Anthropology was a new field of study when Kant first began lecturing on it in 1772, and Kant himself was the first academic to teach regular courses in this area. As is well known, his own approach to anthropology is self-described as ‘pragmatic’, and Kant’s pragmatic anthropology differs markedly from the anthropologies that other early contributors to the new discipline were advocating. In this essay I focus on a fundamental feature of Kant’s anthropology that has been (...) under-appreciated in previous discussions; namely, the particular conception of human nature that he believes anthropology, when pursued properly, leads to. I call this conception a cosmopolitan conception of human nature. In addition to establishing the central importance of this idea for Kant’s project in anthropology, I also try in this essay to unravel some of its ambiguities and tensions as well as to highlight its underlying moral motives. The cosmopolitan conception of human nature that is central to Kant’s anthropology is a further indication of the significance of his anthropology for ethics.Keywords: Immanuel; Kant; Anthropology; Pragmatic; Cosmopolitan; Human nature. (shrink)

Through an examination of such disciplinary keywords, and their silences, as the West, modernity, globalization, the state, culture, and the field, this book aims to explore the future of anthropology in the 21st century, by examining its past, its origins, and its conditions of possibility alongside the history of the North Atlantic world and the production of the West. In this significant book, Michel-Rolph Trouillot challenges contemporary anthropologists to question dominant narratives of globalization and to radically rethink the (...) utility of the concept of culture, the emphasis upon fieldwork as the central methodology of the discipline, and the relationship between anthropologists and the people whom they study. (shrink)

Cultural and historical variability is completely overwhelming and within its context it is almostimpossible to decipher something “essential”, some “invariant variable” which would comprise a clueto what the human is, – this idea is presented as the main presupposition of Eugen Fink’s philosophicalanthropology. A major direction of Fink’s works is a fundamental critique of traditional ontology anda search for a worldly thinking that would be more appropriate or implicit in human “worldly” existence.While following Husserl’s transcendental philosophy, Fink opened up a (...) new philosophical domainthat is implicit in transcendental mode of awareness. His effort consisted in “revealing” what is alreadyamidst us, what we have silently guessed and lived but dared not speak. This “revelation” is at thebasis of Fink’s conception of education. Education is a movement from authority to autonomy, fromsubmission to “pregiven” and ready-made answers toward the creative, the free activity which is itsown source.Keywords: being human, temporality, freedom, productivity, creativity, political self-understanding. (shrink)

One of Kant’s central tenets concerning the human sciences is the claim that one need not, and should not, use a physiological vocabulary if one studies human cognitions, feelings, desires, and actions from the point of view of his ‘pragmatic’ anthropology. The claim is well known, but the arguments Kant advances for it have not been closely discussed. I argue against misguided interpretations of the claim, and I present his actual reasons in favor of it. Contemporary critics of a (...) ‘physiological anthropology’ reject physiological explanations of mental states as more or less epistemologically dubious. Kant does not favor such ignorance claims—and this is for the good, since none of these claims was sufficiently justified at that time. Instead, he develops an original irrelevance thesis concerning the empirical knowledge of the physiological basis of the mind. His arguments for this claim derive from his original and, up to now, little understood criticism of a certain conception of pragmatic history, related to his anthropological insights concerning our ability to create new rules of action, the social dynamics of human action, and the relative inconstancy of human nature. The irrelevance thesis also changes his views of the goal and methodology of anthropology. Kant thereby argues for a distinctive approach in quest for a general ‘science of man’.Keywords: Anthropology; Psychology; Psychophysiological explanations; Pragmatic history; Action explanation; Human nature. (shrink)

Among the many stages of Kant’s problem of a reciprocal collocation of the human knowledges, Encyclopedism, quite unsurprisingly, is one of the most relevant; and yet, quite surprisingly, it is Anthropology which plays here one of the lead parts, insofar as the complex ascertainment of its definition, its position, its task proves to be of irrefutable importance towards solving the greater problem at hand. The question arises as the association – or dissociation – between Empirical Psychology and Pragmatic (...) class='Hi'>Anthropology, and their inclusion in, or exclusion from, their greater or lesser relation with Metaphysics; a problem which, to the careless eye, seems to have been promoted by Kant himself. Here, opinions diverge as to the nature of the relation between the two sciences, from their total inter-dependence to their complete separation. We, in turn, propose a different approach. Our objective is to reenact Kant’s fundamental scheme of human knowledges, as presented not only in the only extant Lecture on Encyclopedism, but in various others dimensions of Kant’s academic activity; and here, to propose a contrasting analysis between Empirical Psychology and Pragmatic Anthropology; one, however, based not on the assumption of their consonance or dissonance through their characteristics, rather on their respective position and scope amid the field of human knowledges. As such, it is our intention to consider Kant’s Lectures in their interconnection, namely, in their apparently dubious simultaneous collocation of an Empirical Psychology as Anthropology; and, based on their specific position in the scheme of human knowledges, and what this position entails in terms of their scope and task, to ascertain to what extent Empirical Psychology is indeed Anthropology, and from what extent Empirical Psychology is no longer Anthropology – not, at least, Pragmatic Anthropology. In other words, we shall labor towards defining a dividing line in Kant’s scheme of human knowledges; one which for Kant represents a third dimension of knowledge and stands between rational and empirical, Metaphysics and the historical sciences; that line, in our view, being that of a cosmopolitical prism. Keywords: Kant, encyclopedism, anthropology, empirical psychology, cosmopolitanism. (shrink)

This paper examines Kant’s anthropological project and its relationship to his conception of ‘man’ in order to show that Kant’s answer to the question ‘what is man?’ entails a decisive re-evaluation of traditional conceptions of human nature. I argue that Kant redirects the question ‘what is man?’ away from defining man in terms of what he is, and towards defining him in terms of what he does, in particular through the distinction between three levels of what I will call ‘man’s (...) praxis’: the levels of technicality, prudence, and morality. As soon as man is understood in terms of what he makes of himself rather than in terms of what he is, two crucial issues arise: what is the purpose of his making? And how can he reach this destination? My claim is that whilst the first question is answered by ethics and a doctrine of prudence, the second question is answered by anthropology. In this sense, anthropology plays the crucial role of identifying the worldly helps and hindrances to the realisation of man’s purposes—and this is the reason why it should be understood as a ‘pragmatic’ discipline.Keywords: Immanuel; Kant; Pragmatic; Anthropology; Praxis; Aliens; Human nature. (shrink)

This paper responds to an invitation to historians of political thought to enter the debate on new materialism. It combines Simondon’s philosophy of individuation with some aspects of post-humanist and new materialist thought, without abandoning a more classically ‘historical’ characterization of materialism. Two keywords drawn from Barad and Simondon respectively – ‘ontoepistemology’ and ‘axiontology’ – represent the red thread of a narrative that connects the early modern invention of civil science to Wiener’s cybernetic theory of society. The political stakes (...) common to these forms of mechanical materialism were attacked ontologically, epistemologically and politically by Simondon. His approach, I will argue, opens the path for a genuine materialist critique of the political anthropology implicit in modern political thought, and shifts political thinking from politics conceived as a problem to be solved to politics as an arena of strategic experimentation. (shrink)

