Is it possible to conceptualize universality in a way that does not exclude particularity, difference, and change? In his approach to universality, Merleau-Ponty distinguishes between acquired universality, which is supposedly objective and non-temporal, and the lateral differentiation of universals, which is temporal and changing. My suggestion, in this article, is that he does not assert that there is a specific kind of unchanging universal norm to which all different styles of experience should be anchored; instead, there is a never-finished diversification (...) through which universal dimensions are instituted. However, I will also present a critical examination of the concept of change as it can also mean oppressive transformation. Ultimately, Merleau-Ponty’s political view of colonial situation seems to contradict his concept of open universality. (shrink)

In the “Temporality” chapter of Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty refers to the Kantian notion of “self-affection.” The subject has an affective self-relation through time because the subject is of time. Merleau-Ponty shows that it is crucial that self-affection is not understood as an immediate self-coincidence. According to him, the idea of an immediate self-possession renders self-relation impossible. Instead, temporal self-relation should be understood as a paradox of connection and difference: the contact of the self to itself always also implies distance. (...) The temporal subject is not transparent to itself but has a connection to its past and its future through the temporal thickness of the present. (shrink)