Democratic theorists often distinguish between two views of democratic procedures. ‘Outcomes theorists’ emphasize the instrumental nature of these procedures and argue that they are only valuable because they tend to produce good outcomes. In contrast, ‘proceduralists’ emphasize the intrinsic value of democratic procedures, for instance, on the grounds that they are fair. In this paper. I argue that we should reject pure versions of these two theories in favor of an understanding of the democratic ideal that recognizes a commitment to (...) both intrinsically valuable democratic procedures and democratic outcomes. In instances in which there is a conflict between these two commitments, I suggest they must be balanced. This balancing approach offers a justification of judicial review on the grounds that it potentially limits outcomes that undermine democracy. But judicial review is not justifiable in any instance in which a bad democratic outcome results from democratic procedures. When the loss that would result from overturning a democratic procedure is greater than the gain to democracy that would result from ensuring against an undemocratic outcome; judicial review is not justifiable. Loss or gain to democracy is defined by the negative or positive impact of each action on the core democratic values of equality and autonomy, aspects of the democratic ideal. Even when judicial review is justified, the fact that it overturns intrinsically valuable procedures suggests that such review is never ideal from the standpoint of democracy. (shrink)

At first, despairing of justifying the Court's new-found rights as the products of interpreting the Constitution, many of the Court's supporters bit the bullet and proclaimed the legitimacy of "noninterpretivism." As an approach to justifying purportedly constitutional decisions, however, noninterpretivism's oxymoronic quality made it an easy target for the Court's detractors, who asserted that noninterpretivism was nothing more than rule by a federal judiciary unrestrained by any positive law.

I argue that disputes within constitutional theory about whether recent supreme court decisions exceed the scope of legitimate judicial review and disputes within legal theory about the nature and determinacy of law are best seen and assessed as disputes over the nature of legal interpretation. I criticize the interpretive assumptions on which these disputes generally depend and defend a theory of interpretation which tends to vindicate the determinacy of law even in hard cases and the (...) style of recent court decisions which many critics find troublesome. (shrink)

Americans cannot live with judicial review, but they cannot live without it. There is something characteristically American about turning the most divisive political questions - like freedom of religion, same-sex marriage, affirmative action and abortion - into legal questions with the hope that courts can answer them. In Judicial Review in an Age of Moral Pluralism Ronald C. Den Otter addresses how judicial review can be improved to strike the appropriate balance between legislative and (...) judicial power under conditions of moral pluralism. His defense of judicial review is predicated on the imperative of ensuring that the reasons that the state offers on behalf of its most important laws are consistent with the freedom and equality of all persons. Den Otter ties this defense to a theory of constitutional adjudication based on John Rawls's idea of public reason and argues that a law that is not sufficiently publicly justified is unconstitutional, thus addressing when courts should invalidate laws and when they should uphold them even in the midst of reasonable disagreement about the correct outcome in particular constitutional controversies. (shrink)

How should courts interpret the law? While all agree that courts must be objective, people differ sharply over what this demands in practice: fidelity to the text? To the will of the people? To certain moral ideals? In Judicial Review in an Objective Legal System, Tara Smith breaks through the false dichotomies inherent in dominant theories - various forms of originalism, living constitutionalism, and minimalism - to present a new approach to judicial review. She contends that (...) we cannot assess judicial review in isolation from the larger enterprise of which it is a part. By providing careful clarification of both the function of the legal system as well as of objectivity itself, she produces a compelling, firmly grounded account of genuinely objective judicial review. Smith's innovative approach marks a welcome advance for anyone interested in legal objectivity and individual rights. (shrink)

This paper argues that, according to a specific conception of the ideals of constitutional democracy - deliberative democratic constitutionalism - the proper function of constitutional review is to ensure that constitutional procedures are protected and followed in the ordinary democratic production of law, since the ultimate warrant for the legitimacy of democratic decisions can only be that they have been produced according to procedures that warrant the expectation of increased rationality and reasonability. It also contends that three desiderata for (...) the institutionalization of the function of constitutional review follow from this conception: structural independence, democratic sensitivity and the maintenance of legal integrity. Finally, evaluating three broadly different ways of institutionalizing constitutional review - solely in appellate courts, in deliberative constitutional juries of ordinary citizens and in a combined system of constitutional courts and civic constitutional amendment fora - it argues that the third arrangement would perform best at collectively fulfilling the sometimes antithetical desiderata. (shrink)

