Abstract. Over time scientists have developed an effective investigative process that includes the acceptance of particular basic presuppositions, methods, content, and theories. T he deeply held presuppositions are the philosophical foundation of scientific thought and do much to define the field’s worldview. These fundamental assumptions can be esoteric for many and can become a source of conflict when they are not commonly shared with other points of view. Such presuppositions affect the observations, the conclusions drawn, and the positions taken. Furthermore, (...) in some cases presuppositions in science have undergone important shifts in meaning, causing an increasing dissonance. We argue that disputes in religion and science often are due to these very basic differences in philosophy that are held by members in the different communities. To better understand the nature of science and its differences with religious views, presuppositions rather than conclusions should be articulated and examined for validity and scope of application. (shrink)

The two-phase study reported here examined the content and communication function served by electronic bumper stickers. EBSs consist of the sayings that are included in an e-mail signature file following personal identifiers such as one's name, phone number, and postal address. In the first phase, 334 EBSs were gathered and content analyzed into one of five message categories. In order of frequency they were: wisdom, humor, advice, religious, and socio-political commentary. In the second phase, open-ended responses from 134 EBS users (...) were coded into one of six motives for interpersonal communication. The relationship between one's motive for using an EBS and the content of one's EBS was not statistically significant. The implications of EBSs and e-mail use for mediated communication competence are considered. (shrink)

Lying and Deception in Human Interaction provides readers with a critical understanding of deception that is necessary for evaluating the integrity of the messages they receive and send in daily life. The author's lively writing style engages the reader as a multitude of real life examples demonstrate the relevance of visual deception in human interaction. Deception, as a form of communication, is represented in the behavior of all living organisms and has been a part of human behavior for millions of (...) years. Lying and Deception in Human Interaction enables its readers to seek more accurate ways of identifying deceitful behavior and to effectively cope with it. (shrink)

Sprachliche Ausdrücke, mit deren Hilfe wir Spiele beschreiben und vorantreiben, sind in ihrer Verwendungsweise so vielfältig wie kaum irgendwelche anderen Ausdrücke. Und sie haben eine Eigenschaft, die man mit dem Thema Spiel eher nicht in Verbindung bringen würde: Sie eignen sich dazu, auf substantive Weise Metaphysik zu treiben oder wieder ingangzubringen. Diese Art der Starthilfe hat die jahrtausendealte Metaphysik (metaphysica specialis) neuerdings nötig. Seit knapp hundert Jahren steht sie im Verdacht, auf nichts besseres hinauszulaufen als leeres, unverständliches Wortgeklingel. Wer (...) diesen sprachphilosophischen Verdacht auszuräumen wünscht, tut gut daran, unverdächtige Redebereiche zu bemühen. In der Tat, mithilfe unserer höchst robusten, völlig alltäglichen Rede vom Spielen und beim Spielen können wir tiefe metaphysische Möglichkeiten verständlich machen, etwa die Möglichkeit einer Wirklichkeit jenseits oder oberhalb des Bereichs derjenigen Wirklichkeit, die wir Natur oder physisches Universum nennen. Dazu betrachte ich ein philosophisches Gedankenspiel (das den Matrix-Filmen zugrundeliegt und all unsere Wissensansprüche zu unterminieren scheint): Wir sind Gehirne im Tank, d.h. wir haben keinen vollständigen menschlichen Körper, sondern nur ein Gehirn, das in einem Tank mit Nährflüssigkeit schwebt; die Nerven-Enden dieser Gehirne sind mit einem Supercomputer verbunden, der uns die Illusion verschafft, dass alles in Ordnung sei. Hiergegen hat Hilary Putnam folgende sprachphilosophische Schwierigkeit aufgeworfen: Wie soll ein Gehirn im Tank seine eigene Situation treffend auf den Punkt bringen, wenn doch seine Ausdrücke "Tiger", "Gehirn", "Tank" usw. allesamt nicht mit echten Tigern, Gehirnen usw. verknüpft sind, sondern mit Nullen und Einsen im Computer? Putnam trieb diese Schwierigkeit bis an den Punkt, an dem sich zweifelsfrei beweisen lässt, dass wir keine Gehirne im Tank sein können. Und da hatte er meiner Ansicht nach recht. Wie ich meine, sollten wir uns nicht darüber den Kopf zerbrechen, ob wir ein Gehirn im Tank sind, sondern darüber, ob wir in einer analogen Situation stecken, um eine Ebene nach oben verschoben. Um die Metaphern dieser Formulierung des Problems auszupacken, setze ich Spielvokabeln ein. Wegen ihrer atemberaubenden Flexibilität brauchen sie (im Unterschied zur naturwissenschaftlichen Sprache) bei Übersetzung aus der Tanksprache in unsere Sprache nicht verändert zu werden; solche Ausdrücke heißen semantisch stabil. Mit ihrer Hilfe können wir gravierende metaphysische Möglichkeiten aufwerfen, z.B.: "Jemand, der nicht aus Materie besteht und nicht in meinem physischen Universum vorkommt, treibt mit mir von außerhalb seine Machtspielchen". Damit beziehen wir uns vielleicht auf die außerirdische Programmiererin der Simulation, in der wir möglicherweise doch stecken. Weniger respektlos formuliert, wäre das die Frage eines allmächtigen Schöpfergottes außerhalb unserer physikalischen Raumzeit: Metaphysik pur. (shrink)