This paper aims to explore the theme of art in Helmuth Plessner’s philosophical anthropology and show the possibilities of its use in the analysis of artistic creation and artwork. The article is divided into three parts: in the first part, it presents the background of Plessner’s anthropological project and the intersection of his philosophy with Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology. This strategy enables the synergy of both approaches which can be used for reflection of art. The second part displays the scope (...) and ingenuity of Plessner’s approach through a selection of texts where he addresses art. And finally, the third part delves into a functional elaboration of the anthropology of an artwork, specifically, using Max Beckmann as an example, into the question of anthropological foundations in art making, and the question of new form in art. For the latter question, I use the approach to architecture as an example relying on corporeality and Umwelt as guiding concepts. This analysis provides, on the one hand, description of anthropologically significant phenomena of artistic production of the first half of the twentieth century, and on the other hand, reveals functional determinations of corporeality, the world, and resonance with the world, the so-called equilibrium, which can be used to understand the artwork, and artistic production in the creation of a new form in art. Keywords: philosophical anthropology, phenomenology, Helmuth Plessner, Edmund Husserl, Max Beckmann, corporeality, Umwelt, resonance, new form. (shrink)

The study began with an introduction to Philosophy of Man. This Philosophical-Christological approach started with sense of self-awareness on this seemingly vain technological modern world. In the history of philosophy, there were three objects of study evolving by themselves, world, man and God in orderly fashion and repeating in interval phases. Self-experience shows three objects: first, existential unity (past), second, experiential unity (present) and third, transcendental unity (future). Western Philosophy banked on Aristotle’s notion of man as rational animal that led (...) to Dualism turned into Monism and finally into Pluralism making it harder to capsulate man’s unity. Thus, the universal question “what is man?” including his end remains unanswered. The problem with Western-Aristotelian Thought was its dependence on rationality as ultimate and highest faculty of man. The Greeks believed in immortality of soul but contradicted reality that human mind has no power over death (mortality). Faith transcends mortal-natural state of man however not in proud and arrogant manner but in utter surrender and subjection (Paschal). Faith turns truth from objective to personal. God’s and man’s identity was both revealed. Man as God’s image becomes definite in the revelation about Christ, the Son of God - the Perfect Man Eph. 4.13. KEYWORDS: Philosophy, Christ, Perfect Man, Philosophical-Christological approach,Christian anthropology, Qualitative Research Design, Philippines. (shrink)

Between 1896 and 1898 Russell’s philosophy was considerably influenced by Hermann Lotze. Lotze’s influence on Russell was especially pronounced in introducing metaphysical—anthropological, in particular—assumptions in Russell’s logic and ontology. Three steps in his work reflect this influence. (i) The first such step can be discerned in the Principle of Differentiation, which Russell accepted in the Essay (finished in October 1986); according to this Principle, the objects of human cognition are segmented complexes which have diverse parts (individuals). (ii) After Russell reread (...) Lotze in June 1897, he claimed that the solution of the dilemma of pluralism or monism depends on how we see space and time: as relational or as adjectival? (iii) Russell decided for the relational conception only after he attended lectures by McTaggart on Lotze in January to February 1898. The lectures helped Russell to advance (from April to June 1898) a new theory of judgment according to which judgments relate terms (individuals) which are distinct one from another. Space and time moreover are series of moments and places with external relations between themselves. The discussions Russell had with Moore in May to June 1898 took place only after Russell developed this conception; they did not cause his philosophical turn. (shrink)

This book suggests a bold comparative approach to broad cultural differences between Africa and Melanesia. Its theme is personhood, understood in terms of what anthropologists call embodiment. These concepts are applied to questions ranging from the meanings of spirit possession, to the logics of witchcraft and kinship relations, the use of rituals in healing, and even the impact of capitalism. Questioning common assumptions about the huge differences among these discrete areas, the contributions document surprising continuities.

In this paper, I propose we replace the anthropocentric paradigm with an ethoanthropological one that can account for the fact that the human being is just a part of the world and of “nature”. Theoretical reflection and recent findings in the natural sciences confirm that ancient anthropocentric dualisms – the ancient body/soul, and res extensa/res cogitans divide – are obsolete. Here I argue that the human being is a bodymind continuum, comprising action, experience, nurture, and culture. To develop a broader (...) and at the same time more specific science of man is possible only on the condition that we give up the anthropocentric view and replace it with an ethoanthropology. This would also provide compelling reasons to forego harmful experimentation and exploitation of other animal species, including animal biotechnology. Keywords: Anthropology; Biotechnology; Ethology; Nurture; Culture Per una etoantropologia Riassunto: In questo articolo si avanza la proposta di rimpiazzare il paradigma antropocentrico con un paradigma etoantropologico rivolto a ricomprendere dell’essere umano all’interno del mondo e all’interno della “natura”. La riflessione teorica e le scienze naturali confermano che l’antico dualismo antropocentrico – l’antico dualismo tra corpo e mente, tra res extensa e res cogitans – è semplicemente obsoleto. L’essere umano è un continuum di corpomente, azione, esperienza, educazione e cultura. Sviluppare una scienza dell’uomo che sia più ampia ed al contempo più precisa è possibile a patto di superare il provincialismo antropocentrico e di sostituirlo con una etnoantropologia. Questa potrebbe fornirci delle ragioni forti per rinunciare alle pratiche più distruttive operate sugli animali, comprese quelle biotecnologiche. Parole chiave: Antropologia; Biotecnologia; Etologia; Educazione; Cultura. (shrink)

Both Kant and Dilthey distinguish between cognition and knowledge, but they do so differently in accordance with their respective theoretical interests. Kant’s primary cognitive interest is in the natural sciences, and from this perspective the status of psychology is questioned because its phenomena are not mathematically measurable. Dilthey, by contrast, reconceives psychology as a human science.For Kant, knowledge is conceptual cognition that has attained certainty by being part of a rational system. Dilthey also links knowledge with certainty; however, he derives (...) the latter from life-experience rather than from reason. Dilthey’s psychology begins with the self-certainty of lived experience and life-knowledge, but this turns out to fall short of cognitive understanding. In the final analysis, both Kant and Dilthey move beyond psychology to arrive at self-understanding. Because of his doubts about introspection, Kant replaces psychology with a pragmatic anthropology to provide a communal framework for self-understanding. Dilthey supplements psychology with other human sciences as part of a project of anthropological reflection.Author Keywords: Anthropology; Cognition; Dilthey; Kant; Knowledge; Psychology. (shrink)

Este artigo trata de um dos rituais mais importantes do Islã, que é a realização do Hajj (peregrinação à Meca) e da Umrah (peregrinação menor). O Hajj é o quinto pilar da religião e deve ser feito se a pessoa tiver condição física e econômica para empreender a peregrinação de acordo com o calendário islâmico. A realização do percurso se dá em cinco dias, que devem ser cumpridos à risca. A Umrah é recomendável e pode ser feita em qualquer período (...) do ano: trata-se a apenas da visita à Caaba. O percurso do Hajj prefigura tempos, símbolos e gestos . Esses elementos podem consubstanciar o rito como performance religiosa, pois determinam um tempo que se repete, como apontou Leach (1971), o que torna o muçulmano um outro , após participar deste ritual. Após fazer o hajj, o peregrino torna-se um hajji, muda de vida, assim como podemos verificar nas transformações apontadas por Schechner(1985): a pessoa não é a mesma depois desta experiência religiosa. A Umrah embora não seja peregrinação, propriamente dita, e sim uma visita, também é carregada de simbolismo e provoca uma transformação no fiel, como é possível perceber em um dos relatos deste artigo. Palavras-chave : Antropologia da performance. Transformado e transportado. Hajj . Comunidade muçulmana no Brasil.This article deals with one of the most important rituals of Islam, which is the realization of the Hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca) and Umrah (lesser pilgrimage). The Hajj is the fifth pillar of the Islam and should be done if the person has physical and economic condition to undertake the pilgrimage according to the Islamic calendar. The completion of the course takes place over five days, which shall be fulfilled to the letter. The Umrah is recommended and can be made at any time of the year: it is just a visit to the Kaaba. The journey of Hajj prefigures times, symbols and gestures. These elements may involve a religious ritual as performance; they determine a time that is repeated, as pointed out by Leach (1971), which makes the Muslim another individual after attending such ritual. After making the hajj, the pilgrim becomes a hajji and then his life is changed, as we can see through the transformations indicated by Schechner (1985): the person is not the same after this religious experience. The Umrah is not, strictly, a pilgrimage, but a visit, full of symbolism that provokes changes in the faithful, as one can see in one of the reports of this article. Keywords: Anthropology of performance. Processed and transported. Hajj. Muslim community in Brazil. (shrink)

