Polanyi and Merleau-Ponty are often viewed as arguing for philosophical positions that are generally non-Cartesian. Despite their broadly compatible orientations, their overall projects differ at key junctures. What I have called Polanyi’s “enactive realism” is an attempt to clarify what is unique about Polanyi’s epistemology. It is specifically Polanyi’s delineation of the hierarchical, stratified nature of comprehensive entities as brought forth by the structure of tacit knowing (not the hierarchy itself) that marks a key departure from Merleau-Ponty.

Embodiment is a crucial feature of Polanyi’s tacit knowing. In the following, I synthesize ideas from Polanyi, Johnson and Lakoff, and Merleau-Ponty to further illuminate the embodied dimensions of tacit knowing. I appropriate two widespread embodied structures, image schemas and metaphor, into a Polanyian framework for embodied knowing. I also briefly indicate some important ways in which Polanyi departs from these three thinkers.

Embodiment is a crucial feature of Polanyi’s tacit knowing. In the following, I synthesize ideas from Polanyi, Johnson and Lakoff, and Merleau-Ponty to further illuminate the embodied dimensions of tacit knowing. I appropriate two widespread embodied structures, image schemas and metaphor, into a Polanyian framework for embodied knowing. I also briefly indicate some important ways in which Polanyi departs from these three thinkers.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Hawaii at Manoa, 2008.

Light metaphors occurring in Chinese philosophy and Stoicism are of special interest for the unique ways they channel potentialities of the self. In this paper I apply ideas from cognitive linguistics to examine selected structural features of these metaphors. I also build on these ideas by presenting a framework regarding affects to assist in disclosing what is at stake for differing Chinese and Stoic technologies of the self. The paper adopts a high-level perspective to see these broad philosophical implications, interleaving (...) discussions of Chinese philosophy (mainly views associated with Daoism), Stoicism (bringing into relief important differences from these views), and contemporary research on socially constructed affects. This “triadic” comparative approach aims to shed new light on some root assumptions built into the projects of self-cultivation that are at the core of Chinese and Stoic worldviews. (shrink)

Tihamér Margitay makes two key moves against Polanyi’s hierarchical ontology in his essay “From Epistemology to Ontology.” I address these two moves and defend Polanyi from a complex-systems point of view.

There are potentialities to be harnessed in a fusion between elements of Alicia Juarrero’s views and a Polanyian framework. In this brief response piece, I address the latent Polanyian dimensions of Juarrero’s ontic approach to dynamical systems.