid organisational form that combines features from the non-profit model and from private enterprise. We examine these three characteristics in turn, with examples and theoretical discussions in each case. (shrink)

Dans ce m?moire nous nous proposons d?examiner le rapport qu?il peut y avoir entre, d?une part, le dualisme de Descartes et, de l?autre, son affirmation que l?homme repr?sente une unit? substantielle de l??me et de corps. En effet, nous nous effor?ons de d?montrer qu?en voulant concilier sa conception de la diff?rence r?elle avec sa propre d?finition de l??tre humain, le philosophe ne s?appuyait pas seulement sur St. Augustin mais aussi bien sur St. Thomas d?Aquin. U ovom se radu ispituje odnos (...) izmedju Dekartovog dualizma i njegovog stava da je covek supstancijalno jedinstvo duse i tela. Tu se nastoji pokazati da se filozof nije oslanjao samo na Avgustina nego i na Akvinskog onda kada je svo ju realnu razliku pokusao da pomiri s vlastitim odredjenjem ljudskog bica. (shrink)

Nonostante l’immagine della visione sia ancora largamente dominata dal paradigma della finestra, per quanto il cinema stesso si sia concepito a partire da tale figura, evocata per altro dal nome del sistema operativo informatico più diffuso nel mondo – Windows –, la mia ipotesi è che, nell’epoca presente, è piuttosto lo schermo ad essere diventato il dispositivo ottico di riferimento, discostandosi in maniera significativa dal modello della finestra. Per questo ritengo che comprendere in che modo pensiamo la nostra esperienza degli (...) schermi oggi, può aiutarci a comprendere la nostra esperienza presente della visione. Credo inoltre che la nostra esperienza contemporanea degli schermi sia il risultato dell’esperienza percettiva dello schermo che è stata inaugurata dal cinema, nonostante le molteplici differenze che separano queste due strutture. A questo proposito, sappiamo che, fin dalla tenda dietro la quale Pitagora si nascondeva, la superficie opaca dello schermo è stata tradizionalmente considerata come qualcosa che impedisce la visione e dunque come ciò che nasconde la verità. Al contrario, l’avvento del cinema ha mostrato che l’opacità di tale superficie è anche ciò che ci permette di vedere, così che luce ed ombra, tradizionalmente opposti dalla nostra cultura, non possono esistere separatamente. Ma possiamo ancora aggiungere che una simile superficie ha da sempre suscitato e orientato il desiderio di chi la contempla. Se un tale desiderio aveva coinciso con la possibilità di vedere oltre lo schermo, al di là di questo, al contrario oggi la superficie dello schermo è ciò che ci avvolge in una visibilità reversibile, invitandoci a soffermarci sulla sua superficie. Possiamo allora pensare il secolo del cinema, che si è da poco concluso, come la progressiva affermazione di una maniera differente di concepire il darsi del nostro incontro con il mondo. Tale modo nuovo, discostandosi dal dispositivo teatrale, cui la finestra rimandava in quanto sistema per eccellenza rappresentativo – come spettacolo percepito al di là del sipario –, apre a un dispositivo cinematografico, di cui tenterò di delineare alcune caratteristiche essenziali. (shrink)

Moral philosophers agree that welfare matters. But they disagree about what it is, or how much it matters. In this vital new work, Wayne Sumner presents an original theory of welfare, investigating its nature and discussing its importance. He considers and rejects all notable theories of welfare, both objective and subjective, including hedonism and theories founded on desire or preference. His own theory connects welfare closely with happiness or life satisfaction. Reacting against the value pluralism that currently dominates moral philosophy, (...) he advances welfare as the only basic ethical value. He concludes by discussing the implications of this thesis for ethical and political theory. Written in clear, non-technical language, and including a definitive survey of other work in this area, Sumner's book is essential reading for moral philosophers, political theorists, and welfare economists. (shrink)

In Working Virtue: Virtue Ethics and Contemporary Moral Problems, leading figures in the fields of virtue ethics and ethics come together to present the first ...

In this timely book L.W. Sumner addresses these issues within the wider context of palliative care for patients in the dying process.