Definition of the problem: Referring to the current critique of bioethics from the point of view of medical anthropology in North America, implications for moral philosophy and health care ethics are questioned. Arguments: The intrinsic and extrinsic flaws of common biomedical ethics as theory-driven ethics of principles and norms are also demonstrated in the German discussion of medical ethics (by reference to ’ethos’ and ’responsibility’) and ethical theory (especially phenomenology or hermeneutics). Objections to the Western bias of Bioethics from (...) the perspective of cross-cultural research are not only a radical critique of biomedicine but a challenge to philosophy and ethics becoming ’intercultural’. Conclusions: Cultural and social studies of life, context and ethos could be helpful in developing the ethical sensitivity, intercultural perception and motivations of health care personnel. In return, the field workers’ self-reflection of their normative preconditions will become an issue. (shrink)

Because our actions change, our responsibility is modified; because our responsibility is modified, we need to question the ethics of the action. Our action is situated right there between announcing a diagnosis, the theoretical and practical result of identification, the determining and naming of a fact and voicing the disease which is a human action where medical and technical expertise comes up against a life and its story. Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis (ALS), or Lou Gehrig’s disease, is a degenerative disease of (...) the motor neurons leading to paralysis. In the absence of any curative treatment, the natural course always results in death. Since 1989, progress in the management of this disease in France has been exponential, resulting in the creation of 17 expert centres throughout the country in 2003. Guidelines have been drawn up through consensus conferences and coordination meetings. For the delicate stage of the announcement, three requirements have been adopted: the quality of receptiveness of the medical practitioner and his team, their ability to listen and to adapt to the particularities of the patient in their care; their commitment with regard to legal obligations as to how and to whom to transmit information; and the need for a multidisciplined approach to be able to rapidly support the patient and his family. Questioning in the field of applied ethics has led us to examine whether having a benevolent and non-harmful attitude towards these patients, respecting their autonomy and legal rights are parameters required in this specialized practice. Through a transversal thematic analysis of the experiences of the medical practitioners at the Centres, we would like to explore a hypothesis of the remarkable epistemological progression of the neurologist in this form of care in the pure Hippocratic tradition. Through the compassionate experience of the other by these committed doctors and their teams, we will try to outline the view of anthropological phenomenology with regard to the ALS patient, their awareness of the future paralysis of the body that is being announced, their awareness of the temporality and will characteristic of the ALS patient and of his finality that they will be accompanying. (shrink)

The outbreak of the novel coronavirus disease and the efforts to contain the raging pandemic raise not only health, but also existential concerns. The present work sets out to examine how the pandemic impacts on the African socio-cultural life. The approach is analytical, phenomenological and above all conversational. For the African, the pandemic has two-pronged, positive and negative existential implications. On the one hand, the search for a possible cure and a vaccine for the novel coronavirus disease, when interpreted from (...) the anthropological point of view, present an opportunity for cultural creativity in the areas of medicine and therapeutics. African traditional medicine as a cultural element is, here, referenced.On the other hand, it is discovered that the isolationist tendency of the pandemic, aggravated by another ‘virus of disinformation’ ─ an infodemics, threatens the social relations within the African world that is largely interdependent. The work argues that a fruitful utilization of the good cultural traits the pandemic brings can serve to boost the African self-confidence and cultural pride. The positive cultural traits that trail the pandemic can be absorbed to enrich the African culture whereas the negative traits should be jettisoned. Keywords: COVID-19 pandemic, African identity, equality, anthropology, medicine, and cultural pride. (shrink)

Definition of the problem: Is respect for autonomy in medicine synonymous with respect for autonomous choices? Does it depend on the competency of patients? Arguments: The article criticizes this opinion, which is widely held in the field of medical ethics. This position does not recognize the problem of paternalism in its full import in modern medicine. It misunderstands the moral meaning of autonomy in its primacy over the psychological meaning, as well as the close ties between autonomy and beneficence. These (...) ties are made evident by reflection on basic anthropological conditions of ethics. Conclusion: Proceeding from this reflection I outline consequences for the praxis of non- paternalistic care that also respects the will of non-competent patients. (shrink)

This volume handles in various perspectives the concept of function and the nature of functional explanations, topics much discussed since two major and conflicting accounts have been raised by Larry Wright and Robert Cummins’s papers in the 1970s. Here, both Wright’s ”etiological theory of functions’ and Cummins’s ”systemic’ conception of functions are refined and elaborated in the light of current scientific practice, with papers showing how the ”etiological’ theory faces several objections and may in reply be revisited, while its counterpart (...) became ever more sophisticated, as researchers discovered fresh applications for it. Relying on a firm knowledge of the original positions and debates, this volume presents cutting-edge research evincing the complexities that today pertain in function theory in various sciences. Alongside original papers from authors central to the controversy, work by emerging researchers taking novel perspectives will add to the potential avenues to be followed in the future. Not only does the book adopt no a priori assumptions about the scope of functional explanations, it also incorporates material from several very different scientific domains, e.g. neurosciences, ecology, or technology. In general, functions are implemented in mechanisms; and functional explanations in biology have often an essential relation with natural selection. These two basic claims set the stage for this book’s coverage of investigations concerning both ”functional’ explanations, and the ”metaphysics’ of functions. It casts new light on these claims, by testing them through their confrontation with scientific developments in biology, psychology, and recent developments concerning the metaphysics of realization. Rather than debating a single theory of functions, this book presents the richness of philosophical issues raised by functional discourse throughout the various sciences.​ Content Level » Research Keywords » Causal role theory of functions - Determination of content - Ecosystem selection - Etiological theory of function - Evolutionary biology - Functional explanations - Historical concepts in biology - Larry Wright - Neurosciences - New mechanism - Selected effects functions - Systemic theory of functions - William Wimsatt Related subjects » Anthropology & Archaeology - Epistemology & Philosophy of Science - Evolutionary & Developmental Biology - Neuroscience - Philosophy TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction.- Section I. Biological functions and functional explanations: genes, cells, organisms and ecosystems.- Part 1.A. Functions, organization and development in life sciences.- Chapter 1. William C. Wimsatt. Evolution and the Stability of Functional Architectures.- Chapter 2. Denis M. Walsh. Teleological Emergence: The Autonomy of Evo-Devo.- Chapter 3. Jean Gayon. Does oxygen have a function, or: where should the regress of biological functions stop?.- Part 1.B. Functional pluralism for biologists? Chapter 4. Frédéric Bouchard. How ecosystem evolution strengthens the case for functional pluralism.- Chapter 5. Robert N. Brandon. A general case for functional pluralism.- Chapter 6. Philippe Huneman. Weak realism in the etiological theory of functions.- Section 2. Section II. Psychology, philosophy of mind and technology: Functions in a man’s world.- Part 2.A. 2A. Metaphysics, function and philosophy of mind.- Chapter 7. Carl Craver. Functions and Mechanisms in Contemporary Neuroscience.- Chapter 8. Carl Gillett. Understanding the sciences through the fog of ”functionalism.’.- 2.B. Philosophy of technology, design and functions.- Chapter 9. Fran¸ coise Longy. Artifacts and Organisms: A Case for a New Etiological Theory of Functions.- Chapter 10. Pieter Vermaas and Wybo Houkes. Functions as Epistemic Highlighters: An Engineering Account of Technical, Biological and Other Functions.- Epilogue.- Larry Wright. Revising teleological explanations: reflections three decades on. (shrink)

