This article examines Plato's claim that the founders of the ideal city ought to establish a law compelling the philosophers to rule. This claim is perplexing as it seems to suggest that in the ideal city justice is not in the best interests of its possessor, for by obeying the law and ruling the philosopher will in turn be made very unhappy. Following a critical appraisal and ultimate rejection of a number of different attempts to make sense of this tension, (...) this article advances a 'communitarian' interpretation. According to this interpretation, the existence of a law compelling the philosopher to rule is ultimately in her best interest because her ruling will lead to a well-educated and intellectually virtuous community. The existence of this virtuous community will, in turn, allow the philosopher better to achieve her principal goal -- the attainment and preservation of truth. (shrink)

This article examines Plato’s claim that the founders of the ideal city ought to establish a law compelling the philosophers to rule. This claim is perplexing as it seems to suggest that in the ideal city justice is not in the best interests of its possessor, for by obeying the law and ruling the philosopher will in turn be made very unhappy. Following a critical appraisal and ultimate rejection of a number of different attempts to make sense of this tension, (...) this article advances a ‘communitarian’ interpretation. According to this interpretation, the existence of a law compelling the philosopher to rule is ultimately in her best interest because her ruling will lead to a well-educated and intellectually virtuous community. The existence of this virtuous community will, in turn, allow the philosopher better to achieve her principal goal—the attainment and preservation of truth. (shrink)

Charles Taylor identifies a close connection between morality and politics, noting that much confusion arises from poorly understood, and sometimes clearly mistaken, moral ontologies. Together with fellow communitarians and civic-republicans, Taylor argues that the rights-based judicial review of legislation rests upon a fundamentally mistaken Rawlsian/Kantian moral ontology. While accepting Taylor’s critique of Rawls’ moral ontology and its questionable ability to defend judicial review, I develop an alternative reading of judicial review relying on insightful new work by Wilfrid Waluchow. I conclude (...) that if we accept Waluchow’s common- law conception of the judicial review, there is good reason for Taylor to reject some of his deprecating comments about judicial review. I further suggest that a common-law conception of the judicial review may be amicable to the larger Communitarian and Civic-republican project. (shrink)