A definitive feature of Kant's moral philosophy is its rationalism. Kant insists that moral theory, at least at its foundation, cannot take account of empirical facts about human beings and their circumstances in the world. This is the core of Kant's commitment to ‘metaphysics of morals’, and it is what he sees as his greatest contribution to moral philosophy. The paper clarifies what it means to be committed to metaphysics of morals, why Kant is committed to it, and where he (...) thinks empirical considerations may enter moral theory. The paper examines recent work of contemporary Kantians who argue that there is a central role for empirical considerations in Kant's moral theory. Either these theorists interpret Kant himself as permitting empirical considerations to enter, or they propose to extend Kant's theory so as to allow them to enter. With some qualifications, I argue that these interpretive trends are not supported by the texts, and that the proposed extensions are not plausibly Kantian. Kant's insistence on the exclusion of empirical considerations from the foundations of moral theory is not an incidental feature of his thought which might be modified while the rest remains unchanged. Rather, it is the very centre of his endeavours in moral philosophy. If we disagree with it, I argue, we have grounds for moving to a distinctly different theoretical framework. (shrink)

In the course of writing this book, answers to the following questions and many others were given in both narrative and visual form. Most of them were presented rather forcefully, and not when I was expecting them. I understood that I was to share what I learned. What is in store for the geology of North America? How do we create matter every day? What is the nature of nature? How did people live more than a half million years ago? (...) What was space travel like a half million years ago? Where is God? What are our responsibilities as humans? Is Hitler in heaven? How can we go to heaven? (shrink)

This wide-ranging collection of essays contains eighteen original articles by authors representing some of the most important recent work on Wittgenstein. It deals with questions pertaining to both the interpretation and application of Wittgenstein s thought and the editing of his works. Regarding the latter, it also addresses issues concerning scholarly electronic publishing. The collection is accompanied by a comprehensive introduction which lays out the content and arguments of each contribution. Contributors: Knut Erik Tranoy, Lars Hertzberg, Georg Henrik von Wright, (...) Marie McGinn, Cora Diamond, James Conant, David G. Stern, Eike von Savigny, P.M.S. Hacker, Hans-Johann Glock, Allan Janik, Kristof Nyiri, Antonia Soulez, Brian McGuinness, Anthony Kenny, Joachim Schulte, Herbert Hrachovec, Cameron McEwen.". (shrink)

Rationality requires us to respond to apparent normative reasons. Given the independence of appearance and reality, why think that apparent normative reasons necessarily provide real normative reasons? And if they do not, why think that mistakes of rationality are necessarily real mistakes? This paper gives a novel answer to these questions. I argue first that in the moral domain, there are objective duties of respect that we violate whenever we do what appears to violate our first-order duties. The existence of (...) these duties of respect, I argue, ensures that apparent moral reasons are exceptions to the independence of appearance and reality. I then extend these arguments to the domain of overall reason. Just as there are objective duties of respect for moral reasons that explain moral blameworthiness, so there are objective duties of respect for reasons that explain blameworthiness in the court of overall reason. The existence of these duties ensures that apparent reasons are exceptions to the independence of appearance and reality. (shrink)

Ethical naturalism holds that ethical facts about such matters as good and bad, right and wrong, are part of a purely natural world — the world studied by the sciences. It is supported by the apparent reasonableness of many moral explanations. It has been thought to face an epistemological challenge because of the existence of an “is-ought gap”; it also faces metaphysical objections from philosophers who hold that ethical facts would have to be supernatural or “nonnatural,” sometimes on the grounds (...) that ethical thought has a practical role that no thought about purely natural facts could have. Its defenders have argued resourcefully against these challenges. (shrink)

When medical assistance in dying (MAiD) was legalized in Canada in June 2016, the question of allowing decisionally capable persons to make advance requests in anticipation of later incapacity was reserved for further consideration during the mandatory parliamentary review originally scheduled to begin in June 2020 (but since delayed by COVID-19). In its current form the legislation does not permit such requests, since it stipulates that at the time at which the procedure is to be administered the patient must give (...) “express consent” to receiving it. Since express consent presupposes decisional capacity, this requirement rules out administering MAiD to a patient who has lost capacity. Amendments to the legislation passed by Parliament in March 2021 open the door slightly by allowing advance requests by patients after they have been approved for MAiD, if they fear losing capacity before the procedure can be administered. But this provision would apply only to patients whose natural death was deemed to be “reasonably foreseeable”, and would continue to exclude (a) requests made after diagnosis of a “grievous and irremediable medical condition” but in advance of approval for MAiD, and (b) requests made before such a diagnosis. My aim in this paper is twofold: to explore the ethical and legal issues concerning advance requests for MAiD, and to argue for expanding provision for such requests to include both of these further scenarios. (shrink)

Originally published in 1914, this book examines the French Voluntarist school of philosophy and the key ways in which it differs from the Pragmatists. Stebbing argues that Voluntarism and Pragmatism both prove inadequate in their definition of truth, and suggests that an acknowledgment of the 'non-existential character of truth' is needed. This book will be of value to anyone with an interest in philosophy.