One of the perennially intriguing questions regarding Kant’s approach to the human sciences is the relation between his ‘transcendental psychology’ and empirical cognitive psychology. In this paper I compare his analysis of the a priori conditions of human cognition in the Critique of pure reason with his empirical account of the human cognitive faculties in his Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view. In comparing his approach to self-consciousness, sensibility, imagination, and understanding in these two works, I argue that (...) Kant distinguishes between the transcendental and empirical aspects of the human cognitive faculties, and regards the transcendental functions as configuring the empirical faculties of human consciousness, or as giving them the structure that they require to become faculties of cognition. I then show that the cognitive faculties of human beings may vary in their empirical operation, even while they are configured by the same transcendental structure. Finally, I characterize Kant’s transcendental psychology in the first Critique as an account of the faculties that are required for a mind to be an agent or subject of cognition, corresponding to his account of the conditions that are required universally and necessarily for something to be an object of cognition.Keywords: Immanuel Kant; Anthropology; Psychology; Cognition; Transcendental; Empirical. (shrink)

The skopos of this new type of church Bible is: ‘How would the source texts of the Bible have sounded in Afrikaans in the context envisaged for its hypothesised first audience?’ Fully acknowledging the complexities of language as a dynamic and complex system embedded in the culture and conceptual world of its speakers, as well as the wide range of frames that are involved in the process of Bible translation as a difficult form of secondary communication, this article addresses two (...) of the challenges of this ambitious project. In the first section the incongruence between the world of the Old Testament and speakers of Afrikaans is treated. Examples are provided of instances where both the nature of difficult secondary intercultural communication as well as the subjective theories of the host audience constrains the ‘directness’ of the translation. In the second section, some of the challenges of distinguishing between the formal and functional features of Biblical Hebrew are dealt with. The article concludes that, although the notion ‘communicative clue’ provides a useful heuristic device to act as point of departure for negotiations on the construal of the meaning of the text in the source language and host language respectively, the notion has to be supplemented by insights from the fields of cultural anthropology, cognitive linguistics and linguistic typology. A better understanding of how meaning ‘works’ provides members of a translation team with some criteria to make informed decisions when they negotiate how the meaning of specific Biblical Hebrew constructions are to be construed ‘directly’ in Afrikaans.Keywords: Afrikaans Bibles; Bible translation; Biblical Hebrew; church Bible; code model; cognitive linguistics; cognitive semantics; communication model; communicative clue; direct translation; discourse marker; dynamic equivalent translation; functionalist tran. (shrink)

John Mbiti, in his attempt to disprove the charge of paganism by EuroAmerican ethnographic and anthropological scholars against African Traditional Religions argues that traditional African religions are monotheistic. He insists that these traditional religious cultures have the same conception of God as found in the Abrahamic religions. The shared characteristics, according to him are foundational to the spread of the “gospel” in Africa. Mbiti’s effort, though motivated by the desire to refute the imperial charge of inferiority against African religions ran, (...) I argue, into a conceptual and descriptive conflation of ATRs with monotheistic faiths. In this paper, I challenge the superimposition of Judeo-Christian categories upon African religions. I argue that monotheism is just a strand, out of many, that expresses belief in God, and that it differs substantially from the polytheistic pre-colonial African understanding of religion. I provide a panentheistic paradigm using traditional Igbo ontology and religion to refute Mbiti’s generalization. Keywords: Monotheism, African Traditional Religion, Igbo, Paganism, Theology. (shrink)

_Riassunto_: Il presente lavoro affronta il delicato tema dell’isolamento digitale e della profonda svolta antropologica scaturita dall’uso delle nuove tecnologie elettroniche. Le nostre relazioni amicali, lavorative e familiari fanno sempre più ricorso alla comunicazione telematica e meno al confronto personale. La conversazione vis-à-vis, che è quella più umanizzante, sta lasciando il posto a quella mediata da computer e smartphone. Tutto questo rischia di provocare un nocivo isolamento digitale, interrompendo ogni forma di dialogo e di introspezione personale. L’isolamento viene spesso abbinato (...) a un utilizzo intenso di Internet e di videogiochi. Le relazioni _online _non possono sostituire completamente quelle che nascono nel mondo reale né, d’altra parte, è pensabile frenare l’avanzata dei contesti virtuali entro i quali siamo immersi consapevolmente e, talvolta, inconsapevolmente. Non si tratta di essere pro o contro la tecnologia. Bisogna solo ritrovare il gusto dell’incontro, della conversazione faccia a faccia, della relazione fisica. Dislocare le nostre relazioni fisiche nel mondo digitale non ha nulla di rischioso. Il pericolo, semmai, è determinato dal contrario. Se la navigazione sul web diventa lo spazio esistenziale in cui vagare liberi e senza meta, con la convinzione che solo lì è possibile ottenere un’immagine vera di sé stessi, il rischio di rimanere prigionieri della propria solitudine potrebbe essere alto. Se, al contrario, le tecnologie sono usate coscientemente, possono portare a riflessioni capaci di esplorare il nostro Io. _Internet _non può eludere il bisogno di avere a che fare con gli altri nel mondo reale, perché solo questo tipo di rapporto fa di noi ciò che siamo realmente. _Parole chiave_: Inclusione digitale; Solitudine; Connessione; Empatia; Salute mentale _A contactless era? From empathic I to digital self_ _Abstract_: This paper addresses the sensitive issue of digital isolation and the profound anthropological shift that has resulted from the use of new electronic technologies. Friendship, work, and family relationships all increasingly rely more on telematic communication and less on personal encounters; face-to-face communication is giving way to modes of communication mediated by computers and smartphones. Does circumventing all forms of dialogue and personal introspection lead to dangerous digital isolation? The risk is real. Only through a balanced use of digital resources can we mitigate the harmful effects of social isolation. _Online _relationships cannot completely replace those that take place in the real world. At the same time, we cannot stop the advance of the virtual contexts within which we are consciously and sometimes unconsciously immersed. It is not a question of being for or against technology. We just need to rediscover our taste for human encounters, face-to-face conversations, and physical relationships. Displacing our physical relationships to the digital world is not in itself risky. The danger, if any, arises from another direction. If web surfing becomes the existential space in which we can roam freely and aimlessly, in the belief that only there is it possible to obtain a true image of oneself, then the risk of remaining a prisoner of one's own lonelinesss rises with devastating consequences at a psychological level. In contrast, technologies are used consciously, they can lead to valuable reflections that help us explore ourselves. The Internet should never circumvent or replace our need to deal with each other in the real world, because it only these kinds of real world relationship that make us who we really are. _Keywords_: Digital inclusion; Loneliness; Connection; Empathy; Mental Health. (shrink)

In order to appreciate the role of the phenomenon of shame in the context of the clinic – both as normal self evaluation and as neurotic response – a philosophical anthropological description of shame is offered. Not only are Biblical metaphors recast, but more recent phenomenological psychological descriptions taken from Max Scheler and others are cited. These necessarily require some account of the patient's body in shame, taken from both his perspective and the physician's. In short, the corporeality of shame (...) is constituted as "ce que enveloppe le corps". Keywords: Shame, Behavior CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