The general assumption that underlines Richard Posner’s argument in his book Not a Suicide Pact is that decisions concerning rights and security in the context of modern terrorism should be made by balancing competing interests. This assumption is obviously correct if one refers to the most rudimentary sense of balancing, namely, the idea that normative decisions should be made in light of the importance of the relevant values and considerations. However, Posner advocates a more specific conception of balancing, both substantively (...) and institutionally. Substantiality, he argues for balancing based on a consequential moral theory that rejects the ideas of deontological rights and particularly absolute or very weighty deontological rights. More specifically, it seems that Posner assumes a utilitarian theory that also rejects intrinsic concern for distributive justice. Institutionally, Posner argues that this method of reasoning should be adopted by judges when interpreting the constitution. These substantive and institutional background assumptions are of course controversial, but I do not dispute them in this Article. My critique concerns Posner’s conclusions based on these assumptions. Posner’s main claim is that given the magnitude of the danger of modern terrorism, even a small probability that an act of terror may occur justifies extreme anti-terror measures. While the general idea that even a slight risk of very serious harm justifies significant cost is plausible, I doubt Posner’s assumptions regarding the cost of various means of preventing these dangers, his claim that judicial review in this context should be very limited, and his suggestion of an absolute formal prohibition that is not strictly enforced in the context of measures such as interrogational torture. (shrink)

In this study, W. J. Waluchow argues that debates between defenders and critics of constitutional bills of rights presuppose that constitutions are more or less rigid entities. Within such a conception, constitutions aspire to establish stable, fixed points of agreement and pre-commitment, which defenders consider to be possible and desirable, while critics deem impossible and undesirable. Drawing on reflections about the nature of law, constitutions, the common law, and what it is to be a democratic representative, Waluchow urges a different (...) theory of bills of rights that is flexible and adaptable. Adopting such a theory enables one not only to answer to critics' most serious challenges, but also to appreciate the role that a bill of rights, interpreted and enforced by unelected judges, can sensibly play in a constitutional democracy. (shrink)

This essay defends judicial review on procedural grounds by showing that it is an integral part of American democracy. Critics who object to judicial review using counter-majoritarian and epistemic arguments raise important concerns that should shape our understanding of the Supreme Court. Nevertheless, critics often fail to account for the formal and informal mechanisms that overcome these difficulties. Critics also fail to show that other branches of government could use the power of Constitutional interpretation more responsibly. (...) By defending judicial review in the American context, this essay demonstrates that judicial review is not inherently undemocratic. (shrink)

Jeremy Waldron is well known for his disdain of U.S. jurisprudential doc- trine that allows courts to invalidate democratically enacted legislation on the ground it violates certain fundamental constitutional (and quasi-moral) rights. He believes that where disagreement on the relevant substantive is- sues is widespread among citizens and officials alike, it is illegitimate for judges to impose their views on the majority by invalidating a piece of enacted law. Even if we assume, plausibly enough, there are objective moral constraints on (...) what restrictions on behavior may be enacted into law, judges have no privileged access to the objective truth and must, like everyone else, rely on their own subjective intuitions and views. Given that judges are hence no more likely than citizens or legislators to reach the correct decision about what morality requires, these disagreements should be democratically resolved. As he puts it, if disagreement about rights is to be sorted out by counting heads, it should be the heads of citizens who have ultimate sovereignty in a democracy, rather than those of unelected judges, that ought to count.In this essay, I consider Wilfrid Waluchow’s response to Waldron’s argument in his outstanding new book, A Common Law Theory of Judicial Re- view, in which he attempts to provide the practice of judicial review with something akin to the foundation that justifies allowing judges authority over the development of the common law. I will begin with a short explication of Waldron’s argument and then consider Waluchow’s objections to Waldron, as well as Waluchow’s living-tree conception of a common-law constitution with content that evolves through a common law approach to reasoning in constitutional disputes.Resumen:A Jeremy Waldron se le conoce por el desprecio que ha manifestado con relación a la doctrina constitucional estadounidense que permite a los tribunales invalidar legislación que ha sido promulgada de manera democrática, dado que según Waldron lo anterior constituye una violación a ciertos derechos constitucionales (y cuasi-morales). Él piensa que si existe un desacuerdo importante entre los ciudadanos y oficiales del derecho en relación con cierto tema sustantivo, es ilegítimo que los jueces impongan sus puntos de vista sobre los de la mayoría de la población al invalidar una ley promulgada. Incluso si suponemos, de manera lo suficientemente plausible, que existen limitantes morales objetivas sobre las restricciones que el derecho puede contemplar en relación con el comportamiento de los ciudadanos, los jueces no gozan de un privilegio especial con el que puedan acceder a estas verdades objetivas y deben, como todos los demás, basarse en sus propios puntos de vista e intuiciones subjetivas. Entonces, dado que los jueces al igual que los ciudadanos y legisladores no pueden llegar a mejores y correctas decisiones en relación con lo que exige la moralidad, estos desacuerdos se deben decidir de manera democrática. Como sostiene Waldron, si los desacuerdos sobre los derechos se deben decidir con un recuento de manos, deben ser las manos de los ciudadanos, los cuales tienen la soberanía última en una democracia, no así los jueces que no son electos.En este artículo, el autor analiza la respuesta de Wilfrid Waluchow a los argumentos de Waldron, los cuales se encuentran plasmados en el nuevo e interesante libro: A Common Law Theory of Judicial Review, donde Waluchow intenta justificar la práctica del judicial review a través de algo parecido a la justificación que otorga a los jueces autoridad para desarrollar el common law. El autor inicia con una breve explicación del argumento de Waldron y continúa con las objeciones de Waluchow a Waldron, entre las cuales destaca la concepción de Waluchow de la Constitución como árbol viviente. (shrink)