Does the decision to relax by taking a drive rather than by taking a walk cause harm? In particular, do the additional carbon emissions caused by such a decision make anyone worse off? Recently several philosophers have argued that the answer is no, and on this basis have gone on to claim that act-consequentialism cannot provide a moral reason for individuals to voluntarily reduce their emissions. The reasoning typically consists of two steps. First, the effect of individual emissions on the (...) weather is miniscule: the planet’s meteorological system is so large, and the size of individual emissions so tiny, that whatever impact an individual emission has on the weather must be vanishingly small. Second, vanishingly small impacts aren’t morally relevant because no one could possibly tell the difference between such an impact occurring and it not occurring. In this paper, we show why both steps are mistaken, and hence why act-consequentialism implies that each of us has an individual obligation to do what we can to stop damaging the climate, including by refraining from, or perhaps by purchasing offsets against, our own individual luxury carbon emissions. (shrink)

Comparative pride—that is, pride in how one compares to others in some respect—is often thought to be warranted. In this paper, I argue that this common position is mistaken. The paper begins with an analysis of how things seem when a person feels pride. Pride, I claim, presents some aspect of the self with which one identifies as being worthy. Moreover, in some cases, it presents this aspect of the self as something one is responsible for. I then go on (...) to argue that when the focus of one's pride is comparative, things are never as pride makes them seem. The core problem is that if the performance in which one takes pride is really valuable, the fact that it is superior to the performance of others does nothing to contribute to that value. I conclude with a discussion of why so many are inclined to validate comparative pride and a response to those who claim that comparisons are essential to pride because they must be used to set standards of excellence. (shrink)

How cautious should regulators be? A standard answer is consequentialist: regulators should be just cautious enough to maximize expected social value. This paper charts the prospects of a nonconsequentialist - and more precautionary - alternative. More specifically, it argues that a contractualism focused on ex ante consent can motivate the following regulatory criterion: regulators should permit a socially beneficial risky activity only if no one can be expected to be made worse off by it. Broadly speaking, there are two strategies (...) regulators can use to help risky activities satisfy this criterion: regulators can mandate strict safety standards that protect those who would otherwise stand to lose, and they can require that some of the benefits of the activity be redirected to them. In developing these themes, the paper aims to provide a theoretical grounding for those who oppose using risk-cost-benefit analysis as the primary regulatory standard, and in particular, for advocates of the precautionary principle. (shrink)

Envy of others' material possessions is a potent motivator of consumerism. This makes it a prudentially and morally hazardous emotional response. After outlining these hazards, I present an analysis of the emotion of envy. Envy, I argue, presents things in the following way: the envier lacks some good that her rival possesses; this difference between them is bad for the envier; this difference reflects poorly on the envier's worth; and this difference is undeserved. I then discuss the conditions under which (...) these presentations can be satisfied by differences in material possessions. My conclusion is that no difference in material possessions can simultaneously be all the ways envy presents it as being. Consequently, economic envy is systematically irrational: it is never a warranted response to the distribution of material wealth. Recognising this bolsters the prudential and moral case for reducing the degree to which we feel it and for resisting the inclinations it gives rise to when we do. (shrink)

In Working Virtue: Virtue Ethics and Contemporary Moral Problems, leading figures in the fields of virtue ethics and ethics come together to present the first ...

According to most contemporary theorists, free riding on the cooperative contributions of others is unfair. At the same time, obligations to contribute to cooperative schemes can compel conformity with conventional practices, and can do so to a degree that poses a real threat to individuality. This paper exposes this tension between fairness and individuality, and proposes a way to resolve it. The resolution depends on an alternative approach to understanding fairness—one that appeals to the relational goods fairness is meant to (...) maintain. In particular, norms of fairness protect against the interactions within a relationship becoming disrespectful. Many instances of free riding are indeed disrespectful and hence unfair. But this is not always so: one can choose to live a lifestyle that fails to return the benefits their community provides without disrespecting one's fellows. It is thus possible to free ride without being unfair, and so duties of fairness need not add to those already formidable forces that threaten to extinguish valuable individuality. (shrink)