Partiendo, de un lado, de la idea de que la especulación es, para el gnóstico,el espejo en el que se reflejan los misterios divinos, cuyo eco percibe asu vez la razón discursiva , y partiendo, de otro, de la exploración intra-lingilística o gramatosófica emprendida por elgnóstico andalusí Ibn al-’Arabi, ofrecemos al lector una traducción comentadade una breve sección del penúltimo capítulo de Las Revelaciones de LaMeca, su principal obra. Nos centraremos, a tal fin, en las diferentes modulacionesmorfológicas y semánticas de (...) la raíz árabe W-D-D, que da lugar alNombre divino al- Wadñd y que permite una original comprensión de la realidaddel amor, su génesis, sus diferentes estados, su carácter divino y susfunciones creadora, cosmológica y antropológica.Palabras clave: Ibn al-’Arabi, Sufismo, Gnosis, Amor, Nombres DivinosEstablished that to think means for the gnostic to reflect divine mysteries,being their echo percieved by reason , and by exploring, on the other hand, Ibn al-’Arabi’s intralinguistical research, which reveals the traces of an authentic grammatosophy, weoffer here a transiation anda commentaly of a brief section ofthe second lastchapter of Ibn al-’ArabT’s Fuu7hat al-Makkiyya, his main opus. We will studyboth the morphological and semantic modulations of te Arabic root W-D-D,from which becomes the Divine Name al- Wadi2d and that permits an originalcomprehension of love’s reality, its genesis, its different grades, its divine sta-tuts and, finally, its creative, cosmological and anthropological functions.Keywords: Ibn al-’Arabi, Sufism, Gnosis, Love, Divine Names. (shrink)

: In this article we shall deal with the construction and defense of subjective identity as a topic at the intersection of psychology and anthropology. In this perspective, defense mechanisms are seen as falling along a spectrum that stretches from the individual to the collective level. The individual mind is the sphere of the intrapsychic defenses and the interpersonal maneuvers to which each of us appeals, in the relationship with other people and with one’s own environment, to defend one’s (...) own self-describability and, indissolubly, the solidity of one’s own self-conscious being. At a social and collective level, on the other hand, the individual self-protective structures are supported by cultural interventions that organize and intersubjectively “domesticate” our subjectivity and our feeling of being-there. Keywords: Autobiographical Reasoning; Defense Mechanisms; Grief; Narrative Identity; Ontological Insecurity Meccanismi di difesa: dall’individuale al collettivo Riassunto: L’articolo si occupa di costruzione e difesa dell’identità soggettiva come tema all’intersezione di psicologia e antropologia. In questa prospettiva, i meccanismi di difesa si dispongono lungo uno spettro che dal livello individuale conduce a quello collettivo. La mente individuale è la sfera delle difese intrapsichiche e delle manovre interpersonali a cui ognuno di noi fa ricorso, nella relazione con gli altri e col proprio ambiente, per difendere la propria autodescrivibilità e, inscindibilmente, la solidità del proprio essere autocosciente. Al livello sociale e collettivo, invece, le strutture autoprotettive dell’individuo sono sorrette da interventi culturali che organizzano e “addomesticano” intersoggettivamente la nostra soggettività e il nostro sentirci esistere. Parole chiave: Ragionamento autobiografico; Meccanismi di difesa; Cordoglio; Identità narrativa; Insicurezza ontologica. (shrink)

ID: 89 / Parallel 4k: 2 Single paper Topics: Philosophy of mind, Philosophy of science Keywords: Cognitive Science, Cognitive Neuroscience, Mechanistic explanations, Reductionism, Normativity, Generality, Emerging School of Philosophers of Science. The role of philosophy in cognitive science: mechanistic explanations, normativity, generality Mohammadreza Haghighi Fard Leiden University, Netherlands, The; [email protected] Introduction -/- Cognitive science, as an interdisciplinary research endeavour, seeks to explain mental activities such as reasoning, remembering, language use, and problem solving, and the explanations it advances commonly involve (...) descriptions of the mechanisms responsible for these activities. Cognitive mechanisms are distinguished from the mechanisms invoked in other domains of biology by involving the processing of information. Many of the philosophical issues discussed in the context of cognitive science involve the nature of information processing. For philosophy of science, a central question is what counts as a scientific explanation. But what is a mechanistic explanation and how does it work, how can philosophy of science use it as a solution for the problem of integration in cognitive science? By answering these questions and merging my answers with discussion of concepts of philosophy, normativity and generality, I will investigate the following claim. -/- I claim that philosophy by using strength concepts such as normativity, generality, and a mechanistic philosophy of explanations, can be a most important contributor to cognitive science. I also investigate how philosophy of science could be (can be) a bridge between psychology and neuroscience. We need a distinction between philosophy of cognitive science and philosophy in cognitive science; I am talking about the latter. -/- This claim is very important for the integration and the future of the interdisciplinary field known as cognitive science. -/- Philosophy as a true cognitive science -/- When the Cognitive Science Society was founded, in the late 1970s, philosophy, neuroscience, and anthropology were playing smaller roles. The three disciplines that formed the core group were artificial intelligence, psychology, and linguistics. The curious thing is that George Miller, a psychologist and an important founder of cognitive sciences in a hexagon diagram that he presented, put philosophy at the top of the diagram and neuroscience at the very bottom. There is enough agreement now that neuroscience is the most important contributor to cognitive science and there are fair connections between philosophy and neuroscience. In that diagram there was almost no connection between philosophy and neuroscience. -/- The developments and rise of cognitive science in the last half-century has been accompanied by considerable amount of philosophical activity. Perhaps no other area within analytic philosophy in the second half of that period has attracted more attention or produced more publications. (Bechtel and Graham, 1998. Rumelhart and Bly 1999. Bechtel, Mandik, Mundale 2001. Thagard, 2007. Bennett and Dennett et al, 2007. Bennett and Hacker, 2008. Andler, 2009. Frankish and Ramsey, 2012.) -/- Many philosophers of science offer conclusions that have a direct bearing on cognitive science and its practitioners can profit from closer engagement with the rest of cognitive science. For example, William Bechtel has discussed three projects, two in naturalistic philosophy of mind and one in naturalistic philosophy of science that have been pursued during the past 30 years, that he contends, can make theoretical and methodological contributions to cognitive science (Bechtel, 2009). Paul Thagard is another example of the mentioned emerging school of philosophers of science that define cognitive science as the interdisciplinary investigation of mind and intelligence (Thagard, 2006). Thagard by presenting some general but important philosophical questions such as, “What is the nature of the explanations and theories developed in cognitive science?”, and by providing answers to these central questions has showed how philosophy of science can help cognitive science by the advantage of its generality. Andrew Brook, however, believes that philosophical approaches have never had a settled place in cognitive science but he is listed in a group of the philosophers of science that they are contributing very closely the cognitive science (Brook, 2009). Daniel Dennett , as well as being a member the mentioned naturalistic philosophers of science, believes that there is much good work for philosophers to do in cognitive science if they adopt the constructive attitude that prevails in science. -/- What are mechanisms? Let us begin abstractly before considering an example. Mechanisms are collections of entities and activities organized together to do something (cf. Machamer, Darden, & Craver, 2000; Craver & Darden, 2001; Bechtel &Richardson, 1993; Glennan, 1996). These explanations are known as ‘mechanistic explanations’. By using and developing these mechanistic explanations of philosophy of science one can draw normative consequences for cognitive science. Paul Thagard (Thagard, 2006 and 2009), William Bechtel (Bechtel, 2008 and 2009), Andrew Brook (Brook, 2008) investigated and promoted using the ‘normativity’ in philosophy to show a better and crucial role for philosophy of science in an interdisciplinary known as cognitive science. Some philosophers have thought that, in order to pursue this normative function, philosophy must distance itself from empirical matters, but there are examples where the investigations of descriptive and normative issues go hand in hand. ( Thagard, 2009). -/- I will investigate how we can reduce a higher-level science such as psychology to neuroscience without the problems of reductionism but via mechanistic explanations. By problem I mean psychology does not lose its autonomy. -/- Conclusion -/- If cognitive science is all about understanding the human mind, or if cognitive science is the interdisciplinary investigation of mind and intelligence, since the whole life of philosophy was involving with the ways of knowing (epistemology) and conceptions of reality (metaphysics), also philosophy has considered the so-called mind-body problem ( identity theory, functionalism, and heuristic identity theory) , then philosophy could be the most deserved discipline to be a most contributor in cognitive science. I tried to discuss this by using the three advantages in philosophy, normativity, and generality and by introducing an emerging school of mechanistic (not mechanical) philosophers. One thing left, as cognitive science is a two-way street, philosophers need also to stop in a station of cognitive science and learn from the most important advances in brain and neuroscience. Key references : Cognitive Science, Cognitive Neuroscience, Mechanistic explanations, Reductionism, Normativity, Generality, Emerging School of Philosophers of Science. (shrink)