Constitutional Charters or Bill of Rights have been applauded because of the protection they provide to minorities and also in ensuring and protecting fundamental rights, however, Charters have been criticized for being considered morally and politically objectionable. The author responds to Charter critics most serious objections and offers some reasons for adopting an alternative framework.

In this article the author aims to assess Wilfrid J. Waluchow’s more recent book, by depicting its main aim, namely to provide a better understanding of judicial review in a constitutional democracy via the “living tree” metaphor; by disapproving an unwarranted claim, purposely to reduce the metaphor to the common law (bottom-up) methodology; and by re-developing his alternative, specifically to identify the community’s constitutional political morality, with a friendly amendment, which is already explicit —or at least somehow implicit— (...) on it, i.e. not only by judges but also by legislators, including framers, amenders or reformers, and other legal officials, including lawyers and citizens, which at the end will grant him the point.Resumen:En este artículo el autor intenta evaluar el libro más reciente de Wilfrid J. Waluchow, al caracterizar su objetivo principal, a saber: proporcionar una mejor explicación del control judicial de la constitucionalidad en una democracia constitucional mediante la metáfora del “árbol viviente”; al cuestionar un argumento, precisamente el que reduce dicha metáfora a la metodología (de abajo hacia arriba) del common law; y, al re-desarrollar una alternativa, específicamente al identificar la moralidad política constitucional de la comunidad, a partir de una enmienda amigable, misma que ya está explícita —o hasta cierto punto implícita— en ella, i. e. no sólo por los juzgadores sino también por los legisladores, incluidos los constituyentes originarios y revisores o reformadores, y otros operadores jurídicos, incluidos abogados y ciudadanos, lo cual al final de cuentas le dará el punto. (shrink)

Judicial review of statutes on constitutional grounds is affected by a cluster of doctrinal practices that are generally accepted, but not very well explained, by the courts and not entirely consistent with each other. Courts usually judge statutes rather than as written; 1 they favor of valid applications of statutes from invalid or possibly invalid applications when possible; 2 and they interpret statutes in ways that avoid constitutional difficulty. 3 These overlapping practices presumably are intended to preserve legislation, (...) and hence are associated with a modest conception of the role of courts in government. Yet they are not always modest in operation. 4. (shrink)