Chrisoula Andreou argues that even if our happiness is determined by our material standard of living, our standard of living could be lowered without lowering our happiness. In this response, I show how this claim can be challenged on both conceptual and empirical grounds. Conceptually, how justified we are in believing her claim depends on how we conceive of the 'we' it refers to. Empirically, there is economic evidence in tension with each of the several interpretations her position admits of. (...) I conclude that Andreou has not provided an argument that can reasonably persuade committed materialists that reducing their standard of living will not reduce their happiness. And I suggest that the search for such an argument ought to include attempts to articulate and defend a theory of well-being that shows how tenuous the connection between material luxury and quality of life really is. (shrink)

Since materially opulent lifestyles are a significant cause of environmental degradation, environmentalists often call for us to live more simply. This call is typically focused on consumption. But our environmental footprint is a function of our paid work as well as our purchases. Consequently, environmentalists should also urge us to work less. Defending this claim is the project of this paper. Reducing our economic productivity, I argue, can often be expected to make both the world and our characters better. And, (...) contrary to what some have suggested, working less than is normal needn’t involve unfairly free-riding on the productive efforts of others. (shrink)

This article develops and defends an account of prudential value that is inspired by ideas found in Thoreau’s Walden. The core claim is that prudential value consists in responding appropriately to those things that make the world better, and avoiding those things that make it worse. The core argument is that this is our aim in so far as we are evaluative creatures, and that our evaluative nature is essential to us in the context of inquiring into our good. I (...) also illustrate how the account can be developed to inform an intuitively plausible theory of well-being, and conclude by discussing its virtues relative to some contemporary alternatives. (shrink)

Mimesis as Make-Believe is important reading for everyone interested in the workings of representational art.

Seeking to explain the emergence of anti-trafficking initiatives, scholars have explored two sets of ideas—national security and gender equality—thought to shape policy. In this study, we examine whether such ideational influence accounts for Sweden's evolving anti-trafficking policy over the past decade. As powerful domestic ideas about gender inequality informed the adoption of an abolitionist prostitution policy in the 1990s, one would expect similar ideas to influence domestic responses to the related issue of cross-border trafficking.However, our case study shows that the (...) policy area of trafficking has largely followed a different ideational path. Gendered ideas, periodically nested in a human rights discourse, have been salient in the public debate on trafficking in human beings, especially during the campaign to boycott the 2006 FIFA World Cup. However, they have exerted substantially less influence on Swedish legislative initiatives to combat trafficking, with security concerns still holding sway. (shrink)

It was proposed that the data from Monte Carlo statistical investigations be subjected to analysis of variance methods rather than the conventional techniques of tabling, graphing, and inspecting the data. Two examples in which analysis of variance methods were applied to published Monte Carlo studies were presented. It was suggested that balanced factorial designs should be used whenever possible in Monte Carlo studies so that analysis of variance methods would be directly applicable. Finally, three advantages of analysis of variance methods (...) over conventional techniques were described and analysis of variance methods were contrasted with a possible alternative analytical method, multiple regression analysis. (shrink)

Can it make sense for someone who appreciates the explanatory power of modern science to continue believing in a traditional religious account of the ultimate nature and purpose of our universe?

Dynamic epistemic logic (DEL) is a multi-modal logic for reasoning about the change of knowledge in multi-agent systems. It extends epistemic logic by a modal operator for actions which announce logical formulas to other agents. In Hilbert-style proof calculi for DEL, modal action formulas are reduced to epistemic logic, whereas current sequent calculi for DEL are labelled systems which internalize the semantic accessibility relation of the modal operators, as well as the accessibility relation underlying the semantics of the actions. We (...) present a novel cut-free ordinary sequent calculus, called |$ \textbf{G4}_{P,A}[] $|⁠, for propositional DEL. In contrast to the known sequent calculi, our calculus does not internalize the accessibility relations, but—similar to Hilbert style proof calculi—action formulas are reduced to epistemic formulas. Since no ordinary sequent calculus for full S5 modal logic is known, the proof rules for the knowledge operator and the Boolean operators are those of an underlying S4 modal calculus. We show the soundness and completeness of |$ \textbf{G4}_{P,A}[] $| and prove also the admissibility of the cut-rule and of several other rules for introducing the action modality. (shrink)

Christopher Southgate has made important contributions to theodicy and the theory of divine action in light of the contingency in evolution and the suffering of creation. What happens then when one thinks through the implications of contingency for Christology? One can admit that aesthetic and moral judgments are products of a contingent history and yet affirm that they really are valid. Similarly, we argue, one can acknowledge the contingency of Jesus’ existence, actions, and subsequent impact and still maintain that his (...) will was uniquely united with the divine will. Following a critical engagement with the recent work of Keith Ward, we argue that a high Christology is compatible with the actual contingencies of evolutionary and social history, without the necessity of interventionist divine action. (shrink)