I present two problems: the logical problem of the Trinity and the metaphysical problem of Incarnation. I propose a solution to both problems: a Neo-Lockean theory of the Trinity and Incarnation, which applies a Neo-Lockean theory of personal identity to the doctrines of the Trinity and Incarnation.

Relative-identity theories of the Trinity and Incarnation are worth another look. But not all such theories are the same. One important difference among them concerns restricted quantification. Peter Geach proposes two theses: the sortal relativity of identity and the irreducibility of restricted quantification. Every relative-identity theory of the Trinity and Incarnation applies Geach’s first thesis. But only what I call “the Geachian theory” applies both theses. I argue that any such Geachian theory faces significant theoretical disadvantages. Towards the end, I (...) propose a closely related but non-Geachian relative-identity theory that doesn’t share those theoretical disadvantages. (shrink)

The Doctrine of the Trinity says that there is one God, that there are three divine Persons, and that each divine Person is God. The Logical Problem of the Trinity is that these claims seem logically inconsistent. We argue that any coherent and orthodox solution to the Logical Problem must use the technique of paraphrase: a logically or metaphysically more perspicuous reformulation. If so, discussions of paraphrase deserve more prominence in the literature on the Doctrine of the Trinity. We also (...) show that such explicit discussion has important implications for theorizing about the Trinity. (shrink)

The paper presents, motivates, critiques, and proposes revisions to Baker’s Constitution View, which includes her definitions of constitution, derivative features, and numerical sameness. The paper argues that Baker should add a mereological clause to her definition of constitution in order to avoid various counterexamples.

The paper presents, motivates, critiques, and proposes revisions to Baker’s Constitution View, which includes her definitions of constitution, derivative features, and numerical sameness. The paper argues that Baker should add a mereological clause to her definition of constitution in order to avoid various counterexamples.

I defend Christian classical theism’s view that God is aspatial in the strict sense but omnipresent only in a loose sense. I consider ten different proposals according to which God is strictly omnipresent and reject them all. I then present two arguments for the claim that God is strictly aspatial. Finally, I argue that, given God creates and sustains all else, God is loosely omnipresent.