Common Law Theory of Judicial Review: The Living Tree, Wil Waluchow neatly sidesteps the critique of judicial review based on the con- tention that constitutional rights are unacceptably indeterminate by arguing that it is this very indeterminacy that makes a common law method of legal interpretation appropriate. However, his contention that judges are able to ‘discover’ the underlying ‘authentic’ moral views of citizens is insufficiently grounded to meet the objection that common law reasoning utilising such (...) unspecific material will result in controversial decisions that reflect the val- ues and experience of an unrepresentative social and professional elite. He also ignores the important fact that electoral democracy is partly about the protection of vulnerable majorities against powerful minorities. However, Waluchow’s approach could be rendered more acceptable where there is the practical possibility of effective legislative on law style decision-making in the arena of human rights.Resumen:En su libro A Common Law Theory of Judicial Review: The Living Tree, Wil Waluchow de manera elegante y sutil evita la crítica al judicial review con el argumento de que los derechos constitucionales son irremediablemen te indeterminados y sostiene que precisamente por este aspecto de inde terminación un método basado en el common law es adecuado para la in terpretación de los derechos. Sin embargo, su postura de que los jueces son capaces de “descubrir” las perspectivas morales “auténticas” de los ciudadanos no está bien fundamentada como para hacer frente a la crítica de que el método del common law, al utilizar dicho material poco específico, da como resultado decisiones controvertidas que reflejan los valores y experiencia de una elite profesional y social no representativa. También el argumento de Waluchow ignora que la democracia electoral tiene como objetivo proteger a mayorías vulnerables de poderosas minorías. No obstante lo anterior, la tesis de Waluchow puede ser más viable donde exista la posibilidad práctica de una revisión efectiva de las leyes a través de las decisiones propias del método del common law en el ámbito de los derechos humanos. (shrink)

Four questions dominate normative contemporary constitutional theory: What is the purpose of a constitution? What makes a constitution legitimate? What kinds of arguments are legitimate within the process of constitutional interpretation? What can make judicial review of legislation legitimate in principle? The main purpose of this text is to provide one general answer to the last question. The secondary purpose is to show how this answer may bear upon our understanding of the fundamental basis of constitutional law. (...) These two purposes should suggest particular answers to the first three questions. (shrink)

Constitutional Charters or Bill of Rights have been applauded because of the protection they provide to minorities and also in ensuring and protecting fundamental rights, however, Charters have been criticized for being considered morally and politically objectionable. The author responds to Charter critics most serious objections and offers some reasons for adopting an alternative framework.Resumen:Las cartas constitucionales o declaraciones de derechos han sido aplaudidas por la protección que brindan a las minorías y su función de asegurar derechos fundamentales; sin embargo, (...) también han sido criticadas por ser consideradas moral y políticamente refutables. El autor responde a las objeciones más serias de los críticos y ofrece algunas razones para adoptar un marco alternativo, de acuerdo al cual, las cartas no aspiran a establecer puntos de acuerdo y compromisos previos. (shrink)

In this book, Christopher F. Zurn shows why a normative theory of deliberative democratic constitutionalism yields the best understanding of the legitimacy of constitutional review. He further argues that this function should be institutionalized in a complex, multi-location structure including not only independent constitutional courts but also legislative and executive self-review that would enable interbranch constitutional dialogue and constitutional amendment through deliberative civic constitutional forums. Drawing on sustained critical analyses of diverse pluralist and deliberative democratic arguments concerning (...) the legitimacy of judicial review, Zurn concludes that constitutional review is necessary to ensure the procedural requirements for legitimate democratic self-rule through deliberative cooperation. Claiming that pure normative theory is not sufficient to settle issues of institutional design, Zurn draws on empirical and comparative research to propose reformed institutions of constitutional review that encourage the development of fundamental law as an ongoing project of democratic deliberation and decision. (shrink)

The lively debate over the constitutional foundations of judicial review has been marred by a formalism which obscures its point and value.ed from genuine issues of substance, the rival positions offer inadequate accounts of the legitimacy of judicial review; constitutional theory must regain its connection with questions of political principle and moral value. Although the critics of ultra vires have rightly emphasized the foundational role of the common law, they have misconceived its nature and implications. (...) On the one hand, they have invited the charge of judicial supremacism by marginalizing the role of legislative intent; on the other, their affirmation of absolute parliamentary sovereignty (within the context of this debate) undermines the critique of ultra vires. In substance, therefore, the rival camps occupy essentially the same ground, equally trapped by a formalism that entrenches a stark confrontation between parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law. A conception of shared sovereignty, or interdependent sovereignties, provides a better foundation for judicial review. (shrink)

