In this paper, I analyse the transition from gradualism to punctualism. I try to respond to the following question: Is the transition in question connected with an increase or decrease of falsifiability? My answer to that question is that from the classical Popperian point of view theory of Punctuated Equilibria is a failure because it does not satisfy the Popperian criteria of progress in the development of science. Classical Darwinism and Neodarwinism have failed in that they predict a number of (...) transitional forms in the fossil record that have never been found. The Punctuated Equilibria theory predicts abrupt appearance of new species and a following stasis. But it is hardly any success, as far as explanatory power is concerned, because the theory in question does not predict really any new facts, it may, therefore, be viewed as an ad hoc proposal. Moreover, its claims are, I argue, unfalsifiable to all practical ends and purposes. (shrink)

It is commonly known that the theory of intelligent design is anti-naturalistic. The anti- naturalism of this theory is usually interpreted as a methodological or metaphysical one. In other words, the theory of intelligent design is considered as a kind of creationism (“creationism in a cheap tuxedo”) and is also often named “neo-creationism.” In the paper I am arguing that this qualification is wrong and is implied by assuming an inappropriate sense of the ambiguous term “naturalism”.

Intelligent design theory is accused of being a hidden form of creationism. Evolutionism and creationism are formulated in different epistemic frameworks. The author wants to answer the question whether the accusation mentioned above is right. The theory does not indicate the source of design. It only postulates the possibility of detecting the design in nature. The identification of the designer is not possible with the help of scientific methods. Therefore, intelligent design theory is compatible both with naturalistic and creationist epistemic (...) frameworks. (shrink)

The paper is devoted to the issue of warfare between science and religion. The author describes various positions at this issue, analyzing their faults and merits. He concludes that two most popular ones — of the two books (the Bible, book of Revelation, and the book of Nature), and of complete separated, non-overlapping magisteria (so-called bomb-shelter theology) — are untenable. He proposes a new conception instead of them — the conception of punctuated, or interrupted, discordism — according to which science (...) and religion are predominantly in real conflict which though dangerous is not fatal to both sides of the conflict. It is so because science is ever-changing set of hypothetical claims in comparison to religious claims which are dogmatic and unchangeable. (shrink)

The main thesis of this book - written by a well known epistemologist and philosopher of sciences is rather sceptical. Both parties of the conflict defend a complex set of beliefs, both a priori accept many narrow, but controversial assumptions, both often ignore the primary arguments of the opponent.

The purpose of the present article is to propose a research project which will analyse the issue of theoretization of empirical data which takes place in the process of formulating scientific problems. J. Hintikka’s interrogative model of inquiry will serve us as a starting point for our considerations. First, his proposal of viewing the theory-dependence of facts will be characterized. Then, with reference to the results of K. Jodkowski, three interpretations of theory-laden thesis will be given: a radical, a (...) modest and a weak one. This will render it possible to further develop a critique of certain aspects of Hintikka’s conception. Subsequently, the critique will provide a basis for presenting a new way of viewing theory-dependence of empirical data. Some considerations regarding a possible use of the received conceptual scheme for analyzing certain problems of philosophy of science will close the article. A possibility of analyzing such classical problems as falsification and the use of the principle of auto-determinacy in science will also be offered. Lastly, with reference to A. Grobler’s analyses, a possibility of representing a process of rejecting metaphysical presuppositions in science will be considered. (shrink)