Hate speech, understood broadly, is any form of expression intended to arouse hatred or contempt toward members of a particular social group. When university administrators have reason to believe that a planned speaking event on campus may feature hate speech (at least in the eyes of some), how should they respond? In this paper I address this question as it arises for Canadian universities. I argue that, where the regulation of campus speech is concerned, the right course of action for (...) university administrators is nearly always to do absolutely nothing. They will have reason to become actively involved only in order to ensure that a speaking event proceeds safely, or when it threatens to disrupt the functioning of the university, or when it is itself threatened with disruption by protesting groups. In those instances the justification for intervention will be to protect and facilitate speech, not to shut it down. (shrink)

Even though the measurement of fear of crime in criminological research commenced a few decades ago, specific populations, such as social activists, remain undocumented. This article is an attempt to address this gap. A study was conducted among 153 social activists involved in exposing corruption and irregularities that take place in the government system in India. This article explores the gap between the fear of crime and actual victimization among the specific social activists in India. The results indicate activists expressed (...) moderate fear of any one form of victimization including verbal and emotional, physical, and sexual victimization. It was also found that one-third of them have reported facing some form of abuse. The research implications are discussed. (shrink)

Mimesis as Make-Believe is important reading for everyone interested in the workings of representational art.

Despite the recent backlash against epistemic consequentialism, an explicit systematic alternative has yet to emerge. This paper articulates and defends a novel alternative, Epistemic Kantianism, which rests on a requirement of respect for the truth. §1 tackles some preliminaries concerning the proper formulation of the epistemic consequentialism / non-consequentialism divide, explains where Epistemic Kantianism falls in the dialectical landscape, and shows how it can capture what seems attractive about epistemic consequentialism while yielding predictions that are harder for the latter to (...) secure in a principled way. §2 presents Epistemic Kantianism. §3 argues that it is uniquely poised to satisfy the desiderata set out in §1 on an ideal theory of epistemic justification. §4 gives three further arguments, suggesting that it (i) best explains the objective normative significance of the subject's perspective in epistemology, (ii) follows from the kind of axiology needed to solve the swamping problem together with modest assumptions about the relation between the evaluative and the deontic, and (iii) illuminates certain asymmetries in epistemic value and obligation. §5 takes stock and reassesses the score in the debate. (shrink)

An anti-dispositionalist interpretation of grammatical knowledge would maintain that such knowledge exists whether or not it can be behaviourally manifested; a dispositionalist interpretation, on the other hand, would identify that knowledge with the in principle possibility of certain behavioural manifestations. The purpose of this paper is to present a preliminary case for the dispositionalist interpretation by accomplishing two complementary tasks: first, rejecting a prominent argument against the dispositionalist interpretation; second, advancing an original argument against the anti-dispositionalist interpretation. Both tasks involve (...) rebuttals of certain key theses associated with Chomskyan grammatical metatheory, and therefore, provide new opportunities for assessing its viability. -/- . (shrink)

The challenge of handling fictional discourse is to find the best way to resolve the apparent inconsistencies in our ways of speaking about fiction. A promising approach is to take at least some such discourse to involve pretense, but does all fictional discourse involve pretense? I will argue that a better, less revisionary, solution is to take internal and fictionalizing discourse to involve pretense, while allowing that in external critical discourse, fictional names are used seriously to refer to fictional characters. (...) I then address two objections to such realist theories of fiction: One, that they can’t adequately account for the truth of singular nonexistence claims involving fictional names, and two, that accepting that there are fictional characters to which we refer is implausible or ontologically profligate. (shrink)

US Supreme Court rulings concerning sanctions for juvenile offenders have drawn on the science of brain development and concluded that adolescents are inherently less mature than adults in ways that render them less culpable. This conclusion departs from arguments made in cases involving the mature minor doctrine, in which teenagers have been portrayed as comparable to adults in their capacity to make medical decisions. I attempt to reconcile these apparently incompatible views of adolescents’ decision-making competence. Adolescents are indeed less mature (...) than adults when making decisions under conditions that are characterized by emotional arousal and peer pressure, but adolescents aged 15 and older are just as mature as adults when emotional arousal is minimized and when they are not under the influence of peers, conditions that typically characterize medical decision-making. The mature minor doctrine, as applied to individuals 15 and older, is thus consistent with recent research on adolescent development. (shrink)