This article challenges Jeremy Waldron's arguments in favour of participatory majoritarianism, and against constitutional judicial review. First, I consider and critique Waldron's arguments against instrumentalist justifications of political authority. My central claim is that although the right to democratic participation is intrinsically valuable, it does not displace the central importance of the `instrumental condition of good government': political decision-making mechanisms should be chosen (primarily) on the basis of their conduciveness to good results. I then turn to an examination (...) of Waldron's claim that individuals are entitled to participate in decisions which affect their lives. Furthermore, I respond to his claim that justifications of constitutional judicial review rely on an objectionable distrust of democratic politics, and is inconsistent with a view of the person as a morally responsible, autonomous agent. Finally, I seek to show that judicial review can itself become a valuable channel of political participation, especially for those who are marginalized and disempowered in the normal political process. (shrink)

This paper investigates the accusation that judicial review is undemocratic. It argues that the alleged tension between judicial review and democracy fails to account for the fact that the content of rights and their scope depends on societal convictions and moral judgments of the public. Such dependence suggests that rights-based judicial review can be described as an alternative form of democratic participation.

Comparative scholarship on judicial review has paid a lot of attention to the causal impact of politics on judicial decision-making. However, the slower-moving, macro-social process through which judicial review influences societal conceptions of the law/politics relation is less well understood. Drawing on the political science literature on institutional change, The Politico-Legal Dynamics of Judicial Review tests a typological theory of the evolution of judicial review regimes - complexes of legitimating ideas (...) about the law/politics relation. The theory posits that such regimes tend to conform to one of four main types - democratic or authoritarian legalism, or democratic or authoritarian instrumentalism. Through case studies of Australia, India, and Zimbabwe and a comparative chapter analyzing ten additional societies, the book then explores how actually-existing judicial review regimes transition between these types. This process of ideational development, Roux concludes, is distinct both from the everyday business of constitutional politics and changes to the formal constitution. (shrink)

The argument I defend in this paper takes for granted that the proceduralist indictment against judicial review is at least partly justifiable, and that a complete theory of democratic legitimacy will therefore attempt to address it to the greatest possible degree. I examine how the indictment can be addressed via the practice of nonparty participation, whereby members of the general public may seek participatory involvement in a court proceeding despite not being directly implicated by the dispute at (...) issue. Through this practice, courts acquire a means to expose themselves to a cross-section of societal influences, which in turn can be said to improve the legitimacy of the decisions they render from a procedural perspective. Importantly, however, such legitimacy will not be transmitted spontaneously, as if the mere fact that courts allow nonparties to participate is all that is needed to address the proceduralist's concern. The crux of my argument is that only when the practice is conceived in a particular way, and is subjected to the appropriate conditions, does it have a genuine chance of realizing its legitimating promise. (shrink)

In a world that is inherently indeterminate, a suitable theory of distributive justice must perhaps itself be indeterminate, and its indeterminacies must accommodate those of the world where relevant.Russell Hardin, Indeterminacy and Society.

As its title suggests, this is a book about constitutional interpretation. More specifically it is an articulation and defense of that particular method of constitutional interpretation, known as originalism, which looks to the original intent of the constitution’s framers as a benchmark against which interpretation is to be made. Professor Whittington believes “that originalism is the method most consistent with the judicial effort to interpret the written constitutional text and that an originalist jurisprudence facilitates the realization of a political (...) system grounded on popular sovereignty”. I think it is fair to say that in the current legal, political, and philosophical climate, originalist theories are pretty much on the defensive, which makes Whittington’s book all the more timely and valuable. (shrink)

Review of Frederic R. Kellogg, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., _Legal Theory And Judicial Restraint_ (Cambridge University Press 2007).