Andrzej Kmiecik Philosophical Aspects of Computer Research Simulation in Social SciencesIn this article I will try to describe four philosophical aspects of the computer simulation of social behavior. These aspects are the following: methodological, concerning mainly agent based systems and cellular automata systems, epistemological, anthropological and ontological. In conclusion we can state that philosophical analyses of human existence are valuable for making models of human behavior. Keywords: cellular automata systems, agent-based systems, social simulation.

Pellegrino's philosophy of medicine is explored in categories such as the motivation in constructing a philosophy of medicine, the method, the starting point of the doctor-patient relationship, negotiation about values in this relationship, the goal of the relationship, the moral basis of medicine, and additional concerns in the relationship (concerns such as gatekeeping, philosophical anthropology, axiology, philosophy of the body, and the general disjunction between science and morals). A critique of this philosophy is presented in the following areas: methodology, (...) relation to ontology and sociology, the dynamic of individual and social concerns, and the new social condition of medicine. Finally, some suggestions for the future revitalization of philosophy of medicine are made based on Pellegrino's ideas. The focus throughout is on the moral basis and moral consequences of the philosophy of medicine, and not on other important themes. Keywords: doctor-patient relationship, goal of medicine, medical ethics, philosophical method, philosophy of medicine, philosophy of the body, values in medicine CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

Author: Moraczewski Krzysztof Title: REFLECTIONS ON THEORETICAL GROUND OF THE HISTORY OF THE CULTURE (Refleksje o teoretycznych podstawach historii kultury) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2011, vol:.12, number: 2011/1, pages: 239-262 Keywords: HISTORY OF THE CULTURE, HISTORY OF MENTALITY, MENTAL REALITY, FERNAND BRAUDEL, JERZY KMITA Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: www:During last 60 years, there was a lot of discussion on the profits that history may gain by applying certain results and (...) theoretical approaches of cultural anthropology and philosophy of culture. Polemists involved were significantly less concerned with the opposite way: the consequences of new models of history for theory of culture. Trying to follow this way I start with classic propositions by Fernand Braudel and his ‘unfaithful’ followers in France, usually connected with the idea of ‘history of mentality’. My main concern is – minding all the theoretical and methodological problems that the term ‘mentality’ have caused and continues to cause – to confront their ideas with concept of culture as a ‘mental reality’, represented by Jerzy Kmita’s social-regulatory conception. The conclusions are not only to substitute the term ‘mentality’ with the theoretical concept of culture (the idea already formulated by Robert Darnton) but firstly to broaden and reformulate some Kmita’s ideas, allowing them to cover the field of research typical for the traditional history of mentality. (shrink)

_Abstract_: Cognitive science is typically defined as the multidisciplinary study of mind, with the disciplines involved usually listed as philosophy, psychology, artificial intelligence, neuroscience, linguistics, and anthropology. Furthermore, these six “core disciplines” are generally regarded as having equal status vis-à-vis cognitive science. In contrast to the latter position, I argue that psychology has a special status here: it is central to cognitive science in a way that none of the other five disciplines is. I support this argument via both (...) theoretical and empirical considerations. _Keywords_: Psychology; Cognitive Science; Interdisciplinarity/Multidisciplinarity _La psicologia è – e dovrebbe essere – al centro della scienza cognitiva_ _Riassunto_: La scienza cognitiva viene definita comunemente come indagine multidisciplinare sulla mente e tra le discipline che vi sono coinvolte vengono solitamente indicate la filosofia, la psicologia, l’intelligenza artificiale, la neuroscienza, la linguistica e l’antropologia. Queste sei “discipline fondamentali” sono generalmente considerate come aventi pari dignità nell’ambito della scienza cognitiva. A dispetto di quest’ultima posizione sosterrò, invece, che alla psicologia vada riconosciuto uno status speciale: la sua importanza per la scienza cognitiva è tale da non poter essere eguagliata da nessuna delle altre cinque discipline. A supporto di questa posizione porterò alcune riflessioni di natura teoretica ed empirica. _Parole chiave_: Psicologia; Scienza cognitiva; Interdisciplinarità/Multidisciplinarità. (shrink)

Roman Godlewski Unjustified Opinions as the Foundation of ActionsThe article concerns the phenomenon of religion. Religious behavior is thought to be an action based on unjustified opinions. Such actions are wrong but there are some exceptions. The exceptional actions are called “superrational,” unjustified opinions they are based on are called “regulative” and facts described in them “superreal.” The author gives a typology of acting in this way. The types go as follows: (1) putting scientific hypotheses, (2) practical pressure, (3) the (...) will of no investigation, (4) the will to regard only some given sources of truth, (5) the will not to know, (6) symbolic or metaphorical behavior (religious included). The latter is described within a wider anthropological and evolutionary context. The author claims that irrationality of religious beliefs in respect to their content does not mean that actions based on them are irrational, but the question is whether a given religious practice fulfills the emotional needs of a particular person. From the evolutionary point of view, it is important to have emotionally stable biological units even if, in order to obtain this, one has to take fiction for reality with reference to facts of little importance for life. Keywords: religion, action, behavior, opinion, belief, justification, rationality, magic, symbol, evolution. (shrink)

Riassunto: In una prospettiva naturalistica, lo studio della religione presenta subito un punto problematico: se essa è così diffusa, tanto da apparire un tratto inscritto nella natura umana, ciò significa che la religione comporta dei vantaggi adattivi o, quantomeno, significa che essa non comporta svantaggi tali da ostacolare la sopravvivenza di chi la pratica. Nel primo caso, si tratta di individuare la possibile funzione della religione, ovvero una qualche utilità che ne giustificherebbe il suo permanere nella storia umana. Alla luce (...) di un modello antropologico che vede l’identità soggettiva segnata da una fragilità ontologica, in questo articolo offriremo una particolare versione della tesi che assegna alla religione, quale byproduct, una funzione positiva, ipotizzando quella che potrebbe essere una sua utilità nella difesa dell’unità dell’autocoscienza. Sarà dunque sulla religione quale insieme di tecniche difensive del self che concentreremo la nostra indagine. Parole chiave : Ernesto De Martino; Naturalismo darwiniano; Meccanismi di difesa; Identità soggettiva; Religione Religion as a Defensive Technique for Subjective Identity: From a naturalistic perspective, the study of religion immediately leads to a problematic point: if religion is so widespread, to the extent that it seems to be a trait inscribed in human nature, then it should have adaptive advantages or, at the very least, it should not have disadvantages that would stand in the way of the survival of those who practice religion. In the former case, we need to understand the function of religion, viz. a utility it confers that may justify its persistence across human history. Against the backdrop of an anthropological model that considers subjectivity identity to be characterized by ontological fragility, this article will offer a special version of the claim that religion, viewed as a byproduct, has a positive function: we will make the hypothesis that it contributes to the defense of the unity of self-consciousness. Thus our focus will be on religion construed as a repertoire of strategies designed to protect the self. Keywords: Ernesto De Martino; Darwinian Naturalism; Defense Mechanisms; Subjective Identity; Religion. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 9.4 (2002) 373-380 [Access article in PDF] Spiritual Experience and Psychopathology:Dichotomy or Interaction? Caroline Brett Keywords: mysticism, psychosis, values, phenomenology, spiritual emergence. THE PURPOSE OF Marzanski and Bratton's paper is to challenge Jackson and Fulford's (1997) treatment of the area of spiritual experience and psychosis, specifically the perspective of discriminating pathological from spiritual experiences on the basis of action enhancement in contrast to action (...) failure. In my opinion, they are partially successful in this aim, and in their analysis they further the discussion of this complex and controversial area in an interesting and potentially fruitful way. What the paper does not offer, or attempt to suggest, is an alternative way of making a distinction, and in the following discussion I intend to explain why I think that, on the one hand, the status of specific experiences is of practical importance, and on the other hand any distinction should not be conceptualized as mutually exclusive. I also hope to clarify those issues which I perceive as being raised by both Jackson and Fulford's and Marzanski and Bratton's papers. The Critique Marzanski and Bratton's first, and in my opinion strongest, point is to argue that "values and actions alone cannot always discriminate between religious experience and psychopathology." They demonstrate convincingly that the fact that an individual positively evaluates a certain anomalous experience and shows enhanced function as a result of it, does not in itself mean that the experience should be viewed as "spiritual." Their second and third points relate to the way spirituality ought to be regarded, suggesting that Jackson and Fulford are in error to identify spirituality with experience, and moreover that any judgment of genuine spiritual content or value requires reference to an individual's personal history, and also some spiritual tradition or authority. I believe that the former point, although certainly relevant to the issue, is in danger of broadening the debate too far from the consideration of particular anomalous experiences: namely, those that are phemenologically similar or identical to psychotic symptomatology. Marzanski and Bratton also mount an objection to the psychologization of spiritual experience by Jackson and Fulford, although I am not convinced that they represent these authors' opinions fairly. Whose Values? Action or Ethics? The first point, the refutation of the thesis that a spiritual experience can be distinguished from [End Page 373] psychopathology on the basis of a positive evaluation and preservation of functionality, succeeds in that it is shown both that (1) experiences accepted as spiritual within major religious traditions may actually be distressing and/or disabling; and (2) anomalous experiences that are both positively evaluated by the experient and action enhancing nevertheless may not have genuine spiritual characteristics. The argument proceeds through the use of counterexamples, and it is indeed a problem for the Jackson and Fulford account that suffering and periods of social withdrawal or distress do appear to be historically, anthropologically, and theologically associated with the spiritual journey. Bratton and Marzanski use, among other examples, the "dark night of the soul" of mystics, raising the very interesting point that a person may have experiences that, at least at the time of experiencing, are profoundly disturbing or even disabling, socially or functionally, and yet those same experiences may in some way set the scene for a profound transformation or spiritual renewal. To my mind this concept can be seen reflected in the "terrible" forms of the Wisdom Goddess in Advaita Vedanta (as expressed in my own paper), and can be related to the concept of "breaking down to break through" espoused by transpersonal psychologists such as Grof and Grof (1992).Therefore, on closer examination, it appears that Jackson and Fulford's notion of preserved functionality may play some role after all, even if it does require supplementation: if the breaking through aspect of the process is necessary to distinguish from simply breaking down, then action enhancement may remain a criterion determining the spiritual value of an experience. However, it will need to be observed in the longer term, and as such can only play a role... (shrink)

Author: Rogucki Krzysztof Title: ANDRZEJ CHMIELECKI’S INTEGRAL ONTOLOGY (Ontologia integralna Andrzeja Chmieleckiego) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2006, vol:.6, number: 2006/1, pages:171-206 Keywords: ANDRZEJ CHMIELECKI, INTEGRAL ONTOLOGY, MATERIALISM, TRANSFORMATIONISM Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail:The article analyses of the Andrzej Chmielecki’s system of integral ontology as a solution to the psychological problem – transformationism. From the standpoint of integral ontology Chmielecki confronts the fundamental problems of the theory of cognition, axiology, philosophy of (...) language, philosophy of mind, and anthropology. Chmielecki’s philosophical reflection is inspired by the concepts of Ch. Peirce, M. Scheler, and N. Hartmann. Chmielecki keeps a distance from some philosophical solutions popular in analytic philosophy; however, he takes full advantage of the accomplishments of modern mathematics. The presentation of Chmielecki’s most important ideas is the objective of the article. (shrink)

Resumo: Paul Ricoeur propõe uma filosofia do símbolo, que se encontra no limiar da inserção da hermenêutica em sua filosofia. Decisiva para esta fase, foi a interpelação de outras disciplinas que se constituíram por meio da análise da linguagem simbólica, entre as quais se encontra a antropologia estrutural de Lévi-Strauss. Dessa forma, definimos os termos mais específicos do diálogo estabelecido entre Paul Ricoeur e Claude Lévi-Strauss sobre a análise da linguagem simbólica do mito. Esta pesquisa nos auxiliou a compreender melhor (...) a fase de abertura da hermenêutica ricoeuriana e suas aproximações e afastamentos com o estruturalismo lévi-straussiano, tão difundido em nosso campo acadêmico. Palavras-chave: Hermenêutica; Estruturalismo; Símbolo. Convergent divergence: the dialogue between Paul Ricoeur and Claude Lévi-Strauss Abstract: Paul Ricoeur proposes a philosophy of the symbol, which is on the threshold of the insertion of hermeneutics in his philosophy. Decisive for this phase, was to put forward the question to other disciplines that played an essential role in the analysis of symbolic language, among which is the structural anthropology of Lévi-Strauss. Thus, the terms - more specific to the dialogue established between Paul Ricoeur and Claude Lévi-Strauss on the analysis of the symbolic language of myth - were defined. Finally, this research provides a better understanding of the opening phase of the Ricoeur’s hermeneutics as well as its alignments and divergences with the structuralism of Lévi-Strauss so widespread in the academic field. Keywords: Hermeneutics; Structuralism; Symbol. Divergencia convergente: el diálogo entre Paul Ricoeur y Claude Lévi-Strauss Resumen: Paul Ricoeur propone una filosofía del símbolo, que se encuentra en el umbral de la inserción de la hermenéutica en su filosofía. Decisivo para esta fase fue la interpelación de otras disciplinas que se constituyeron a partir del análisis del lenguaje simbólico, entre las que se encuentra la antropología estructural de Lévi-Strauss. Definimos así los términos específicos del diálogo establecido entre Paul Ricoeur y Claude Lévi-Strauss sobre el análisis del lenguaje simbólico del mito. Esta investigación nos ayudó a comprender mejor la fase de apertura de la hermenéutica ricoeuriana y sus aproximaciones y alejamientos del estructuralismo lévi-straussiano, tan difundido en nuestro campo académico. Palabras clave: Hermenéutica; Estructuralismo; Símbolo. Data de registro: 04/10/2022 Data de aceite: 01/02/2023. (shrink)