Judicial process is an integral part of legal systems. The process rests primarily on established principles of constitutional governance and responsibility. In the last ten years, the dynamism within judicial institutions and the judicial process has gained considerable attention. The dynamism is often viewed in light of the diversity of claims being addressed, the openness of courts to foreign material, and the use of non-legal studies and findings in court proceedings. How one views the judicial process (...) in the traditional sense, and in the light of the new experiences is an important question today. Also, what new theories explain this public sphere of activity? -/- In this regard, Dr. Pathak’s book "Judicial Process" is a noteworthy contribution. The book explores the complex nature of the judicial process, along with its wider constitutional, political, and social relevance. The book builds on an understanding that the judicial process, the courts, and the judges are central to constitutional governance. With that backdrop, it engages with four aspects of the judicial process, including (1) the nature of the judicial process, (2) the engagements and interactions within the judiciary, (3) the engagements and interactions between the courts and other institutions, and (4) the protection of rights and redressal of violations function performed by courts. -/- The book includes a detailed discussion on key concepts, practices, tests, and principles. The following chapters and discussions are particularly interesting. Chapter one involves a jurisprudential take on the subject while referring to the works of Blackstone, Holmes, and Cardozo. Particularly relevant in chapter one are Indian cases that have cited Cardozo while determining important judicial matters. Further, the chapter includes foreign case law which has been cited by the Indian courts to discuss the nature of the judicial process. Chapter three on Judicial Review discusses the scope of judicial review in India and its centralizing force in constitutional governance. The author carefully explores the expansion in a judicial capacity for review. The chapter highlights the dynamism attached to the practice of judicial review, moving from the review of constitutional amendments, to that of laws, administrative actions, and policy. Further, the chapter includes a discussion on the basic structure of the Indian Constitution. Chapter four on Law of Precedent includes a discussion on stare decisis, which the author refers to as a principle conferring legitimacy and stability to the judicial system. Recent scholarship on the nature of obiter dicta of higher courts and persuasive quality of foreign case law in domestic cases has been cited. Chapter five covers the Independence of the Judiciary debates in India. It discusses the issue of post-retirement appointments of judges and recusal from judicial matters. Chapter eight Judicial Activism traces the development of the concept from its early days to the present times. The chapter adopts the five core meanings offered by Keenan Kmiec to substantiate the old and the new avatars of judicial activism. The chapter discusses the role of social action litigation in India and its hand in defining the judiciary as a protector of rights and constitutional values. -/- The book provides sufficient guidance to study the nature of the judicial process. It also makes one curious about the changing nature of the judicial process and the new waves of constitutional ethics and governance. The following are some of the themes not attended to in the book. First, the judgments of the courts. The written judgments constitute an integral part of the judicial process. The judgments constitute public law reaching out to beneficiaries including litigants, people at large, as well as foreign institutions and courts. That being said, a discussion on judgements and the written or unwritten standards governing the same needs attention. Also included in this point is the role of dissenting judgments. How should one view or study dissent in judgments of constitutional significance? A normative framework to study the same is much needed. Second, the tools and indicators to measure judicial impact. The judicial impact can include (a) the impact of judicial decisions on the law, policy, and society (b) the impact of law/legislation on the judicial process, and (c) the impact of technological and scientific advancements on the judicial process. Tools like judicial impact assessment have been widely argued to be important to the working of the courts. Further, parameters to study compliance, policy integration, and the impact of judicial decisions on other state institutions have gained attention. (shrink)

Many scholars believe that it is procedurally undemocratic for the judiciary to have an active role in shaping the law. These scholars believe either that such practices as judicial review and creative statutory interpretation are unjustified, or that they are justified only because they improve the law substantively. This Article argues instead that the judiciary can play an important procedurally democratic role in the development of the law. Majority rule by legislatures is not the only defining feature of (...) democracy; rather, a government is democratic to the extent to which it provides egalitarian forms of political participation. One such form of participation can be the opportunity to influence the law through the courts, either directly by participating in a case or indirectly by advocating litigation. Arguing from several examples, this Article shows that judicial decision-making allows different voices to be heard that may not necessarily have influence or power in majoritarian legislative structures or popular initiatives. Giving citizens the opportunity to change, to preserve, and to obtain authoritative clarification of the law through the courts can thus make a government procedurally more democratic. (shrink)

This review essay examines the contribution of Legislated Rights (Webber et al, Cambridge 2018) to a central issue in constitutional theory: namely, how the institutional division of labour between the legislature and the judiciary with respect to the task of giving effect to constitutional rights is best understood and conceived. In doing so, the essay situates the work within contemporary scholarship and adopts a broadly comparative lens — a perspective that is mindful of key developments in constitutional law (...) and theory over the past several decades. Ultimately, it is suggested that a critical weakness of the capacity of Legislated Rights to contribute to contemporary debates about judicial review is its lack of engagement with these developments. As a result, the work’s intervention largely misses its mark. It speaks to an outdated view that does not reflect contemporary constitutional practice or scholarship. (shrink)