Riassunto: Reificazione presenta notevoli discontinuità rispetto alle precedenti e alle successive trattazioni honnethiane e costituisce un tentativo audace di fondare una teoria sociale normativa su strutture ontologiche e antropologiche. Per salvare la pregnanza di questa prova, cercheremo di conciliare gli aspetti più contraddittori dell’opera, mostrando l’unitarietà di fondo dell’intero percorso honnethiano. Innanzitutto, occorre mettere a fuoco lo statuto del riconoscimento, preso di per se stesso, al fine di comprendere l’unità che si gioca alle spalle delle diverse versioni elaborate da Honneth. (...) Poi, ci concentreremo sul riferimento alla psicoanalisi e alla psicologia evolutiva, cercando di mettere in relazione i concetti di simbiosi e di imitazione neonatale. In terzo luogo, intendiamo illuminare la duplice dimensione del paradigma honnethiano del riconoscimento: da un lato, esso viene caratterizzato normativamente; dall’altro, ha una pretesa più propriamente ontologica e antropogenetica. Infine, occorre ridefinire l’orizzonte sorgivo del conflitto. Parole chiave: Axel Honneth; Riconoscimento; Intersoggettività; Antropogenesi; Teoria Critica Honneth’s Paradigm of Recognition: Interaction, Anthropogenesis, and Normativity: Reification demonstrates a number of discontinuities with Honneth’s earlier and later works and constitutes a bold attempt to ground a social normative theory on ontological and anthropological grounds. In order to respect the importance of this effort, I try to reconcile some of the more incompatible aspects of this work by pointing to the deep unity of the Honnethian path as a whole. First, I focus on the status of recognition itself, in order to reveal the unity of thought behind the different versions proposed by Honneth. Then, I concentrate on his references to psychoanalysis and evolutionary psychology, in an attempt to bring together the ideas of symbiosis and neonatal imitation. Third, I highlight the dual nature of the Honnethian recognition paradigm: on the one hand, it can be characterized as normative; on the other, it makes a truly ontological and anthropogenic claim. Finally, I redefine the source of the conflict between this and Honneth’s other work. Keywords: Axel Honneth; Recognition; Intersubjectivity; Anthropogenesis; Critical Theory. (shrink)

Author: Michalski Rafał Title: IN SEARCH OF PARADISIAC NAMES – PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY AND THE PROBLEM OF ORIGIN OF LANGUAGE (W poszukiwaniu „rajskich imion” – antropologia filozoficzna wobec problemu genezy języka) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2006, vol:.6, number: 2006/1, pages: 101-117 Keywords: WALTER BENJAMIN, HERDER, GEHLEN, ORIGINS LANGUAGE Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: www:The article deals with the problem of origin of an individual, particular speech and its relation to the (...) language of intersubjective communication. Paradisiac names – the term used by Walter Benjamin – are words which release suppresed semantic potentiality originated in the early phase of childhood. The author of the article shows the way J.G. Herder and A. Gehlen make clear this phaenomen in their conceptions of anthropology. (shrink)

"The aim of this paper is to propose some philosophical interpretations of Winnicott’s concept of “the use of an object”. These interpretations will be coming from Heidegger’s fundamental ontology and from Buber’s late philosophical anthropology. We also noticed that Winnicott’s theory of “the use of an object” was already in some way or another present in the Phenomenology of Spirit, in the fourth chapter, where consciousness is treated in terms of desire. Our main thesis is that after the subject (...) encounters the resistance of the external world, its adversity and contrasting feature, the subject recognizes it as something independent and autonomous from the self, so the subject is able therefore to set that being at a distance, enter into relation with it, and finally establish the world qua world. We are going also to draw lines between Winnicott’s perspective and the views of some phenomenological authors such as Eugen Fink, Merleau-Ponty or Marc Richir. Keywords: Hegel, Buber, Winnicott, Heidegger, resistance, distance, relation, object, destructiveness, aggressivity. ". (shrink)

Autora: Susanne Katherina Langer Tradução: Clovis Salgado Gontijo Oliveira Obra: LANGER, Susanne Katherina. The Lord of Creation. Fortune Magazine, v. 30. P. 127-154. 1944. O senhor da Criação Resumo: Neste artigo, publicado pela revista Fortune em 1944, a filósofa estadunidense Susanne K. Langer retoma temas fundamentais de sua obra mais célebre, Filosofia em nova chave, cuja primeira edição data de 1942. Em linguagem acessível destinada a público não especializado, a autora sintetiza sua concepção antropológica, visitando questões como a especificidade de (...) nossa mentalidade; a distinção entre os signos e os símbolos, assim como entre as esferas do real e do possível; a transformação simbólica; a essência da linguagem; a relevância de formas articuladas não discursivas para a expressão e a cognição humanas; a conexão entre a razão e a loucura. Para além de uma mera síntese, Langer relaciona, de modo sagaz e oportuno, tais aspectos ao período de guerra no qual escreveu este artigo, ao observar, como sintoma da crise cultural de então, a perda de referências simbólicas e a substituição dos antigos símbolos (míticos e religiosos) por aquele do nacionalismo. Palavras-chave: Expressão; Signo; Símbolo; Linguagem; Crise da Cultura The Lord of Creation Abstract: The American philosopher Susanne K. Langer reviews, in this article, published by Fortune Magazine in 1944, some fundamental themes of her most renowned work, Philosophy in a New Key, firstly edited in 1942. The author sums up her anthropological conception, through an accessible language intended to a general public, examining topics such as the specific trait of our mentality; the distinction between signs and symbols, as well as between the domains of the real and the possible; symbolic transformation; the essence of language; the importance of non-discursive articulate forms for human expression and cognition; the relationship between reason and lunacy. In addition to that synthesis, Langer relates those aspects, in an insightful and opportune way, to the war period when this article was written, observing, as a symptom of the cultural crisis of that time, the loss of symbolic references and the substitution of the old symbols (mythical and religious) for the one of nationalism. Keywords: Expression; Sign; Symbol; Language; Crisis of Culture El Señor de la Creación Resumen: En este artículo, publicado por la revista Fortune en 1944, la filósofa estadounidense Susanne K. Langer reanuda temas fundamentales de su más célebre obra, Nueva clave de la filosofía, cuya primera edición data de 1942. Por medio de un lenguaje accesible destinado a un público no especializado, la autora sintetiza su concepción antropológica, examinando cuestiones como la especificidad de nuestra mentalidad; la distinción entre los signos y los símbolos, así como entre los campos de lo real y de lo posible; la transformación simbólica; la esencia del lenguaje; el importante rol de las formas articuladas no discursivas para la expresión y la cognición humanas; la conexión entre razón y locura. Más que una mera síntesis, Langer relaciona esos aspectos de modo agudo y oportuno, al período de guerra en el cual escribió este artículo, al observar, como síntoma de la crisis cultural de entonces, la pérdida de referencias simbólicas y la sustitución de los antiguos símbolos (míticos y religiosos) por aquel del nacionalismo. Palabras clave: Expresión; Signo; Símbolo; Lenguaje; Crisis de la Cultura Data de registro: 28/10/2022 Data de aceite: 01/02/2023. (shrink)